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Abstract 
This study considers the relation between irony and otherness. Chapter 2 shows that 
there is little agreement on the politics of irony in critical discussions. Nevertheless, 
irony and otherness do appear to be linked in many of these discussions. Chapter 3 
offers a consideration of Emmanuel Levinas' s conception of ethics in terms of his 
understanding of the other as face and trace. The tendency of language to foreclose 
on otherness by reducing it must be interrupted, while otherness must, nonetheless, be 
Said. The chapter concludes with an attempt to relate Levinas's conception of 
otherness - as the interruption of conceptualising otherness - to Paul de Man's 
conception of irony as permanent parabasis in terms of the tropes of prosopopoeia and 
catachresis. Any representation of the other must be interrupted continually as it is a 
prosopopoeia of otherness (in that it gives otherness a face) and therefore a catachresis 
(for the other has no face and must be given one). The task with which the (reading) 
self is faced is ironic in that it consists at once of positing and interrupting the face 
given to the other. Chapters 4, 5 and 6 are attempts at reading the interplay of irony 
and otherness in selected recent South African fiction. Van Heerden's Kikoejoe, as an 
allegory of the refusal to narrativise otherness, is read as being caught in the double 
bind of irony; Matlou's Life at Home is read as a text intimating an otherness at the 
heart of domesticity and within the reader; and, finally, Coetzee's Age of Iron is read 
as a text in which confession is the nexus of the relation between irony and otherness. 
This study brackets the political in order to examine the relationship between 
irony and otherness from the vantage point of Levinas' s 'conception' of the other. 
The task remains to consider whether it is possible to approach irony ethically, or 
ethics ironically, and to consider the political ramifications of the relation between 
irony and otherness postulated in this study. 
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Chapter 1 
Introduction 
A huge amount has been written on irony, and the need for yet another study of it 
might seem questionable. Yet, despite the volume of material on irony, no entirely 
satisfactory definition of irony seems to exist (cf de Man 1996). Indeed, the very 
volume of writing on irony seems to imply that irony does not allow for exhaustive 
definitions. This would suggest that irony evinces a certain refractoriness to 
definition, which in tum suggests that irony may be resistant to conceptualisation. 
Taking this basic assumption as its point of departure, the present study 
considers the relation between irony and otherness. In terms of the work of 
Emmanuel Levinas, the other exceeds any determination made of it. No 
conceptualisation of otherness is, in principle, adequate. In fact, any such 
conceptualisation would reduce otherness. For this reason conceptualisations of 
otherness must be recognised as being inadequate to the other: conceptualisations of 
otherness are not 'natural' but linguistic. The confrontation with otherness entails at 
once a confrontation that is immediate and mediated. It is immediate because the 
other exceeds any mediating conceptualisation, yet it is mediated because it takes 
place in language. This would mean that any conceptualisation of otherness -
including Levinas's- has to be recognised as not giving access to the other an sich, 
but as being a representation of otherness. Yet the other, in Levinas's conception, 
cannot be represented. Levinas's project is thus caught, inevitably, in an ironic 
double bind. It is my postulate that irony allows us not to misrecognise the 
(reductive) representation of the other for the other. Irony interrupts the 
representation of the other and draws attention to its representational status. 
An immediate problem with regard to examining the relation between irony 
and otherness, concerns the kind of language to be used in the study. By this I mean 
the difficulty (also faced by Levinas) of writing about the beyond of being in the 
language of being. As Heidegger points out in Being and Time, "ancient ontology" 
understands being as presence: 
The outward evidence of this - but of course only outward - is the 
determination of the meaning of being as parousia or ousia, which 
ontologically and temporally means 'presence' ['Anwesenheit']. Beings are 
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grasped in their being as 'presence'; that is to say, they are understood with 
regard to a definite mode oftime, the present. 
(1996: 22) 
This relation between the Greek terms ousia (being) and parousia (presence) makes 
clear that, to ancient ontology, the understanding of beings "has the temporal structure 
of a pure 'making present' of something .... [Genuine] beings ... are conceived as 
presence (ousia)" (1996: 22-23). How is this language of presence to be escaped? As 
Levinas puts it, "As a speech directed upon the present, philosophy is an 
understanding of being, or an ontology, or a phenomenology" (1996c: 66). 
It is one of the hypotheses of this study that the approach by the other, in 
language, and the consequent putting in question of the same and the self by the other 
in her or his proximity to that self, introduces into the language of presence as the 
thematisation and comprehension of beings in their being, an otherness which may be 
read, if not understood, as the staging of infinity through irony. The methodological 
question of transcending the language of presence is crucial within the context of this 
study: its title may, for example, by virtue of using the word 'otherness', be 
understood to imply that there is an essence of the other, or even an essential other. 
'Otherness' would then be that essential quality which makes the other other, which, 
as it were, defines the being of the other, which would 'make present' the other to me. 
Clearly, such a conception of otherness would amount to reducing the other to a 
concept. It would be to circumscribe and comprehend the other, to place the other at 
the mercy of a self who would thus contain the other and destroy the otherness of the 
other, or even kill the other herself or himself. The other would no longer be other if 
its otherness were circumscribed and comprehended. 1 
How then, is the otherness of the other to be maintained? Of course, this 
sentence in itself maintains a relation of power between the self as subject and the 
other as object. 'Maintaining otherness' sounds suspiciously like a Heideggerian 
'letting be' of otherness, something Levinas rejects repeatedly because of the implied 
power of self over other such a relation would imply (cf. Levinas 1987a: 3; 1996: 
6ff.). How is one then to write about otherness without circumscription and 
comprehension? These are questions which will remain unanswered, but which will 
continually hover over this study. The point needs to be made that this study is not an 
attempt to comprehend the other in her or his otherness. Rather, and at the risk of 
invalidating the study before it has properly begun, the study will be an attempt to 
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understand the relation between irony and otherness - understood not as a making 
present of the being ofthe other, but as the enigma of the other in her or his pastness: 
"Alterity occurs as a divergency and a past which no memory could resurrect as a 
present" (Levinas 1996c: 72; his italics). In very basic terms, the study will postulate 
a link between otherness and irony, and will propose that this link is to be found in 
interruption. 
Not only does irony interrupt conceptualisations of otherness, but it also 
relativises one's position towards the other. Irony unsettles clear-cut positions and 
oppositions. Perhaps because it tends to interrogate positions, to interrupt 
conceptualisations and thus disrupt reductions of all manner of otherness, there seems 
to be a general suspicion of irony. This would certainly seem to be the case in the 
South African context. Thus Zoe Wicomb (1993: 11), in an illuminating review of 
three post-apartheid anthologies of stories, parenthetically refers to irony as "that 
politically suspect trope", without, however, explaining why it is that irony is so 
clearly politically suspect, or why it would be in need of being "rehabilitated".2 
Indeed, an aspect of post-apartheid writing which has not received the attention due to 
it, is the relation of such writing to irony. This seems somewhat strange, particularly 
in view of the emphasis on irony in the influential critical paradigms of Njabulo 
Ndebele and Albie Sachs.3 In terms of these paradigms, apartheid writing in all its 
'spectacularity' could be said to have been characterised by a lack of irony, while a 
thoroughly post-apartheid writing - that is, one rid of apartheid - would presumably 
be ironic in taking account of all the ambiguities of life. It is remarkable that, despite 
this insistence on irony in these two influential theorists of (post-)apartheid writing, 
little attention has been accorded this phenomenon in the criticism of post-apartheid 
art. Very little, if any, critical work has been done in which the mode of irony as it 
operates in late and post-apartheid writing, is considered. 
Not only is irony routinely ignored in much critical writing on South African 
literature, but when it is mentioned it is, as often as not, dismissed as inconsequential. 
An important recent example of the routine dismissal of irony as expendable in the 
struggle against injustice is that of Michael Chapman in his Southern African 
Literatures. Referring to the condition of art under the emergency of the 1980s, 
Chapman (1996: 428-429) states that 
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What the expression of the emergency continues to remind us is that, ~n 
dangerous times throughout the South African story, many people who m 
other circumstances would have been less than artists have had to become 
more than artists. Without the protection of ambiguity, irony or even the 
expensive package of the literary book, they have had to find the words to 
speak out boldly against injustice. 
Yet Chapman can continue, in the next sentence, to assert that his study "has defined 
literature broadly as the rhetorical act of writing and speaking" (1996: 429). 
Chapman, strangely, seems to be either of the opinion that irony is not rhetorical, or 
that it is not rhetorical enough and is, consequently, unable to serve the cause of 
justice. Such a view of irony is suspect because of the instrumentalist view of 
language it propounds. To Chapman, irony is something without the "protection" 
(1996: 428) of which people in the struggle against apartheid had to transcend the 
confines of the aesthetic, as if irony were an article of clothing with which to cloak, 
luxuriously, optionally, the stark realities of oppression in something dubious called 
'art'. Even worse, irony is lumped together with ambiguity and the elitism of the 
literary book as something behind which one can hide and which consequently 
obscures real meaning. Irony, to Chapman, is clearly a sign of inauthenticity. In its 
dismissal of irony as aesthetic luxury and inauthenticity, such a view merely manages 
to re-establish the New-Critical assumption that irony, on a formal level, can be used 
to transcend contradiction ( cf Dane 1991: 117, 153; Behler 1990: 1 02). Irony, 
tellingly associated by Chapman with ambiguity, separates essence and truth from 
phenomenonal appearance and obscures the former by means of the latter. Chapman 
implies that irony necessarily involves a dialectic of essence and appearance (a highly 
questionable assumption),4 and that irony thus defined characterises an elitist 
approach to art which takes the latter as involving a moment of transcendence over 
history as essence and truth. On the contrary, Chapman states (with reference to the 
imbrication of certain "forms of expression" with the "hyper-reality of the 
emergency") that "the issue for the literary critic is not whether or not Mzwakhe' s 
oral utterances, or Tutu's sermons, have the 'art' to transcend their own moment" 
(1996: 428). 
In dismissing irony in this way - in urgent times more drastic measures than 
mere irony are called far, measures which "speak out boldly against injustice" (1996: 
429; my italics) - Chapman seems to be proposing the transcendence of the 
supposedly transcendent. That is, his view seems to be that irony involves the denial 
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- the false transcendence - of history and that this transcendence itself needs to be 
transcended by "speak[ing] out boldly against injustice". Chapman thus manages to 
dismiss irony, if not as irresponsible, then at least as politically irrelevant. His 
conception of irony uses New Critical assumptions of irony and ambiguity which 
define art through conflating 'art' and 'irony' in the process by means ofwhich works 
of art "transcend their own moment". But, of course, Chapman only sets up such a 
conception of irony in order to dismiss it, and with it the type of art he thinks is 
characterised by it. 5 
Such a view of irony (which Chapman sets up only in order to dismiss) is 
closely related to a Romantic, post-Kantian heritage torn between "the relationship 
between subject and object - or aesthetic process and product" (Sychrava 1989: 51). 
Chapman's view of irony (as underlying 'art') tends to con:flate art and criticism and 
enables him to dismiss irony as supposedly allowing art to transcend the 
contradictions of history. Such a view is, ultimately, organicist and his dismissal of 
irony in political terms merely serves to underscore a general lack of agreement vis-a-
vis the politics of irony. 
I consider a number of divergent positions with regard to the politics of irony 
in Chapter 2. This chapter is an initial attempt at justifying this study in that I 
undertake to establish that there is, indeed, a link between irony and otherness. This 
link, in the work of the critics I consider, appears to be political in nature. But there 
seems to be little agreement on what the nature of the politics of irony might be in the 
approaches of these critics. I therefore, in Chapter 3, depart from the politics of irony 
in order to move towards a possible intersection between irony and otherness on the 
basis ofLevinasian ethics. Where Chapter 2 may be said to move from irony towards 
otherness, Chapter 3 is an attempt to take the other as a point of departure for the 
discussion of irony. Irony itself is approached vis-a-vis Paul de Man's understanding 
of this complex trope.6 
The next three chapters consider three contemporary South African texts. 
Each chapter is an attempt to read a particular text with regard to the ways in which 
irony seems to be related to the representation of otherness. Chapter 4 considers 
Etienne van Heerden's novel Kikoejoe (1996), Chapter 5 Joel Matlou's Life at Home 
(1991), and Chapter 6 J. M. Coetzee's Age of Iron (1990). These texts were selected 
on the basis of a number of similarities they seem to evince, which would suggest that 
they might be fruitfully compared. It is significant, in the first place, that each of the 
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texts may be said to narrativise the past. Each, to a varying degree, is written in an 
autobiographical mode, and unsettles autobiographical procedures. As such, each 
text involves the interrogation of memory and its capacity reliably to recall, indeed, 
represent the past. This problem of the reliability of memory, which is central with 
respect to autobiography, is dealt with in autobiography by means of the trope of 
prosopopoeia. Thus the past is faced by the narrating subject: a face is given to the 
past and, consequently, to the narrating subject in the attempted recuperation of her or 
his past. But this ordering gesture- this prosopopoeia- is interrupted, or threatened 
with interruption, at least partially because of the very attempt to narrativise. In spite 
of the self-reflexive recognition in each text that the ordering gesture of narrative is 
just that - an imposition of order upon what has none, and therefore a linguistic rather 
than a natural process subject to uncertainty and unreliability - the urge to impose 
order, closure and completion compels the narrator to proceed.7 
Because of the coexistence of the urge to narrate and the recognition of its 
impossibility, each text is caught in a dialectic involving at one and the same time a 
tendency towards closure and towards fragmentation. It is for this reason that each 
text may be said to be ironic in terms of form: despite the recognition of its incapacity 
to establish closure, completion and finality, each text nonetheless evinces attempts to 
achieve just such impossible finality. This dual tendency may explain the 
preoccupation of the texts I discuss with the radical absence that is death. Death 
figures prominently in Kikoejoe in the faceless servant Windpomp burning in the 
haystack. The Thing Kikoejoe itself is associated with time and death, while all the 
characters in the novel die and the farm goes to waste. In Life at Home death is not 
figured as such, but absence and madness nonetheless appear as key elements in the 
text. In Age of Iron the narrator of the novel speaks, im possib I y, of her death. 
In keeping with the retrospective gaze of the texts I discuss in this study, 
childhood is a constant preoccupation in them. Most of Kikoejoe and much of Life at 
Home have child narrators. In Age of Iron Mrs Curren is preoccupied with her 
childhood, as well as with her children (her daughter in America as much as her 
cancer). Not only is the future (death) given a face, but also the past (childhood). 
Prosopopoeia as the giving of a face to what has none thus features quite explicitly in 
all the texts I discuss. 
In addition, this prosopopoeia is in each case interrupted and fragmented in the 
text. The end of Age of Iron, in its undecidability, makes of the novel a fragment. 
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Determining the import of the novel (whether it is 'positive' or 'negative', a statement 
of salvation or damnation) would ignore the essentially undecidable status of this text 
as fragment. Life at Home, as a short story cycle following in the wake of the farm 
novel, is explicitly an exercise in intenuption and fragmentation. Kikoejoe explicitly 
thematises its fragmentary nature in its unreliability with regard to the recuperation of 
the past. 
Because of the preoccupation with its status vis-a-vis the past and its 
inadequacy, its fragmentariness in the face of the past, one should not find it 
surprising that writing itself is an important facet in each text. Kikoejoe is, self-
reflexively, written as a bricolage by the retrospecting Fabian. Mrs Curren's letter to 
her daughter, which constitutes Age of Iron, provides a focus on the written nature of 
the text by drawing attention to its status as writing in the face of death. Moreover, 
the letter is interrupted by the extra-linguistic, the contingency of the other upon 
which the letter depends as much as the other which is death. Life at Home self-
consciously plays with language, in particular so-called Standard English. It is also 
explicitly self-referential as quasi-autobiography. 
The above common tendencies with respect to the three texts discussed in this 
study, should serve to some extent to justify their selection. As should be clear by 
now, the danger any reading faces (including the ones in which I engage in this study) 
is that of reducing the otherness of the text it reads. In particular, my readings here 
might result in further readings, which would bring into play the issue of canonisation. 
Derek Attridge (1994: 250) has argued, with regard to Coetzee in particular but also to 
literature in general, that the process of canonisation entails domestication, that is, a 
reduction in otherness because "traditionally [it has been] the task of criticism and 
pedagogy . . . to reduce otherness in the texts it reads". This problem is exacerbated, 
as Attridge recognises, in the case of canonised authors and works. And J. M. 
Coetzee, of course, is a largely canonised author, the recipient of many prizes and the 
subject of many books and essays. Age of Iron in particular has been the subject of 
much critical activity, the result of which would be, in terms of Attridge's argument, 
that its otherness will have been significantly reduced already prior to my engagement 
with this text. The same applies to the work of Etienne van Heerden, who is an 
important writer in Afrikaans literature. Nonetheless, at the time I wrote the chapter 
on it, Kikoejoe was still a very recent text and had in fact not even been translated into 
English (the fact that it has since been translated of course may imply that it is being 
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canonised). In contrast to Age of Iron, there is therefore a comparative paucity of 
work on Kikoejoe. Similarly, despite his celebration by Ndebele, the work of Joel 
Matlou has been, relatively speaking, neglected by critics. The important point I am 
making here is that each text, whether canonised or not, tends to have its otherness 
reduced in being read, something of which I am very aware and which I have tried to 
counteract in my readings by (ironically) unreading readings, including my own. 
As it happens, each of the texts I discuss is also engaged in reading (or 
unreading) canonised texts. Whether the texts I consider respect the otherness of the 
texts they reread, is an interesting and important question on which I have not 
elaborated in this study. Nevertheless, the canon does play an implicit role in my 
discussions. In Age of Iron, Mrs Curren is a retired classics lecturer who has spent her 
life giving voice to the dead in her study of ancient languages. Indeed, the text may 
be read as a rereading of Dante's Divine Comedy, as well as of a number of other texts 
(such as Hesiod's Works and Days, Virgil's Aeneid or Ovid's Metamorphoses). 
Kikoejoe explicitly engages with VanWyk Louw's Raka as well as with the work of 
Olive Schreiner, and Life at Home (perhaps less explicitly) with the farm novel (for 
instance, Olive Schreiner and Pauline Smith). Clearly, classics are implicitly of some 
importance with respect to the readings in which I engage here. 
Even though Attridge's statement quoted above is correct, one might argue, in 
view of de Man's paper on Benjamin, that it is in fact the otherness implicit in the 
canonisation process which allows texts to survive. If theory, criticism and translation 
serve to canonise texts, then these processes inherent in canonisation uncover an 
otherness at the heart of the text being subjected to them. Canonisation would then 
not only be a conservative force, but would enable otherness to 'appear' in texts: 
Both criticism and translation are caught in the gesture which Benjamin calls 
ironic, a gesture which undoes the stability of the original by giving it a 
definitive, canonical form in the translation or the theorization. In a curious 
way, translation canonizes its own version more than the original was 
canonical. That the original was not purely canonical is clear from the fact 
that it demands translation; it cannot be definitive since it can be 
translated. . . . The translation canonizes, freezes, an original and shows in the 
original a mobility, an instability, which at first one did not notice. . . . [In the 
work performed by a translator] the original work is not imitated or 
reproduced but is to some extent put in motion, de-canonized, questioned in a 
way which undoes its claim to canonical authority .... 
(de Man 1986: 82-83)8 
8 
It is my hope that this study, in examining the relation between irony and otherness, 
will also make apparent the otherness implicit in the texts I read. In that case, my 
readings would not only destabilise these texts, but also indicate the degree to which 
they enact destabilisation in the act of being read. 
Notes 
1 This implies that it may not necessarily be a lack of understanding which 
would result in the destruction of otherness by the self, but precisely the self s 
understanding of the otherness of the other. Understanding would thus be 
understood as comprehension, as reduction of otherness, as adequation of 
otherness to sameness, as taking the other in terms of the same in not 
respecting the otherness and difference of the other. 
2 As it happens, I agree with Wicomb that the politics of irony is anything but 
clear. It is for this reason that I, after Chapter 2, attempt to move away from a 
consideration of the political nature of the relation between irony and 
otherness. 
3 I examine at greater length these paradigms in Chapter 5. 
4 See Lang's (1988: 35ff.) elaborate discussion of this dialectic, involving as it 
does the binary "phenomenon-opposed-to-essence, expression-opposed-to-
meaning". 
5 This is a move which may be associated with a post-Kantian Romantic 
aesthetics indebted to Schiller, as noted by Sychrava (1989). Briefly, to 
Schiller the two aesthetic modes of the naive and the sentimental "must be 
harmoniously reconciled in a higher synthesis" (Sychrava: 1989: 13) so that 
"the whole of rational man and the whole of sensuous man [may be brought] 
to a conscious reconciliation in the aesthetic state" (1989: 25). However, 
according to Sychrava (cf 1989: 46ff.), Romantic aesthetics draws on 
Schiller's distinction between the naive and the sentimental while ignoring his 
attempt at synthesising these two opposite modes. This results in a privileging 
of the sentimental over the naive, which is set up as a kind of straw man for 
the sole reason of pulling it down, thus to strengthen the sentimental. Dane 
(cf 1991: 9, 81), similarly, identifies the tendency in much theory of irony to 
set up two kinds of irony, one rhetorical and one other than rhetorical. In this 
move, rhetorical irony is set up simply to be dismissed in favour of the second 
type of irony. In Chapman's case, it seems as if a kind of irony is set up in 
order thus to dismiss irony as such. 
6 I do not approach de Man's work in terms of the "reevaluation of the ethics of 
deconstruction" (Buell 1999: 8) subsequent to the posthumous republication of 
his wartime journalism for the reason that this study is not primarily concerned 
with the ethics of irony (nor with its politics), but with its relation to otherness 
(which might, indeed, have ethical implications). 'Alterity', 'otherness' and 
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'the other' are, of course, key terms in the current flowering of ethical 
approaches to literature. See Attridge (1999: 21-22) for a consideration of the 
import of these terms. 
7 This urge may, of course, be understood in terms of desire. In other words, the 
presence of an urge towards totality lends itself towards a psychoanalytic 
consideration of narrative, something which falls outside of the purview of this 
thesis. 
8 J. M. Coetzee makes a similar, ironic point as far as the role of criticism with 
regard to the survival of'the classic' is concerned (cf Coetzee 1993: 20). 
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Chapter 2 
Approaches to Irony: Towards Otherness 
2.1 Introduction 
This chapter has three main strands. It is concerned with attempting to define irony 
more clearly, establish that there is a relation between irony and otherness, and 
indicate that this relation is taken by critics as having a political nature. 
The main purpose of this chapter is to establish that there is a relation between 
irony and otherness and, in the course of this attempt, to clarify the concept irony 
itself The second purpose is to consider how the relation between irony and 
otherness figures in some recent studies of irony, and to indicate the importance of the 
political nature of this relation in these studies. Thus the chapter, if not this thesis, 
may be said to be concerned broadly with the politics of irony. 1 
In this chapter I elaborate concepts of irony, working towards a usable concept 
of irony for this study. I do this fully aware of having to justify the current enterprise 
and of the difficulty of defining a usable concept of irony. Anyone embarking on yet 
another study involving irony - as I am doing here - faces a daunting task. So much 
has been written on irony over the last couple of decades, not to mention the last two 
millennia (cf Hutcheon 1994: Iff.; 35; 44-45), and such a diversity of functions have 
been ascribed to it (cf Dane 1991: 8ff.; Hutcheon 1994: 56), that any attempt at 
comprehensiveness is doomed from the outset.2 This is why I wish to use this chapter 
to indicate where my focus vis-a-vis irony lies - on otherness - and to provide some 
justification for this focus. 
The chapter is divided into two main sections. In the first section I attempt to 
delineate a conceptual background to irony at the same time as establishing a link 
between irony and otherness. I do this with reference to three recent studies, those of 
Dane (1991), Hutcheon (1994) and Behler (1990). Each of these studies, useful as it 
is, has a focus different from that of the present one. Dane emphasises the politics of 
irony as a critical construct, while Hutcheon investigates the politics of irony in terms 
of what might be called its 'empirics', its uses. Behler, on the other hand, devotes his 
attention to the relation between irony and the discourse of modernity. That is, in 
terms of self-reflexivity, irony is seen as being symptomatic of the self-contradictory 
nature of the move beyond the modem. 
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In the second section, I focus briefly on the problematic nature of the politics 
of irony (already evident in the discussions by Dane, Hutcheon and Behler) in terms 
of the relation between irony and transcendence. I do this with reference to 
Shershow's (1986) book on comedy and Lang's (1988) distinction between 'irony' 
and 'humour', and discuss Flay's (1990) essay on dialectic in order more clearly to 
define the relation between irony and transcendence. 
2.2 Approaches to Irony 
2. 2.1 Irony and the Politics of Criticism 
One ofthe problems confronting any discussion of irony is what Joseph Dane (1991) 
calls the critical mythology of irony. The term 'irony', Dane argues, is essentially a 
nineteenth and twentieth century appropriation and domestication of a philosophical 
concept which may be related to Plato's Socratic dialogues. In effect, the concept of 
irony was perverted by the Romantics and, via them, became the hallmark of Great 
Literature to the New Critics, their "principle of structure" (Behler 1990: 1 02). 
Because of his belief that, historically, irony has become an instrument of 
criticism tending towards the displacement of authority (on to the critic and away 
from the author and text) rather than - as it ought to be - a rhetorical tool, Dane 
situates his survey of the history of irony in terms of its "critical function" (1991: 6) 
and states quite clearly that his interest lies not so much in irony as a linguistic than as 
a critical phenomenon. As he puts it, "ironies are not embedded in texts awaiting 
discovery" (1991: 4) and, of definitions of so-called 'Romantic irony', he repeats his 
general point that "These definitions (as well as their critiques) are actually readings 
of selected romantic literature and evaluations of that literature. Romantic irony is 
itself a product of such readings and of associated critical polemic" (1991: 73). On 
the contrary, rather than being 'found' in texts, irony "lies at the intersection of [two] 
views" (1991: 6), each of these being critical with "one directed toward the literature 
[on irony] and its history ... [and] the other toward the critical reception of that 
literature" (1991: 6). Dane's study examines the ways irony has been used by various 
critics- "my object of study is the critical institution" (1991: 5) -and attempts to 
determine the political consequences of such uses. 
Dane calls irony a "critical myth" ( 1991: 5) the purpose of which has been, as 
was noted above, to shift interpretive authority to the critic. It is worthwhile quoting 
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at some length the passage in which Dane lodges his initial accusation against an 
authoritarianism masquerading as liberation from that very authoritarianism: 
Irony, however defined, always suggests an authority. The history of irony 
outlined here will show a shift in that authority: from the domination of 
spoken statements by intended meanings, to the usurping of that linguistic 
authority by the romantic writer, to the final usurping of that authority by the 
postromantic critic. This final move entails the reconception of the ironist, 
who becomes associated more with the critic than with the poet. . . . In its 
history, irony generally involves an authority (for example, the authority of 
meaning over statement in rhetorical irony). In deriding such an authority or 
claiming to eliminate it altogether, critics only relocate that authority in 
themselves. 
(1991: 11) 
The target of the vehemence evident in this passage is, in particular, the tendency 
Dane identifies in some "recent structural studies of irony" (1991: 9) which, he points 
out, "attempt to define irony (or types of irony) by opposing it to another term or 
terms" (1991: 9). Nonetheless, while earlier definitions are ostensibly rejected, "the 
most heated attempts to revise definitions of irony have consistently repeated the 
assumptions underlying earlier definitions" (1991: 81). Thus it would seem that there 
is a tendency to define irony in such a way as to denigrate 'traditional' definitions of 
irony in order to privilege the irony defined by the critic as being somehow superior to 
earlier, inadequate definitions. This tendency has the result of enabling the critic to 
present her/his view of irony - and therefore herself or himself- as somehow superior 
to the views s/he discards. At the start of his study, Dane (1991: 9-10; 194, note 15) 
cites two examples of this tendency: those of Wilde (1987) and Lang (1988). 
Furthermore, and this is a point of some importance to this study, Dane traces this 
tendency to German Romanticist conceptions of irony, in particular those of Schlegel, 
Solger and Muller (cf 1991: 82, 126). According to Dane (cf 1991: 124, 126), in 
critical conceptions of Romantic irony two types of irony are without fail identified: 
"A common strategy in the scholarly development of the notion of romantic irony . . . 
has been to divide romantic irony into two forms: either a higher and lower form . . . 
or a theoretical and practical form .... " (1991: 75-76).3 To Dane, such an approach to 
irony repeats the elitism inherent in any account of irony, and therefore inherent in 
irony itself as an hierarchical phenomenon ( cf 1991: 81 ). 4 
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Irony has come to be associated indubitably, via the Romantics, with the New 
Critics and their particular critical ideology. It might be worthwhile at this point to 
follow Mileur's discussion of organicism and its link with irony. According to Mileur 
(1998: 199), "irony in this new romantic, modem sense ... becomes virtually 
identical with critical and theoretical writing about literature". Mileur (1998: 201) 
attempts to trace this Romantic change in the definition of irony, according to which it 
was no longer seen as "merely another trope in the taxonomy of classical rhetoric: 
saying one thing while meaning another", a trope, moreover, which was deemed to 
have "a relative! y isolated and finite effect". Instead of being regarded as a trope with 
limited provenance, irony came to be viewed as being a "defining characteristic of 
whole works and even genres" (Mileur 1998: 201 ). This development may be 
characterised as a movement from a conception of irony as litotes to one which 
understands it in terms of hyperbole: "The Schlegelian expansion of irony enacts a 
shift from a litotic to a hyperbolic conception of its operation, more commonly 
associated with 'Litenrture,' which is to say literature that is also its own theory or 
philosophy .... " (Mileur 1998: 201).5 
Mileur states that Friedrich Schlegel's appropriation of the sentimental -
despite Schlegel's exaggeration of the difference between Schiller's category of the 
sentimental and his ironic appropriation of it - is what, among other things, leads to 
"the new ideal of the work of literature that is also its own theory" (1998: 207). 
Similarly, Sychrava takes irony as a sentimental phenomenon and comments that 
viewing "poetry as [involving] ironic or self-critical consciousness" (1989: 51) is the 
result ofthe "contrived coincidence oftheory and practice" (1989: 51), which to her is 
a definition of poetry that may be ascribed to what she terms a "sentimental principle" 
(1989: 52). The criticism of poetry itself is taken to be poetic, while irony is deemed 
a defining characteristic of both poetry and criticism-as-poetry. According to 
Sychrava, these tendencies (of collapsing criticism and poetry, as well as poetry and 
irony) entail a sentimental move by the Romantics and result in organicist conceptions 
of the text, which is taken to be a whole.6 
It is such a conception of the text as an organic whole - which allegedly can 
be traced back to Romantic conceptions of irony - that, according to Dane, allows 
critics to take irony as a unifying structural principle (cf. 1991: 153). Dane's entire 
thesis may be said to consist of a polemic against this organicism (as it functions in 
critical approaches) and its roots in a hyperbolic conception of irony. 
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Romantic irony for Dane is mythological because it shifts the emphasis on 
irony as a mode of (literary) production to irony as a (critical) tool of reading, a shift 
which can be traced back to the mediaeval association of irony with allegory: "The 
apparently innocent association of the word [irony] with allegory in Isidore [of 
Seville] is significant. Irony ... shifts from a word dealing with literary production to 
one Jealing with literary reception" (1991: 54). This shift causes irony to become "a 
powerful interpretive tool" (1991: 54) and results in "a refocusing of the question of 
irony onto the reader-exegete" (1991: 54-55). 
To Dane this is also the crux of Romantic approaches to irony. Thus 
Romantic aesthetics privileges the critic as artist (cf 1991: 117), which enables New 
Critical approaches to literature to use "irony as a tool for analyzing literary works of 
art. The notions of irony that developed in the nineteenth century can be considered a 
bridge: the ironist changes in character from a philosopher-poet to a critic" (1991: 
121). This change is analogous to the mediaeval shift from the author and text to the 
(critical) reader of that text, a shift from a perception of irony as a rhetorical tool 
functioning in terms of litotes to an emphasis on irony as a structural principle to be 
discovered by the critic. Moreover, Dane also emphasises that this shift not only 
privileges the critic over the author and the text, but also implies a sly, elitist hierarchy 
involving initiates and those excluded from and unaware of irony. Dane explicitly 
traces this alleged elitism back to Romantic, in particular Schlegelian conceptions of 
irony (cf. 1991: 150, 155, 158).7 
Thus, according to Dane, a New Critic such as Cleanth Brooks saw irony as a 
mark of excellence in poetry: "Brooks applied the word [irony] to lyric poetry, 
strengthened the evaluative force of the word, and attempted to redefine irony not as a 
vertical hierarchy of statement and meaning but rather as a horizontal tension. Ironic 
literature was better than other literature .... " (Dane 1991: 149). The audience 
needed to appreciate such 'superior' literature (even though it is supposed to be the 
result of a horizontal, democratic impulse) is in essence elitist. Indeed, the democratic 
impulse perceived in irony is inherently fallacious to Dane: " ... irony can never be 
fully democratized, even in New Critical hands" (1991: 151; cf 157). He argues that 
irony always implies a vertical relation, a hierarchy, and therefore authority. 
Associating irony with ambiguity and tension, as the New Critics did, implies 
a dissolution of authority vis-a-vis the ironic statement. However, according to Dane, 
when "romantic poets or New Critics assert such a multiplicity of competing 
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meanings and call that multiplicity irony, they adopt for themselves the role of 
authority attributed in rhetorical irony to an articulable meaning" (1991: 143). All 
conceptions of irony, whether overtly or not, appeal to authority and are therefore 
explicitly or implicitly progeny of ancient rhetorical irony: 
. . . my argument here is that the popularity of the word irony in lite~ary 
criticism is firmly rooted in the implications of rhetorical irony. Rhetoncal 
irony involves an appeal to an absent authority - a meaning opposed to its 
superficial statement. Under later theoretical forms of irony, such an authority 
is not canceled; it is rather displaced, either onto the poet (romantic irony) or 
onto the critic. . . . Rather than a subversion of authority, what this history 
reveals is a displacement of authority. The authority of the poet's meaning has 
yielded to the authority of the poet's sensibility, and to the authority of the 
critic who analyzes these matters. 
(Dane 1991: 136-137) 
Dane warns against the way in which New Criticism, under the influence of German 
Romanticism, and in keeping with the histoty of irony viewed as a mythologising of 
irony (a process Dane attempts to sketch in his book) defines irony against itself. 8 In 
other words, irony is sought to be defined and valorised against another conception, 
often called 'rhetorical irony'. 
Despite Dane's methodological warning, though, it seems that conceptions of 
irony will inevitably have to be contrasted in terms of the degree to which they are 
adequate for the task at hand. As far as this thesis is concerned, in focusing on a 
particular manifestation or version of irony, moreover, I do not hope to valorise that 
version against other, supposedly less adequate versions. Nonetheless, even though 
this is not my aim, it might on occasion quite conceivably be both possible and 
necessary to do just that. 
Thus Hutcheon (1994: 61ff.), for instance, points to the implications of 
viewing irony as more-or-less corresponding to antiphrasis - a view which might be 
said to parallel that identified by Dane as being the traditional, 'proper' view of irony. 
She shows how such a view of irony is inadequate and reductive because it is unable 
to account for some empirical manifestations of irony and indicates that this is a view 
based on an overly simplified understanding of the way irony happens. 
And Lang's discussion of irony/humour, even though it operates in terms of 
two views of irony which are set up against each other (as Dane indicates), one of 
which approximates the rhetorical conception of irony as a trope, is valuable in that it 
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points out some of the problematic aspects of taking irony to be a trope. 
Understanding irony as a trope "entails the elimination of contradiction within the 
original utterance and/or between the utterance and its context, by transporting the 
true meaning of the expression elsewhere" (Lang 1988: 43). Such a view of irony 
would accord with Lang's characterisation of irony as conservative. As it tends 
towards closure, authority, and clarity, this method of interpreting irony involves "the 
replacement of an illogical or unacceptable utterance with an acceptable, logical one", 
with the object being "to phrase in logical, coherent language an original intention 
that unifies all parts of the text by subordinating them to a central core of meaning" 
(1991: 43). Lang contrasts this view of irony with another so radically different that 
she forgoes the name "irony" and calls it "humor" (cf 1991: 35).9 
Dane's rejoinder to this would be that laying claim to authority is part of the 
structure of irony, and that consequently it is not true that some forms of irony do not 
"[transport] the true meaning of the expression elsewhere". 10 Apart from accusing 
Lang (to my mind persuasively) of misreading Barthes and Derrida (cf 1991: 171), 
Dane reiterates his oft-repeated point that distinguishing forms of irony in terms of a 
dichotomy involving an inadequate (often rhetorical) irony surpassed by a more 
adequate definition, is to use irony in the services of a particular critical position, and 
therefore amounts to an exercise in the politics of the institution of criticism: "To 
assume a good and a bad form of irony is useful primarily as a weapon for 
promulgating new theories of irony and denouncing old ones, as Barthes himself 
realized full well" (1991: 169). 
In Dane's estimation, then, the critical history of irony tells us a lot about the 
institution of criticism and not that much at all about literary texts, the objects of that 
criticism. Irony tells us more about the critics who discern or attribute it (to use 
Hutcheon's term) for purposes of scoring points, than it does about any particular 
(literary) text. While Dane's wide-ranging study may serve as a useful point of 
departure concerning the politics of irony - or rather, the politics of the institution of 
criticism - his dismissal of almost all critical work concerning irony, and his 
reduction of all irony to rhetorical irony on the basis of his implicit belief that irony is 
inherently elitist and authoritarian, seems unproductive of a better understanding of 
irony itself It is in order to reach such an initial understanding that I would now like 
to turn to Linda Hutcheon's recent comprehensive book on the subject. 
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2.2.2 Politics and the Uses of Irony 
As far as the politics of irony is concerned, the first point that needs to be made here is 
that Hutcheon disagrees with Dane's notion that irony is necessarily elitist and 
hierarchical, or, at least, disputes the idea that irony functions in terms of an implied 
superiority involving different parties. 11 On the contrary, she persuasively argues that 
irony is dependent for its efficacy on shared or overlapping discursive communities, 
while limiting the supposed elitism of irony to one particular function of irony, 
namely the 'aggregative' (cf. 1994: 54). Apart from this function, which she says is 
one of the functions operating on the basis of discursive communities- which, to her, 
constitute a sine qua non of irony: discursive communities enable irony rather than the 
other way around (cf. Hutcheon 1994: 18; 54)- Hutcheon identifies a number of other 
possible functions of irony. Her approach celebrates the plural nature of irony: she 
recognises that it is possible to identify different functions of irony and that one 
should not delimit the concept too closely, which should not be taken to imply that for 
Hutcheon it is impossible to define irony clearly. 12 
On the most basic level, Hutcheon defines irony by distinguishing it clearly 
from other rhetorical figures on the basis of its affective dimension: "Unlike metaphor 
or allegory, which demand similar supplementing of meaning, irony has an evaluative 
edge and manages to evoke emotional responses. . . . That affective dimension of 
irony's edge is the starting point of this study; it is also its (deliberate) limitation" 
(Hutcheon 1994: 2). In terms of this "affective dimension" of irony, which involves 
its "evaluative edge", Hutcheon delimits the aims of her study by saying that hers is 
an attempt "to understand how and why irony is used and understood as a discursive 
practice or strategy" (1994: 3), focusing in particular "on how irony comes into 
existence (or does not) for me as an interpreter" (1994: 4). She states that her 
"concern here is more with inference than with implication, more with the attribution 
of irony than with any 'original' intent to ironize" (1994: 45). That is, the focus of 
Hutcheon's study is the process by which irony comes to be 'attributed' (cf. 1994: 3, 
5) by the interpreter. Her focus is thus deliberately more empirical and political than 
philosophical (to use these terms in an extremely broad sense), which is not at all to 
suggest that her work is not philosophically sophisticated. 13 But Hutcheon's study is 
overtly concerned with how irony "happens" (1994: 12; cf. 89ff.), in what might be 
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termed 'real-life situations': what generates it, what effects it might have _ that is, 
how irony works. 
This is quite evident from Hutcheon's schematic exposition - in the course of 
an attempt to define more clearly how, exactly, irony may work - of the ironic 
situation from the different points of view of the ironist and the interpreter: 
~rom. the point ~f .view of ~he interpreter, irony is an interpretive and 
IntentiOnal move: It IS the makmg or inferring of meaning in addition to and 
different from what is stated, together with an attitude toward both the said 
and the unsaid. The move is usually triggered (and then directed) by 
conflictual textual or contextual evidence or by markers which are socially 
agreed upon. However, from the point of view of what I too (with 
reservations) will call the ironist, irony is the intentional transmission of both 
information and evaluative attitude other than what is explicitly presented. 
(Hutcheon 1994: 11; her emphasis) 
What is evident from this passage - apart from Hutcheon's 'empirical' focus 
(compare her use of terms like "move", "evidence", "markers", "transmission") - is 
the importance to the ironic event of difference, of the presence of absence. Hutcheon 
makes the important point that irony "is the making or inferring of meaning in 
addition to and different from what is stated"; it involves "an attitude toward both the 
said and the unsaid"; "irony is the intentional transmission of both information and 
evaluative attitude other than what is explicitly presented". And she adds that irony 
happens in the space between (and including) the said and the unsaid; it needs 
both to happen. . . . [The] said and the unsaid coexist for the interpreter ... to 
create the real 'ironic' meaning. The 'ironic' meaning is not, then, simply the 
unsaid meaning, and the unsaid is not always a simple inversion or opposite of 
the said ... : it is always different - other than and more than the said. 
(1994: 12-13) 
Hutcheon's emphasis on this aspect of the ironic event leads to a thorough 
investigation of variables such as race, gender and interest which are involved in the 
creation of the discursive communities ( cf 1994: 18fT. & 89-115) which furnish the 
contexts - both the context and the difference in context - within which irony can 
happen. In a restatement and refinement of her initial definitions of irony, Hutcheon 
states that "For me, it [irony] is the superimposition or rubbing together of these 
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meanings (the said and plural unsaid) with a critical edge created by a difference of 
context that makes irony happen" (1994: 19). 
While Hutcheon's emphasis on difference and, indeed, otherness is 
provocative and provides some justification for a closer investigation of the relation 
between irony and otherness, it needs to be emphasised that my study is not 
particularly concerned with how irony works as a speech act, nor with what Hutcheon 
calls its "affective dimension" (1994: 2). Nonetheless, a basic understanding of this 
process is important for the reason that my study focuses on one aspect which to 
Hutcheon always seems to be involved in the ironic event: otherness. But the present 
study will, as it were, bracket empirical occurrences of the phenomenon irony and 
move on, or rather step back, beyond the politics of irony and towards the ethical. 
Hutcheon's discussion is admirable in the way it very persuasively addresses 
the tendency to view irony as a 'rhetorical' figure- often equated with antiphrasis, in 
terms of which the unsaid is equated with the opposite of what is said and thus with 
the ironic- without falling victim to Dane's objections discussed above concerning 
the definition of irony against another, supposedly simpler definition. Hutcheon 
indicates, on the contrary, the complexity of the phenomenon irony and does not 
valorise her own more adequate view of it, which is that a model of irony based on the 
logical exclusion of opposites - one of which is said, another unsaid - is simplistic. 
As we have seen, according to Hutcheon ironic meaning is "not necessarily 
[constituted] only by an either/or substitution of opposites but by both the said and 
the unsaid working together to create something new. The semantic 'solution' of 
irony would then hold in suspension the said plus something other than and m 
addition to it that remained unsaid" (Hutcheon 1994: 63; cf 12, 19, 39, 89). 
It is on this "other than" that I focus in this thesis, specifically vis-a-vis the 
problem of defining the excess of meaning which is different to both the said and the 
unsaid, to use Hutcheon's terms for a moment. A point which is to be elaborated on 
in the next chapter needs to be made here, namely that this study operates on another, 
more abstract level, and with another problem: that of the representation of otherness. 
And an immediate question which arises is whether it is possible at all to represent 
otherness if it exceeds, as Hutcheon seems to imply, both the said and the unsaid. 
Might such a representation of otherness by means of irony not, ironically, be viewed 
as resulting in the dissolving of otherness within the ironic communicative act? If 
irony lies in the otherness beyond what is said and not said, does it not per 
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definition disappear when the irony is understood? And if the otherness of irony lies 
beyond what is said and what remains unsaid, does this mean that otherness is 
ultimately recuperated in the course of ironic communication?14 
The event of understanding what is other (which seems, to Hutcheon, always 
to be required if irony is to be understood) - that is, an understanding of what is other 
by virtue of an understanding of the irony involved in a given communicative process 
through the interplay of the other - would, rather, amount to not understanding the 
other. This is so because understanding the other would reduce the otherness of the 
other. Irony cannot lead to a greater understanding of what is other because that 
would reduce its otherness. This is to say that irony cannot be located in otherness, 
but that irony might infinitely approach otherness in terms of the problem of 
understanding and thus annihilating it. 15 
The objection might he raised here that this event may also be understood in 
any number of additional ways, for instance as paradox (cf Hutcheon 1994: 62, 
64ff.), or in terms of parody and allegory, in particular as regards the etymology of 
allegory, implying as it does an "other speaking" through allegoresis as interpretation 
(cf Ulmer 1982: 558). Indeed, it will be the burden of the next chapter to elaborate, 
among other things, the complicated relation between irony and allegory, in particular 
as worked out by Paul de Man. The reason for situating the paradoxical event of 
representing the other- the interplay, or even the appearance and thus re-presentation 
of otherness- within the ambit of irony rather than other tropes, lies in the important 
link which, hypothetically, may be drawn between irony and otherness: each is 
potentially infinite. And each, while linguistic, escapes language. The other, even 
though it appears in language, can never be apprehended in that language, while 
irony, similarly, even though it operates in language, exhausts language or the attempt 
to close it off so it can mean fully. 16 As Hutcheon says, it seems that "we can use 
language to convey messages that are different from what we are actually saying" 
(1994: 58), that is, messages which exceed the language that we use. 17 
These points are not to be taken as exaggerated claims for the provenance, 
effect, or power of irony. I do not subscribe to views of irony which inflate its 
significance as some sort of master trope or way of seeing the world, and, on this 
point, find myself in full agreement with Hutcheon's assertion relating to her study: 
" ... it does not treat irony as a keystone of poetics, a paradigm of criticism, a mode of 
consciousness or existence that raises questions about the self and the nature of 
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knowledge, a philosophical stance vis-a-vis the universe, an informing principle of 
personality, or a way of life .... "(Hutcheon 1994: 3). 
However, where Hutcheon limits herself to questions relating to "how and 
why irony is used and understood as a discursive practice or strategy" (1994: 3), my 
study departs from hers in its emphasis: it is concerned with irony, not as a "practice 
or strategy" (which does not mean to imply that irony is not or cannot be used as a 
"practice or strategy"), but precisely as an effect of the other rather than the action of 
the subject. My focus is not on the employment of irony (and the point needs to be 
stressed again that this should not be construed as a denial of such a possibility) by a 
subject in control- or not- of irony, but rather on irony as it is generated beyond the 
subject, be the subject that of irony (the 'ironist'), or the interpreter, or the butt of 
irony. My use of the terms 'understanding' and 'comprehension' involves something 
other than the empirical relation between the ironist generating an ironic effect "and 
the comprehending (attributing) interpreter not far below" (Hutcheon 1994: 54), a 
relationship which implies a hierarchy resulting from an "assumption of superiority 
and sophistication on the part of both the ironist and the intended (that is, 
comprehending) interpreter - at the expense of some uncomprehending and thus 
excluded audience" (Hutcheon 1994: 55). It is for this reason that I shall shy away 
from terms used by Hutcheon such as "the intending ironist" or "the intended 
receiver" (1994: 6), even though she does qualify her use of terms related to 
"intentionality" (1994: 11) by making clear that some ironies may not be intended (cf 
1994: 10) because of irony's "indirection", which may result in "attribution" and 
"interpretation" of irony taking place "regardless of the intentions of the ironist" 
(1994: 11).18 
Given her focus on the empirics and politics of irony, the effects it has and 
how it works in everyday life, Hutcheon's study may be said to fall within the ambit 
of 'cultural studies'. She "uses the public controversy over the interpretation of a 
particular cultural text (a museum exhibition)" (1994: 4-5), and her examples come 
"from a range of media - music, fiction, academic discourse, film, opera and popular 
music performances, visual art, museum exhibits" (1994: 5). Hutcheon emphasises 
that irony occurs "in all kind of discourses (verbal, visual, aural), in common speech 
as well as in highly crafted aesthetic form, in so-called high art as well as in popular 
culture" (1994: 5). 
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Throughout these vanous instances of irony, Hutcheon stresses the 
perjormative nature of irony: "I have sometimes chosen ironies with public and 
discernible consequences. . . . Hence, the emphasis on performances, because of the 
overtly public and social nature of their reception" (1994: 5).19 
A key problem in relation to the politics of irony in use (with which this study 
will not be concerned) is determining whether it is conservative, or subversive and 
oppositional. In feminist circles, for instance, there is both a "suspicion of irony's 
instability" and a "realization of the power that lies in its potential to destabilize" 
(Hutcheon 1994: 31 ), 
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which Hutcheon ascribes to the "transideological nature of 
irony: people of all political persuasions have been known both to endorse and to 
condemn its use" (1994: 46). A similar problem is evident with respect to the 
political relation with the other as regards postmodemity, as articulated in the study 
by Behler (1990), to which I would like to tum next. 
2. 2. 3 Irony, Postmodernity, Politics 
Hutcheon's study of irony makes explicit reference to the relation between irony and 
what is other, and recognises the nature of the politics of this relation as a problem. 
Similarly, the important relation between irony and otherness (with which this thesis 
is primarily concerned), as well as the relation between irony and politics (with which 
it is not), forms an important moment in Ernst Behler's (1990) study of irony. This is 
evident, for instance, in Behler's following general description of irony: 
The ironic manner of expression can be described as attempting to transcend 
the restrictions of normal discourse and straightforward speech by making the 
ineffable articulate, at least indirectly, through a great number of verbal 
strategies, and accomplishing what lies beyond the reach of direct 
communication. This attitude, however, automatically constitutes an offense 
to common reason and understanding. . . . Socrates was the first example for 
that constellation. 
(Behler 1990: 111) 
Behler here links irony with both otherness and politics. Irony involves making the 
"ineffable articulate". This ineffable (which is other) lies "beyond the reach of direct 
communication" and therefore cannot be grasped. For this reason irony involves the 
transcendence of "the restrictions of normal discourse", something which "constitutes 
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an offense to common reason and understanding". The example of Socrates' 
execution by the Athenians completes the link between irony and otherness via 
politics. 
Behler's description of irony not only convincingly establishes the importance 
of the complex interrelationship among irony, otherness and transcendence, but also 
enables a first consideration of what is perhaps the key problem with which my study 
is concerned. If irony is, as Behler contends, an attempt at transcending ordinary 
language - albeit indirectly - to make present ("articulate") what is not present 
("ineffable", other), then the implication is that irony presents otherness.
21 
Irony 
would then be a strategy in the service of reducing the other to the same, and would 
collaborate in the metaphysical project of establishing understanding as presence to 
the self Irony would become a subspecies of understanding in its comprehension of 
what is not to be comprehended and its articulation of the ineffable, despite the 
offence this would apparently give to understanding and reason. Ordinary language -
as normal, direct and straightforward - would be the vehicle of understanding and 
reason, while ironic language - as abnormal and indirect - would become the vehicle 
for gaining access to and a grasp on what is beyond both ordinary language and its 
understanding. Irony would make understandable that which is beyond 
understanding. This is to say that irony, ultimately, would be the tool of 
understanding. Ironically, irony would only seem to give offence to common sense. 
Despite Behler's distinction between two kinds of irony, 22 the second of which 
he associates with Romanticism and subsequently with postmodernity/ 
postmodernism, 23 it needs to be pointed out that the distance between the irony which 
appears in the course of his study and the rhetorical irony he rejects, does not seem as 
vast as appears initially. Behler distinguishes between kinds of irony by linking what 
he calls a "new notion of irony" with "the consciousness of literary modernity that 
marked the beginning of romanticism" (1990: 75). This new notion of irony Behler 
opposes to "rhetorical irony" (1990: 81) which allows for the actual communication 
of intended meaning: "Although in rhetorical irony the intention of the speaker is 
contrary to what he actually says, rules insure that we actually understand the 
intended meaning. This irony is based on complete agreement, perfect understanding 
between speaker and listener, and an absolute notion oftruth" (1990: 81). 
The new notion of irony, in contradistinction to rhetorical irony, subverts such 
complete understanding through the link between all forms of irony and otherness. 
24 
To Behler, irony "is not to be taken in any restricted literary meaning, but in that 
broad mode of saying it otherwise, of circumlocution, configuration, and indirect 
communication characteristic of today's humanistic and scientific discourses" (1990: 
vii). 
Behler's linkage of irony and otherness finds expression in a trajectory which 
traces the extension to poetry of the notion of infinite perfectibility, and therefore of 
progress, evident in Romantic writing. This notion forms a crucial component of 
modernity as a mode of self-awareness. Behler traces the link between irony and 
otherness via modernity through Romantic writers like Friedrich Schlegel and Mme 
de Stael, and asserts this link as being of a defining nature with regard to not only 
modernity but also postmodemity. Thus, in his discussion of Schlegel's conception of 
Romantic poetry, Behler emphasises the central position of irony and its link with 
otherness: "Since total communication is impossible, poetry transforms itself into 
indirect communication, into saying it otherwise, by spacing and temporalizing. The 
imagination therefore finds its necessary correspondence in irony, in ironic 
construction .... " (1990: 67). And, in terms of Mme de Stael's consideration of 
modern literature in terms of perfectibility, Behler delineates the characteristics of 
modern poetry24 in opposition to those of ancient poetry in terms of the link between 
irony and otherness: 
Ancient poetry, to use the later distinctions between classicism and 
romanticism, is that of a full identity with itself, or self-presence, perfect 
integrality, and a harmonious display of poetic power and joy in life. Modem 
poetry is that of longing, nonidentity, otherness, reflection, dissimulation, and 
melancholy .... 
(1990: 54) 
Finally, in defining postmodemity as being subject to the paradoxical expression of its 
own impossibility, Behler makes explicit this linkage between irony and otherness: 
The prefix post seems to suggest - as in postcapitalist, poststructuralist, 
postfeminist, or postnuclear - a new period, another epoch after a former one, 
a relief, so to speak, from the past, and, because of a lack of a new designation, 
contents itself with canceling out the previous system without completely 
deleting it. Yet in the case of postmodem, this does not work, because modern 
is already the most advanced period designation and cannot be outdone. 
Postmodemity therefore reveals itself as an ironic notion communicating 
indirectly, by way of circumlocution, configuration, and bafflement, the 
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necessity and impossibility of discussing the status of modernity in a 
straightforward and meaningful manner. Postmodernity, in its twisted posture, 
seems to be the awareness of this paradox, and consequently of the status of 
modernity, in a somersaulting fashion. 
(1990: 4-5) 
Behler discusses this link between otherness, irony, and postmodernity by indicating 
that postmodernism may be defined in terms of its retrospective nature, its sceptical, 
self-critical relation to the past, as opposed to the avant-garde, which is oriented 
towards the future (Behler 1990: 5). Postmodernism does not amount to an 
overcoming of modernism, but is "a critical continuation of modernism which is itself 
both critique and criticism" (1990: 5). As Behler puts it, this implies that 
postmodernism is a criticism of criticism: "Criticism now turns against itself, and 
postmodernism thereby becomes a radicalized, intensified version of modernism, as 
would seem to be implied through a certain nuance in the prefix posf' (1990: 5). 
Postmodernism continues modernism, but critically. It continues modernism, as 
critique, by means of the very fact that it departs from it. Modernism, as critique, in 
an impossible gesture turns its critique upon itself. It thus continues itself in the act of 
bringing itself to an end: 
. . . we can see postmodernism as that situation in which all the ideals of 
modernity have come to their exhaustion .... [Yet] ifpostmodernism opened 
an entirely new phase of intellectual history, of antimodernism or the 
accomplished transgression of modernism, it would continue the innovative 
trend of modernity, something which seems to be precluded by the paradoxical 
configuration of its name. 
(Behler 1990: 5-6) 
This brings Behler to a statement of the anti-totalitarian, anti-systemic drive of 
postmodernism, which is described as "the rejection of any totalized conception of 
truth", as "a radical pluralism of thought and opinion" (1990: 6). This rejection of 
totalised conceptions of truth and embrace of radical pluralism, of course, leads 
Behler to touch upon the problematic political relation between the postmodern and 
alterity. While one could say "that postmodernism protects the position of the other 
side, that of the nonsystem, of the woman, the suppressed minority" (1990: 6), such 
commitment runs counter to "the antisystematic and atotalitarian drive in 
postmodernist thinking" (1990: 6). That is, while the postmodern might be said to 
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engage with otherness, this engagement can only be of an ironic nature as, otherwise, 
otherness would become a new project and would, consequently, be totalised. To 
Behler, this clearly would run counter to the nature of postmodern thinking, 25 which is 
why the relation between otherness and the postmodern would be mediated by irony. 
To put it differently, as far as Behler is concerned, irony is an essential, even 
universal, aspect of the relation between postmodernism and otherness. It is in the 
nature of postmodernism, because of its rejection of totalities, to include the excluded 
(for Behler the other), but this very inclusion of otherness runs counter to "the 
antisystematic and atotalitarian drive in postmodernist thinking" (1990: 6). Such an 
understanding of otherness, as always necessarily involving irony, would make 
postmodernism vulnerable to accusations of political irresponsibility, as Behler's 
argument implies that postmodernism subverts commitment. This is a point on which 
Behler does not seem to elaborate?6 
2. 3 Irony, Politics and Transcendence 
2. 3.1 Irony, Transcendence and Dialectic 
It is clear that the relation between irony and politics is viewed as being problematic 
by Dane, Hutcheon, and Behler, albeit to different degrees and on different levels. 
The problem may also be approached in terms of comedy generally (to which I shall 
refer in the next part of this section), in particular via an investigation of the link 
between irony and transcendence, a relationship touched upon very briefly in the 
previous section. It could be argued that the transcendence at issue in that discussion, 
pertaining to irony's ability to articulate the ineffable by transcending ordinary 
language, is not true transcendence for the reason that it presents. In order initially to 
elaborate on this contention, without introducing Levinas' s conception of 
transcendence into the discussion yet, I would like to turn to Joseph C. Flay's essay on 
the relation between irony and dialectic?7 
While this thesis does not pay much attention to Hegel - since its focus lies 
elsewhere, it is not particularly concerned either with Hegel's views on irony (cf 
Behler 1990: 85-92 and passim) or with Levinas's complicated relationship to Hegel 
(cf Williams 1992: 297-301)- it is worth noting that Hegel's dialectic may be said 
both to involve alterity and to be thoroughly ironic (cf Williams 1992: 111). In fact, 
one could argue that Hegel's celebrated discussion- in the Phenomenology of Spirit 
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(1977: 111-119) - of the life and death struggle and the relationship between master 
and slave illustrates this irony in terms of otherness (cf. Williams 1992: 174). Robert 
R. Williams indicates that 
Hegel's Phenomenology employs a skeptical dialectic of tropic reversals. It is 
an extended application of the principle of equipollence. Each Gestalt des 
Bewusstseins begins with an immediate, naive and one-sided expression. The 
original Gestalt is self-confident, but such self-confidence is only a 
presumptive certainty that self-destructs under the conditions of experience, 
the impact of the other. 
(Williams 1992: 169~ cf. 123) 
Thus the encounter with the other "shatters the immediate presumption that self-
certainty simply is the truth" (Williams 1992: 173). On the contrary, "truth will tum 
out to require the inclusion of the suppressed other" (Williams 1992: 172). However, 
the "other eludes me" (1992: 173), and thus ensues the life and death struggle. This 
tendency towards self-destruction - which is the result of the requirement that the 
other be included in the relationship in order for the self to be recognised, combined 
with the attempt by the self to destroy the other in order to master it - leads, according 
to Williams, to irony: 
The irony is that the self can fulfill its need to intuit itself as absolute negation 
of everything fixed, only by seeking to eliminate the other, and yet it depends 
on the other for recognition of its freedom and negativity. The self cannot 
demonstrate its freedom and transform its certainty into truth without seeking 
the elimination of the other, and yet it also depends on the other to confirm its 
freedom. . . . Cancelling otherness by attempting to kill the other is thus self-
subverting. For the point is not to end life, but to secure recognition and 
intersubjective legitimation of one's certainty. 
(1992: 174) 
This irony occurs in the one particular, determinate manifestation of recognition 
discussed by Hegel in the Phenomenology of Mind (cf. Williams 1992: 186, note 1), 
that of master and slave. Master/slave self-destructs because it does not entail 
genuine recognition of and by the other: "Hegel observes that master/slave is a 
deficient mode of the concept of recognition, that self-destructs and falls apart from 
its own internal incoherence" (Williams 1992: 180). It achieves the opposite of the 
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effect intended - the destruction of the master and the liberation of the slave. The 
relationship between master and slave is not premised upon genuine otherness: 
If the slave is no longer an independent being, but merely unessential, so is the 
recognition the slave bestows. . . . Thus, the truth of the master is the slave. 
The reduction of the slave to a mere commodity makes explicit what mastery 
is .... [The] slave's confirmation of mastery is worthless because the slave is 
for the master unessential. 
Since the slave is unessential, merely an extension of the master, 
recognition by the slave does not count even for the master. The slave is not 
genuinely other, it is only "the master's other" .... Mastery r~presents a vain 
attempt to reduce mediation by other to self-mediation. However, mastery 
succeeds merely in reducing the other to a slave, only to discover that coerced 
recognition is both phony and worthless. But phony recognition is the truth of 
mastery. Thus, mastery turns out to be self-subverting and brings about the 
opposite of what it intended. Mastery ends in failure, a dead end which can 
only be maintained by force. 
(Williams 1992: 176-177) 
Recognition entails that a relationship be constituted in genuine otherness. The self is 
absolutely dependent on the other if it is to exist in and for itself; existence for-itself 
requires existence "for-itself-far-an other" (Williams 1992: 172). Alterity is essential 
if the self is not, ironically, to destroy itself in asserting itself and its freedom. And, 
ironically, the other must be both included and not included within the relationship. It 
must be included, for otherwise there can be no recognition. It must not be included, 
for it must remain genuinely other for true recognition to take place. The paradox is 
that the other must both remain transcendent and be immanent if the self is to gain 
recognition from that other. The other's position as other - its otherness - must 
involve complete separation from, indeed, a nonrelationship to, the self in order to 
remain other and thus enable recognition, and at the same time must stand in 
proximity towards the self.28 It is important to underscore that the logic of recognition 
is ironic, as it entails a simultaneous approaching and distancing motion. One gets 
closer to oneself in getting closer to the other. And one gets closer to the other in 
getting further away from it. 
The tendency towards self-destruction (in particular in terms of self-
preservation) is inherent in Hegel's dialectical method generally. Flay, in an essay on 
Hegel's Logic, approaches the irony of this self-destruction in terms of the categories 
of the understanding. The essay examines dialectic in terms of Hegel's "rational-
29 
speculative critique of the ways in which the traditional logic and metaphysics - the 
logic and metaphysics of the understanding - deal ·with their respective problems" 
(1990: 154). Flay argues that "the rhetorical framework of Hegel's dialectic is in 
general governed by irony" (1990: 157). In arguing this case, and in indicating how 
what he terms "destructive" as well as "constructive" irony (1990: 157 note 8~ 159ff.) 
contributes to the necessarily negative and positive moments of dialectic ( cf Williams 
1992: 96), Flay defines irony as occurring in "a situation that contains or shows the 
incongruity of an outcome contrary to what was or might have been expected, 
recognizing this not in the form of sarcasm, but as the nondeliberate emergence of a 
meaning different and often the direct opposite of the meaning intended" 
(1990: 157). 
The justification Flay offers for privileging irony in this way - over, say, 
metaphor - is that irony, when used as a rhetorical framework with which to approach 
an argument, does not involve either "a problem of truth" or "a question of the 
appropriateness of the framework or of the use to which the framework is put" (1990: 
157). This is so because in the case of irony truth is not taken to transcend the 
argument. In this it differs from a trope such as metaphor, which "carries us away 
from the original" (1990: 158)?9 Irony is not transcendence (nor does it lead to 
transcendence or is it transcended itself) for the reason that the truth is not outside the 
argument, and the argument is not measured against such an extra-argumentative 
truth: 
what goes on in a framework of irony is the relating of claims to their 
justifications, not claims to the 'things' to which those claims refer us .... 
With irony one offers a critique which shows that the original form of the 
original position itself has consequences and outcomes which are directly in 
opposition to the consequences and outcomes intended. Instead of being 
drawn away from the original position ... one is more deeply implanted in the 
original position. 
(Flay 1990: 158-159) 
This irony is intimately connected with alterity, as is clear from the metaphor 
("implanted") within which this description of irony is couched, which suggests the 
rootedness of the other position within the original position. Irony goes nowhere~ 
according to Flay, if it transports us at all, then the direction of this transportation is 
not away from, but simultaneously away from and towards the original position. 
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Irony is here described as the same which leads to an other within itself, which leads 
to itself but also to other outcomes. These other "unexpected and perverse outcomes 
are demonstrated on no grounds other than those of the original position" (1990: 159). 
The original content "presents its own irony" (1990: 159), which is simultaneously 
present and not present and must therefore be dis-covered. It would seem that the 
irony with which we are dealing here is not to be controlled.30 
Irony, for Flay, does not occur when the truth of a claim is questioned right 
from the start. Rather, it occurs when the truth of an argument is accepted for 
argument's sake and therefore taken to be justified within the parameters of that 
argument. The force of a particular argument is not assessed on the basis of a thing 
outside of it, but is provisionally accepted. The locus oftruth is taken to be inside, not 
outside the argument. Truth, within an ironic approach to an argument, is not empiric. 
In fact, the empiric might be said to be bracketed within such an approach. 
Approaching an argument on the basis of accepting the justification of its claims, and 
investigating the justification of those claims on the basis of the argument itself, leads 
to irony when those claims are shown to be untenable if the argument is followed 
consistently in the justification of its claims. In the problem Flay is discussing - the 
claim that a particular category of the understanding is absolute - the argument is 
shown to refute itself If the refutation of the argument by itself 
occurs in the framework governed by irony, this means that it has been shown, 
by means of criteria intrinsic to the original position itself, that the claim of 
absoluteness made for the category in question involves us in a self-destructive 
contradiction in some specific, determinate way. . . . [Something] explicitly 
denied in the original position is in fact entailed by the original position. The 
irony is that precisely what was to be avoided, denied, or excluded, must, for 
totally unforeseen reasons, be accepted, affirmed, or included. 
(1990: 160) 
Irony opens the argument to the contamination of what it is not or, rather, exposes the 
argument to have been contaminated all along by what it is not, by what it opposes. 
Irony is not against the understanding; rather, it indicates that the understanding tends 
towards self-destruction if it is followed in its search for an absolute category (for 
instance, being) at the cost of excluding what it is not. 
This irony can be elucidated by tracing Flay's argument relating to the two 
levels of irony - what Flay terms "destructive" and "constructive" irony (referred to 
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above)- in Hegel's dialectic. While destructive irony "occurs in the primary negation 
of the original positive term", constructive irony occurs "in the negation of this 
negation" (1990: 159). First a category which has traditionally been taken to be 
absolute is taken up for consideration ''just because it has been held up by the 
tradition either to define the absolute or to be an integral part of some one category 
that defines the absolute" (1990: 159).31 This initial positive moment of the dialectic 
involves a "description of it [the category] and the claims made for it, not by Hegel, 
but by those in the tradition who held it to be absolute or to be a crucial moment of the 
absolute" (1990: 159). This "description of it and the claims made for it" leads to 
"and in part constitutes the second or dialectical moment proper, and evidences a self-
destructive contradiction in the category as defined and described" (1990: 159-160). 
At this moment we find the first, destructive kind of irony: "The rhetorical framework 
of irony gives us a necessarily self-destructive negation which has absolute force 
because within it we find a determinate negation such that something explicitly 
denied in the original position is in fact entailed by the original position" (1990: 160; 
my emphasis). 
This initial destructive irony, based in the positive moment of the description 
of the claims made for a particular category, results in negation. And this negation is 
the negation of the claim put forward in the course of putting forward the claim. But 
Hegel's project is not to destroy the project of the understanding; on the contrary, 
Hegel is "in agreement with the understanding's desire to find the absolute" (Flay 
1990: 160) and therefore attempts to save "the project of the understanding . . . from 
its own self-destruction" (1990: 161). 
This is a most important point, and it is necessary to trace the argument at 
some length. According to Flay, the dialectic must continue after one has indicated, 
in the first moment of negation which constitutes the dialectical critique, that the 
claim of the understanding refutes itself. The second moment of this critique, which 
moves beyond the dialectical critique, constitutes a speculative moment: "The 
significance of the move beyond the first negative moment lies in Hegel's 
commitment to the preservation of the power of the understanding" (1990: 161)?2 So 
a double irony is at work, an irony of irony. 
The first, negative moment which constitutes the dialectical critique through 
destructive irony, leads towards the dialectical moment proper by moving beyond 
destructive irony: (destructive) irony is transcended by means of (constructive) irony. 
32 
If irony is to be transcended at all, this would, ironically, be by means of irony. Flay 
terms this irony of irony, which involves the ironising of irony, "constructive irony". 
The entire process described here by Flay constitutes the dialectic and 
involves, ultimately, Aujhebung: 
Finally, in the stage following the speculative moment characterized by this 
second form of irony, one finds and takes up a category from the tradition that 
will embrace the constructive contradiction and formulate a new claim to 
absoluteness or a new claim to something that is in part constitutive of 
absoluteness. 
(1990: 161-162) 
Flay illustrates this dialectical process - involving the negative critique of the 
understanding (Verstand) through destructive irony, the positive speculation of reason 
(Vemunjt) through constructive irony, and the new claim, the Aujhebung - with 
reference to the three categories 'being', 'nothing' and 'becoming'. Being, which 
would seem to be the fundament, is supposed to exclude nonbeing (nothing) and 
becoming. Flay proceeds to trace how Hegel indicates that the attempt to determine 
'pure being' as the absolute category is self-destructive as it "turns out in fact to be 
indistinguishable from 'pure nonbeing' or 'pure nothing'. . . . The attempt completely 
to exclude nonbeing from being leads not only to including it in being, but to making 
it identical with being" (1990: 163). 
The self-destruction of being is not inevitable, but can be prevented. This is to 
be done by speculating how the self-refutation occurred in the first place. And the 
way the self-refutation came about, is through the attempt "to determine the absolute 
as being. 'Being' was to give us all that which is and to completely exclude that 
which is not .... It was to allow us fundamentally to differentiate what-is from what-
is-not" (1990: 164). But in order to achieve this differentiation, what-is-not is 
completely excluded from what-is. This exclusion has the result of forcing the 
identification of what-is with what-is-not because of the attempt to make the 
dissociation complete. Flay explains this by elaborating in the following way on the 
ironic tum in this attempt completely to separate being from nonbeing: ". . . to 
understand 'being' as designating that which is without any further determination -
for any determination would involve us with negation and thus with what-is-not- is 
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to make it completely indeterminate and thus indistinguishable from what-is-not or 
nonbeing" (Flay 1990: 164). 
That is, the attempt to determine being as absolute is bound to fail. Being, if it 
is to be absolute, is to be absolutely distinguishable from nonbeing, from its other -
not only from what is not but, determinedly, from what it is not. It cannot be defined 
in terms of what it is not, because "any determination would involve us with negation 
and thus with what-is-not". But not determining being would be to make it 
indeterminate. And nonbeing is, precisely, what is indeterminate, what-is-not. Being 
would thus be equal to nonbeing. What is therefore to be avoided in determining 
being as absolute is "the absolute separation - the absolute nonrelation - of being to 
its opposite, nonbeing; for it is that nonrelation which is the source of the ironical self-
destruction" (1990: 165)?3 
This destructive irony, which shows how the claim to the absolute nature of 
being refutes itself, is followed in the dialectic by a second, constructive irony, as we 
have seen. This second irony governs the speculative moment, which attempts to 
prevent the understanding from self-destructing. If separating being from nonbeing 
(in determining that it is absolute) is only possible by not determining it at all (which 
therefore results in it being indeterminate and therefore equal to what-is-not), then, 
ironically, one should not separate being.from but relate it to nonbeing: " ... to not 
separate the two in order to avoid self-destructive contradiction is to relate them, and 
the category that relates them is 'becoming"' (1990: 165). 
Not only is it ironic that being is to be related to rather than separated from 
nonbeing (ironic, that is, for the reason that separating being from nonbeing in order 
to determine it, results in the self-destruction of the category being through its 
identification with what is indeterminate, namely nonbeing), but it is ironic too that 
becoming (which was deemed a category inferior to being) should now be taken to be 
being: 
. . . 'becoming' was first held to designate either something to be totally 
rejected, or to be relegated to the status of the illusory, or to be made 
dependent upon 'being'. However, we now see that only if we take being as 
becoming, only if we define and describe the category 'being' in terms of what 
has been traditionally held to be the definition and description of the category 
'becoming', will we avoid the specific and determinate cause ofthe first, self-
destructive contradiction that emerged from the category 'being'. 
(Flay 1990: 165) 
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Understanding being as becoming enables one clearly to distinguish between being 
and nonbeing in two ways, namely in terms of "the movement from nonbeing to 
being" and "the movement from being to nonbeing" (1990: 165). A "corollary irony" 
(1990: 165) is that not only does being include nonbeing (from which it is nonetheless 
clearly differentiated as becoming), but nonbeing precedes being: "When being is 
accepted as becoming, nonbeing turns out to 'logically' precede being; for becoming 
is a movement from nothing to nothing" (1990: 165). 
Thus the project of the understanding is saved, but in a way repugnant to the 
understanding (by means of contradiction - cf 1990: 161 ), which turns out to be 
constructive: "What we have now is a constructive contradiction framed within a 
constructive irony, an intelligible unity of opposites, a unity which preserves the 
opposites as opposites" (1990: 165). Nonbeing and becoming, which were to be 
avoided in order to define pure being absolutely, have turned out to be "what is real 
and fundamental about being" (1990: 166). This contradiction is what "preserves as a 
possibility the whole intention and project of a metaphysics of the understanding: to 
get to what is absolutely fundamental concerning what-is through the establishment of 
the difference between being and nonbeing" (1990: 166). 
It is important to note here that irony is conceived, ultimately, as not unsettling 
the order of metaphysical understanding, but as preserving it. However, that order is 
preserved in unsettling it. Irony is not negativity, even if it starts out as such. And the 
result of irony, in the case of the relation between being and nonbeing, is that we find 
that "[becoming] as a category gives us a stable whole that is the framework for 
internal, qualitative difference" (1990: 165). That is, irony does not undermine the 
understanding but strengthens it: ultimately, in this conception, it would have a 
restorative function. 34 Moreover, irony is what enables the comprehension of being: 
" ... we have a conception of what-is that reflects both its unity and its internal 
difference and that gives us our only chance of comprehending being" ( 1990: 166). 
Being is comprehended as Dasein, "determinate being, being-there, existence. We 
have left behind as an illusion pure being, Sein als solches, and now understand the 
absolute to be a being-there that involves difference" (1990: 166). However, this 
determinate being-there must now itself, according to Flay, be comprehended, 
something he sees as the "task at this point". 35 
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Flay qualifies the restorative closure attributed to irony as inherent in dialectic 
by concluding his discussion of Hegel's dialectic in the following way: "To posit a 
linear structure to thought and being is self-destructive. Only the dialectic in the unity 
of thought, in the unity of being, and in the unity of thought and being can give us 
what the original nondialectical understanding wanted, but has now been shown to be 
never capable of achieving" ( 1990: 167). This intimate link between irony and 
dialectic, crucially, involves a closure which is open. Hegel's philosophy, according 
to Flay, does involve a certain kind of closure: 
However, it is a closure which is dialectical in nature, which constantly opens 
up new categories and developments by working on and out of itself The 
ultimate irony is that closure can be truly achieved only by recognizing the 
openness installed by dialectic and the irony which makes the dialectic itself 
matter. 
(1990: 168i6 
The dialectic ends but does not end. It attains a closure founded on openness, "a 
closure which is dialectical in nature".37 
This returns us to the point at which the detour to Hegel, via master/slave and 
the irony of dialectic, was taken. The discussion has indicated the degree to which 
irony forms part of dialectic, in particular as far as its complicated relation to 
transcendence is concerned. In short, irony inheres in that which is ironised. It is 
immanent in the claim or position subjected to irony. This means that no claim or 
position is really subjected to irony, but rather that it may be indicated to contain 
irony within itself However, this irony cannot be contained without altering the 
claim or position. Indeed, the irony is shown to be the other-in-the-same to which the 
same stands in a relation of non-identity, but which is, nonetheless, included within 
itself Irony, as that which exposes the contamination of the supposedly pure by its 
other, is transcended only by itself Irony is necessarily ironised itself, which involves 
an impossible movement of irony beyond itself, a doubling of irony. In this 
movement it not only articulates the ineffable (to return to Behler's terminology), but 
exposes the ineffable as being contained within what is apparently clear and can be 
expressed in straightforward language. This exposure/exposition of the other within 
the apparently straightforward does not entail a move beyond the straightforward as 
much as a move beyond the straightforward which is a move into it. The movement 
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beyond is a movement backwards. Thus irony does not provide resolution through 
transcendence, but opens to itself as other that which was thought to be closed off, 
self-sufficient and whole. In irony Aujhebung is aufgehoben, which is to say that the 
Aujhebung is never final because it can itself be shown to contain within itself an 
other. Irony provides no resolution and no closure; or rather, it provides a resolution 
which is never finite. Irony provides infinitely deferred closure, which is the same as 
saying that there is no resolution of the antinomy self/other (or same/other), no 
articulation of the ineffable. The ineffable remains ineffable, but this ineffability is 
approached (or, rather, approaches) through irony as the non-articulation ofthe other. 
In addition, I would like to argue, in view of the discussion above, that the 
ineffable, if it is ineffable, cannot be articulated, because such articulation would 
amount to a reduction of the other to the same. If it is to be ineffable, it must be truly 
beyond the grasp of phenomenality. This is the same as saying that the ineffable 
cannot appear, because if it appears (if it is articulated, in other words, Said) it no 
longer is ineffable at all. Its otherness will have been elided. And this elision will 
have taken place as a consequence of a movement beyond the phenomenal, articulable 
towards transcendence. But transcendence, if it is to be transcendent, precisely must 
remain beyond the grasp of phenomenality. The transcended cannot be grasped, 
cannot be articulated, if it is to be transcendent. Not only can irony not be 
transcended, as I have attempted to argue in this section, but transcendence itself, as 
beyondness, is an impossibility in the sense that it is not. If irony, which cannot be 
transcended, gives access to the transcendent, then this access always remains the 
outline of access. 
2.3.2 Irony, 'Humour' and Transcendence 
The previous section has ended on a rather abstract note. I would now like to return 
to the discussion, temporarily suspended at the conclusion to section 2.2.3 (above), of 
the relation between irony and otherness in more concrete terms, by referring briefly 
in this section to the studies by Shershow (1986) and Lang (1988). 
The politics of irony forms an important part of the discussion of comedy and 
its relation to transcendence in Scott Cutler Shershow's book on comedy (1986). 
Comedy, according to Shershow, articulates a "double vision" (1986: 26). This 
double vision is the result of two contradictory impulses, and leads to conflicting 
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critics which she terms their '"humorous' critical discourse", and what she calls "a , 
politics of subversion" (1988: 66). The "Anglo-American" critics, such as Muecke, 
Knox and Booth (cf. 1988: 38-46) as well as Wilde and Handwerk (1988: 46-50), 
entertain what is, ultimately, a conservative conception of irony for the reason that it 
can be traced back to the recuperation of unitary subjectivity. 
Lang deems 'irony' to be a rhetorical device which functions on the basis of 
the discrepancy between form and content, or signifier and signified (1988: 3). As 
such, 'irony' is constituted by a 'vertical' relation, "because the meaning is said to be 
concealed under the language (1988: 2). Such irony is resolvable as it is premised on 
the authority of intention (1988: 2) and functions "within a system of vertical 
transcendence" (1988: 35). However, according to Lang "another ('horizontal') 
conception of irony (and of language)" (1988: 2), which she designates as "humor" 
(1988: 4; her italics) rather than 'irony', also occurs in Kierkegaard's treatise. This 
conception Lang calls "horizontal" (1988: 2), as it conceives of meaning as a play of 
signifiers which hides "no positive contenf' (1988: 3; her italics). Language is no 
longer understood as a container of meaning. The reason why Kierkegaard settles for 
the 'vertical' as opposed to 'horizontal' conception of irony is that "to accept all the 
consequences of irony conceived as an irreducible text would be to renounce his 
[Kierkegaard' s] belief in a transcendent signified and ultimately in Transcendence 
itself(orHimselt)" (1988: 3).38 
According to Lang, then, to think of irony as 'humour', as being other than a 
rhetorical device, other than the concealment of intent through inversion, is to forgo 
transcendence. 'Irony', in terms of Lang's terminological distinction between 'irony' 
and 'humour', precisely depends on transcendence as it is ultimately a trope which 
functions within a theory of meaning as expression and language as medium ( cf. 
1988: 5). 'Irony', as a figure of speech, depends on the authority of an originary 
meaning, whether it be that of "a speaker who knows his own thought while couching 
it in potentially misleading language" (1988: 15) or, within an ironic world view, of a 
Transcendent Being whose meaning as Truth is to be investigated and gradually 
revealed - "a Knower whose infinite wisdom is communicated only obscurely 
through the phenomenal world" (1988: 15). To Lang this traditional conception of 
irony still has its supporters - she refers to the "ironic critic", who would define "the 
critic's task as the discovery or revelation of meaning (i.e., authorial intent). The 
40 
ironic critic assumes that language is by nature subservient to conceptualization .... " 
(1988: 5) 
Lang points out that that the conflation of 'irony and 'humour' may be traced 
back to Quintillian' s confusion of the distinction between trope and figure, a 
confusion which implies that irony as figure is situated after the trope irony: 
Quintillian extends "the notion of figure to include the ironic persona in terms which 
imply that the ironic figure is a later (and somewhat deceitful) development or 
proliferation of the ironic trope" (1988: 39). In thus rejecting the conflation of 'irony' 
and 'humour' -which "conflation of two fundamentally different textual phenomena 
[is fostered] with dismaying regularity" by recent literary critics (1988: 35) -Lang 
also by implication rejects the notion that 'irony' somehow precedes 'humour', and 
the concomitant slur that a conception of 'irony' as a rhetorical device is less adequate 
than a conception of irony as 'humour' (cf 1988: 40). 
Nonetheless, it is clear that Lang, inconsistently, detects a historical process at 
work which tends towards the contemporary supersession of 'irony' by 'humour'. 
Thus she invokes Kuhn's work on paradigm shifts in order to distinguish between 
ironic and humorous world views, where the former clearly precedes the latter (1988: 
15ff.). And Lang makes clear her preference for what she calls "the humorous critical 
paradigm" (1988: 8), that is, for 
the critical practice of treating meaning either as an effect of language or as 
the product of the reader's interpretive activity (or some combination of the 
two) [which] is one manifestation of a paradigm whose determinate feature is 
the presupposition of a universe without Transcendence. 
(1988: 15-16) 
'Irony' and 'humour' are here no longer simply critical terms: they become world-
historical determinants. Indeed, Lang characterises her project as follows: "The 
following chapters constitute attempts to read selected works from both the modern 
and postmodern periods with an eye to whatever traces of an ironic or a humorous 
world view may be discernible in each text" (Lang 1988: 69). In addition, as we have 
seen, 'humour' and "the humorous critical paradigm" are invoked as "one 
manifestation . . . of a universe without Transcendence" (1988: 16) because of "the 
relinquishment ofthe ego" (1988: 49). 
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Lang is quite right to argue that transcendence is not possible (otherwise it 
would not be transcendence, as I have argued). While the conception of irony I am 
employing in this study is analogous to what Lang understands under 'humour', I do 
not wish to insist, as Lang does, that 'irony' and 'humour' are "two fundamentally 
different textual phenomena" (1988: 35). This might well be the case, although (as 
we have seen Dane argue) such a clear-cut distinction would be questionable. While I 
am aware of the dangers inherent in less than rigorous distinctions (and would not 
claim that irony or, indeed, otherness, constitutes a monolith), I do not find 
taxonomies of ironies particularly helpful for the reason that they seem to obscure 
what is common to all irony, albeit in diverse manifestations. I am thinking here, of 
course, of the importance of otherness for any conception of irony. Otherness is as 
important in traditional, rhetorical conceptions of irony as it is in other varieties of 
irony. It is, in any event, as I indicated at the start of this chapter, not my intention to 
play different critics off against one another (although, to some extent, comparisons 
are inevitable). Similarly, my interest does not lie in formulating a new, more 
adequate theory of irony, but in establishing the link between irony and otherness, in 
particular in terms of de Man's conceptions of irony and Levinas' s of otherness. 
Before concluding this chapter, I would like to return briefly to Lang's 
distinction between 'irony' and 'humour', a distinction which I find interesting but 
which does not appear unproblematic. As I argued earlier, I do not conceive of irony 
as being beyond transcendence, nor do I conceive of transcendence as being 'beyond' 
irony. On the contrary, if transcendence is to be truly beyond, then it is never to be 
reached, never to be within the compass of being and comprehension. Irony (or, in 
Lang's terminology, 'humour'), as I shall argue in the next chapter, is precisely one 
manifestation, not of a universe without transcendence, but of an infinite approach 
from the beyond of being towards the subject of language which interrupts the 
subject's conception of the other. 
Lang uses the concept 'transcendence' in terms of what she calls a vertical 
relationship. But the terms of her argument make clear that she abolishes the 
possibility of such a vertical relationship: ultimately, to her, Kierkegaard' s postulation 
of a vertical relationship between the subject and a God above and beyond serves 
merely to recuperate the fullness of the subject: 
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· · : i? the Kierkegaardian scheme, the ego is redeemed in its infinite eternal 
v~hdity thr?ug? the s,ubject'.s rel~ti?nship to God. Both irony and 
Kierkegaardian humour function Within a system of vertical transcendence· 
the rec~peration of the self in a transcendental Other remains as egotistical ~ 
theoretical gesture as the self-aggrandizement practiced by the ironist. 
(Lang 1988: 35i9 
If transcendence is truly beyond being, as I have argued above, then it leads not to 
closure and comprehension but to their deferral. In terms of Lang's scheme, this 
means that 'irony' is not truly transcendent because it leads to "the recuperation of the 
self in a transcendental [sic] Other". That is, the transcendent is used by the self in the 
service of its reconstitution of itself through irony. Ironically, Lang's 'humour' might 
be said to 'be' transcendent precisely because it does not reach a final resting place, a 
dis/solution. It suspends that on which to Lang 'irony' depends: the distinction 
between form and content, appearance and reality - and thus moves beyond essence, 
being and phenomenon. 
2.4 Concluding Remarks 
I hope to have established in this chapter that there is, indeed, a link between irony 
and otherness. I also hope to have indicated that this relationship is, more often than 
not, defined in terms of politics. Moreover, I hope to have indicated the controversial 
nature of the politics of irony. 
Irony has been found to be discussed, approached and used in terms of the 
politics of criticism (Dane), in terms of irony as it happens in empirical, everyday 
events (Hutcheon), as a distinguishing mark of postmodernism and its privileging of 
the marginalised (Behler), as a trait of what appears as a rather deficient mode of 
comedy (Shershow), and as an embodiment of a politics of subversion (Lang). It has 
been seen to be portrayed variously as hierarchical and conservative, and therefore 
necessarily elitist (Dane), as transideological, sometimes conservative, and sometimes 
subversive (Hutcheon), as the sine qua non of modernity and therefore postmodemity, 
in the service of which its support for the marginalised is cancelled out as a result of 
its subversion of system and totality (Behler), as caught in a finite dialectic of the 
utopian and conservative (Shershow), and as split between a conservative 
ontotheological mode on the one hand, and a radically subversive assertion of the 
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death of God and the impossibility of transcendence within a 'humorous' paradigm on 
the other (Lang). 
I hope to have established, therefore, that there is little agreement on the nature 
of the politics of irony. Instead, there seems to be a multitude of contending and 
sometimes strident voices who variously seek to discard or deify irony vis-a-vis 
politics. One contribution of this thesis will hopefully be, by bracketing the question 
of the politics of irony and stepping back towards an ethics of irony defined in 
Levinasian terms, to offer at least a conceptual framework from which one might 
attempt to establish more clearly the nature of the politics of irony, an ethical base 
upon which might be constructed a theory ofthe politics of irony. 
Throughout this chapter, I have attempted to indicate the importance of the 
notion 'transcendence' in discussions of irony, particularly as far as its relation with 
otherness - understood as a political relation - is concerned. 'Transcendence', as I 
also hope to have suggested, is a crucial notion in any understanding of irony. This 
will prove to be the case, too, in the next chapter, which is concerned not with the 
politics of irony, but with what will hopefully tum out to be an ethical dimension of 
the relationship between irony and otherness. 
2.5 Notes 
1 My use of the term politics in this chapter is rather general. In Chapter 3 I 
hope to elaborate on a Levinasian conception of politics as constituting the 
order of the same in its attempted elision of otherness through the egological 
reduction of the other to the same. My use of the term 'politics' in terms of 
empirical relationships in the present chapter, if not refined vis-a-vis Levinas, 
hopefully at least anticipates that concept. 
2 Dane (1991: 221-230) and Hutcheon (1994: 210-238) provide what are 
probably the fullest bibliographies on irony. General surveys of and 
specialised monographs on aspects of irony include those by Simpson (1979), 
Smyth (1986), Handwerk (1985), Wilde (1987), Lang (1988), Behler (1990), 
Dane (1991) and Hutcheon (1994). 
3 Lang points out that Kierkegaard also identifies two kinds of irony which are 
related to two conceptions of Socrates (cf. 1988: 24). 
4 I disagree with Dane's contention that irony is necessarily always premised 
upon hierarchy and authority, indeed, upon elitism. Such a view of irony only 
serves to propound a highly politicised conception of irony and forgets its 
ethical aspect. In my view, which I shall argue at greater length in the next 
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chapter, irony possesses the potential to move beyond, or, rather, before 
politics in its interruption of the conceptualisation of otherness effected by 
politics. 
5 This shift in the conception of how irony works need not in itself be 
considered strange. It must be noted that, for Mileur (1998: 199), revisionism 
is part of the essence of irony: most discussions of revisionism ("whether by 
Nietzsche or Levi-Strauss or Derrida") "are actually guided and made possible 
by a form of revisionist consciousness. I speak of irony". Irony is a form of 
revisionist consciousness, which means that revisionism involves irony. 
However, irony itself is also always subject to revisionism. Irony, as 
revisionism, is subject to the revision of itself (This characteristic folding 
back of irony upon itself is discussed in greater detail in the next chapter vis-a-
vis de Man's conception of irony.) The implication would be that a single 
view of irony would not be tenable. 
6 At this point it might be worth remarking in passing that more than one critic 
has noted the intimate link between de Man and the New Critics, phrasing 
their discussions in terms of the supposed organicism of de Man's position and 
his conflation of poetry with its criticism (cf Sychrava 1989: 102-104; 170-
173; Behler 1990: 101-103; Dane 1991: 169; 172-182). Behler, for instance, 
explicitly defines de Man's conception of irony in terms of the New Criticism, 
while specifying it as the negative of that of the New Criticism: 
One reason for the prominence of irony in de Man's writings may 
simply have been the new criticism. Just as irony had been the 
'principle of structure' in literary works for some of the new critics 
(e.g., Cleanth Brooks), irony was for de Man the principle of disrupture 
in a literary text. Whereas the new criticism saw irony, ambiguity, and 
paradox as forging together the multiplicity and variety of a poetic 
work to an organic whole of integrality, harmony, complete identity 
with itself, and self-presence, de Man conceived of irony in terms of a 
discrepancy between sign and meaning, a lack of coherence among the 
parts of a work, a self-destructive ability on the part of literature to 
articulate its own fictionality, and an inability to escape from a 
situation that has become unbearable. 
(Behler 1990: 1 02) 
De Man, contrary to allegations of being a closeted New Critic, was quite open 
about his indebtedness to the New Criticism (cf 1979: 4). Moreover, the 
thrust of his critical enterprise could be characterised as an attempt to put in 
question the very notions of organicism of which he has subsequently been 
accused. See the next chapter for a more exhaustive discussion of de Man's 
complicated conception of irony. 
7 In the next chapter I attempt to indicate that irony, at least in de Man's 
conception and for the purposes of this thesis, is to be associated with 
undecidability. It would be a misapprehension to consider irony elitist for the 
reason that nobody - least of all the ironist - is immune to irony. Indeed, 
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irony itself is subject to irony and thus structurally tends towards undoing 
itself and its authority. 
8 I consider the problem of defining irony in the next chapter. 
9 See my discussion of Hutcheon's and Lang's work, below, for an elaboration 
of the points made here. 
10 Dane's insistence on the necessarily hierarchical and authoritarian structure of 
irony is contrary to the position for which I shall argue in the next chapter. 
See note 7, above. 
11 As should be clear from the fact that she attributes hierarchy to one function of 
irony (the "aggregative"), she does not disagree with as much as modulates 
this view - and refers specifically to Dane's association of a "rhetoric of 
hierarchy" with irony (1994: 54). 
12 On the contrary, one gets the idea that Hutcheon is very much in control of her 
subject matter. Indeed, this control extends so far as to allow Hutcheon to 
state confidently, as a matter of fact, that "this is a book about irony, and not 
an ironic book" (1994: 7). This claim would presuppose that Hutcheon is in 
control of irony, a claim apparently borne out by the admittedly impressive 
taxonomies of and references to irony found in her study. Nonetheless, as I 
shall argue elsewhere in this study, it is part of the structure of irony to undo 
itself In addition, irony can only be transcended ironically, which is to say 
that irony tends towards ironising itself On these grounds alone it would be 
impossible to employ irony unironically or, in Hutcheon's case, to refer to 
irony without willy-nilly becoming entangled in it. Assuming that one can 
transcend irony implies an untenable presupposition that one can escape the 
contamination of irony, difference and, indeed, otherness. 
At least one reviewer has made similar points with regard not only to 
Hutcheon's work on irony in particular, but to her oeuvre in general ( cf Scott 
1997). 
13 Following Williams's (1992) elaboration on the distinction between empirics 
and eidetics, one might say that Hutcheon's work is concerned primarily with 
the empirics of irony (how it works) and with the politics of its effects. 
Williams characterises eidetics as "analysis of the concept" (1992: 133), and 
states that it is "an exploration of meaning at the general level of ontology, 
namely the study of possibility" (1992: 144). Empirics, on the other hand, 
entails "concrete investigations of the concept in determinate form" (1992: 
133). Clearly, Hutcheon does spend a great deal of her time analysing the 
concept irony. Nonetheless, the burden of her study is to investigate the 
politics of irony as it is used in determinate, everyday forms. In any event, 
Williams (1992: 169) cautions against artificially installing an absolute 
separation between eidetics and empirics: 
The distinction between eidetics and empirics, between Begriff and 
experience is not an absolute one; it would be a mistake to conceive it 
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as an ontological dualism. Eidetics is not some realm apart from or 
beyond the empirical~ rather, as Hegel says, it is only the empirical 
brought closer, i.e., made explicit and brought into focus. The eidetic 
structures of being-for-self and being-for-other, reciprocity and 
reversal, are not actual apart from experience. 
14 This would seem to be the implication of Dane's position. The other meaning 
has authority and is recuperated as the proper meaning. 
15 It is this point which will be elaborated in far greater detail in the next chapter, 
specifically vis-a-vis Levinas's understanding of the other in terms of a trace 
which is always past. 
16 The other does not strictly speaking 'appear'. To say that it appears would be 
to make of it a phenomenon. Rather, it is the trace of the always already past 
other which appears. I discuss this point in somewhat greater detail in the next 
chapter (see 3.2.2, below). Some of the other points made in this paragraph 
are also dealt with in a more thorough way in Chapter 3. In particular, I 
elaborate on the relation between infinity and the other (see especially 3.2.1, 
3.2.2) and between irony and infinity (see 3.3.1, 3.3.2). 
17 As indicated above, this study is not concerned primarily with the uses of 
irony. This does not mean that irony cannot be used. In the next chapter, 
nonetheless, the easy assumption that irony can be used and controlled, to the 
extent that it becomes a position, will be treated with scepticism. 
18 Hutcheon's use of terms relating to intention does not seem to have much in 
common with phenomenology. 
19 On irony as act, in particular as performative, see Gasche ( 1981 ). 
20 It should be noted that, in the course of her discussion of the problematic 
nature of the politics of irony vis-a-vis feminist politics, Hutcheon offers a 
brief consideration of J. M. Coetzee's Foe (1986) in terms of its engagement 
with "both feminist and postcolonial political contexts" (1994: 30). Her 
comments, particularly with regard to what she terms Coetzee's "ironizing of 
allegory" ( 1994: 31) are tantalising if all too brief 
21 Such a version of irony implies dependence on a notion of transcendence 
which encloses just what might be argued to be transcendent itself - the 
ineffable, the other. It reduces the transcendence of the transcendent by 
enclosing it within the realm of being-here-below. Such a move is 
problematic, as I shall argue below vis-a-vis Flay's (1990) essay on Hegel's 
Logic. 
22 As we have seen, this is a move of which Joseph Dane disapproves. Dane 
does not engage directly with Behler's study, though he does refer to earlier 
work by Behler. Even though Behler's study was only published in 1990, the 






Behler does not clearly distinguish between postmodernity and postmodernism 
(or modernity and modernism). I have followed his fuzzy use of these terms 
in the course of describing his argument, although obviously some form of 
distinction is desirable. Elsewhere in this thesis I employ the conventional 
uses of these terms. In other words, modernity and postmodernity may be said 
to refer to intellectual and philosophical tendencies, while modernism and 
postmodernism relate primarily to artistic and literary tendencies. 
The following brief discussion of Behler's argument vis-a-vis 
postmodernity and modernity is necessary in order to establish his view on the 
relation between irony and otherness, which is couched in Behler's discussion 
ofthe politics ofpostmodernism. 
Behler indicates the extent to which the tendency of Romantic writers to refer 
to Romantic poetry- that is, poetry contemporary to them- as 'modern' is 
precisely an effect of their modernity. Designating this poetry 'modern' is an 
indication of the self-reflexive nature of modernity and implies a process of 
progression and infinite perfectibility according to which modern poetry, like 
science, is seen to exceed that of the ancients. See Behler (1990: 37ff.) for a 
discussion of the extension of the notion of progress and infinite perfectibility 
from the realm of science to that of poetry. 
In terms of the argument of this thesis, it would of course also reduce 
otherness itself. 
Behler does, however, elaborate on what he calls "an extension of art to mass 
society and mass culture" (1990: 8), which is typical of aesthetic life and 
production in postmodernism. This leads to "a levelling of art to the standards 
of a mass culture" which is characteristic of the postmodern, a reduction of the 
aesthetic to the economic: 
Art is no longer the realm of otherness, no longer able to hold a mirror, 
to point a finger. . . . [The] museum has become a postmodernist 
architectural building surrounded by shops and restaurants where 
objects of exhibition are evaluated according to economic standards. 
. . . [Purpose-oriented] activities based entirely on profit, such as 
advertising, assume the lofty I 'art pour I 'art attitude of complete 
purposelessness. 
(Behler 1990: 8-9; c£ Steiner 1989) 
Nonetheless, finally, the very diversity of styles characteristic of 
postmodernism leads Behler to identify it with otherness (c£ 1990: 9). 
27 This detour is of importance not only because it will afford us a better 
understanding of the relation between irony and transcendence, but because 
this relation involves otherness. Thus, this discussion may serve as an 
introduction to the discussions in the next chapter of the relation between 
irony (vis-a-vis de Man) and otherness (vis-il-vis Levinas). 
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28 These are evidently Levinasian terms. I shall elaborate on these terms in 
particular on the paradoxical, indeed, ironical nature of the (non)relation~hip 
with the other in the next chapter. 
29 This is, indeed, suggested by the etymology of the word "metaphor" ( cf de 
Man 1986: 83). The full quotation from Flay (1990: 158) reads as follows: 
To look again at metaphor for a contrast, a critique in these terms is one 
which takes the original position away from its original form by 
suggesting and arguing that the original form was deficient because 
there were aspects of the state of affairs being referred to which had 
been simply overlooked. The metaphor carries us away from the 
original. 
Irony is more persuasive than metaphor as it takes us closer to, in fact, right 
into the claim. 
30 Whether irony can be controlled or not is a question which also arises from de 
Man's conception of irony, which involves irony ironising itself See note 7, 
above. 
31 The absolute is defined parenthetically by Flay as being a fundament of being, 
and thus as being ontological. See the following statements: "The category 
'being' is the first, and seemingly most natural candidate for the absolute" 
(Flay 1990: 162); "the absolute means the ultimate unity of what-is such that 
there is no need to go beyond it or to look for a more fundamental category" 
(Flay 1990: 159). 
32 Flay emphasises that he is not in agreement with Hegel's project of attempting 
to preserve the understanding (cf 1990: 161 note 10). 
33 Thus we are here again, as in the discussion of master/slave, confronted with 
the problem of otherness, which, as otherness, is absolutely separate from, yet 
completely involuted in the selfsame. 
34 On this point, see note 32, above. 
35 I shall disagree that it is the task at hand to comprehend being. Rather, in the 
next chapter I follow Levinas's consideration of the otherwise than being. 
Even though this study quite consciously attempts to focus on irony vis-a-vis a 
Levinasian conception of otherness, one might invert this opposition and 
consider the implications of irony for an investigation of otherness. Such an 
investigation would then be an impossible, ironic one: to comprehend being 
would be to include and not include the other (of being); to comprehend the 
other would be not to comprehend it. 
36 That is, it matters and is given force as a result of first being negative, 
indicating that it is the understanding itself which causes its own self-
destruction. 
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3 7 Flay ends his consideration of Hegelian dialectic with a summary of the 
contemporary situation in philosophy, to which I would like to refer 
parenthetically only at this point. There are still many philosophies which are 
pre-Hegelian and of the understanding, "a remnant of the movement of 
modernity in the classical age, a remnant of the thinking that Hegel showed to 
be self-destructive" (1990: 168-169). But Flay says there are also other 
philosophies, which he characterises as ironic: 
... there exists a set of thinkers who take up the theme and power of 
irony and other rhetorical frameworks, and who begin to articulate the 
ascendency of rhetoric, not in the traditional way in which it is made 
either a handmaiden or enemy of philosophy, but as an important 
structure to be analysed and employed for itself. Nietzsche and 
Kierkegaard and their twentieth-century progeny continue the work 
begun by Hegel in his engagement with philosophies of the 
understanding. 
(1990: 169) 
38 It may be interesting to note that Lang's distinction between 'irony' and 
'humour', explicitly made as it is in terms of a further spatial distinction 
involving vertical and horizontal approaches to irony, is reminiscent of Dane's 
(1991: 149fT.) characterisation of Cleanth Brooks's New Critical approach to 
irony. Brooks similarly privileges a "horizontal tension" over a "vertical 
hierarchy" (Dane 1991: 149). Thus Lang's project may be closer than she 
would admit to that of the "Anglo-American" ironists she derides. 
39 Lang is here referring to the Romantic ironist, whose brand of irony is rejected 
by Kierkegaard. Romantic irony is assigned "a value (albeit negative)" by 
Kierkegaard (1988: 35) and is thus defined teleologically (1988: 34) in its very 
refractoriness with regard to definition, resulting in what is a denial of 
verticality and confirmation of the horizontal in its (that is, that of Romantic 
irony) "assertion of an aberrant subjectivity" (1988: 34) which leads to "an 
exacerbated egoism" (1988: 49) as a result of its protest over the self-other 
dichotomy and, finally, to a "despairing self-knowledge" (1988: 52). 
One might also note at this point that Lang's critique of false 
transcendence and religion is reminiscent of Levinas' s critique of theology as 
an institution in Otherwise than Being (cf. Peperzak 1993: 224fT.). But 
Levinas' s critique goes one step further: he is concerned with something 
beyond a relationship with the other, a true transcendence as opposed to 




Irony and Otherness: From the Other 
3.1 Introduction 
After having established, in the previous chapter, that there is, indeed, a link between 
irony and otherness, and that this link involves a problematic political relation, I want 
to turn in this chapter to a closer examination of one particular way of understanding 
the relation between irony and otherness - one informed by the thinking of, 
respectively, Emmanuel Levinas and Paul de Man. As intimated at the end of the 
previous chapter, bracketing the problem of the political nature of irony and focusing 
on an examination of the relation between irony and otherness in terms of Levinasian 
ethics, might lead to the future development of a more thorough understanding of the 
relation between irony and otherness in terms of politics conceived as starting with 
ethics. 1 
My attempt at more clearly defining the relation between irony and otherness 
in this chapter will be informed, as I have made clear from the start of this thesis, by 
Emmanuel Levinas' s thinking. I need to emphasise here that this thesis will limit 
itself quite severely to one particular perspective on otherness (one related to the work 
of Levinas) and one particular perspective on irony (informed by the work of de 
Man). This is, quite obviously, not to claim that other important versions of otherness 
or irony do not exist. Nor is it, willy-nilly, to ignore a host of other crucial work done 
on the topics of irony and otherness, as well as on the relation between them. On the 
contrary, it is a measure of the enormous range of these problems that I have chosen 
to focus the thesis in the way I have. 
Nonetheless, I do believe that a Levinasian conception of otherness may be a 
highly potent vehicle for a critique of other, less adequate notions of otherness. 
Similarly, I believe that a de Manian conception of irony raises problems in terms of 
our understanding of irony which cannot be ignored? And it is my contention that a 
Levinasian conception of otherness and a de Manian one of irony may have a great 
deal in common, or may, at least, offer enlightening perspectives on each other. 
As far as otherness is concerned, I shall attempt to outline Levinas' s ethics, in 
particular with respect to the double bind in which his description of the other is 
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caught. While Levinas engages in a description of the other, his work asserts that the 
other is beyond description. That is, his description of the other may be characterised 
by his recognition of the impossibility of adequately describing the other. I shall 
attempt to outline Levinas' s ethics in terms of his non-conception of the other and his 
rejection ofthe possibility of representing the other.3 My discussion will proceed via 
Levinas' s insistence on the radical pastness (or passedness - cf Levinas 1981: 9) of 
the other as trace. The other, as irreducibly past and as always already having passed 
to an other place, cannot be made present, that is, represented. The other always 
exceeds the representations made of it. Representing otherness destroys otherness -
the only adequate representation of the other, the only representation which respects 
the otherness of the other, is to be found in the acknowledgement that the other cannot 
be represented. Furthermore, representations of the other, because they totalise and 
enclose the other by thematising and conceptualising its otherness, must be 
interrupted and fragmented in order to show that they form part of the economy of the 
Same. This interruption of representation, as ontological Said, takes place in reducing 
the Said to an ethical Saying. 4 
This discussion ofLevinas's philosophy will be followed by a consideration of 
irony in terms of Paul de Man's understanding of that concept. In brief, it will be my 
contention that the other as trace, when represented or embodied, is necessarily 
embodied and given a face by the representing subject. Thus, the trope of 
prosopopoeia is at work in any representation of otherness. But, if the other as trace 
of what is absent is not available to representation, then the other may be understood 
and represented- given a face-as-mask- only catachrestically. The catachresis, by 
means of which the other is prosopopeically represented, is interrupted in order to 
allow for a break in the adequating representation of the other. This interruption of 
the face given to the other may be understood as involving irony as permanent 
parabasis. 
This attempt to read de Manian irony in terms of Levinasian ethics, as outlined 
above, should in no way be construed as entailing a levelling of differences. I shall 
not be suggesting fanciful relations between Levinas and de Man (be they conscious 
or otherwise). Instead, I shall argue that Levinas's perspective on otherness may 
provide a conceptual framework within which one could place de Man's 
understanding of irony, and that this understanding of irony, conversely, might serve 
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to illuminate aspects of Levinas' s thought. The point needs to be stressed that this 
thesis is not primarily meant to be a comparative study of Levinas and de Man, but a 
study of irony in terms of the representation (for lack of a better term) of otherness. 
Different as these thinkers are, aspects of their respective systems of thought might be 
brought to bear on issues involving irony and otherness. 5 
3. 2 Otherness 
3.2.1 Otherness, Ethics and the Face 
According to Simon Critchley, "Levinasian ethics bears a critical relation to the 
philosophical tradition. For Levinas, Western philosophy has most often been what 
he calls 'ontology', by which he means the attempt to comprehend the Being of what 
is, or beings (das Sein des Seienden)" (1992: 5; cf. Levinas 1969: 42ff.). As should be 
clear from this quotation, in order to understand Levinasian ethics it is important to 
note Levinas's philosophical context, in particular vis-a-vis phenomenology. I would 
like to consider briefly the link between Levinas on the one hand, and Husserl and 
Heidegger on the other. 
Peperzak makes the point that, of twentieth-century philosophers, only Husserl 
and Heidegger "are almost constantly present" (1983: 113) in Levinas's thought: 
Husserl started the revolution in philosophy called 'phenomenology'; 
Heidegger exploited hidden possibilities of Husserl' s phenomenology and 
transformed it into a new ontology; Levinas developed and tried to overcome 
phenomenological ontology by a new sort of 'metaphysics', rehabilitating the 
existent (das Seiende, l'etant or l'existant) by a thought 'beyond Being' (au-
de/a de I 'etre,jenseits des Seins). 
(Peperzak 1983: 113) 
Peperzak considers only the very early stage ofLevinas's career (1927-1950), but, as 
he points out (1983: 114), the central theme of Totality and Infinity is already clearly 
articulated in an early essay translated as "Is Ontology Fundamental?" (1996). And, 
as Critchley points out, Levinas's work after Totality and Infinity (1969) may be 
viewed as a radicalisation of that work: whereas in Totality and Infinity otherness as 
"a point of exteriority is located in the face of the Other, but is still articulated in the 
language of ontology" (1992: 6), in his later Otherwise than Being (1981), Levinas is 
concerned with "the possibility of an ethical form of language, the Saying (le Dire), 
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which would be irreducible to the ontological language of the Said (le Dit)" (1992: 7). 
Put differently, while Totality and Infinity 
powerfully articulates the non-ontological 'experience' of the face of the Other 
in the language of ontology . . . Otherwise than Being is a performative 
disruption of the language of ontology. . . . Whereas Totality and Infinity 
writes about ethics, Otherwise than Being is the performative enactment of 
ethical writing. . .. 
(Critchley 1992: 8) 
This is to say that the influence of Husserlian phenomenology and Heideggerian 
ontology persists throughout the Levinasian oeuvre, which entails the necessity of 
briefly considering Husserlian phenomenology and Heideggerian ontology. 6 My 
discussion will focus on Husserlian phenomenology as the immediate basis of the 
work of both Heidegger and Levinas. Critchley (1992: 4) explains the Levinasian 
conception of ethics, that is, "the putting into question of the ego, the knowing 
subject, self-consciousness, or what Levinas, following Plato, calls the Same (le 
meme; to auton)", in terms of Husserlian phenomenology: "In Husserlian terms, the 
domain of the Same includes not only the intentional acts of consciousness (noeses), 
but also the intentional objects which give meaning to those acts and are constituted 
by consciousness (noemata)". 
As far as phenomenology is concerned, Peperzak (1983: 115) affirms that 
"intentionality is the key concept by which the relationships between consciousness 
and reality have to be understood". As Husser} (1970: 23; his italics) puts it, "True 
being . .. has significance only as a particular correlate of my own intentionality". 
For Husserl, only through the transcendental ego - which is reached through the 
reduction of "the natural human ego" by means of the phenomenological reduction or 
epoche (Husserl 1970: 10)- "does the being of the world, and, for that matter, any 
being whatsoever, make sense to me and have possible validity" (Husserl 1970: 10).7 
The intending subject has access to the world beyond the self, which Husser! terms 
"transcendent' (1970: 10), through the transcendental ego and "the transcendental 
system of intentionality [through which] nature or the world exist [sic] invariably for 
the ego" (1970: 21-22).8 This leads Husserl to make the following crucial claim: 
Transcendence is an immanent mode of being, that is, one that constitutes 
itself within the ego. Every conceivable meaning, every thinkable being -
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regardless of whether it is immanent or transcendent- falls within the realm of 
transcendental subjectivity. The idea of something outside of this realm is a 
contradiction: transcendental subjectivity is the universal and absolute 
concretion. 
(Husser! 1970: 32) 
The realm of transcendental subjectivity encloses everything, that is, "Every 
conceivable meaning, every thinkable being". But Levinas's ethical claim is that, 
unthinkably, there 'is' something beyond being, something transcendent which does 
not "[fall] within the realm of transcendental subjectivity". Within this realm, to 
which everything can and must be related, and which is therefore the realm of the 
Same, the other is violently reduced in order to be mastered, comprehended and 
represented by the subject: "As a result of its intentional, or directional, nature, 
consciousness reduces the other to its object and, in so doing, it achieves a full 
correspondence between its representations and external 'reality'" (Marais 1997:1). It 
is in this sense that one may understand Peperzak's (1983: 116) contention that 
"Levinas characterizes Husserl's philosophy as a ... vorstellende, and 'objectifying' 
or 'representationist' way ofthought. ... ".9 
The transcendental subject gains knowledge of the two fundamental modes of 
being - "the being of the objects of outer perception and the being of consciousness" 
(Peperzak 1983: 115) - on the basis of objectification which entails a process of 
making present (re-presentation): " ... both modes of being converge insofar as they 
can be 'defined' as the presence of the object itself for consciousness or as the 
presence of consciousness to its objects" (Peperzak 1983: 115). Objects, including 
the consciousness of the transcendental subject itself (which can be objectified in 
reflection), are available, can be re-presented and grasped because of their presence. 
As Levinas (1996f: 152) puts it, "Presence as a letting-itself-be-taken, as the chance of 
understanding; knowledge remains linked to perception and to apprehension and to 
the grasp even in the concept or the Begriff' .10 
This insistence on presence, and representation, forms a cornerstone of 
Levinas's (as it does of Derrida's) rejection of phenomenology and his 
characterisation of it as ontology. 11 The emphasis on presence results in a view of 
knowledge as resting "on things given in a world that is given, which Husser! will call 
the life-world, the famous Lebenswelf' (Levinas 1996f: 152). Within such knowledge 
"nothing remains absolutely other" (1996f: 153). The "intentional will" of thought 
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masters all otherness through "conceptual synopsis [which] is stronger than all the 
diversity and incompatibility of unassemblable terms, stronger than any diachrony 
which would want to be radical and irreducible" (1996f: 153)_12 Husser! insists "that 
ideal knowledge is adequacy (i.e., the exact 'fitting' of the world into consciousness)" 
(Peperzak 1983: 116; cf. 1993: 21), the correlation of being and intentionality: 
Levinas notes that "the structure of all thought ... is correlation (1996c: 67) and that 
"consciousness is intentionality in Husserlian phenomenology: cogitation comes out 
of itself, but the cogitatum is present to cogitation, the noema equals the noesis and 
corresponds to its intention" (1996f: 153). 
Such a model of full correspondence, correlation and comprehension means 
that, "At the most basic level ... the relation between same and other is one of violent 
adequation" (Marais 1997: 1). This reduction of the other to the same, Levinas 
claims, characterises not only Husserlian but Western philosophy as such13 and is also 
apparent in Heidegger. Levinas takes the understanding of a being as the elision of 
the otherness of that being, and rhetorically asks how it would be possible for the 
relation with being to be anything but the comprehension of being: 
The understanding of a being will thus consist in going beyond that being 
(I 'etant) into the openness and in perceiving it upon the horizon of being. That 
is to say, comprehension, in Heidegger, rejoins the great tradition of Western 
philosophy: to comprehend the particular being is already to place oneself 
beyond the particular. To comprehend is to be related to the particular that 
only exists through knowledge, which is always knowledge of the universal. 
. . . [One] is forced, it would seem, to subject relations between beings to 
structures of being, metaphysics to ontology, the existentiell to the existential. 
How, moreover, can the relation with being be, from the outset, anything other 
than its comprehension as being (etant), the fact of freely letting it be 
inasmuch as it is being (etant)? 
Unless it is the other (Autrui). Our relation with the other (autrui) 
certainly consists in wanting to comprehend him, but this relation overflows 
comprehension. 
(Levinas 1996: 5-6) 
That is, the other cannot be contained within comprehension, which is the 
comprehension of what is, of being. In terms of Husserlian phenomenology, "The 
other qua other cannot be accommodated in the noema of a noesis" (Levinas 1996f: 
153). For the reason that "it is co-extensive with being, consciousness cannot meet 
with meaningless or irrational being. Its contact with reality is never a shock" 
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(Peperzak 1983: 119). Levinas (1996b: 48; cf 1996a: 14; cf also Peperzak 1993: 91; 
Critchley 1992: 109) thus likens Western philosophy as autonomy to the travels of 
Ulysses rather than Abraham: "The itinerary of philosophy remains that of Ulysses, 
whose adventure in the world was only a return to his native island - a complacency 
in the Same, an unrecognition of the Other". No surprises are in store for the subject 
of such a philosophy (cf 1996d: 80; Peperzak 1993:16): "The 'act' of representation 
discovers, properly speaking, nothing before itself' (1969: 125). In representation, 
the object is present to the subject and otherness is, unsurprisingly, elided: " ... the 
structure of representation as a non-reciprocal determination of the other by the same 
is precisely for the same to be present and for the other to be present to the same. We 
call it 'the same' because in representation the I precisely loses its opposition to its 
object. ... " (1969: 126; cf 128).14 
However, the other does not fit into philosophy as the coincidence of being 
and consciousness: "The signifier, he who emits the sign, faces, despite the 
interposition of the sign, without proposing himself as a theme" (Levinas 1969: 96). 
On the contrary, the other "exceeds conceptuality and cognitive categories" (Marais 
1997: 62) because, as Levinas (1969: 196) insists, "The idea of infinity, the infinitely 
more contained in the less, is concretely produced in the form of a relation with the 
face" of the other. 15 And the relation between other and self is characterised by 
asymmetry to the degree that Levinas calls this relation an "'unrelating relation', 
which no one can encompass or thematize" (1969: 295), a relation which escapes 
comprehension and transcends conceptuality: "The face is present in its refusal to be 
contained. In this sense it cannot be comprehended, that is, encompassed. It is 
neither seen nor touched - for in visual or tactile sensation the identity of the I 
envelops the alterity of the object, which becomes precisely a content" (Levinas 1969: 
194). 
This is to say that, in phenomenological terms, the other falls outside the 
horizon of being. 16 As Blanchot (1993: 52) recognises, this would mean that, in its 
infinitude and height, the face of the other is invisible because the other 
comes from elsewhere and is always somewhere other than where we are, not 
belonging to our horizon and not inscribing himself upon any representable 
horizon whatsoever, so that his 'place' would be the invisible - on condition 
that we hear in this expression . . . what turns away from everything visible 
and invisible. 
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The face falls outside the "domain of visible things" (Blanchot 1993: 54). Blanchot's 
important qualification here is that the face of the other 'is' not invisible: it "turns 
away" from conceptualisation as either visible or invisible. In the place of the 
transcendental subject who masters objects and is able to gain knowledge understood 
as representing (that is, making present) intentional objects of knowledge by means of 
intentional acts, we find in Levinas, as Blanchot explains, a self disturbed ( cf Levinas 
1996b: 59) by the other: the self appears as no longer in control because "the other 
imposes itself upon me as exceeding me infinitely: a relation that relates me to what 
goes beyond me and escapes me to the very degree that, in this relation, I am and 
remain separated" (Blanchet 1993: 52).17 
The face of the Levinasian face to face, for the reason that it does not appear 
but "always exceeds both the representation I might make of it and any form, any 
image, any view, any idea by which I might affirm it, arrest it, or simply let it be 
present" (Blanchot 1993: 54) must remain unknown and the Stranger (cf. 1993: 52).18 
The Levinasian face is infinite and exceeds conceptuality: the face of the other, which 
exceeds the comprehension and definition of the self, cannot be represented. 19 For 
this reason, the face of the other stands in a relation of absolute immediacy to the self. 
The relation between self and other is immediate and the other, in its otherness, stands 
outside the ambit of understanding, which mediates between the self and that which it 
is not: 
The immediate is not an object of comprehension. An immediate given of 
consciousness is a contradiction in terms. . . . The relation with the face, 
speech, an event of collectivity, is a relation with beings as such, as pure 
beings. . . . To comprehension and signification grasped within a horizon, we 
oppose the signifyingness of the face. 
(1996: 9-IOi0 
The "signifyingness of the face" is beyond signification and comprehension: it is 
beyond phenomena, otherwise than being. As such, it disturbs the order of the same. 
Marais (1997: 60-61) puts this as follows: "Being unable to establish a relation of 
correlation with the other, the subject cannot foreclose on its otherness and, owing to 
its irreducibility, the other surprises the subject who finds itself in a relation to 
something which is nothing definable". This surprised subject, out of its depth and no 
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longer in control, is confronted with an immediate otherness from which there is no 
escape and which cannot be dominated with the gaze of comprehension. 21 The face of 
the other cannot be dominated and controlled because it escapes the purview of the 
self and, as such, disrupts the subject's world. The subject's freedom is grounded in 
its ability to dominate and objectify what is other to it: the phenomenonal world and 
other humans. Indeed, Levinas (1987: 48; his italics) defines freedom and autonomy 
as "the reduction of the other to the same". In its resistance which does not resist, the 
other puts in question the subject and "refutes the subject's spontaneous freedom in 
unicity and thereby dispossesses it of what is required for the exercise of force and 
violence" (Marais 1997: 61). While it is possible to kill the other (cf Levinas 1969: 
198-199), it is the inability to comprehend and encompass the other - the infinity of 
the transcendence of the other beyond being - which, according to Levinas, resists 
without resisting the wish of the self to kill the other (to clear the way for the care of 
the self through the maintenance of its power and its freedom): 
This infinity, stronger than murder, already resists us in his face, is his face, is 
the primordial expression, is the first word: 'you shall not commit murder'. 
The infinite paralyses power by its infinite resistance to murder, which, firm 
and insurmountable, gleams in the face of the Other, in the total nudity of his 
defenceless eyes, in the nudity of the absolute openness of the Transcendent. 
There is here a relation not with a very great resistance, but with something 
absolutely other: the resistance of what has no resistance - the ethical 
resistance. 
(Levinas 1969: 199i2 
Blanchot (1993: 54) comments as follows: 
The visage - here is the essential, it seems to me - is that experience I have 
when, facing the face that offers itself to me without resistance, I see arise 'out 
of the depths of these defenseless eyes,' out of this weakness, this 
powerlessness, what puts itself radically in my power and at the same time 
refuses it absolutely, turning my highest power into im-possibility. In front of 
the visage, Levinas emphasizes, I am no longer able. And the visage is that 
before which the impossibility of killing - the 'thou shalt not kill' - is decided 
on the very basis of what exposes itself completely to my power to bring 
death. 
Thus Blanchot characterises Levinas' s philosophy as metaphysics, that is, as first 
philosophy. Blanchot argues that metaphysics, as conceived by Levinas, is 
constituted not by "the care, the question, or the call of Being" (1993: 54), but by the 
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"transcendent relation with autrui". That is, "first philosophy is not ontology ... but 
ethics, the obligation toward autrui" (Blanchot 1993: 54). And Williams (1992: 298) 
glosses Levinas's philosophy as the insistence that "ethics is prior to ontology and 
theory .... This means that ethical responsibility for the other precedes knowledge of 
the other". Respect for the other as other, the commandment which proscribes killing 
the other (and thus reducing the otherness of the other), takes precedence over care for 
the self 
3.2.2 The Other as Trace 
After this brief consideration of Levinasian ethics in terms of its phenomenological 
context, which led to a consideration of the face, it is now time to examine Levinas's 
insistence that the other, who is not present to the gaze of the representing subject, is a 
trace. According to Levinas (1996b: 62), in the other as trace "has passed a past 
absolutely bygone". This makes the other as trace in "an irreversible past" 
inaccessible to memory: "No memory can follow the traces of this past. It is an 
immemorial past .... " (1996b: 60). The other, in its infinity, cannot be recuperated or 
made present because of this immemorial pastness of the other as trace. 
In order to elucidate this important point, I would like now to consider briefly 
Plato's notion of anamnesis and Descartes's of infinity. After this discussion, I shall 
return to a consideration of the other in terms of the implications for representation of 
the trace as belonging to "an immemorial past". 
3.2.2.1 Anamnesis and Infinity 
Anamnesis implies a past which can be made present, as it involves making present 
truth which has been here, which prefigures the present. The idea of infinity, on the 
other hand, involves the destruction of the noesis-noemata structure, in that the 
ideatum exceeds its idea for the reason that it contains more than it is capable of 
containing (cf Levinas 1987: 54ff.; 1969: 49; 1996f: 150). The idea of infinity, 
Levinas states, is an idea that is not a "concept" and "reminiscence" (1987: 54). 
According to Levinas, "Western thought very often seemed to exclude the 
transcendent, encompass every other in the same, and proclaim the philosophical 
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birthright of autonomy" (1987: 48). Levinas relates the Cartesian cogito, "the soul 
conversing with itself' (1987: 49), to Plato's notion that, "qua reminiscence, [the soul 
rediscovers] the teachings it receives" (1987: 49; cf 1969: 126; Peperzak 1993: 94-
95, 216), a conception which "thus promote[s] freedom" (1987: 49) or autonomy as 
opposed to the heteronomy implicit in the confrontation with otherness. 23 That is, 
according to Levinas, truth in Western philosophy has often been deemed to be 
immanent to the subject of truth, and has thus served to promote the supposed self-
sufficiency of the subject. Thus, in the Theaetetus, Socrates describes himself as a 
midwife who mediates between the self and the truth within that self Socrates insists 
that his pupils have not learnt anything from him: " ... they have themselves 
discovered many admirable things in themselves, and given birth to them. Still, for 
the delivery it's God, and I myself, who are responsible" (Plato 1973: 14). 
Socrates addresses Theaetetus and insists that "you're pregnant with 
something inside you" (Plato 1973: 15). Even if this were to mean that Socrates is 
simply making a point about the production of philosophical theses - that he does not 
produce philosophical theses himself, but can elicit them from others and test their 
correctness (cf McDowell 1973:116ff.) - Socrates's words may nonetheless be 
related to the Platonic model of the discovery of truth as anamnesis or reminiscence. 
This model may, in tum, be related to the Cartesian cogito's discovery of itself 
as the only indubitable standard. Levinas makes this connection quite explicit in the 
essay "Philosophy and the Idea of Infinity" (1987). To Levinas, this identification in 
the Western philosophical tradition of truth with the freedom of the Same (which 
overcomes the transcendent other it finds outside itself in its quest for truth, and which 
it then transposes into an immanent "discovery" -an anamnesis) amounts to a denial 
of radical alterity. 24 
The Platonic conception of truth in terms of the immanence and self-
sufficiency of an I who is free, leads Levinas to his oft-repeated insistence, as noted 
above in the section on Levinasian ethics (3.2.1), that philosophy as autonomy (rather 
than as heteronomy) is not really an adventure because no surprises are in store to the 
subject of such a philosophy. But Descartes is also credited by Levinas for, alongside 
Plato, having insisted on a beyond of being. This Descartes does, according to 
Levinas, by invoking the idea of infinity in order to account for the existence of 
God?5 
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In the Third of his Meditations on First Philosophy, after having cast doubt on 
everything he had believed, and after having indicated that the one indubitable fact is 
the existence of the I that thinks, Descartes proceeds to attempt to prove the existence 
of God. The indubitable fact that "I am a thing that thinks: that is, a thing that doubts" 
(1984: 24) entails establishing the duality between mind and body, res cogitans and 
res extensa, and simultaneously putting in question the existence of the res extensa. 
However, 
even though the objects of my sensory experience and imagination may have 
no existence outside of me, nonetheless the modes of thinking which I refer to 
as cases of sensory perception and imagination, in so far as they are simply 
modes of thinking, do exist within me - of that I am certain. 
(1984: 24) 
In other words, even if objects (res extensa) do not exist, nonetheless modes of 
thinking (res cogitans) of them do exist within the thinking, doubting subject (the 
cogito). That is, even if the subject cannot know objects, it can know that it does not 
know them - which provides it with certainty that it exists: "I am certain that I am a 
thinking thing" (1984: 24). But to know this much is not to know much at all. Sense 
certainty is unreliable, as Descartes argues. It is possible that there is a God - in 
particular, a deceiving God - who "could have given me a nature such that I was 
deceived even in matters which seemed most evident" (1984: 25), for instance, the 
certainty that the subject is lodged in finding itself thinking. Descartes attempts to 
prove the existence of God in order to remove the possibility that he may be deceived 
by a deceiving God. The way he does this is by making use of the idea of infinity, in 
the process drawing heavily on the scholastic distinction between formal and 
objective reality. 
According to Descartes, thoughts can be classified into two kinds: first, ideas 
and, second, judgments and volitions. An idea is a thought which, as it were, is the 
image of a thing thought, which cannot in itself be true or false. On the other hand, 
thoughts which are judgments or volitions/emotions must be distinguished from ideas 
in that in such cases "my thought includes something more than the likeness of that 
thing" (1984: 26). Only thoughts which are judgments can, strictly speaking, be true 
or false and therefore entail the possibility of mistakes. The reason for this lies in 
referentiality: Descartes cannot be mistaken about a judgment which is not linked to 
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something outside of him, but which is merely a mode of thought (and thus not a 
judgment as such). The basic kind of judgment, and the one most likely to cause 
error, "consists in my judging that the ideas which are in me resemble, or conform to, 
things located outside me" (1984: 26). 
However, the moment judgment enters into the picture (for instance, the 
judgment that the idea resembles a thing outside of the subject), the possibility of 
error and deception also makes its appearance. Descartes's problem is as follows: 
given that there are different kinds of ideas ( 1984: 26) - innate (derived "simply from 
my own nature"), adventitious (derived "from things which are located outside me") 
and invented (like sirens or hippogriffs which "are my own invention") - why do I 
take adventitious ideas to resemble things? 
Descartes gives the example of the sun. Of the two ideas of the sun which the 
self has, the one "which seems to have emanated most directly from the sun itself has 
in fact no resemblance to it at all" (1984: 27). That is, sense perception, upon which 
judgment is based, errs in its description of the object 'the sun' because it judges the 
sun as it appears, in other words, as being small. On the other hand, the idea of the 
sun innate to the subject, that it is many times larger than the earth, "is based on 
astronomical reasoning, that is, it is derived from certain notions which are innate in 
me" (1984: 27). Sense perception, based as it is on the judgment of ideas, is not 
trustworthy and cannot be used as a basis to prove the existence of anything outside 
the cogito. As Descartes puts it later, vis-a-vis the idea of the infinity of God, "my 
mental vision is blinded by the images of things perceived by the senses" (1984: 32). 
This leads Descartes to the conviction that, ultimately, even in the case of things- the 
ideas of which are clearly adventitious and could not have originated in the self -
judgment is not dependable. This means that it is "merely some blind impulse that 
has made me believe up till now that there exist things distinct from myself which 
transmit to me ideas or images of themselves through the sense organs or in some 
other way" (1984: 27). The self, which knows that it exists because it thinks, still 
cannot bridge the apparent chasm between the knowledge it has of itself and the 
knowledge it has of extended things outside of it. 
But there is another way, according to Descartes, of determining "whether 
some of the things of which I possess ideas exist outside me" (1984: 27). And this 
way is based on the necessity of the existence of God, proof for which is to be 
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obtained in the scholastic distinction between formal and objective reality, that is, the 
distinction between reality founded in the object itself and that founded in the idea of 
the object (cf 1984: 28 note 1). This distinction entails that an object must have 
formal reality if it has objective reality, that is, that an object of which the self has an 
idea (objective, representational reality) must have an ideatum (formal reality) which, 
however, is not the effect as much as the cause of the idea: "For just as the objective 
mode of being belongs to ideas by their very nature, so the formal mode of being 
belongs to the causes of ideas" (1984: 29). And even if it were so that one idea would 
merely lead to another, that chain of ideas must have started somewhere: 
... eventually one must reach a primary idea, the cause of which will be like 
an archetype which contains formally <and in fact> all the reality <or 
perfection> which is present only objectively <or representatively> in the idea. 
So it is clear to me, by the natural light, that the ideas in me are like <pictures, 
or> images which can easily fall short of the perfection of the things from 
which they are taken, but which cannot contain anything greater or more 
perfect. 
(1984: 29) 
Thus Descartes will be able to prove that there are others, apart from himself, if there 
is but one idea with such a degree of objective reality that its reality cannot be lodged 
within himself, that it "could not have originated in myself' ( 1984: 31 ). And this is 
the idea of the infinity of God, an idea which exceeds itself Except for this idea, it is 
possible to imagine all ideas to have originated in the self, to be merely things with 
attributes which derive from "various thoughts which I can count" and which are a 
factor of the self s perceiving "that I now exist, and remember[ing] that I have existed 
for some time" (1984: 30). The idea of the infinite, which Descartes discovers in 
himself, proves the existence of the infinite, which is an attribute of God, because "I 
clearly understand that there is more reality in an infinite substance than in a finite 
one" (1984: 31). The reason for this is that the infinite cannot be grasped, but the 
finite can. The infinite must exist because it contains the finite, which exists (and the 
finite does not contain the infinite). That is, just because a finite being, which exists, 
can have an idea of the infinite (within which it is, per definition, contained as a finite 
being) must mean that the infinite must exist for the reason that the finite implies the 
infinite: "It does not matter that I do not grasp the infinite ... for it is in the nature of 
the infinite not to be grasped by a finite being like myself' (1984: 32). Infinity can, 
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quite literally, not be thought. Finite knowledge can always increase, which means it 
can never be infinite. The infinite, on the other hand, cannot increase just because it is 
infinite. Yet, despite the fact that it cannot increase, it can be approached without 
ever, however, being reached. Nonetheless, according to Descartes "It is clear enough 
that an infinite regress is impossible here" (1984:34) for the reason that "the ultimate 
cause is reached, and this will be God" {1984: 34), who not only creates but preserves 
and thus re-creates what he has created (cf 1984: 33). God, as ultimate cause, must 
exist because he- unlike, for instance, one's parents (cf 1984: 35) - re-creates by 
preserving. 
Descartes can thus assert that "it must be concluded that the mere fact that I 
exist and have within me an idea of a most perfect being, that is, God, provides a very 
clear proof that God indeed exists" (1984: 35). Descartes thus thinks God as an 
infinite being beyond being. God, as the infinite, is thought without being thought. 
Even though being thought, God is not encapsulated within the thought of being. 
The idea of God is neither the result of sense perception nor of the invention of 
the self, but is innate in the self God has "placed his idea in me to be, as it were, the 
mark of the craftsman stamped on his work" {1984: 35). That is, the self is the 
"image and likeness" (1984: 35) of God. At the same time, therefore, that God exists 
because he is thought without being grasped in his infinity, the idea of him entails that 
"I understand that I am a thing which is incomplete and dependent on another. . . . I 
recognize that it would be impossible for me to exist with the kind of nature I have-
that is, having within me the idea of God - were it not the case that God really existed 
(1984: 35). 
Even if God cannot but be thought in finite being, the thought of God is a thought 
which exceeds the being of the finite being thinking and exposes that being as 
incomplete. As Blanchot (1993: 53) puts it, 
The finite self thinks the infinite. In this thought, thought thinks what goes 
infinitely beyond it and what it cannot account for on its own; it thinks 
therefore, more than it thinks. A unique experience. When I think the infinite, 
I think what I am not able to think (for if I had an adequate representation of 
it, if I comprehended it, assimilating it and making it equal to myself, it would 
be a question only of the finite). 
65 
The infinity of which Descartes speaks is a time beyond time, in the final instance a 
time immemorial. It is a time in which God is not present to finite being, but enables 
being in his infinity. For Descartes, God, as the ultimate and infinitely perfect cause, 
precedes the presence of the self and thus, according to Levinas, causes "the breakup 
of the I think", "the breakup of consciousness" (1996e: 135, 136). 
3.2.2.2 The Irreducible Pastness of the Trace 
In contradistinction to a presence, or quasi-pastness (because it can be remembered, or 
represented) of the other with respect to the consciousness of the self-present same, 
Levinas insists on the irreducible pastness of the other. The other surpasses the self s 
conception of him or her or it, just as the idea of infinity (or God) is surpassed by 
infinity (or God) itself. To cite Blanchot (1993: 53) again, 
When I think the infinite, I think what I am not able to think. . . . I therefore 
have a thought that goes beyond my power; a thought that, to the very extent 
that it is a thought of mine, is the absolute exceeding of the self that thinks it -
in other words: a relation with what is absolutely outside myself: the other. 
The self cannot re-member, embody or re-present the other, because the other 'is' 
infinite. In this sense the other is 'a-historical'. It does not "[go] off into the past" 
and can therefore not be "recalled or recovered by history" (Levinas 1996e: 134). In 
its infinity, the other is a past which is not "a modification of the present" (Levinas 
1996e: 134) and is therefore refractory to reminiscence and consciousness. Because 
of its infinity, which surpasses the idea of the other, the other is always past. To re-
present the other would be to re-member the other, and would mean that the other's 
past is merely "a modification of the present", that the pastness of the other was 
present earlier and can be re-presented. It would be to recover the otherness of the 
other and thus to destroy it. 
Derrida, in relating his notion of dif.ferance to the trace, and to Levinas' s 
thinking, emphasises the irreducible pastness of the trace: 
In order to describe traces, in order to read the traces of 'unconscious' traces 
(there are no 'conscious' traces), the language of presence and absence, the 
metaphysical discourse of phenomenology, is inadequate. . . . The alterity of 
the 'unconscious' makes us concerned not with horizons of modified- past or 
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future - presents, but with a 'past' that has never been present, and which 
never will be, whose future to come will never be a production or a 
reproduction in the form of presence. Therefore the concept of trace is 
incompatible with the concept of retention, of the becoming-past of what has 
been present. One cannot think the trace - and therefore, dif.ferance - on the 
basis of the present, or of the presence of the present. 
A past that has never been present: this formula is the one that 
Emmanuel Levinas uses, although certainly in a nonpsychoanalytic way, to 
qualify the trace and enigma of absolute alterity: the Other. . . . Within these 
limits, and from this point of view at least, the thought of dif.ferance implies 
the entire critique of classical ontology undertaken by Levinas. 
(Derrida 1982: 21) 26 
This passage is of central importance for the understanding of Levinas proffered in 
this thesis, tied as it is to an understanding of the trace as always already past: Derrida 
relates Levinas's thought firmly to his own elaboration of differance. He does so by 
claiming it implies "the entire critique of classical ontology undertaken by Levinas", 
in particular of phenomenology. Husserlian phenomenology, positioning itself vis-a-
vis "horizons of modified - past or future - presents", employs retention and 
protention in order to re-present the present. However, alterity involves "a 'past' that 
has never been present, and which never will be", and will therefore fall outside the 
purview of phenomenology. 27 Derrida points out that Levinas uses the concept 
"trace" in terms of"A past that has never been present".28 
This irreducible pastness of the trace of alterity means to imply that the 
otherness of the other cannot be recuperated. As always separated from the self, the 
other is not an object of perception which can be known by being reduced to 
consciousness. The past in which the other 'is', is a past which was never present, "an 
immemorial past" (Levinas 1996b: 60). Phenomenologically speaking, the other can 
therefore not be correlated with the self as an object can with a subject and, as such, 
cannot be represented: 
A relationship that would not create simultaneity between its terms but would 
hollow out a depth from which the expression approaches would have to refer 
to an irreversible, immemorial, unrepresentable past. 
But how refer to an irreversible past, that is, a past which this very 
reference would not bring back, like memory which retrieves the past, like 
signs which recapture the signified? What would be needed would be an 
indication that would reveal the withdrawal of the indicated, instead of a 
reference that rejoins it. Such is a trace, in its emptiness and desolation. . . . 
What is this original trace, this primordial desolation? It is the nakedness of a 
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face that faces, expressing itself, interrupting order. 
decomposed and naked. 
[A] face is 
(Levinas 1996c: 69) 
In this passage Levinas links the irreducible pastness of the other with the trace as the 
"nakedness of a face that faces". It is a face which disrupts order, the order of 
representation. Levinas explicitly introduces the concept 'trace' into his work in order 
to deal with the relation of the face to representation, as I shall attempt to explain 
now. In the essay "Meaning and Sense", Levinas makes use of a set of startling 
images in order to contrast the enigmatic nature of the face with the phenomenon: 
Whereas a phenomenon is already, in whatever respect, an image, a captive 
manifestation of its plastic and mute form, the epiphany of a face is alive. Its 
life consists in undoing the form in which all beings (etant) when they enter 
into immanence, that is, when they are exposed as a theme, are already 
dissimulated. 
The Other (Autrui) who manifests himself in a face as it were breaks 
through his own plastic essence, like a being who opens the window on which 
its own visage was already taking form. His presence consists in divesting 
himself of the form which does already manifest him. 
(Levinas 1996b: 53) 
The face of the other is said to "undo(ing)" and "break through" the form of being as 
theme. It is as if the other is a phenomenon, the petrified (cf Levinas 1996c: 69) 
mould or mask29 of which is torn away, a reflection on a window which is opened to 
reveal the other within: "The manifestation of a face is the first disclosure. Speaking 
is before anything else this way of coming from behind one's appearance, behind 
one's form, an openness in the openness" (1996b: 53). The face interrupts 
phenomenonality; it interrupts the manifestation of being as if this manifestation or 
appearance were a mask to be torn off, vestments from which the other "divest[s]" 
itself However, Levinas complicates this scene of divestiture and revelation in the 
following way: 
The signifyingness of a face in its abstractness is in the literal sense of the term 
extra-ordinary, outside of every order, every world. How is such a production 
possible? How can the coming of the Other, the visitation of a face, the 
absolute not be - in any way - converted into a revelation, not even a 
symbolism or a suggestion? How is a face not simply a true representation 
... in which the Other renounces his alterity? 
(1996b: 53) 
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How is one to go about not falling into the trap of mistaking the face as the revelation, 
the representation of otherness? The face cannot, in spite of the scene of divestiture, 
be understood as being a representation of the other behind or within which the other 
appears, for such an understanding would return the other to the realm of the Same 
and thus reduce the otherness of the other. This is a crucial problem concerning 
methodology, the problem of how one is to speak of the other without betraying it by 
reducing its otherness in the act of representation: "A methodological problem arises 
here, whether the pre-original element of saying (the anarchical, the non-original, as 
we designate it) can be led to betray itself by showing itself in a theme (if an an-
archeology is possible), and whether this betrayal can be reduced .... " (Levinas 1981: 
7). This problem, "a problem that haunts every page of Otherwise than Being' 
(Critchley 1992: 7) must be faced not only by Levinas but by anyone writing about 
the other. Levinas addresses this problem by introducing the concept trace into his 
writing: "To answer, we will have to study the exceptional signifyingness of the trace . 
. . . " (1996b: 53-54)?0 
In a radical qualification of what I have termed the scene of divestiture, 
Levinas (1996b: 60) asserts that "The face presents itself in its nudity; it is neither a 
form concealing, but thereby indicating, a ground nor a phenomenon that hides, but 
thereby betrays, a thing itself'. That is, behind the face is nothing. The face does not 
cover or conceal the other; it is not as if the face is a phenomenon which can be 
removed to reveal the thing itself behind it. The face indicates the absence of the 
other, not its presence. If it indicated the presence of the other, it would have been a 
mask behind which the real thing, the other, could be found. This is not the case: 
"Otherwise, the face would be one with a mask, but a mask presupposes a face. . . . 
The Other proceeds from the absolutely Absent, but his relationship with the 
absolutely Absent from which he comes does not indicate, does not reveal, this 
Absent; and yet the Absent has a meaning in the face" (1996b: 60). 
The face is not a mask, for a mask presupposes a face. If the face concealed 
the other, it would indeed have been a mask - removing the face-as-mask would 
reveal or disclose the other. Behind this face, there is nothing. The face does not 
reveal what is absent, thus making it present; nor does it reveal that "absolutely 
Absent" in its absence. If it were to reveal anything, it would be the "absolutely 
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Absent'. And, indeed, it is not possible to remove the face (or any literal face) as if it 
were a mask: the face does not reveal "this Absent; and yet the Absent has a meaning 
in the face". This "meaning" of the Absent in the face is the trace of the other: "Such 
is the signifyingness of the trace. The beyond from which the face comes signifies as 
a trace" (1996b: 60).31 
At this point I would like to return to my parenthetical remark above 
concerning the impossibility of removing the face (or any literal face). I paid no 
attention in my earlier discussion of this 'concept' to the status of Levinas's term 
'face' as literal or figurative. Clearly, Levinas does not use 'face' in a literal sense 
(initial evidence for this presents itself in the frequency with which he uses the 
indefinite article and refers to "a face"). The term does not refer to a real face. As 
Peperzak explains, '"Face' is the word Levinas chooses to indicate the alterity of the 
Other" (1993: 64), and again, "The word 'face' can be replaced by 'expression' or 
'word' or 'speech"' (1993: 142). Nor, however, for the reason that it does not 
substitute for a (more) proper term, is the term 'face' a figure. There is no more 
proper way of referring to the other than by means of this metaphor (or other 
metaphors). That is, the face, like the trace, is a catachresis of the other. That the 
trace of the other is a catachresis of the other, is asserted by Miller in terms of 
Levinas's contention that the trace of the other 'is' in the face: 
For Emmanuel Levinas 'the other' is an absolute transcendence, 'beyond 
being', who leaves traces of itself or himself in the face of the other person. 
Levinas says traces, not signs. A sign presupposes the existence and 
availability of its referent. A trace is a catachresis (though Levinas does not 
use this word) for something or someone I can never confront directly. He or 
it belongs to 'a past absolutely bygone' .... 
(Miller 1994: 6i2 
Because of the irreducible pastness of the other as trace, the other can only be thought, 
represented and spoken catachrestically: the otherness of the other is not present to the 
representing subject, and any determination of the other (that is, any definition of 
what the otherness of the other consists in) is necessarily a catachresis. Indeed, not 
only is any representation of the other a figure for the other which cannot be made 
proper: already to refer to the other (for instance by means of the term 'face') is to 
invoke and give a face to the other. Not only would the term 'face', therefore, be a 
catachresis of the other (because 'face' is neither literal nor figurative, but a figure 
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which cannot be made proper); it would also be a prosopopoeia. But, as it is part of 
the structure of a catachresis to undo itself (as I shall argue below, this otherness is 
evident in catachresis because it is a trope functioning as if it were proper, that is, a 
trope which cannot be made proper because it does not substitute a proper meaning -
it is a trace of otherness in that it signifies absence) this prosopopoeia is interrupted, 
precisely, in that it is a catachresis of the other. The prosopopoeia of the other, as 
catachresis, is interrupted by the other. 
Before substantiating this claim by examining in more detail the important 
terms catachresis and prosopopoeia, and the relation between them - but this time in 
terms of irony- I would now like to turn to a consideration of Levinas's distinction 
between the Saying and the Said. The term 'face' might be said to constitute an 
example of the ontological Said in that it gives a face to the other and thus, willy-
nilly, conceptualises the other; but the irreducible otherness within this term, as 
catachresis, is testimony to the 'presence' within it of an ethical Saying. 
3.2.3 The Saying and the Said 
As mentioned above (in the discussion of what I there termed the scene of 
divestiture), if the other, as irreducibly past, cannot be represented, then Levinasian 
ethics is caught in an inevitable double bind. This is so for the reason that it deals 
with the other, that is, with something which cannot, in a radical sense, be dealt with: 
in dealing with the other it defines and delimits what is infinite. It has as theme that 
which exceeds thematisation. In claiming that the other exceeds explanation, it 
already explains the other. In saying that the other exceeds representation, it already 
fixes the other in propositional discourse. 
Levinas recognises that "The beyond being, showing itself in the said, always 
shows itself there enigmatically, is already betrayed" (1981: 19). When the other, as 
an enigma beyond being, is said, this amounts to the transmogrification of the other 
into an appearance. That is, when the other is said, it appears as a phenomenon, no 
longer as an enigma: its otherness is reduced and it is, as a result, betrayed in being 
said. When the other is said, it becomes part of the world of phenomena and, 
subsequently, like the world, can be conceptualised within the horizon of being: "The 
world is said and hence can be a theme, can be proposed" (1969: 98). 
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As a result of this thematising and conceptualising which occurs in the other 
being said, Levinas must engage in the difficult task of unsaying what is said about 
the other: 
When stated in propositions, the unsayable (or the an-archical) espouses the 
forms of formal logic; . . . the beyond being is posited in doxic theses, and 
glimmers in the amphibology of being and beings - in which beings 
dissimulate being. The otherwise than being is stated in a saying that must 
also be unsaid in order to thus extract the otherwise than being from the said in 
which it already comes to signify but a being otherwise. 
(1981: 7) 
The other, as that which cannot be contained within the horizons of phenomenality, 
and which therefore exceeds the limits of being and (ontological) comprehension-
the realm of appearance and dissimulation - is otherwise than being. The other 
signifies, but it signifies "being otherwise". Nonetheless, when "the beyond being is 
posited in doxic theses" and is thus couched in propositional language, it "is already 
betrayed" (1981: 19). Peperzak confirms the double bind ofLevinas's thought in the 
following way: 
The difficulty of Levinas' s enterprise lies in the task of showing - in the form 
of a thematic, and thereby necessarily gathering, discourse - that gathering, 
coherence, and unity do not constitute the ultimate horizon of such a 
discourse, and that otherness, separation, and transcendence are irreducible to 
any unity. 
(1993: 135i3 
Marais, in terms highly germane to this thesis (as its main burden is to read novels in 
terms of the relation between irony and otherness), states this problem vis-a-vis the 
representational protocols of the novel-as-genre: 
Of immediate concern . . . is the problem of constative representation that is 
raised by an ethics that is grounded in a relation of radical difference to an 
absolute alterity. How can that which is not an object, and therefore not 
present, be represented? If ethics is premised on respect for the other, how 
may the other be respected in a discourse that attempts to represent its 
otherness? The mere attempt to describe that which is radically exterior to the 
same in the language and discourse of the same is bound to reduce it to an 
object and thereby to violate it. 
(Marais 1997: 2i4 
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This reduction of the other to the same in the Said of propositional discourse must be 
unsaid, that is, interrupted. This interruption of the Said would amount to a reduction 
of the Said, "thereby letting the Saying reside as a residue, or interruption, within the 
Said" (Critchley 1992: 8), and the effort of the philosopher would consist, among 
other things, "in the reduction of the Said to the Saying" (Critchley 1992: 8), in an 
attempt to reduce the degree of betrayal of the other?5 
In a passage quoted earlier (in the course of the discussion of the trace), 
Levinas (1996c: 69) describes the irreducible pastness, inaccessible to representation, 
of the trace of the other in terms of the nakedness of a face. It is a face which 
interrupts the order of representation. It is important to note that the interruption of 
the Said by the Saying follows an anterior interruption: that of the order of 
representation by the other. The other, by virtue of its otherness, disturbs the freedom 
of the self, as was noted above (section 3.2.1 ). This disturbance of the other, which 
interrupts the coherence of being, however, is threatened with being incorporated into 
the propositional discourse of representation. That is, representation, in giving the 
other a face (in making 'a face' 'the face') forgets that "a face is decomposed and 
naked" (1996c: 69). A decomposed face is 'restored' into the face of the other by 
means of smoothing over the absence which is the face of the other. It is necessary to 
remind oneself that, behind the face of the other, is nothing, that the face of the other 
reveals nothing. As I have argued, following Levinas, if it were to be a revelation, it 
would be a sign and, as such, its referent would be available ( cf Miller 1994: 6) and 
present to the representing self The other cannot be represented without reducing its 
alterity. 
It is in this sense that it is necessary to interrupt the face of the other, that is, to 
decompose, deform or de-face the face. If the face of the other is not interrupted, the 
face becomes a mask of the other, as I have argued. The interruption of the face, as 
soon as it becomes lodged in representational discourse, must be interrupted itself 
This is acknowledged by Levinas in the following important passage from Otherwise 
than Being, albeit not explicitly in terms of the face. Rather, Levinas uses an 
extended metaphor to describe the Said in terms of the text as fabric. I quote 
extensive! y: 
The logos said has the last word dominating all meaning, the word of the end, 
the very possibility of the ultimate and the result. Nothing can interrupt it. 
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Every contestation and interruption of this power of discourse is at once 
related and invested by discourse. It thus recommences a~ soon as one 
interrupts it. . . . This discourse will affirm itself to be coherent and one. In 
relating the interruption of the discourse or my being ravished into discourse I 
connect its thread. . . . The approach, or saying, is a relationship with what is 
not understood in the together, the out-of-the-series. A subversion of essence, 
it overflows the theme it states, the 'all together', the 'everything included' of 
the said. . . . Does not the coherent discourse, wholly absorbed in the said, 
owe its coherence to the State, which, violently excludes subversive 
discourse? . . . Does not the discourse that suppresses the interruptions of 
discourse by relating them maintain the discontinuity under the knots with 
which the thread is tied again? 
The interruptions of the discourse found again and recounted in the 
immanence of the said are conserved like knots in a thread tied again, the trace 
of a diachrony that does not enter into the present, that refuses simultaneity. 
(Levinas 1981: 169-170) 
Even though a number of important areas of concern are evident in this passage, I 
would like to focus on two only. In the first place, the passage deals with the 
necessity of interrupting interruption because the discourse of "the logos said" 
"recommences as soon as one interrupts it". Before considering this point more 
closely, it is necessary to point out that, in the second place, the passage associates 
interruption with Saying and with ethics. On the other hand, the suppression of 
interruption is identified with the Said and with politics. This involves an infinite, 
spiralling movement (cf. Critchley 1992: 123) from an ethical interruption of the 
political Said to the political suppression of all interruption, including the ethical. The 
implication is that ethics is less a fundament of politics than an interruption of it 
which inheres in it. This inherently ethical interruption of the political is, of necessity, 
for the sake of orderliness and society, suppressed by the political - while that 
interruption, the ethical residue, persists within and disturbs the very fabric of politics. 
The translation of the passage as it appears in Derrida' s essay "At This Very 
Moment in This Work Here I Am" ( 1991: 21 ), makes this point clearer: "The 
discourse which suppresses the interruptions of discourse in relating them together, 
does it not maintain the discontinuity behind the knots where the thread is retied?" 
One gets the sense more clearly here than in the translation of the passage quoted that, 
even though this discourse (that of "Western philosophy and the State" [Levinas 
1981: 169]) ties again the broken thread of the logos, the knots with which continuity 
is restored are traces of the "discontinuity" which is "maintain[ ed]" "behind the knots 
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where the thread is retied". Within the fabric of politics, ethical interruption persists. 
That is, politics turns out to be the necessary fiction of coherence, while ethics is the 
infinite and uncomfortable reminder that coherence is a fiction, that is, the reminder of 
an interrupting otherness outside of the totality of every society and State ("the 'all 
together,' the 'everything included"').36 At this point I would like to return to a 
consideration of the passage in tenns of the thematics of interruption. 
Saying, as what "overflows the theme it states", is, in this passage, 
characterised as being an interruption, as being "the out-of-the-series": the Saying, as 
the approach of the other, interrupts totality (as it does politics) by its absence, by not 
being fitted into linearity. However, in the very act of "relating the interruption of the 
discourse . . . I connect its thread". Relating, that is, narrating, the interruption of 
discourse covers up the interruption, makes it part of the narration. 37 
By means of the repetition of the words "thread" and "knots" in phrases such 
as "the knots with which the thread is tied again", that is, by means of the "metaphor 
of the retied thread" (Critchley 1992: 125) in the passage, a second, extended 
metaphor arises (mentioned above). The text is, by means of this extended metaphor, 
compared to a fabric being woven (etymologically the word 'text' is related to the 
Latin word texere, which means 'to weave'). The moment the logos is interrupted, 
when, as it were, the fabric of the text is interrupted and the woven thread is torn 
asunder, the logos is restored - as if the thread is knotted - because the interruption 
itself must occur narratively, that is, textually. The text which interrupts the text of 
the logos is itself a text. 
What this implies is that the process of "rending and mending", as Critchley 
(1992: 125) calls it, is infinite. That is, the interruption of the Said, of the logos, of 
the representation of the other, must be interrupted, and that interruption must, in its 
turn, be interrupted, and so on. The fabric of the text, in being rended, is already 
mended, and must therefore be rended again. Even though the interruption of the Said 
by the Saying is said (this turn of phrase graphically illustrates how the interruption of 
the Said by the Saying turns into the Said in being said!) in the passage to be "the out-
of-the-series", it is immediately incorporated into a new series: the series of rending 
and mending which, as Critchley (1992: 125) puts it, leads to "an unbound seriality of 
discourse". Critchley (1992: 128), following Derrida, calls this seriature: "This 
image of the text as a play of binding and unbinding, where the mended interruption 
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of essence is itself interrupted by a moment of irreducible ethical priority, is the way 
in which Levinas' s work works. It is that which Levinas' s writing enacts". 
Despite the incorporating force of the logos, which results in infinite 
interruption of interruption, the rending moment does have priority over the mending 
one. Even though one could explain the infinite series of rending and mending in 
terms of an image "of a single thread with a series of knots running along its length", 
each of which represents both "the ethical interruption of essence" (Critchley 1992: 
125) and the mending of that interruption, nonetheless "The fabric of discourse is not 
simply the play of rending and mending" (Critchley 1992: 127). This is so because 
each interruption, each knot, is, in its turn, interrupted. Perhaps a way of thinking this 
movement would be by imagining, within each knot along the thread, another tear 
which cannot be mended: "The picture that now emerges is one in which, within the 
knot of each ethical interruption that has been tied back into the ontological thread, 
there persists an irreducible supplement to the knot which is the very interruption of 
interruption" (1992: 127). 
In the next section I shall argue that this irreducible interruption of the 
interruption of the conceptualisation of the other, which persists along the narrative 
line ofthe logos, may be explained in terms of irony. At least, this is the case if irony, 
following Paul de Man (1979a: 301; 1983: 220; 1996: 178), is understood as a 
"permanent parabasis", a perpetual interruption along the line of a narrative, that is, as 
the allegorisation of irony. I shall attempt to show that irony understood presupposes 
the a/legorisation of irony, the perpetual and successive interruption of the narrative 
which explains irony. This allegorisation of irony - which enables the provisional 
control of irony and thus renders it understandable - may be compared with the 
narrative line of the logos. 
As I showed above, the 'coherent' narrative text of the Said, which ties 
together the fractured fabric of the logos (and of society) by smoothing over the 
ethical interruption of the Saying, is, in Levinas' s conception, politics. Irony would 
then appear as the infinite, ethical, interruption of the politics of allegory as 
narrativisation and coherence because of its reminder that the face given to the other 
and the systems constructed on the basis of the "comparison between incomparables" 
(Levinas 1981: 16) are, necessarily, fictive. 
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3.3 Irony 
In this final section of the present chapter, I want to relate irony to otherness in the 
light of the discussion of otherness above in terms of Levinasian ethics, where 
interruption appeared as a crucial moment of Levinas' s conception of otherness. This 
will entail, first, determining irony in terms of interruption and, second, determining 
the nature of the interruption effected by irony. Put differently, the following are the 
two questions being posed here: In which way can irony be characterised as 
interruption? And if it can be characterised as entailing interruption, what is it that is 
interrupted by irony? 
I shall attempt to argue here that irony can, indeed, be characterised as 
entailing interruption and shall do so on the basis of an understanding of irony as 
permanent parabasis. And I shall attempt to argue that what is interrupted by irony as 
permanent parabasis, is conceptuality itself. That is, irony, as permanent parabasis, 
involves the interruption of the coherence of the concept. It disrupts the concept or 
face in recognising it as having been posited: the prosopopoeia is recognised as 
prosopopoeia, a fiction which lends a face to what has none. That is, the 
prosopopoeia is recognised to be a catachresis, a death mask signifying not presence 
but absence. Irony exposes the (absence of the) other 'within' or 'behind' the same. 
It intimates otherness by continually disrupting and interrupting the narrative of 
coherence. It, as it were, de-allegorises allegorisation (the latter understood as tending 
towards coherence). 
In this respect, irony - as necessarily the allegorisation of itself, the putting 
successively of what is simultaneous - undoes itself. If irony is understood, it is 
undone: understanding irony involves conceptualising it, narrativising it, telling a 
story about it. But irony radically resists conceptualisation, narrativisation, and 
allegorisation. This means that irony interrupts the allegorisation of itself. Irony is 
interrupted by being understood, but that interruption (its understanding) is itself 
interrupted. 
Here we find a number of ironies. It is ironic that understanding (in this case, 
of irony) should appear as a moment of interruption rather than of gathering, or, 
rather, that understanding irony - as the coherent gathering together of what disrupts 
coherence - should be disruptive of irony. Understanding irony, as the making 
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coherent of irony, means not understanding irony since irony is necessarily disruptive 
of coherence. A second irony consists of the fact that understanding irony, while 
destroying irony by allegorising it, should itself be ironic. Understanding irony 
appears as both profoundly unironic (irony allegorised) and irrevocably ironic (first, 
irony can only appear successively, if at all; second, understanding irony interrupts 
irony precisely by gathering it and is thus immediately ironised since irony gathered is 
itself open to the disruptive effects of irony). In this way, irony and its interruption by 
understanding are subject to a potentially infinite process of gathering and 
interruption. My understanding of irony, too, must itself be unironic because it 
thematises irony as that which is "resistant to theoretical formulation" (Newmark 
1992: 914), and potentially ironic in being subject to the disruptive force of irony 
which would result in the ironising of my understanding of irony. Not only is irony 
allegorised in understanding it, but that allegorisation is in tum ironised. 
In order to substantiate some of the apparently outrageous claims made above, 
it will be necessary to tum to a closer examination of irony as permanent parabasis. 
This examination will take into account de Man's distinction between irony and 
allegory, and his association of the latter with conceptualisation (with otherness Said, 
to put it in Levinasian terms). As an initial aside, or parabasis, irony will be 
understood as being "constitutive, as well as disruptive, of the Romantic project" 
(Albert 1993: 847 note 24). Irony will be understood in terms of the 'self-resistance' 
(cf. Newmark 1992) and 'unworking' (cf. Critchley 1997) ofthis "Romantic project", 
as this unworking is exemplified in the fragment as "a form that embodies interruption 
within itself' (Critchley 1997: 106). "That is to say", as Critchley (1997: 106) puts it, 
"the fragment fails", which is its success as project. 
I shall then attempt to relate irony to prosopopoeia. Irony, as the permanent 
interruption of conceptuality, shows the face to be a fiction, that is, a prosopopoeia. 
Irony may be said, in terms of Levinasian ethics and a de Manian understanding of 
irony, as involving the recognition of the face of the other as being a death mask. It is 
a death mask for the reason that the face of the other is radically disrupted- de-faced 
- by the absence of the other to representation. The face of the other does not re-
present the other but indicates the other's absence in the same way that a death mask 
cannot, strictly speaking, be a representation because what it signifies is absent. 
Crucially, a death mask signifies not presence but absence and therefore, as a 
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representation of death as such, is a misrepresentation (cf Critchley 1997: 73-74).38 
In a similar way, the face of the other - to the extent that it is available to sight and 
understanding - signifies not the presence of that other, but its absolute absence. As 
always already belonging to a "past absolutely bygone" (Levinas 1996b: 62), the other 
is available to representation only catachrestically, as a scandalous impropriety. 
3. 3.1 Para basis 
Critchley (1997: 112), following de Man, argues that "the lack of synthesis and 
endlessness of romantic writing is a permanent parabasis". 39 He does this in the 
context of a discussion of Jena Romanticism on the basis of its manifest, na'ive failure 
(see Critchley 1997: 94fT.) which is both aesthetic (as evident in its inability, contrary 
to its declared intent, to produce the "total book" [Critchley 1997: 94]) and political 
(in that its radical beginning is eclipsed by its conservative end). 
This thesis is not primarily concerned with Romanticism. Nonetheless, 
Critchley's consideration of the failure of Romanticism and its vulnerability to 
external critique (cf Critchley 1997: 95-96), and in particular his "presenting and 
defending another version of romanticism", what he calls "an unworked romanticism" 
(Critchley 1997: 97), presents a useful starting point for a consideration of irony as 
permanent parabasis. As inheritors of "a romantic modernity . . . in which we are 
both unable to believe, but which we are unable to leave", Critchley claims that 
Romanticism may lead us to "the thinking of finitude - of the finiteness of the finite" 
and thus to "an acceptance of finitude and an acknowledgement of the other" (1997: 
97). 
Romanticism is characterised by an essential ambiguity in that it is both "an 
aesthetic absolutism" and yet "the experience of failure and incompletion" (Critchley 
1997: 105). But what potentially redeems this incoherence is that Romanticism "is 
self-conscious of the possibility of its own failure" (1997: I 06). That is, it is aware 
that its attempt at the literary absolute (cf Lacoue-Labarthe & Nancy 1988) is 
necessarily circumscribed by the impossibility and untenability of totality. To this 
extent, "The romantic model for the literary absolute, the genre par excellence for 
romantic expression, is the fragment' (Critchley 1997: 106). And, as Critchley points 
out in a passage already partially quoted above, 
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the specificity of the fragment, its uniqueness, is that ~t is a form that is b~th 
complete and incomplete, both a whole and a part. It 1s a form that embod1es 
interruption within itself. That is to say, the fragment fails. Thus, the success 
of Jena Romanticism is the development and deployment of a genre that 
embodies failure within itself, whose completion is incompletion, whose 
structure is essentially ambiguous. 
(Critchley 1997: 106)40 
Critchley crucially relates this completion-as-incompletion of the fragment to the 
endlessness of Romantic writing and thus to irony as permanent parabasis. In short, 
he relates irony as interruption to the unworking of the work, the detotalising of 
totality evident in the form of the fragment, an ensemble of which "constitutes a field 
irreducible to unity" (Critchley 1997: 108). As Critchley (1997: 108-109) puts it, with 
reference to Friedrich Schlegel's fragments, 
The form of the fragments provides an image of an ideal romantic community, 
where collective expression and communal production would exist in a 
creative tension with singularity and individuality. . . . [A] perfected romantic 
society would be ... a community worked and unworked, where the being-in-
common of individuals is irreducible to fusion, unity or totality. 
Like a collection of fragments, each of which is neither complete (because then it 
would no longer be a fragment) nor incomplete (because then it would already be 
fitted into a greater whole and thus recuperated and closed oft) (see Frey 1996: 25ff.), 
society too consists of a collection of individuals who are not reducible to some 
greater totality. A collection of fragments, like society itself, "is continually referred 
back to the chaotic singularities that make it possible - republican speech, republican 
space" (Critchley 1997: 108). 
This should not be taken to imply that Romanticism is averse to systematicity: 
on the contrary, Romanticism, like its form - that of the fragment - is both complete 
and incomplete, systematic and unsystematic, "and this constitutes its essential 
ambiguity" (Critchley 1997: 109). Fragments, since they are neither complete nor 
incomplete, but have an undecidable status vis-a-vis their completion, are always in 
the process of becoming. An ambiguity characterises them in as far as both their form 
and content are concerned: they are, simply, unfinished. Yet this statement already 
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serves to determine the status of the fragment and seeks to render it whole by mending 
its moment of simply breaking off. 
The fragmentation of the fragment has the status of a project (cf Newmark 
1992: 926). But this project can have no end, for if it were to have such an end 
(whether it be a telos or a limit), the project would be at an end and the fragment 
would no longer be a fragment. The impossibility which would be a completed 
fragment - completed and yet simultaneously a fragment - "would be at once 
completely subjective and objective, it would be a project of individual freedom and 
genius and yet objectively realized in sensuous form" (Critchley 1997: 110). As 
Critchley notes, such an impossible fragment clearly "does not exisf' (1997: 110): it 
can only ever become. Thus Critchley goes on to state that "the romantic fragment or 
project, defined as the synthesis of form and content or subject and object is the self-
consciousness of the perpetual lack of this final synthesis" (1997: Ill; Critchley's 
italics). It is the essence of Romanticism that it does not exist: it is not, it becomes. 
Romanticism, understood in this way, is not a work tending towards totality and 
coherence, but a self-reflective awareness of the impossibility of such a total work. In 
this self-reflexivity, the work of Romanticism is continually interrupted and prevented 
from achieving the synthesis of form and content which would characterise the work 
of Romanticism and its ideal genre, the complete fragment. 
Critchley puts this a little differently - and this is where the fragment, as was 
mentioned above, is linked to irony - by distinguishing, in Schlegelian terms, between 
wit and irony: "If wit is synthetic, the chemical mixing of disparate elements, then 
irony is diaeretic, the separation or division of those elements" (1997: 114 ). 41 But 
while it is, according to Critchley, possible analytically to distinguish between wit and 
irony, it is nonetheless of crucial importance to show their interdependence, "the wit 
within irony and the irony within wit. The synthesizing chemistry of wit is 
counteracted by the dissolving diaeresis of irony" (Critchley 1997: 115). Critchley 
says this "oscillating movement, this alternation between Witz or Wissen and Ironie or 
skepsis, is almost a dialectics. That is to say, it is a dialectics without Hegelian 
reconciliation or Aujhebung' (1997: 115). Moreover, "The genre of the fragment 
enacts [this] quasi-dialectical oscillation between wit and irony, that is, between the 
creative desire for synthesis and the destructive scepticism of diaeresis" (1997: ll5). 
Within the fragment as form, tending as it does towards an end or synthesis but never 
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achieving it, the urge for totality and closure uneasily coexists with the awareness of 
its status as incomplete and infinite. It is a project tending towards completion but 
continually interrupted. And this continuous interruption, which unworks 
Romanticism and the fragment as form in its "dissolving diaeresis", is irony. This 
returns us to Critchley's statement (quoted at the start of this section), following de 
Man, that "the lack of synthesis and endlessness of romantic writing is a permanent 
parabasis" (1997: 112). 
De Man, in the essay to which Critchley refers, associates irony with 
"aphoristic, rapid, and brief texts (which are incompatible with the duration that is the 
basis of the novel)" (de Man 1983: 210-211), and the ironic process with "an 
unsettling speed" (1983: 215): in the theorisations of it by Schlegel and Baudelaire, 
"irony appears as an instantaneous process that takes place rapidly, suddenly, in one 
single moment" (1983: 225). In terms of de Man's definition, following Schlegel, of 
irony as a permanent parabasis - "Die lronie ist eine permanente Parekbase" 
(Schlegel 1963: 85)42 -this unsettling speed of irony is a suspension or interruption of 
duration, or, as de Man puts it, "an interruption of the narrative line" (de Man 1996: 
178). 
It is characteristic of an interruption to be sudden and swift: it is "punctual" 
(Albert 1993: 847 note 24). But irony is said to be a permanent parabasis, which 
makes it the permanent interruption of the narrative line (of, for instance, the Greek 
drama within which it occurs). In an impossible gesture, irony is said to suspend 
permanently the line of action without allowing it to be resumed. This is an 
impossibility for the reason that the parabasis, per definition, has a temporary nature 
and always involves the resumption of what it has interrupted, namely the narrative. 
De Man (1996: 178-179) puts this important point as follows: 
But parabasis is not enough, for Schlegel. Irony is not just an interruption; it is 
(and this is the definition which he gave of irony), he says, the "permanent 
parabasis", . . . parabasis not just at one point but at all points . . . : irony is 
everywhere, at all points the narrative can be interrupted. Critics who have 
written about this have pointed out, rightly, that there is a radical contradiction 
here, because a parabasis can only happen at one specific point, and to say that 
there would be a permanent parabasis is saying something violently 
paradoxical. 
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A permanent parabasis would not merely be the interruption of narrative once, but 
repeatedly: it is "the constant interruption of the narrative illusion by intrusion" (de 
Man 1996: 178). 
However, there is a cardinal difference between repetition and permanence. A 
permanent interruption can only be thought successively, as entailing repetition. This 
is to say that irony can only be conceptualised in conceptual terms, that is, 
. I 43 Ir narrative y. ony can only be thought by conceptualising it. As I attempted to 
show above, it is impossible to think irony as permanent interruption: such 
interruption would consist of simultaneously suspending the narrative illusion 
punctually and, crucially, maintaining it in order to interrupt it. The narrative line 
would, impossibly, have to be interrupted and maintained at the same time; the loss of 
illusion would have to coexist with the maintenance of the illusion. 
As Frey (1990a: 96) notes, in an important essay which considers de Man's 
work in terms of his view of language, this begs the question of how irony is possible 
at all. His answer, in terms of a passage of de Man's "The Rhetoric of Temporality" 
in which irony is defined as "a consciousness of non-consciousness" (1983: 216), is 
"that consciousness and non-consciousness are taken apart and are placed opposite 
each other. Togetherness becomes after-each-otherness, simultaneity is transformed 
into succession. One can call this, in de Man's terms, an allegorising of irony" (Frey 
1990a: 96).44 
Narrative, allegory and conceptuality may be linked in terms of the tendency 
of language to work conceptually by constructing coherence and order. As Frey puts 
it, "language cannot but construct orders and postulate them as valid" (Frey 1990a: 
97).45 This statement is to be understood in terms of de Man's association of allegory 
and narrativisation with the nature of language itself. With reference to one of 
Wordsworth's "Lucy" poems, de Man (1983: 225) states that "The fundamental 
structure of allegory reappears here in the tendency of the language toward narrative, 
the spreading out along the axis of an imaginary time in order to give duration to what 
is, in fact, simultaneous within the subject". What is "simultaneous within the 
subject" here involves the "double structure of ironic language" (de Man 1983: 216), 
what Frey (1990a: 96) calls "This impossible distance [which] characterises the 
structure of irony". 46 Frey makes the very important point that language itself is not 
posited.47 
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The narrative line which is said to be interrupted permanently by irony - an 
interruption which can only be conceptualised in terms of repetition and 
successiveness: narratively- is the line of"logos (cause, reason, meaning, or end)" as 
Miller puts it (1982: 106). That is, what irony disrupts is conceptuality itself. 
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Critchley puts it, the lack of synthesis characteristic of the Romantic fragment, 
consisting as it does of the oscillation of the synthesis of wit and the diaeresis of 
irony, leads to "an infinite reflection that is not completed in any intuition or in any 
coincidence of thought and object of thought, i.e. the Concept" (Critchley 1997: 115). 
Now, for de Man, conceptuality is tropological. 49 In the course of a discussion 
of Schlegel's conception of irony in terms of Fichtean dialectic, de Man relates 
"comparative judgments" to the possibility of experience (1996: 175). 50 He continues 
by noting that this (Fichtean) system of comparative judgments "is first of all a theory 
of trope" for the reason that "the circulation of the property (Merkmal) described in 
the act of judgment here is structured like a metaphor or a trope, is based on the 
substitution of properties" (de Man 1996: 176). Secondly, he characterises the system 
as performative because it involves "an original act of positing" (1996: 176) and 
claims "one can only call [this system] an allegory .... It is an allegory, the narrative 
of the interaction between trope on the one hand and performance as positing on the 
other hand" (1996: 176). The point which I would like to emphasise here is de Man's 
identification of conceptuality - systematicity, coherence - with tropology, with a 
"tropological system", a "narrative line", a "tropological narrative" (1996: 177). 
According to de Man, parabasis undoes "the narrative structure resulting from the 
tropological system" (1996: 179). He continues by stating that "The allegory of 
tropes has its own narrative coherence, its own systematicity" and that "irony is the 
undoing, the necessary undoing, of any theory of narrative" (1996: 179). This is to 
say that irony interrupts the totalising, narrativising, and allegorising tendency of 
language, the tendency to conceptualise and synthesise which results in the 
"coincidence of thought and object ofthought" (Critchley 1997: 115). 
The discussion above should serve to illuminate de Man's difficult definition 
of irony, namely that "irony is the permanent parabasis of the allegory of tropes" 
(1996: 179).51 This is a self-subverting definition, because in effect it claims that any 
definition of irony - that is, any explicating narrative of irony, any allegory of irony -
is interrupted permanently by irony. At the same time, a self-subverting definition is 
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the only kind of definition which would do justice to irony as disruption, since a 
coherent definition of irony would ignore the disruptive nature of irony. It is for this 
reason that de Man claims "irony is not a concept" (1996: 163), and might be 
postulated as at least one ground for the difficulty of giving a definition of irony ( cf 
de Man 1996: 164ff.). 
A crucial aspect of parabasis which I have not dealt with up to this point is its 
relation to fiction. A parabasis is an interruption, but this interruption must be 
characterised, on the basis of its historical reference to Greek drama, as the 
interruption of fiction or the illusion of fiction. As an interruption of the narrative line 
of the play, the parabasis interrupts the progression of the play by "represent[mg] 
itself as reality with respect to the play" (cf Albert 1993: 842). However, this 
interruption of the play is itself part of the play, that is, fictive. Fiction is interrupted 
by fiction. This means that the parabasis, liminally, is simultaneously included and 
excluded from the play: it is excluded because it purports to be an interruption of the 
play as fiction, and yet it is included because it forms part of the script. The 
parabasis, as fictive interruption of fiction, is a fragment in that its status vis-il-vis 
completion is undecidable: in itself it is a complete entity, for it interrupts the play; 
but it, simultaneously, forms part of the very play which it interrupts and therefore 
cannot be complete in itself Irony, as the permanent parabasis of fiction, turns out to 
be characterised by the undecidability of the fragmentary. In its unmasking of fiction 
as fiction, it blurs the very distinction between reality and fiction. Albert (1993: 843) 
puts this as follows: 
The ironical spectator (or the ironist in general) is the one who realizes that he 
is always already a character in the play. Although he is obviously free to 
react as he wishes, his reactions (as reactions of a spectator who belongs to the 
play) belong in turn to the play and are a part of his role. Even his knowledge 
that he is part of the play is part of the play; even his self-reflection does not 
belong to him; even his irony is ironized. 
It is for this reason that irony, as permanent parabasis, "In suspending the [narrative] 
line ... suspends also itself' (Miller 1982: 1 05). Irony is subject to its own disruptive 
power because, as an example of interruption, it effaces interruption. This is a 
problem as far as fragmentation and interruption in general are concerned in that "the 
particular examples that must be given to illustrate the resulting fragmentation also 
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have a way of generalizing themselves into a systematic formulation, however 
aberrant such formal systems have just been shown to be" (Newmark 1992: 925). 
Irony, in interrupting the logos, turns into the logos, which is ironised and in its tum 
interrupted. In its requirement to be recognised as irony, irony undoes itself for the 
reason that what it does is, precisely, to interrupt understanding itself. Irony turned to 
logos must, in its tum, be ironised. Newmark (1992: 925) notes that this makes irony 
self-resisting, and characterises Schlegel's definition of irony as a permanent 
parabasis as "that most self-resisting definition of irony he ever gave". 
Irony is thus potentially infinite in its disruptive power: not only does it expose 
fiction as fiction, but it exposes itself as part of that selfsame fiction. It is to the 
implications of this ironic double bind - similar to the Levinasian dilemma of the 
ethical Saying turning into an ontological Said and the infinite ethical movement of 
interruption required as a result - that I want to tum next, for irony may be 
characterised as interrupting also one particular kind of fiction: that of the face given 
to the other in the act of representing, defining and conceptualising it. Irony, as 
permanent parabasis, disrupts prosopopoeia by unmasking the face given as a mask. 
In interrupting the allegory of tropes, irony undoes the positing performance of 
tropology. 
3. 3. 2 Prosopopoeia and Catachresis 
It will be the task of this final section of the chapter to consider catachresis and 
prosopopoeia at greater length, and to indicate how these terms may assist in 
understanding the relation between irony and otherness. As pointed out earlier (in 
section 3.2.2.2), the trace ofthe other may be understood in terms ofcatachresis. That 
is, the face of the other, to the extent that it is given and available to representation, 
may be understood as involving prosopopoeia. This close link between catachresis, 
prosopopoeia and otherness is confirmed by Miller (1990), who approaches 
prosopopoeia in terms of the metamorphoses in Ovid's Metamorphoses, in particular 
with reference to the story of Pygmalion, which involves the coming to life of the 
statue Galatea: 
If most of the metamorphoses in the Metamorphoses go from human to 
inhuman, life to death, animate to inanimate, the coming alive of Galatea goes 
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~he ot~er w~y: The name for the figure of speech of which this metamorphosis 
IS the hterahzmg allegory is prosopopoeia. This trope ascribes a face a name 
or a voice to the absent, the inanimate, or the dead. ' ' 
(Miller 1990: 3-4) 
Miller makes the link between prosopopoeia and otherness even more explicit by 
associating the former with the elision of the latter. According to him, it is the 
function of prosopopoeia as personification to reduce the "irreducible otherness" of 
the neighbour or the beloved. Thus, "prosopopoeia is a cover-up of death or of 
absence . . . . My neighbor is always somehow absent even in moments of the most 
intimate presence. Personification both covers over these blank places in the midst of 
life and, sooner or later, brings them into the open" (1990: 4). 52 As is clear, however, 
prosopopoeia does not function only reductively. Not only does it "[cover] over blank 
places", but it can also bring them "into the open". The face given to the other, that 
is, appears not only to reduce otherness but may also reveal it. This revelation of 
otherness in the face given by prosopopoeia to the irreducibly other becomes evident 
not in the face as such, but in the recognition that behind the face is nothing. This is 
the recognition, in Levinasian terms, that the face given by prosopopoeia is a mask for 
what has no face (for what exceeds any face)- a death mask- which is to say that 
prosopopoeia is a catachresis ofthe other (cf. Critchley 1997: 74). 
Miller calls prosopopoeia "the trope of mourning" (1990: 4) and associates the 
changes which occur in the Metamorphoses with personification: "They are 
etiological myths expressing our sense that an obscure human life is diffused 
throughout nature - in the sighing of branches, in the whispering of water in a 
fountain, in the dancing of a daffodil" (1990: 4). Of note here is the hallucinatory 
implication of prosopopoeia, a trait it shares with catachresis (and which will be 
considered at greater length below as it will be of some importance for the readings in 
the next chapters). Prosopopoeia, as personification, is linked to the pathetic fallacy 
(cf. Miller 1989). The specularity always involved in the act of prosopopeically 
ascribing a face, a name and a voice to that which has none, is emphasised by Miller 
in terms of the Pygmalion myth: "The story of Pygmalion shows prosopopoeia 
functioning not to hide the absolute absence of death but to give life to the inanimate 
in a dream come true. For Pygmalion, the other is not really other. Pygmalion has 
himself made Galatea. She is the mirror image of his desire" (1990: 4). Miller 
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continues by claiming "The entity I have personified is given the power to respond to 
the name I invoke, to speak in answer to my speech" (1990: 5). In this way 
prosopopoeia is, to Miller, also linked to catachresis: 
... though prosopopoeia is a fact of language, a. mem~er of th~ ~amily of 
tropes, this tends to be hidden because the trope 1s postted. a pn?n. Many 
prosopopoeias are part of ordinary language and so extst pnor ~o the 
distinction between figurative and literal speech - many prosopopoetas are 
also catachreses, neither literal nor figurative, like 'headland', 'eye of a storm', 
or 'face of a mountain'. 
(Miller 1990: 5) 
This occultation of the tropological nature of catachresis indicates the close relation 
between prosopopoeia and catachresis, and implicates both in the tendency to forget 
the posited nature of language and the misrecognition of a linguistic order for a 
natural one: 
A prosopopoeia is a human creation, a product of the capacity within language 
for tropological substitution. We can, for example, shift the name of a part of 
the human body to a feature of the landscape and speak of the face of a 
mountain. This operation is concealed when the anthropomorphism then 
becomes a part of ordinary language. We forget that we ourselves have 
artfully personified the mountain and are fooled into taking our own creation 
literally .... Pygmalion is so skilful an artist, skilled even in concealing his art 
from himself, that he is taken in by his own fabrication: it seems to him that 
Galatea must be a real girl. 
(Miller 1990: 8-9) 
De Man, too, links catachresis and prosopopoeia. He describes prosopopoeia, in 
terms of its etymology - ''prosopon poi en, to confer a mask or a face" (1979c: 926) -
as "the fiction of an apostrophe to an absent, deceased or voiceless entity, which 
posits the possibility of the latter's reply and confers upon it the power of speech" 
(1979c: 926). Elsewhere, de Man says ''prosopon-poiein means to give a face and 
therefore implies that the original face can be missing or nonexistent" (1986: 44). He 
continues by relating prosopopoeia to catachresis in the following way: 
The trope which coins a name for a still unnamed entity, which gives face to 
the faceless is, of course, catachresis. That a catachresis can be a prosopopeia, 
in the etymological sense of 'giving face', is clear from such ordinary 
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insta~ces as the face of a r:nountain or the eye of a hurricane. But it is possible 
that, mstead of prosopope~a bei?g a subspecies of the generic type catachresis 
(or the reverse), the relattonshtp between them is more disruptive than that 
between genus and species. 
(de Man 1986: 44) 
Frey elaborates on the nature of this relation between prosopopoeia and catachresis by 
characterising prosopopoeia, in an important formulation, as "the figure which gives a 
form, a face, to that which is not perceptible to the senses. It makes appear that which 
cannot appear" (1990a: 80). 
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This determination of prosopopoeia occurs in the 
context of a consideration of understanding, and thus of reading, as the ability to 
distinguish between the literal and the figurative: "If reading as understanding 
presupposes clarity over the rhetorical status of what has been written, then a text in 
which it is not possible to draw the distinction between figurality and literality is no 
longer readable" (Frey 1990a: 78). 54 As an example of such a confusion between the 
literal and the figurative, which unsettles understanding and readability and, in fact, 
potentially leads to hallucination, Frey mentions catachresis. 
In the case of catachresis, the relation between the figural and proper meaning 
is more complex than in other cases. As Frey explains (1990a: 79), a catachresis is a 
metaphor which has substituted a word which does not exist at all. That is, in the case 
of catachresis the figural meaning cannot be replaced by a proper meaning which 
would name an object. Frey elaborates by citing the example of a table. That on 
which a table stands is called a leg, which is a catachresis because it is a metaphor 
(since the inanimate table is determined in terms of an animate member) which, 
however, cannot be replaced by a non-figurative word for the reason that such a word 
does not exist. The figure 'leg' directly refers to an object and need not be translated 
into a proper term which would name that object. Convention determines that the 
figure refers to an object (a table) and that the term 'leg' must be taken to be 
figurative, not literal. That is, the figurality of the figure 'leg' is ignored: 
catachresis functions in such a way that the ordinary relation between the 
figurative and the literal is reversed in that one no longer reaches the object by 
returning to the proper word via the figure, and from the former to the object, 
but in such a way that one ignores the figurality of the figure and reaches the 
object directly through it. In the case of catachresis, figurative meaning must 
be read referentially and literal meaning figuratively. 
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55 (Frey 1990a: 79) 
This reversal of the figurative and the literal can be potentially confusing. In the 
absence of convention, or some other context, one could mistake the figurative for the 
literal and take the figurative legs of the table as referentially signifying literal legs: 
"But this soon leads to a hallucination in which the table is distorted [disfigured] into 
a four-legged monster" (1990a: 80).56 In a passage which underscores the close 
relationship between prosopopoeia and catachresis, de Man states that catachresis is 
capable 
of inventing the most fantastic entities by dint of the positional power inherent 
in language. . . . Something monstrous lurks in the most innocent of 
catachreses: when one speaks of the legs of the table or the face of the 
mountain, catachresis is already turning into prosopopeia, and one begins to 
perceive a world of potential ghosts and monsters. 
(de Man 1996a: 41-42) 
The table now appears, monstrously disfigured, as a personification: it has come to 
life through being, literally, disfigured: "The disfiguration [Entstellung] is a 
disfiguration [Dis.figuration] also in a rhetorical sense, because it consists in the word 
leg no longer being taken as a figure, but being understood literally" (1990a: 80).57 
One could call such a monstrously disfiguring hallucination a prosopopoeia, because 
it makes appear that which cannot appear, to return to Frey's formulation quoted 
above. Frey (1990a: 80) continues that determination of prosopopoeia in terms of 
catachresis in the following way: 
In this way [by making appear that which cannot appear], prosopopoeia goes 
one step further than catachresis. The latter signifies figuratively that which 
has no proper name, but as a result of which is not put in question in its 
sensible presence. The first makes visible what is invisible. Catachresis is an 
irreducible figure which should be read referentially, while prosopopoeia is a 
fiction which does not correspond to any perceptible reality. s 
Prosopopoeia is thus the radicalisation of catachresis. As I indicated at the end of the 
previous section, it is possible to relate irony to prosopopoeia on the basis of the 
interruption of fiction by irony understood as permanent parabasis. Frey, on the basis 
of his distinction between prosopopoeia and catachresis (and the radicalisation of the 
first), does, indeed, proceed to relate prosopopoeia and irony in terms of the 
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interruption of the fictionality of prosopopoeia by irony through the unmasking of 
prosopopoeia as "a fiction which does not correspond to any perceptible reality". He 
does this by indicating that the face given by prosopopoeia, in the context of its 
hallucinatory aspect, is shown by irony to be not a face, but a mask. Frey proceeds, in 
terms of de Man's conception of irony and against the background of his conception 
of language as being non-human, 59 by considering the lack of ground underlying 
reality - reality, as linguistically mediated, is not founded on some or other natural 
order enabling solid positions: 
If conventional order is the possibility of a position, of a point of view 
[Standpunktes], then the unmasking of order as fiction removes [entzieht] the 
ground of the position. . . . If normality, health, rationality is recognised 
[durchschaut] as fiction and mask, then the unmasking does not unmask a face 
behind the mask but only its absence. The insight in the fictivity of current 
orders does not lead to finding a truth on which a valid order could be erected, 
but is at the same time the insight in the impossibility of a foundational order. 
(Frey 1990a: 95-96t0 
However, the insight that any foundational order is impossible, that any position is 
unfounded, is itself a position. It is the position (as well as the positing) of 
positionlessness, the insight into the impossibility of insight. The process of positing 
a position which is simultaneously de-posited in being recognised as unfounded, Frey 
calls irony. 
The process of positing and de-positing [Entsetzung], which arises in this way, 
is infinite because there exists neither a tenable position nor an utterance 
which would not amount to taking a position, with the result that speech 
fluctuates unendingly between a position and its untenability. This infinite 
process of the break-up of each position, without it being possible ever finally 
to escape a position, is irony. 
)
61 (Frey 1990a: 95 
Frey thus links irony and the otherness of language (that language itself is not 
reducible to the human and the human not reducible to language) in terms of 
prosopopoeia. The face given by prosopopoeia to what lacks a face may be 
understood as being conceptuality itself. Conceptuality makes a thing into something 
by identifying it and by giving it identity, in other words, by relating it to and 
distinguishing it from other things. Conceptuality is the construction of a network of 
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relations (cf. Frey 1990a: 93) through the "suppression of the fragmentary" (Frey 
1985: 133). This suppression of the fragmentary may be understood as resulting in 
"an order that understanding, writing and reading achieve" (Frey 1985: 133), an order 
which reduces otherness and the fragmentariness characteristic of irreducible 
otherness. It is the price of order, the "comparison of incomparables" characterised 
by Levinas as politics (1981: 16). Frey (1990a: 73) notes that the word human 
(Levinas might here say other) is fictive - which is not the same as claiming that there 
are no humans, but simply means that we do not know what it is that we call 'human'. 
In short, the human escapes language because it escapes definition. And the 
humanness of the human is lost in being defined: 
The general concept human exists only in language. The human exists only as 
word. The humanness of the human, that which is common to all humans and 
makes it possible to call them human, is only given in language and rests on 
the repression of the differences which exist among particular humans. 
(Frey 1990a: 73-74)62 
Both politics and conceptualisation are founded on a network of relations, that is, a 
system of tropes which entails the comparison of the incomparable, the violent 
reduction of what is radically other to an object which can be mastered and controlled. 
In its interruption of conceptuality, irony serves as a reminder of the otherness 
inherent in what it is to be human: in society, politics, language. It interrupts the 
necessary illusion that people are all the same - the fiction which is necessary in order 
to guarantee order but which must be interrupted while it is maintained in order to 
prevent the tyranny of totality which results from the levelling of difference and 
elision of otherness - by insisting on their infinite separation, on "the unovercomable 
distance which must always prevail between the selves" (de Man 1983: 228; cf. 
Derrida 1992: 324ff.; 1992b: 431ff.). As Newmark argues, in terms of the possible 
implication of the Romantic project with National Socialism (cf. 1992: 914 ff.), irony 
as permanent interruption "forever disrupts the mythological unity of literature and 
philosophy" (1992: 927); that is, it disrupts the mythology which would constitute a 
kind of unity between literature and philosophy, form and content, rhetoric and truth 
(cf 1992: 906)- "a universal philosophy of literature that would go hand in hand with 
a totalizing, and potentially totalitarian, national aestheticism" (1992: 926-927). 
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As noted above, Frey explicitly relates irony to prosopopoeia in terms of 
otherness, in this case, the otherness of language as the non-human. If it is not certain 
whether language itself is posited by humans, then the fact that there is language -
that language occurs, that individual speech acts are posited- is anterior to humanity. 
If the construct of meaning must rest on the assumption that language is a given and 
exists, and if it is only possible to attribute meaning to the fact that language has taken 
place after it has taken place, 63 then the meaning of meaning itself is uncertain 
because it is impossible to relate the construct of meaning to something on which it 
could be founded, for instance an author. The attempt to trace speech back to a 
speaker or a text to an author must then be seen as an attempt to attribute the positing 
of language to an instance such as a speaker or an author and is exactly what happens 
when the author is taken as an instance outside of language who stands in for the text: 
But to the degree that it is precisely not the speaker who posits [setzt] 
language, and, inversely, that it is language itself which is the precondition 
[Voraussetzung] for the occurrence at all of language, the author is a figure for 
a positing [Setzung] which is completely withdrawn from and inaccessible to 
him, while at the same time he is at the mercy of [ ausgesetzt] that positing 
because he, in speaking, co-fulfils [mitvollzieht] it without being able to exert 
control over it [i.e., the positing of language]. The author, as retrospectively 
placed in a position anterior to/presupposed by [ vorausgestellte] and 
[therefore] the precondition [Voraussetzung] of the construct of meaning 
[Sinngefoge], is the prosopopoeia of preconditionlessness 
[Voraussetzungslosigkeit], that is, of the abrupt positing [Setzung] oflanguage. 
(Frey 1990a: 93)64 
The non-human aspect of language makes each ground of language, each position 
which would secure language - such as the author - fictive and, as such, the 
prosopopoeia of preconditionlessness and groundlessness. Each position is made 
uncertain and questionable. Frey thus characterises irony as the awareness of the 
questionable nature of all positions because of the recognition that they are unfounded 
and fictional. Each and every position can be exposed as being without basis and 
fictional. But one cannot not have a position: an impossible double consciousness is 
required which would indicate the inevitability of having to have a position which one 
knows cannot be valid while showing that the impossibility of having any position is 
in itself invalid because it too would amount to a position. Frey elsewhere puts this 
succinctly: 
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Irony is not the position of the person who refuse~ to ?ave a position. ~he 
person who refuses a positi~n falls into ~he ~rap of, m domg so, alread~ .havmg 
moved into a position negattvely. The tromst do:s not refus~ ~he posttlon but 
takes it up without taking it seriously. . . . Irony 1s not a posttton, n~t b~cause 
it denies positions, but because it sees through the ulttmat:ly ";lnJustlfi~b~e 
nature of all positions. The ironist does not fall victim to the dl~~ton t~at 1t ts 
possible to manage without positions, but takes up postttons m the 
consciousness of their unjustifiable nature. 
)
65 (Frey 1990: 274 
It is for this reason that irony is not transcendence, and that the ironist cannot afford to 
be smugly superior. Social conventions are fictive, but this recognition in itself must 
also be open to irony; the position that one cannot have a position is also a position: 
"Irony can therefore never become a position in the sense of a defendable attitude" 
(Frey 1990a: 97).66 But it goes without saying that just such an ironic position is 
inevitable while impossible. That ironic position would be the allegorisation of irony 
referred to above (3.3.1). 
What this amounts to, finally, is that irony - as the interruption and 
fragmentation of the wholeness of the totalised concept by unmasking it as being 
baseless (because it is linguistic and conventional rather than natural) and therefore 
fictional, interrupts the fictionality of the concept. It exposes the concept as fitting 
into a totality constituted by tropes which have been posited within language. And it 
dis-figures and de-faces that tropological construct: "Irony is the figure of 
disfiguration" (Frey 1990a: 97).67 However, irony cannot itself posit a new, proper, 
natural construct (that would just be to reconstruct the construct) in place of the 
construct it has exposed in its constructedness, because what irony indicates is 
otherness. "It sees though all orders as masks without a face, as prosopopoeias of its 
absence" (Frey 1990a: 97).68 Irony does not lead to the real otherness behind the face 
- otherness is what escapes the conceptuality of language. As Miller ( 1994: 1 0) puts 
it, 
[de Man's] radical concept of irony . . . presupposes the encounter with an 
otherness within language that involves a permanent suspension of meaning. 
In de Man's last essays this otherness is given the strange quasi-Marxist name 
'materiality' .... It names a radical alterity that is not phenomenal, that is not 
the object of a representable intuition, that cannot be confronted or 
referentially, literally named. 
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Irony names the impossibility of naming otherness. Rather than enabling access to 
otherness, irony disables it. It is the recognition that any determination of otherness 
(whether it be an otherness in language or of the other person) is a reduction of that 
otherness through the act of conceptualising it, while accepting that it is impossible to 
give up that conceptualising act. Through irony one is faced with a radical 
undecidability which entails the impossibility of conceptualising otherness and the 
impossibility of giving up conceptuality - the face given to the other which figures 
otherness (after all, irony is itself a figure): "Irony is being-suspended between the 
discrediting of the figure and the impossibility of giving it up" (Frey 1990a: 97).69 
And this impossibility, which requires the conceptualisation of otherness (whether the 
otherness oflanguage or of the other human) is the necessity of politics. 
The price of the order of politics is the elision of otherness in the face given, 
that is, the misrecognition of the mask as face or of the fragmentary as the whole. The 
ethical demand would be to prevent politics from turning into tyranny through the 
ironic reminder that politics is a fiction, a fiction which elides the irreducible 
otherness of others, an otherness resulting from the "unovercomable distance which 
must always prevail between the selves" (de Man 1983: 228). 
3.4 Notes 
1 At this moment I need to introduce the caveat that the main focus of this thesis 
is not ethics as such (see also note 5, below). For this reason, and for the 
purposes of this thesis, I ignore the "powerful critique of Levinas" by Michel 
Haar (Critchley 1997: 189 note 53). Haar, as Critchley reports, wrote to him 
"I don't see why there is ethics since there is alterity". See also Critchley 
(1997: 80), where Critchley questions why it should be that alterity is 
necessarily good and ethical: "Why is it not rather evil or an-ethical or 
neutral?". 
2 As already cautioned in the previous chapter, it is not my purpose to play off 
against one another, or adjudicate, different theories. Names absent from this 
thesis should, therefore, not be taken to be unimportant. They are simply not 
relevant to a consideration of irony (as conceived by de Man) in terms of 
otherness (as conceived by Levinas). 
3 It should be clear at this point already that a Levinasian conception of 
otherness is radically incompatible with much so-called post-colonial theory, 
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which tends to be concerned with 'embodying' specific instances of otherness. 
Compare in this regard Marais (1997: 62; 1997b: 179ff.). 
4 In capitalising these terms ofLevinas's, I follow the usage of Critchley (1992). 
5 I further need to stress that, apart from not being a comparative study of 
Levinas and de Man, this thesis is not primarily concerned with either Levinas 
or de Man, and therefore does not constitute a study of either of these thinkers. 
Thus, I am not engaged here in an attempt to establish, say, a 'Levinasian 
aesthetic' (cf. Marais 1997) of irony, or a 'de Manian theory of ethics' (cf. 
Handwerk 1985). I shall attempt, at most, to consider aspects of each 
thinker's diverse and rich conceptual apparatus in order to work out an 
approach to the relation which might obtain between irony and otherness. 
6 Levinas's relation to Husserlian phenomenology and Heideggerian ontology is 
highly nuanced. While Levinas came to oppose Heidegger, and perhaps 
moved closer to Husserl (cf. Peperzak 1983: 114), he views them "either as 
inaugurators of a new way of philosophizing or as respected adversaries with 
whom he is in discussion" (Peperzak 1983: 113). My references to the 
philosophy of, respectively, Husserl and Heidegger, are necessarily curtailed, 
unnuanced, and biased towards Levinas' s critique of them. Levinas' s reading 
of various philosophers is open to criticism, among them Hegel ( cf. Williams 
1992: 297-301) and Husserl (cf. Peperzak 1983: 117). I do not for the purpose 
of this thesis take cognisance of such criticism: Levinas' s relation with other 
philosophers is too complex and nuanced for in-depth study here. 
7 On the phenomenological reduction or epoche, see the lucid discussion by 
Peter Koestenbaum (1970: xixff.) Koestenbaum's introductory essay to 
Husserl's Paris Lectures provides a succinct introduction to his philosophy. 
8 Husserl does not claim that the transcendental ego creates the world, but that 
the ego constitutes (cf. 1970: 24) it: 
. . . the perception and its intentionally given object call to my 
attention, by virtue of the presumed horizon, an endless and open 
system of possible perceptions, perceptions which are not invented but 
which are motivated from within my intentional existence, and which 
can lose their presumed validity only when conflicting experience 
eliminates it. 
(Husserl 1970: 23) 
The intentional constitution of the world is subject to the rules of experience 
and evidence (cf. Peperzak 1983: 116), given that for the phenomenological 
establishing of "conceptual systems which determine the fundamental 












Levinas criticises the intellectualism in which such an understanding of 
knowledge as representation results. See Levinas (1996: 4-5). See also 
Peperzak (1993: 16). 
According to .Critchley's fo~tnote at this point, "Levinas is playing on the 
analogous ~ati~ and Ger~a~Ic etymology of these terms where the activity of 
knowledge IS hnked to se1zmg, grasping, and gathering" (Levinas 1996f: 192 
note 9). 
It is also in this context that Levinas' s insistence on the pastness of the trace 
which will be considered in the next subsection, must be understood. ' 
As we shall see in the next subsection, Levinas opposes the diachrony of the 
other, who is not present but past, with the synchrony of the same. 
Williams points out that Levinas's view of "philosophy itself [as] an egology 
that reduces infinity to totality, the other to the same" (1992: 298) 
problematically reduces philosophy to a monolith, a gesture which, in fact, 
echoes the views ofF. H. Jacobi in Hegel's day: "It is striking that Jacobi, like 
Levinas and others, portrays what he wishes to attack as a monolithic 
tradition" (1992: 305 note 51). 
This lack of surprise which, for Levinas, characterises Western philosophy, 
may also be considered in terms of the Platonic idea of anamnesis. See the 
following subsection, as well as Marais (1997: 60) and Peperzak (1993: 18). 
I shall devote more space to a discussion of the infinite vis-a-vis Levinas in the 
course of the next subsection, on the other as trace. 
Williams (1992: 298) points out, in fact, that "Levinas's analysis ofthe face is 
phenomenology in an antiphenomenological mode, for the face is not an 
appearance or a theme". It is for the reason that the other does not appear, 
that it is not a phenomenon but an enigma, that Levinas designates the other a 
trace. I shall discuss this point at greater length in the next section. 
It is of some importance to note at this point the complete dislocation of the 
other. The other is dislocated both spatially (Blanchet uses the word 
"elsewhere") and temporally. Blanchet, in the passage quoted above, says the 
other "comes from elsewhere" and does not belong "to our horizon". The 
other does not inscribe "himself upon any representable horizon whatsoever". 
Thus the other exceeds the horizon of being in that it is not present - that is, 
not here, not now. The trace of the other trace is a trace of both pastness and 
passedness ( cf Levinas 1981: 9). 
The temporal dislocation of the other as trace will be considered at 
greater length in the next subsection, on the trace. But it needs to be stressed 
here that this dislocation of the other is disturbing to the self My later 
discussion of irony and allegory hinges on this temporal dislocation. The 






an experience of the present in terms of its interpl~y with wh~t p~ecedes and 
follows and therefore renders experience in narrative form - ts dtsturbed by 
the im~ossible double structure of irony which consists of simultaneity made 
successive. 
The other is a stranger because of the absolute separation between self and 
other. After initially being reluctant to use the term 'neighbour' to describe 
the other (cf Levinas 1996a: 26-27), Levinas in his later work does resort to 
that term. Not only is the other infinitely separate from the self, and therefore 
a stranger to the self, but the other also stands in a relation of proximity to the 
self. To the extent that the self, in its responsibility for the other, must 
substitute itself for the other, "substitution as the otherwise than being [lies] at 
the basis of proximity" (Levinas 1981: 19). 
To anticipate somewhat, as I shall claim later in this chapter (in the section on 
prosopopoeia), what can be represented is the face which the self posits for the 
other. That is, the represented face of the other is, in a radical sense, not a face 
(Blanchot agrees that Levinas's term, 'face' (visage) "creates difficulties" 
[1993: 54]). The face of the other, to the extent that it can be seen, is not 
proper to the other but flows from the representation of the self It is in this 
sense that I claim the face of the other must be de-faced: it must be recognised 
as a face which can be put on or taken off, that is, as a mask. However, 
crucially, this face-as-mask is a face behind which nothing appears, behind 
which is only absence. For if the face were to be the face of the other, it 
would already have been represented. And if, behind the face of the other 
would appear the other, then the other would be within the purview of 
representation. On the contrary, to Levinas the face exceeds representation in 
its infinity. The face of the other -which, as Blanchot puts it, is in a place 
neither visible nor invisible and, as such, is itself neither visible nor invisible -
in escaping from and exceeding representation, also interrupts representation. 
See the section on the trace (3.2.2.2) for an elaboration of the status of the face 
as mask. 
It is interesting to note the extent to which Levinas's language, in this essay 
("Is Ontology Fundamental?") is still explicitly ontological. Levinas uses the 
term "being" to describe the other and mentions a "relation" with the face. 
The passage is couched in Husserlian and Heideggerian terms such as 
"horizon", "let ... be" and "to be given" (es gibt). As mentioned above, 
Levinas in his later work attempted to move away from this kind of 
ontological language (cf Critchley 1992: 6ff.). 
Levinas describes the other both in terms of an impossible immediacy which 
disrupts the objectifying, reflective intention of the subject (cf Peperzak 1993: 
142, 163), and, from a slightly different vantage point, as outside the purview 
of the other because of the infinite nature of the other's face and the infinite 
nature of the separation between self and other. As we shall see, this infinite 
separation is understood by Levinas to entail the 'irreducible pastness' of the 
other; that is, the other can never be present to the representing subject. 
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22 Critchley (1992: 187 note 31) comments on the problematic nature of any 
speculation on the origin of language (in terms of this passage) by considering 
whether the first word -the interdiction against murder - might "not simply be 
expressed by the ethical resistance of the Other's face". For a discussion of 
the Husserlian distinction between indication and expression vis-a-vis Levinas 
and Derrida, see Critchley (1992: 169-180) and Marais (1997: 64; 1997a: 
I Off). 
23 Levinas's reading of Plato is carefully nuanced. On the one hand, he sees 
Plato as belonging to the tradition of autonomy, specifically vis-a-vis 
anamnesis; on the other hand, he celebrates Plato's insistence on the 
transcendence of the Good as an instance of truth conceived in terms of 
heteronomy (cf 1987: 47; 1969: 103; 1981: 19). 
24 Foucault relates this movement of truth into depth - inwards into the inner 
being of the transcendental subject - to the disruption of what he calls the 
classical period by the modem (1970: 236ff; cf Rajchman 1985: 108ff.). It is 
important to stress that this anamnesis, as reminiscence of what has always 
already been there, of knowledge hidden in the depths of the Cartesian cogito, 
involves an essentialism: an essence or Being of the being. This essentialism 
amounts to forgetfulness: in turning inward the cogito forgets the world and 
anamnesis becomes amnesia. Williams (1992: 145) defines Hegelian 
consciousness as "embodied and situated in the world", while "the Cartesian 
cogito is a pre-reality individual, an abstraction from the fundamental concrete 
ontological setting in life". According to Williams, for Hegel "the other lies 
deeper than theoretical-reflective or explicitly thematic considerations. . . . 
[Hegel] expresses a pre-intentional world-openness and relatedness that has 
been long forgotten by the intellectual amnesia of the Cartesian cogito". 
25 See Peperzak (1993: 108-109) for a discussion of the question whether the 
translation of the term "l'Infini" should be rendered as "infinity" or "the 
infinite". 
26 The relation between Derrida's work and that of Levinas is anything but 
uncomplicated. Each of these two thinkers has had an important influence on 
the other, with Derrida deserving "a good deal of the credit . . . for having 
called the attention of literary scholars to Levinas's work" (Buell 1999: 9). 
See especially Derrida's essays "Violence and Metaphysics" (1978), "At This 
Very Moment in This Work Here I Am" (1991) and "Adieu" (1996), and 
Levinas's essay "Wholly Otherwise" (1991). Scattered references to Levinas 
appear elsewhere in Derrida, and to Derrida in Levinas (in particular in 
Otherwise than Being). 
See Critchley (1992) for a useful introduction to the relation between 
Derrida and Levinas. 
27 Levinas argues that, because it has an irreducibly past, enigmatic nature, the 
other cannot be called a phenomenon. A phenomenon is, as Heidegger 
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explains at the beginning of Being and Time (1996: 25-28; 30-34), something 
which appears and comes to light out of its concealment. 
28 Derrida also asserts that Levinas conceives of the trace "certainly in a 
nonpsychoanalytic way". This point of Derrida' s should go some. way in 
serving to justify my decision to exclude psychoanalysts, and 
psychoanalytically derived theories of subjectivity, from the ambit of this 
thesis. Nonetheless, this is not to claim that Levinas's work is antipathetic to 
psychoanalysis, although Levinas himself makes the point that his work does 
not follow "the way of the unconscious" (1996d: 83). Indeed, the very 
concept 'trace' as deployed by both Levinas and Derrida (as well as differance 
itself) is closely related to the Freudian Spur (cf Derrida 1982: 18). 
Furthermore, the language of the lengthy passage from the essay "Differance" 
which I have quoted above, of course, quite explicitly relates Derrida' s use of 
the concept 'trace' to psychoanalysis. Bennington, among others, has pointed 
out the close relationship between Derrida's thinking and psychoanalysis (cf 
Bennington 1993: 133fT.). A recent book-length study applies Levinas's 
thinking to psychotherapy (Kunz 1998). 
29 Later in the same essay, Levinas (1996b: 60) complicates the idea of the 
mould or mask vis-a-vis the face and, as I shall indicate below, radically 
qualifies this scene of divestiture. 
30 Of course, the trace is precisely not a concept. As I shall attempt to show, the 
trace as a trace of otherness is a remnant of that which escapes conceptuality 
and thus disturbs and interrupts the order of conceptuality. In the next section 
(3.2.3) I shall consider a related answer to the quandary facing any writing or 
speaking about the other, namely Levinas's "great innovation in Otherwise 
than Being ... the model of the Saying and the Said as the way of explaining 
how the ethical signifies within ontological language" (Critchley 1992: 7). 
31 It might be worth pausing briefly at this point to address the possible 
accusation that Levinas's philosophy is solipsistic, in other words, that it 
fetishises otherness in its insistence on the radical separation between self and 
other, and the consequent inability to represent otherness without thereby 
reducing it. On the contrary, argues Blanchot (1993: 52), Levinas's work 
"seems to ... be the contrary of solipsism". This is so for the reason that, 
while self and other are infinitely separate, it is precisely in this infinite 
separation "that the relation with the other imposes itself upon me as 
exceeding me infinitely: a relation that relates me to what goes beyond me and 
escapes me to the very degree that, in this relation, I am and remain 
separated". As Levinas puts it in a passage from Totality and Infinity already 
quoted above, the other stands to the self in an '"unrelating relation', which no 
one can encompass or thematize" (1969: 295). Similarly, as noted above (note 
18), this 'unrelating relation' between self and other is defined not only in 
terms of separation, but also in terms of proximity, the basis of substitution. 
To this extent, Levinas's choice of'face' as a marker of the other is testimony 
to the importance of proximity in the face to face. In addition, the disturbance 
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occa~ion:d by the other in the order of the Same as a result of exceeding the 
self mfimtely- and therefore not being subject to the conceptualising of the 
self- should be an indication that Levinas cannot be accused of solipsism. 
32 This last phrase is an allusion to Levinas (I 996b: 62): "In the trace has passed 
a past absolutely bygone". 
33 See Critchley's discussion, in terms ofDerrida's essay for Levinas entitled "At 
This Very Moment in This Work Here I Am" (1991), of the double bind as it 
appears with respect to the necessary ingratitude which has to characterise any 
text for (in homage of) Levinas: "The logical and ethical necessity that haunts 
Derrida's essay is that by writing a text for Emmanuel Levinas ... one would 
return the work to its author, thereby betraying the ethical structure that 
Levinas's work tries to set to work" (Critchley 1992: Ill; cf 129). 
34 Marais's argument is that Coetzee's answer, as evident in his novels, is not to 
represent but to indicate the other. Marais refers to "Coetzee's anti-
representational strategy" (1997a: 9) and suggests "that the meta-
representational strategy which Coetzee uses in his fiction establishes an 
indicative relation with otherness (1997a: 10). In this argument, Marais draws 
on Husserl's distinction between indicative and expressive signs (cf also 
Marais 1997: 116ff.). See note 22, above. 
In this thesis the emphasis is less on (meta)representational strategies 
(on the question of how the other is to be represented), than on the restoration 
of the ethical Saying of otherness within the thematising Said of representation 
(on the question of how the representation of the other is to be interrupted). 
35 The term 'reduce' (as well as 'reduction') may here be understood in the 
everyday sense in which I have just used it, that is, as being more or less 
equivalent to the word 'diminish'. However, it is important to note the 
phenomenological provenance of the term, as it reaffirms the degree to which 
Levinas' s thinking appears in the wake of phenomenology. The ethical 
Saying is anterior to the ontological Said and, Levinas implies, may be 
reached through a reduction of that Said. See note 7, above, on the 
phenomenological reduction. 
36 Ciaramelli (1995: 90) importantly distinguishes politics from tyranny in the 
following way: "Now, the specific operation of the political in human society 
is understood by Levinas as the institution of equality among separated and 
different individuals. . . . Politics - as distinct from totality, distinct from 
tyranny- is the institution of a society of equals". As such, in order to ensure 
justice, politics is a necessary fiction, because the relation between self and 
other, as I have shown, is radically asymmetrical. But Critchley (1992: 240) 
adds that democracy consists in "the on-going interruption of politics by 
ethics, of totality by infinity, of the Said by the Saying". That is, politics, if it 
is to be democracy, must be ethically interrupted if it is to be prevented from 




It is important to note the nuance of the word 'relatin~', and its. relation to the 
concept of narrative. In the passage quoted abo~e, t~1s nuanc~ 1s strengthened 
by the identification of the discourse of the Satd wtth narrative by me~ns of 
the participle 'recounted': "The interruptions of the disco.urse foun~ agam and 
recounted in the immanence of the said are conserved hke knots m a thread 
tied again .... "(my emphasis). The discourse of the Said, which is compared 
to a woven fabric, a text, is identified with narrative. 
See Goodwin and Bronfen (1993: 7) for an elaboration of the problem of 
representing death. As they note, extending the problem of representing death 
to representational discourse in general, 
Representation presupposes an original presence, and in the case of 
death that is clearly paradoxical. In any representation of death, it is 
strikingly an absence that is at stake, so that the presentation is itself at 
a remove from what is figured. This is not just to claim that any 
representation of death in fact targets something else - the terms in 
which it chooses to make itself known - though no doubt some would 
argue just that. Any representational discourse implies the muteness, 
absence, nonbeing - in short, the death - of the object it seeks to 
designate. 
To this extent, one might argue that representation, presupposing absence and 
death as it does, necessarily functions prosopopeically in giving a face or voice 
to what is, or may become, absent. 
39 Critchley's reference to de Man is to his 1969 essay "The Rhetoric of 
Temporality" (1983: 220). Critchley (1997: 112) glosses his use of the term 
parabasis in the following way: it is "a stepping forward, or stepping aside, 
originally designating the parts of ancient Greek comedy sung by the chorus". 
For further explanations of the parabasis in historical terms, see de Man ( 1983: 
218-219; 1996: 178); Miller (1982: 105); and Albert (1993: 840-843). 
40 For discussions of the undecidable status of the fragment, see Frey (1996: 25-
29; see also 1985: 132-133; 1990a: 168fT; 187ff.). For an explicit 
consideration of the fragment in terms ofRomanticism, see Frey (1994). 
41 In thus associating irony with separation, division and dissolution, Critchley is 
explicitly following de Man's insistence that irony does not lead to any final 
Aujhebung, but "is disruption, disillusion" rather than "aesthetic recuperation" 
(de Man 1996: 182). 
42 It is important to note that, quite in keeping with the notion of Romanticism as 
a project, Schlegel never managed to complete a final definition of irony. 
Instead, irony is defined again and again in many of Schlegel's fragments and 
other writings (cf Schlegel 1967, 1973). I here refer only to one of these 
many, incomplete, fragmentary definitions: one which has proven particularly 
influential. 
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43 See Miller (1990: 13fT.) for a consideration of the relation between reading, 
narrative, otherness, conceptuality and ethics. While reading can be 
characterised as entailing a confrontation with otherness (cf 1990: 20), Miller 
argues that reading also betrays otherness for the reason that all texts demand 
to be read (I 990: 18). 
44 "dass Bewusstsein und Unbewusstsein auseinandergenommen und einander 
gegenubergesetzt werden. Das Miteinander wird in ein Nacheinander, 
Simultaneitat in Sukzession umgewandelt. Man kann das in de Mans Sinn 
eine Allegorisierung der Ironie nennen." 
Translations are by me unless otherwise indicated in the Bibliography. 
45 "die Sprache [kann] nichts anders als Ordnungen zu errichten und sie als 
giiltig zu postulieren" 
In his recent book-length study of the novel, Brink characterises "language as, 
itself, a narrative activity" ( 1998: 4). He refers to "the storytelling properties 
of language" (1998: 7) and claims that "In some respects language may be 
regarded as a form of narrative. . . . [It] may be said that language has a 
propensity for narrative" (1998: 9). 
46 "Dieser unmogliche Abstand kennzeichnet die Struktur der Ironie" 
47 I consider this point at somewhat greater length below (see pp. 91fT.) in terms 
of the non-human aspect of language, that is, in terms of the anteriority of 
language to any particular human, something which implies that language 
itself could not be have been posited by the human. Of course, this has 
implications for any theory of the origins of language. See the "Metaphor" 
chapter in Allegories of Reading (1979b) and Frey's discussion (1985: 128ff.; 
1990a: 74fT.). 
48 For this reason, too, the definition of irony as a conceptualisation of 
permanence in terms of repetition, as Albert recognises, is ironic ( cf 1993: 
847 note 24). I elaborate on this point below (see pp. 107fT.). 
49 This point is of some consequence for the argument of this thesis. As de Man 
(1979c: 922) puts it in "Autobiography as De-facement", a "tropological 
structure . . . underlies all cognitions". In the "Metaphor" chapter from 
Allegories of Reading, in an important passage which I would merely like to 
cite here in order to confirm de Man's view that conceptualisation is, indeed, 
tropological, he puts this as follows: "[Conceptualization] is an intralinguistic 
process, the invention of a figural metalanguage that shapes and articulates the 
infinitely fragmented and amorphous language of pure denomination. To the 
extent that all language is conceptual, it always already speaks about language 
and not about things. . . . All language is language about denomination, that 
is, a conceptual, figural, metaphorical metalanguage" (1979b: 152-153). 
103 
50 The relation between Schlegel, Fichte and de Man would result in a discussion 
into which I cannot venture at this point, as it would take us far afield indeed 
(see Albert 1993: 843 note 2). See Gasche (1981:52ff.) for an in-depth 
discussion ofFichte as a source of Speech Act Theory within the context of an 
examination of de Man's relation to that theory. 
51 See also de Man's following difficult definition, at the end of Allegories of 
Reading: "Irony is no longer a trope but the undoing of the deconstructive 
allegory of all tropological cognitions, the systematic undoing, in other words, 
of understanding. As such, far from closing off the tropological system, irony 
enforces the repetition of its aberration" (1979a: 301). 
52 On the relationship between prosopopoeia and personification, see Miller 
(1990: 4ff.). 
53 "die Figur, die dem eine Gestalt, ein Gesicht gibt, was nicht sinnlich 
wahrnehmbar ist. Sie bringt zur Erscheinung, was nicht erscheinen kann." 
This formulation is of importance for this thesis because it determines 
prosopopoeia in phenomenological terms which enable one to link 
prosopopoeia to otherness in Levinasian terms. In terms of the latter, as we 
saw above, what can appear is a phenomenon and what cannot is an enigma. 
What cannot appear is the other. 
54 "Wenn Lesen als Verstehen Klarheit tiber den rhetorischen Status des 
Geschriebenen voraussetzt, so ist der Text, bei dem der Entscheid zwischen 
Figiirlichkeit und W ortlichkeit nicht getroffen werden kann, nicht langer 
lesbar." 
55 "die Katachrese [funktioniert so], dass das gewohnte Verhaltnis zwischen dem 
Figiirlichen und dem Wortlichen umgekehrt wird, indem man nicht mehr 
dadurch zur Sache kommt, dass man von der Figur auf das eigentliche Wort 
und von diesem auf die Sache zuruckgeht, sondern so, dass man die 
Figiirlichkeit der Figur ignoriert und von ihr aus direkt zur Sache kommt. Bei 
der Katachrese ist die figiirliche Bedeutung referentiell und die wortliche 
Bedeutung figiirlich zu lesen." 
56 "Das fiihrt aber bald einmal zur Halluzination, m der der Tisch zum 
vierbeinigen Ungeheuer entstellt wird." 
57 "Die Entstellung ist eine Disfiguration auch im rhetorischen Sinn, denn sie 
besteht darin, dass das Wort Bein nicht mehr als Figur, sondern wortlich 
verstanden wird." 
58 "Dadurch geht the Prosopopoiie einen Schritt weiter als the Katachrese. Diese 
bezeichnet figiirlich, was keinen eigentlichen Namen hat, dadurch aber in 
seiner sinnlichen Prasenz nicht in Frage gestellt ist. Jene macht sichtbar, was 
unsichtbar ist. Die Katachrese ist eine unreduzierbare Figur, die referentiell zu 
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lesen ist, wahrend die Prosopopoiie eine Fiktion ist, der keine wahrnehmbare 
Wirklichkeit entspricht." 
59 See de Man's paper on Benjamin (1986: 73; 105). Frey (1990a: 71ff.) 
discusses this paper at some length, in particular with regard to de Man's 
interrogation of language in terms of the non-human, that is, the fact that 
language precedes and outlives particular, individual humans (see de Man 
1986: 87). At the same time, as Frey (1990a: 73) puts it, such particular, 
individual humans exceed the limits of language: "It is neither possible to 
explain language through the human, nor the human through language. 
Language escapes the human and the human escapes language" [Weder erklart 
sich die Sprache durch den Menschen, noch der Mensch durch die Sprache. 
Die Sprache entgleitet dem Menschen, und- der Mensch entgleitet der 
Sprache]. The key question here, which unsettles any determination of 
language as human, is not how individual utterances are posited (they are, 
clearly, posited by particular humans), but how language as such is posited. 
As Frey (1990a: 94) points out, language has meaning, but that language 
exists may be meaningless. The possible meaninglessness of language, that is, 
underlies the meaning generated within language and makes impossible any 
final, delineated meaning. However, it is not part of Frey's argument that 
meaning as such is impossible: on the contrary, it is necessary fiction. 
Meaning and the prohibitions and rules expressed in laws are only ever 
conventions, but they are necessary conventions -that Gesetze are gesetzt, 
that laws are posited (see Frey 1990a: 274). 
60 "Wenn die konventionelle Ordnung die Moglichkeit der Position, des 
Standpunktes ist, so entzieht die Enthtillung der Ordnung als Fiktion der 
Position den Boden. . . . Wenn Normalitat, Gesundheit, VemOnftigkeit als 
Fiktion und Maske durchschaut werden, so enthOllt doch die Entlarvung kein 
Gesicht hinter der Maske, sondern nur dessen Fehlen. Die Einsicht in die 
Fiktivitat geltender Ordnungen fuhrt nicht zur Findung einer Wahrheit, auf der 
sich eine gOltige Ordnung errichten liesse, sondern ist gleichzeiting die 
Einsicht in die Unmoglichkeit einer fundierten Ordnung." 
61 "Der Prozess von Setzung und Entsetzung, der auf diese Weise in Gang 
kommt, ist endlos, weil es weder eine Position, die haltbar ware, noch ein 
Reden gibt, das nicht das Einnehmen einer Position ware, so dass das Reden 
unaufhorlich zwischen der Position und ihrer Unhaltbarkeit fluktuiert. Dieser 
endlose Prozess der VerrOckung von jeglicher Position, ohne dass es doch ein 
endgOltiges Loskommen von der Position gibt, ist die Ironie." 
62 "Den Allgemeinbegriff Mensch gibt es nur in der Sprache. Den Menschen 
gibt es nur als Wort. Das Menschliche des Menschen, das, was allen 
Menschen gemeinsam ist und macht, dass sie Menschen heissen konnen, ist 
nur durch die Sprache gegeben und beruht auf der UnterdrOckung der 
Unterschiede, die zwischen den einzelnen Menschen bestehen." 
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63 It is not possible to know what an utterance means before it takes place. The 
moment one has read or someone has spoken, it becomes possible to construct 
meaning, which, in any event is to draw relations [Ziehen der Beziehungen]. 
See Frey (1990a: 93). 
64 "Aber in dem Masse, als es gerade nicht der Sprechende ist, der die Sprache 
setzt, und als diese umgekehrt die Voraussetzung dafur ist, dass Sprache 
iiberhaupt stattfindet, ist der Autor die Figur fur eine Setzung, die ihm 
ganzlich entzogen und unzuganglich ist, und der er, indem er sie redend 
mitvollzieht, ausgesetzt ist, ohne dariiber verfugen zu konnen. Der Autor als 
die nachtraglich dem Sinngefuge vorausgestellte Voraussetzung ist die 
Prosopopoiie der Voraussetzungslosigkeit, das heisst der abrupten Setzung der 
Sprache." 
65 "Ironie is nicht der Standpunkt dessen, der sich weigert, einen Standpunkt zu 
haben. Werden Standpunkt verweigert, geht in die Faile, dass er damit bereits 
verneinend Stellung bezogen hat. Der Ironiker verweigert den Standpunkt 
nicht, sondem er nimmt ihn ein, ohne ihn Ernst zu nehmen. . . . Die lronie ist 
kein Standpunkt, nicht weil sie diesen vemeint, sondem weil sie die letztliche 
Unvertretbarkeit aller Standpunkte durchschaut. Der Ironiker verfii.llt nicht der 
Illusion, ohne Standpunkte auskommen zu konnen, sondem er nimmt 
Standpunkte im Bewusstsein ihrer Unvertretbarkeit ein." 
66 "lronie kann deshalb niemals zu einer Position im Sinne einer vertretbaren 
Haltung werden." 
67 "Ironie ist die Figur der Disfiguration." 
68 "Sie durchschaut aile Ordnungen als Masken ohne Gesicht, als Prosopopoiien 
ihres Fehlens." 
69 "lronie ist Suspendierung zwischen der Diskreditierung der Figur und der 
Unmoglichkeit, auf sie zu verzichten." 
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Chapter 4 
Kikoejoe: Fragmentation, Prosopopoeia and the Absolutely Other 
4.1 Introduction1 
How to read? The reader of Kikoejoe is faced with a predicament. This is a novel 
which offers itself as fragmentary and which, self-reflexively, makes explicit that it 
does not offer understanding. Kikoejoe is a novel which advertises itself as 
untrustworthy in its concern with the refractory nature of what is past. The novel is 
interspersed with editorial interruptions which acknowledge the difficulty, if not the 
impossibility, of the very project being worked out in it. Thus, for instance, the adult 
Fabian muses: 
That summer? A different one? Or do things repeat themselves, so that day 
and year don't matter, anyway? Isn't every story just a return to an earlier 
one, an addition, a supplementation- or even a process of betrayal? 
This is the currency of memory: betrayal of the past and of those with 
whom you shared the past. 
(140/133i 
How to write? The question posed in this passage concerns the avoidance of betrayal: 
it explicitly addresses the question of responsibility to the others with whom one 
shares history, a question which mounts in urgency if they have no voices, if they are 
dead (cf 168, 269/159, 255). Moreover, the question is phrased explicitly in terms of 
the link between the past, memory and narrative. Narrative is described here as 
consisting of a network of narratives, a construct made up of narratives supplementing 
one another. This process of return, of elaboration and supplementation is associated 
with the betrayal both of the past and of those with whom one "shared the past". 
Remembering the past amounts to reconfiguring it, but in doing so, we are told (and 
reminded), betrayal is inevitable. The work of narrative gathers what is separate and 
places in sequence what is random: it serves to make accessible and comprehensible 
that which is past, absent, and scattered (cf Brink 1998: 95, 196). 
This reminder is a timely one, particularly as reviewers of the novel, in 
general, have overlooked it (and thus betrayed it). Whereas the novel, in self-
reflexive passages such as the one quoted above (cf also 13, 146-147, 282-283/12-13, 
139, 267-268), tends towards fragmentation by advertising its provisional status vis-a-
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vis the past and acknowledging itself as an instrument of the betrayal of that past, 
reviewers have sought instead to gather together the various strands of the novel. 
Indeed, a common complaint in many reviews is the lack of unity in this novel. More 
than one reviewer of the novel seems to be of the opinion that the novel is flawed 
because of this alleged lack of unity. 
In this respect, the response of Pakendorf (1997: 10) is representative. 
According to him, van Heerden is one of the most highly gifted Afrikaans writers, 
something evidenced by Kikoejoe. This novel is "masterful" in evoking the mood of a 
holiday farm populated by a whole host of eccentric characters. But Pakendorf finds 
it a pity that "the work as a whole is not satisfactory" (1997: 10; my emphasis). 3 He 
speculates that the reason for this might lie in the novel containing too many diverse 
particulars, or possibly in van Heerden having been over-hasty, or in his editors not 
having taken sufficient care with the manuscript. Another possibility is, significantly, 
the following: "Perhaps an overarching concept to bind the excess of elements was 
absent from the start".4 As a result, 
the further the narrative develops the more it breaks open into loose fragments. 
Indeed, the last couple of chapters have no momentum, and the repetitions and 
attempts to fill up and close off and plug gaps leave the impression that the 
writer himself no longer quite knows how to conclude his narrative. 5 
What is evident here is Pakendorf s dissatisfaction with the absence of a clearly 
specified narrative telos. The diversity of characters, episodes and themes he 
identifies is not unified in "some or other upheaval or climactic point - even if it were 
to be an anti-climax - towards which everything moves"6 and which the reader, 
according to Pakendorf, expects. Pakendorf labels this a "lack in thematic closure"7 
and extends his attribution of this lack from plot to characterisation in the novel. His 
final verdict is that van Heerden should, perhaps, stick to short fiction as his attempts 
at the latter are better than his novel writing: "His latest book creates the impression 
that, for the greater vision of longer prose, he needs more discipline". 8 
It is my contention that what is perceived here - and by other reviewers, such 
as Burger (1996) and Kannemeyer (1997)9 - to be an absence or a lack, may be 
understood precisely as indicative of a radical incapacity to thematise and enclose the 
events and characters narrated in the novel, even if one might argue that the attempt to 
do so is evident in the novel. 10 It is fitting that this incapacity should manifest itself 
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in, among other things, the perceived inability of the author to control his subject 
matter properly, and consequently as an inability to lend his text the kind of coherence 
of sustained narrative embodied by the novel-as-genre. 11 Apart from the questionable 
organicist aesthetic evident from assertions such as those quoted above (among other 
things, Pakendorf seems to be attempting to explain and give meaning to the 
fragmentariness of the text as something offensive to his aesthetic and more broadly 
philosophical principles), what is not borne in mind by these reviewers is that it may 
not be possible to enclose this novel - that there are forces which enforce its 
fragmentary nature. 
As we have seen, the subject's control over language, in particular the 
narrativisation of the past, is explicitly and self-reflexively questioned in Kikoejoe. 
Tant Geertruida' s following description of her genealogical research as something 
over which she has no final control, may be said to be emblematic both of the text's 
genealogical concerns and of the lack of control over the text by the narrator, and, by 
extension the author (who, after all, like the narrator Fabian, is engaged with the 
project of dealing with the past [see Wasserman 1996; de Waal 1998]: if the novel is 
untrustworthy, this leaves the author no less unscathed than the narrator): "As I was 
saying, research is a strange business. Sometimes it leads you to places you don't 
want to go. But that, Fabian, is the whole excitement of research. One minute, you 
still believe that one equals one, then suddenly you have three in front of you" (34-
35/32-33).12 This is despite Ma's characterisation of genealogy in conventional terms 
- as consisting of painstakingly and precisely narrativising the past by constructing 
coherent accounts of people's descent - in order to explain Tant Geertruida's 
predilection for sequential action: "Tant Geertruida was fond of doing things in the 
same order. 'That's because she's a genealogist,' said Ma. 'It's precision research . 
. . . "' ( 4/3). 13 
Pakendorf s speculations as to possible reasons for the diffusiveness of the text 
(poor editors, undue haste, and the like) may thus be construed as attempts, as Frey 
(1985: 132; 1990: 168ff.) might argue, to control the fragment by ascribing to it 
extraneous (or internal) principles of explanation. The possibility is never considered 
by any of the reviewers cited that the text might be fragmentary just in its very 
fragmentariness. Instead, attempts are made to explain away and thus control its 
fragmentariness. 14 
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4.2 Determining Kikoejoe 
The attempt to enclose the text is evident also in a variety of critical speculations as to 
the nature of the enigmatic Kikoejoe. Various explanations of his significance have 
been proffered by reviewers (cf. Burger 1996: 10~ 1997: 36fT.~ HE 1998: 72). But the 
novel does not allow for such speculation to be finalised. Among the possibilities 
mooted in the novel itself to determine the Beast, it is suggested that Kikoejoe is time 
(cf. 51, 148, 168/48, 140, 159), God (cf. 129 & 149/122 & 141), the collective 
unconscious (cf. 147, 274/139, 260), the insanity which plagues the Latsky family (cf. 
151/143), or a monstrous, marauding beast (cf. 193, 277/183-184, 263) which perhaps 
is a figment ofFabian's imagination (cf. 96-97/91-92). 15 
Burger (1997: 37) speculates that Kikoejoe might have escaped from Pa's 
LSD dreams, 16 and subsequently identifies Kikoejoe with Fabian for the reason that 
each has only one eye. This identification of Kikoejoe with Fabian is suggested in the 
novel itself (cf. 274/260). In fact, it is strengthened in other passages as well, for 
instance where Fabian watches Tant Geertruida and then urinates against a tree (151-
153 /143-145). Kikoejoe is later, during Charles Jacoby's concert, described in an 
identical pose, also watching and urinating (255-257/242-244). However, similarly, 
the Veteran is also identified with Kikoejoe in that each is said to have a row of eyes 
(in the case of the Veteran this refers to his medals) (cf. 49, 138, 262/46, 131, 248). 
I claimed above, with respect to attempts by reviewers to determine Kikoejoe, 
that the novel does not allow for such speculation to be finalised. I would therefore 
now like to turn to a closer examination of descriptions ofKikoejoe in the novel itself, 
descriptions which nonetheless tend towards embodying the Beast. In the novel the 
Beast is initially identified as "half-human, half-orang" (21/20). 17 We are given the 
following information: 
Everyone knew about the Beast, but this was the first time we'd seen him. He 
was very furtive and never left complete tracks, but if you could read the veld, 
you saw the half-moons of strange palms, the heel-print of an alien foot, the 
knuckle-marks of a half-man .... 
The hotel waiters called the Beast Kikuyu, because some mornings 
bites had been ripped out of the kikuyu lawn round the furthest rondavels. The 




This passage suggests that the Beast Kikoejoe is a real if monstrous entity which is 
simultaneously both human and beast. For this reason already it is indefinable as it 
exceeds the categories 'human' and 'bestial': "[The vervet monkeys] couldn't tell 
whether they'd picked up the scent of a person or an animal" (96/91). 19 But even if 
the Beast does soon take on a more mythical, less concrete character, descriptions of it 
in the novel more often than not embody it. Ma's frustrated desire (to be an actress as 
much as to enjoy love) and her consciousness of transience, of time passing, is 
described in terms which will come to signify Kikoejoe as a dark, indefinable 
presence or, perhaps, absence which is disturbing: 
Time pressed down on her, trying to smother her, press her back against the 
bed. Sitting there, she was conscious of battling against a heavy body that 
pa:1ted over her, wanting to have its way with her. She just didn't know what 
it was. It pressed against her, this thing with no name. But it had a breath, 
rank against her cheek. · 
(51/48)20 
Even if the Beast is here identified with Time, and signifies something less concrete 
than an apeman - something indefinable - it is nonetheless described in terms which 
embody it. Time is personified as a Beast and what is supposed to be indefinable and 
supracorporeal is reduced in being embodied. Time is given a face in the 
prosopopoeia of the Beast. While this Thing is indefinable ("She just didn't know 
what it was"), it is nonetheless defined in being rendered concrete in the act of 
embodiment via prosopopoeia. As Ma yields to the Thing, it is significantly to 
commit adultery with the Veteran. It is as though she breaks free from Time ravaging 
her: "Then she was on the kikuyu and she was free" (52/49)?1 Yet this freedom is 
radically qualified by means of the reference to kikuyu, which of course is associated 
precisely with the Thing from which she is escaping. Her freedom from Time is 
illusory and the Beast, albeit in its absence, is omnipresent. This is further suggested 
in the description of her short journey to the Veteran and their subsequent 
lovemaking. With the preponderance of prosopopoeia as well as catachresis evident 
here, this description is lent a certain hallucinatory quality (cf. 52-53/49-50)?2 Yet, 
despite this unsettling of categories as a result of the employment of prosopopoeia and 
catachresis, they nonetheless also seem to result in a further embodiment of the Thing, 
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Kikoejoe. Thus, the Veteran is described in the following way: " ... but once she was 
gone, his breath started rushing in and out over his tongue, as though it were a 
physical thing" (53/50)?3 The animal imagery evident in further prosopopeic 
descriptions of the Veteran embracing Ma also serves to associate him with the Beast, 
and thus to embody the latter: "She was surprised by his lean, sinewy body and the 
veins that writhed like snakes over his arms, his legs and his lower body. In the 
moonlight, they looked like black worms feeding on him. She shuddered when he 
raised his body and she saw the shiny head of the cock .... "(53/50~ my emphasis).24 
This tendency to insist on the supracorporeal nature of the Beast, as well as to 
reduce it to something physical by embodying it, recurs in the novel. Thus a few 
pages after this passage, the following description occurs of Pa's suffering from 
depression and hallucinations while under experimental psychiatric treatment with 
LSD. Dr Clark has ensconced himself in the Bitter Aloe rondavel on the farm, and 
Fabian imagines his father's struggle: 
Pa blinked and he was in a boat on the Mouille Point sea. The boat 
took him into currents and winds that we did not know. It jerked and bobbed 
and glided on stormy waves. Kelp tangled around the boat and Pa was not 
alone there. The body fell against him as the sea tossed and it was he or Pa. 
They wrestled and Pa felt dank hair brushing over his face, the strong, 
muscular body that pumped against him, the hairless stomach and the erect 
prick. The devil' s paws trod on Pa' s bare feet and he felt he was being 
overwhelmed. It was as though the breathing over him were drugging him. 
Consuming his breath. 
(56/53)25 
The similarities evident in this description with that of Ma's struggle with the Beast 
just prior to her flight into the arms of the Veteran, suggest that each passage is 
concerned with the same entity, or at least with different manifestations of that entity. 
In this regard one might compare the references to the entity wrestling, its bestial 
sexuality, its "breath" ("asem") and, though this is lost in translation, the use of the 
same term ("bedompig", rendered respectively as "rank" and "dank") to describe it. 
Moreover, these descriptions prefigure later descriptions of Kikoejoe, such as that of 
the Beast in London, following Tant Geertruida as she visits the doctor who is to 
remove her breasts and womb (cf 65-66/62), as well as of the Beast at the hospital in 
Mouille point ( cf 66-67 /62-63). Even though the Thing is embodied as Beast, 
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Kikoejoe - in its transcendence of space and time - is nothing concrete and cannot be 
defined exclusively in sensory terms. Kikoejoe is radically different and strange, as 
the following description makes clear: 
The Beast growled softly when [the dogs] came upon his rank odour on the 
branches of the river scrub, the hair bristling on their backs before they ran 
yelping back to the lawn between the big house and the rondavels .... 
His urine smelled like nothing else on earth. It gave off steam and the 
stench drifted through the night, past the terrace with the upturned, sleeping 
chairs, past the moths fluttering round the stoep lights, past the city dogs that 
crept in under the cars, whimpering. 
It drifted down to the river and the sleeping troop of vervet monkeys 
stirred restlessly. They began chattering and jumping up and down and 
shaking the branches. Some lost their balance, tumbled into the reeds and 
began scrambling about in confusion, crashing into one another in the dark, 
tripping and scrambling out of the way. 
Ijledfrom my bed .... 
(66-67/62-63; my emphasisi6 
The smell of Kikoejoe' s urine, as a trace of his radical otherness which is beyond 
presence and absence and exceeds conceptuality, disturbs order. The descriptions 
cited above suggest that Kikoejoe is neither a presence nor an absence, neither 
concrete nor abstract. Kikoejoe is neither sensory nor supersensory, but both and 
neither. In short, Kikoejoe is other. As such, even if it is embodied through 
prosopopoeia in the novel, all attempts finally to determine Kikoejoe must fail. 
Apart from the possible determinations of Kikoejoe suggested in the novel 
itself (and listed above), a number of characters are associated explicitly with it (I 
have mentioned the identification ofKikoejoe with Fabian and the Veteran). Reuben 
is identified with Kikoejoe, when he illustrates the circumference of the Beast's prick 
by showing Fabian his elbow (288/273). Earlier he is identified with the Beast in the 
following way: 
He gazed up at the stars, strewn like crumbs across the sky and twitched his 
nose. Was that the smell of rain? Was there another smell on the evening 
breeze, something other than the faint smell of manure from the cattle pens, 
the grass smell rising from the kikuyu as the first dew fell? Was it a smell 
other than that of the damp sandbanks at the river and the peach trees behind 
the huts? 
At this time of the night the heavy, dank smell of soap and steam 
wafted on to the terrace from the ablution block, the smell of Jeyes Fluid and 
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shampoo and aftershave. But there was something other that Reuben couldn't 
place. It was a smell that was familiar and strange at the same time. H~ raised 
his arm and sniffed absent-mindedly at his armpit - Ma was very stnct and 
made sure that every waiter got a Mum roll-on every month. No, it wasn't 
him although he recognised something of himself in the odour. 
' (110/104-105~ my emphasis)27 
In this passage, Reuben is confronted with something indefinable. This undefinable 
otherness may be linked to the otherness of the Beast Kikuyu (as perhaps suggested 
with the explicit reference to kikuyu grass). Otherness is intimated in odour. Even if 
it is not his smell, Reuben recognises in himself this other smell, this smell of 
otherness. At this point I am emphasising the diversity of possible associations 
suggested in the novel between Kikoejoe and various characters. But one should 
nevertheless note the emphasis on alterity already evident in this passage, especially 
vis-Cl-vis smells as traces of otherness. 28 
Even Tant Geertruida (or her Luger), m the scene mentioned above, is 
identified with Kikoejoe as she aims the "poison eye" into the dark (153/145).29 For 
Fabian's eye has been poisoned and burned away by the Beast's saliva (cf. 129, 
149/122, 141), and the scars ofTant Geert's amputated breasts are described as eyes 
with Miss Brower's saliva on them (cf 127, 133/120, 126). 
Apart from suggestions of links and associations such as these in the novel 
itself, one could, with Burger (1997: 37), identify Kikoejoe with the unconscious: 
The Beast hides in an inherited, unconscious part of the psyche - forces about 
which little can be known. . . . The attempt by the adult Fabian to recall 
history is an attempt to get to know that which has been hidden, the Beast. He 
experiences the urge to tame the Beast by telling his story, his history. 
Monsters may, on a psychological level, be viewed as very deep, basic forces 
which erupt, like a volcano, in a monstrous deed. In the case of Kikoejoe, this 
monstrous act is the rape of Tsitsi, Oom Boeta's young black domestic 
servant. The Beast is responsible for this, that Beast present in the 
unconscious of each person on the farm. 30 
Leaving aside the questionable assertion that Kikoejoe is "that which has been 
hidden", 31 and the subsequent association of what has been repressed in history (the 
presence of the proverbial tarbrush in the Latsky family in the form of the slave 
woman Antjie Provee) with the repressive power of the unconscious (cf. also Smuts 
1996: 27), it is significant that Burger does take note of the inherent paradox of 
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Kikoejoe: that little can be known of the powers embodied by the Beast, but that the 
compulsion to know that unknowable is an urge which cannot be denied. Burger's 
suggestion that the raison d'etre of the novel is to know, contain and thus to tame the 
Beast is an important one. 
I shall, for reasons gtven earlier m this thesis, not be following a 
psychoanalytic approach here. 32 However, I would like to underscore Burger's 
perceptive acknowledgement that the Beast is diffuse - to a significant extent the 
suggestion in the novel (for instance in the descriptions quoted above [65ff./62]) that 
it is present in each character (whether in their unconscious or not) bears out my 
contention that Kikoejoe is nowhere. If it is everywhere and in each character, then 
Kikoejoe is nowhere in particular, and cannot be determined as this or that force or 
identified with this or that character. As such, the novel cannot but itself become 
diffuse and fragmentary, something which would go some way towards explaining the 
complaints by reviewers cited above concerning the apparently fragmentary nature of 
the text. 
Possibly the most persuasive attempt to pin down Kikoejoe's identity is that of 
the Dutch reviewer HE (1998: 72), who claims that the novel must be understood on a 
mythical level: "The mythical level is reached, particularly, where the inhabitants of 
Soebatsfontein feel that there are powers larger than themselves which they cannot 
know. The powers are embodied in the legendary Beast who is called Kikoejoe or 
Steppenwolf. ... ".33 This assessment is particularly perceptive in its recognition that 
Kikoejoe - or what it represents - cannot be known. However, my argument is that 
Kikoejoe, precisely, does not represent anything. It is for this reason that it cannot be 
known and that one cannot really claim that Kikoejoe "embodies" anything. Kikoejoe 
escapes or exceeds signification and determination. All representations of Kikoejoe, 
including the determination that Kikoejoe cannot be determined, are inadequate. 
Given the explicit refusal within the novel finally to determine Kikoejoe, it 
would be incorrect to try to pin its identity down. Such attempts, though, are 
understandable given that the novel (as well as van Heerden himself in interviews) 
does seem to feed attempts to reduce the otherness of Kikoejoe by, for instance, 
embodying it via prosopopoeia and suggesting mythological links with the 
landscape. 34 Even if these prosopopeic reductions are interrupted ironically in the 
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novel (as I claim is the case, given that the novel suggests such a plethora of possible 
determinations ofKikoejoe), this process does not seem to occur consistently. 
One of the most troubling instances of the embodiment and concretising of 
otherness in Kikoejoe is related to the many references to the work ofN. P. van Wyk 
Louw, in particular his epic poem Raka (1941). While it might initially appear that 
the references and allusions to Raka help make Kikoejoe less determinable (in 
operating in conjunction with other semantic fields in making the text more diffuse), 
the opposite would in fact seem to be the case. For this text not only has a central 
place in the canon of Afrikaans literature (and, in this sense, may be said to be 
overdetermined), but is problematic in the symbolism it suggests. This is to say that 
the reader of Kikoejoe would be steered into a highly particularised, embodied, 
understanding of Kikoejoe. Indeed, Kikoejoe is saturated with overt allusions to 
Raka, which quite explicitly associate Kikoejoe with Louw's mythological monster 
(at least to Afrikaans readers)?5 
One of the most direct allusions to Raka is the following: '"It was the women 
who noticed him first,' Ma said of the Veteran's parading". In Afrikaans this 
coincides almost exactly with the opening line of Raka: "The women noticed him 
first/in the languid afternoon" (189/180; Louw 1981a: 95)?6 The first reference to the 
Beast classifies it as "half-human, half-orang" (21/20),37 while Louw's Raka is an 
"apeman" ("aap-mens"; Louw 1981a: 95; cf. 111). A later, possibly imaginary 
description by Fabian (cf 96-97/92) of the Beast's brutal hunting, coincides with a 
similar description ofRaka (cf 102-103/97-98; Louw 1981a: 91). Moreover, the text 
resorts to direct reference to Raka (cf 147/139). 
Apart from such overt references and allusions, a number of further echoes of 
Raka occur in Kikoejoe. Once the link between these texts has been established, 
many motifs and word choices appear to be more-or-less conscious evocations of 
Raka. Thus the Beast is, like Raka, said to "cavort" ("buitel"; 66/62; cf Louw 1981a: 
97, 104). Reuben is throughout described in terms of a sentinel ("skildwag"; 44/41; 
cf Louw 198la: 98).38 Like Raka, Fabian wanders around at night ("dwaal"; 82177; 
130/123; cf. Louw 1981a: 98). The many references in Kikoejoe to circular 
movement (of the tea leaves in Ma's cup, of the soldiers around Pa's chair, of 
Fabian's dreams) evoke Raka's wandering around the kraal (cf. 173, 177, 182, 
186/164, 168, 173, 177; cf Louw 1981a: 95, 98)?9 Kikoejoe is said to produce a 
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"moaning call" ("steunroep"; 91/87; cf Louw 1981a: 109). The link with Louw's 
work is strengthened, as Kannemeyer (1997: 16) notes, with the explicit references to 
(virtual quotations from) the poem "Die Strandjutwolf' (cf 282-283/268; Louw 1981: 
136), which relate Kikoejoe to the beast in Louw's poem. Finally, Smuts (1996: 27) 
also notes links with "Ballade van die Bose" (Louw 1981: 132-135). 
This association of the Beast Kikoejoe with Raka (and other monsters in 
Louw's work) is far from unproblematic. According to A. P. Grove (1966: 15), "the 
opposition Koki-Raka is ... central in the work as a tense dramatic piece. It's an 
opposition which controls the entire course of the narrative". 40 This opposition 
between Koki and Raka is founded in the different nature of each: "Koki is the 
spiritual leader who is concerned with the potential loss of a valued possession .... ",41 
while "Raka is pure brute corporeal strength" (1966: 15).42 This leads Grove (1966: 
16) to define Raka as a "being of nature" (natuurwese) against Koki as a "cultured 
person" (kultuurmens). 43 Indeed, Grove in effect reads Raka as an allegory of the 
clash between nature and culture. This tension between nature and culture may be 
extended to the oppositions "body-spirit, desire-thought, instinct-reason, chaos-order" 
(1966: 27).44 In each case the first element of these pairs threatens the second. And 
against the kind of force embodied by the carnal, instinctual, chaotic 'being of nature' 
Raka, there is only one defence: 
Against such a force the cultural community can only remain standing if an 
awareness of and responsibility towards the culture (e.g. through the vigilance 
and action of the strict, spiritual aristocrat) can be kept alive in its midst. 
Basically we therefore have a tension between nature and culture, and the 
cultural community is - as we clearly see here - doomed to destruction the 
moment Raka's kind of values, of a merely corporeal existence, start 
becoming acceptable to it. 
(1966: 26)45 
It would be possible to extend this view of Raka, and to apply it allegorically to the 
position of the Afrikaner in Africa. In such an allegorical reading, Koki would stand 
for the vigilant spiritual aristocrat, the poet who is the bearer of the valued possession 
-the culture of the nation (cf Grove 1966: 4, 25).46 The tribe would stand for the 
Afrikaner nation whose culture is threatened by evil, carnal, irrational, chaotic forces 
outside the laager (the kraal). And Raka would become the representative of, 
specifically, the black person and, more generally, any outsider who might threaten 
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the cultures and values of the nation. Such a reading of the poem is given credence in 
Grove's (1966 : 25} citation of D. J. Opperman's report that W. E. G. Louw (Van 
Wyk Louw' s brother) once brought to the fore two possible interpretations of Raka, 
"interpretations which he inferred from a conversation with the poet":
47 
"He (viz. VanWyk Louw) drew attention to the fact that a cultural group may 
run wild spiritually if it opens itself too readily to strange influences." As a 
second possibility: "the biological fact that the population growth of 
spiritualised man, who occupies a higher rung on the cultural ladder, is in 
general far slower than that of the less privileged, sometimes less intelligent, 
but mostly carnal man of nature, and that this process in the long run may 
result in a huge threat to the spiritual civilisation of Western man."48 
These xenophobic - and indeed racist - statements take us to the heart of a particular 
historical justification of apartheid by Afrikaner intellectuals, in the light of which one 
would be able to read Raka as an apology for the system of institutionalised racism 
that was to become apartheid: the Afrikaner intellectual has the duty to protect the 
nation from strange (or foreign) influences.49 Such protection would appear 
especially urgent because the Afrikaner is presumably more spiritualised and 
therefore civilised ("occupies a higher rung on the cultural ladder") than people closer 
to nature ("man of nature"). These people are, sometimes, "less intelligent", yet are 
more "carnal", which in the long term may result in a threat to the "spiritual 
civilisation of Western man" for the reason that it is a "biological fact" that the 
population growth of spiritualised man in general is far slower than that of supposedly 
'lower-order' people. Read alongside Grove's approach to Raka as constructed on a 
number of oppositions and tensions, this reference by W. E. G. Louw to "Western 
man" would suggest that it might be possible to take Raka as a vehicle for the defence 
of white (Afrikaner) supremacism. Van Heerden's quite explicit choice of Raka as 
intertext would thus be problematic, overdetermining as it does the figure of 
Kikoejoe. The link with Raka - as the other allegorised in terms of a being of nature 
threatening (Western) civilisation, in particular because of its carnal and corporeal 
qualities- reduces the otherness ofKikoejoe by embodying it in terms ofRaka as the 
figure of carnal embodiment. The presence of Raka in Kikoejoe is highly troubling 
not only because it reduces the otherness of Kikoejoe, but in the way it does so. 
The indebtedness of Kikoejoe to Louw' s Raka is criticised by, among others, 
Kannemeyer (1997: 26) and Smuts (1996: 27). To Kannemeyer the use of the Raka 
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figure has an "obscuring effect", 5° while Smuts is of the opinion that the use of Raka 
is "problematic" for the reason that "it is already historically an explained symbol". s 1 
Van Heerden is quite open about his indebtedness to Louw and, in fact, at the end of 
the novel includes him in a wide list of sources he consulted in writing Kikoejoe 
(315/295). This does make the novel, to a greater or lesser extent, permeable and 
underscores its fragmentary status in implicitly denying that it is somehow self-
enclosed ( cf Frey 1994). I would therefore disagree with Kannemeyer' s assessment 
that the use of Raka 'obscures' the novel. Instead, one might argue, with Smuts, that 
the use of this text, rather than being co-constitutive of the openness and 
indeterminacy of this text, tends towards closing it off in, precisely, clarifying it. Van 
Heerden would seem to yield to and participate in the urge to name and rationalise the 
other in bringing Raka into the equation proffered in Kikoejoe: it is a work which is 
central in the canon of Afrikaans literature, and Raka is therefore "historically an 
explained symbol". Moreover, the nature of this symbol is highly problematic in view 
of the history of apartheid and its intellectual justification in fascist terms, as I 
attempted to indicate at some length above. 
Despite the diffuseness of Kikoejoe, then, this figure is nonetheless to an 
extent embodied, enclosed, and predetermined as a result of van Heerden's decision to 
incorporate Louw's work into Kikoejoe. But, while this is indeed a problematic 
aspect of the text, it should in my opinion not be overemphasised. For, as we have 
seen, the text does evince a proliferation of possibilities with regard to determining 
Kikoejoe's identity. 
4.3 Names 
If Kikoejoe cannot finally be determined, identified, or named, then this means that it 
cannot be represented adequately. This excessive nature ofKikoejoe, as well as of the 
subject matter the novel attempts to deal with, is suggested by the striking prevalence 
of different names for the same phenomena in the novel. Thus, the Veteran Major's 
identity is explicitly put in doubt by Tant Geert: "I'll eat my hat if Heathcote 
MacKenzie is his real name" (294/278). 52 That the man's name is not "Heathcote 
MacKenzie" is already suggested much earlier in the text: "On his arrival at 
Soebatsfontein, the Veteran had presented himself as 'Heathcote MacKenzie Esquire 
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OBE, Veteran El Alamein" (42/39-40; my emphasis). 53 But this is apparently a 
misrepresentation: "He glanced up at the sun, reminding himself that he was a veteran 
of the desert. . . . 'Heathcote MacKenzie,' he practised quietly. 'Heathcote 
MacKenzie"' (43-44/41; my emphasis). 54 The man's name, and possibly his entire 
self-representation as Veteran, is a persona, a mask. This is further suggested in his 
inconsistent bragging about his position during the Second World War (cf. 116/110, 
131/124). Or rather, it is a mask offered as a face - a prosopopoeia - while the 
memory of the desert may be, catachrestically, a memory of what never was. 
The Veteran, Major Heathcote MacKenzie, has many names and therefore no 
name. Similarly, the farm Soebatsfontein has many names: 
Everyone had a different name for our place. The Veteran talked about 
the Guest Farm. . . . Ma called the place Hotel Halesowen .... 
Miss Marge Bruwer, Tant Geertruida's friend who worked in the town 
library, called our place a "vakansieplaas" .... 
Tant Geertruida spoke of "The Farm" or "De Boerderij", depending on 
which foreign city was freshest in her memory .... 
Pa called the place Soebatsfontein or Moordenaarskaroo, or, when 
politics got him down, Kaffirland. If he'd just got to the end of one of Zane 
Grey's cowboy books, he'd talk about Dodge City. 
(9-1 0/8-9/'5 
While there is a surfeit of names in some cases, black people in the novel, as Ampie 
Coetzee (1997: 22) notes, are, "with few exceptions, nameless". One exception is 
Reuben, who is, however, often addressed by Fabian's mother as "Jack" or "my 
Jack". This, we are told, is in fact not a name particular to Reuben, or even a 
nickname, but a generic term for a black man: "Ma called out after Reuben. 'Jack! 
Where are you off to now, my boy Jack!' Jack was the name white people called 
black men. I don't know why Ma decided to call Reuben Jack at this moment" 
(25/24).56 
Tsitsi, in the narrator Fabian's attribution of thoughts to her, formulates names 
for Reuben and, in the process, associates him with Kikoejoe: 
That hungry man, he with the teeth as white as the wood he splits, he 
can eat me. He can bite into me as though I were watermelon, right to the 
deepest sweetness. There where it's reddest, there, yes there, he must eat me, 
the hungry man, the man with the tray, the kikuyu man, the ... 
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him. 
She murmured names for him; her own words with which she caressed 
(217/206; ellipsis in text)57 
Significantly, in terms of the prevalence in this novel of a multiplicity of names, this 
chain of names is presented as indeterminate and incomplete. Finally, Fabian is 
characterised in different terms by different characters. He is called, variously, "little 
pupil" (by Tant Geert; (cf 75, 221ff./71, 210ff.),58 "little corporal" (by the Veteran; 
cf 22, 46, 76, 133, 180/21, 43, 71, 124, 171i9 or "little soldier" (cf 121, 1311115, 
124),
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"little disciple" (by the Pastor; cf 71, 306/67, 290),61 "little ram" (by his 
father; cf 157/149)62, "little racehorse" (by doctor Lyell 136/129)63 and "cowboy" (by 
Charles Jacoby; cf 306/290) while his mother, of course, is said to have had the 
"stage name" ("speelnaam": 'play name') Joey Versluis (cf 88/83). 
This overt emphasis on names and the process of naming, in particular the 
slipperiness of names, may be related to the operation of prosopopoeia in the novel, 
that is, to the impossible attempt of the novel to recover the past by pinning down 
identity.64 The inability to know the name, such as the inability to know the name of 
God suggested by God's paronomistic answer "I am what I am" (Exodus 3:14), 
implies that the essential nature of the party which cannot be named (or cannot be 
named finally) cannot be known. This inability to name (for instance to name God) 
may be linked to the inability to see the face of God.65 Furthermore, the 
indeterminacy of names may be linked to the attempt to impose order by means of 
narrative, seeing that it is the ability to determine ancestry by linking names which 
characterises Tant Geert's genealogical research. And, as I have shown, a notable 
aspect of the makeup of the 'Major' is the mask of his name. 
The name 'Kikoejoe' (as well as the many names for other entities in the 
novel) is, ultimately, a name for something which cannot be named.66 The 
determinations of Kikoejoe, whether in the form of names or representations, 
constitute the face given to something which has no face and which radically escapes 
the conceptuality which would render it nameable and knowable. Kikoejoe, rather 
than being determined in the narrative, disrupts the narrative with a force which 
cannot be measured. As such, this novel, which itself attempts to impose order by 
relating identity, is subject to the disruptive power of the other. 
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Attempting to enclose the novel and determine the status ofKikoejoe (as some 
reviewers have sought to do, as I showed above) is to miss the point that no narrative 
closure nor final determination ofKikoejoe is possible and, further, that any tendency 
towards such closure and final understanding must be subverted in order to allow for a 
just representation. Seeing that representing the other, even though it is radically 
impossible, is nonetheless not only necessary but occurs every day, a just way has to 
be found to represent the other. Such a representation of the other, I suggest in this 
thesis, would be one which counteracts itself ironically in the process of 
prosopopeically lending the other a face. It would reveal itself as linguistic rather 
than natural and, in drawing attention to itself, would relativise itself in order to 
intimate that it, "as the invention of the other, encounters something unknowable, 
something, moreover, that is as much obscured as uncovered by being personified" 
(Miller 1990: 81).67 
But, of course, to say that this is the point of Kikoejoe is, again, to fall into the 
trap of attributing a telos to the novel, to gather together the fragments and attribute to 
them a cause. For this reason, my gathering here of Kikoejoe must also be interrupted 
and unworked, that is, ironised. A just reading of Kikoejoe must perform the 
paradoxical task of reading the text while not reading it: that is, it must read the text in 
its fragmentariness without trying to undo that fragmentariness in the process. 
Similarly, the figure Kikoejoe would have to be approached without letting it appear, 
without reducing its otherness. 
4. 4 Prosopopoeia 
Kikoejoe is a novel which is explicitly concerned with the past. Van Heerden has 
confirmed the status of this novel as a document which attempts to come to terms with 
the past. In an interview with Wasserman (1996: 4), he cites the view that literature 
may function as a kind of Truth Commission, and relates this view to contemporary 
Afrikaans fiction as it attempts, often "through the eyes of a child", to come to terms 
with the past.68 As far as van Heerden is concerned, Kikoejoe, too, participates in this 
"kind of mining of the past" (Wasserman 1996: 4).69 Indeed, not only is the novel 
concerned with "mining" the past (something with which Tant Geert is openly 
concerned in her genealogical research),70 and thus with enclosing and controlling it, 
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but also with the reverse: the impossibility of controlling the past and its effects on the 
present. 
At the heart of Pa's depression is his feeling of being subject to the past, to 
powers beyond his control. This lack of control over the past is exemplified by the 
family trust: 
Shaking with bottled-up frustration, he took out Grandpa's will and Ma had to 
call Tant Geert to come and discuss family matters: the complicated trust the 
family farm. . . . How, Pa asked Tant Geert, can we break the trust? ' 
[Everyone] is part of the complicated game Grandpa is playing from 
his grave. 
"But I want out!" Pa shouted. "I want to be free." 
(120-121; cf 158, 200/114; cf 150, 190f1 
The trust and the discovery of Antjie Provee in the genealogy of the Latsky family are 
only two examples of this effect of the past on the present. But just as Oupa speaks 
from the grave by means of the Trust, which thus serves as a prosopopoeia of Oupa 
and lends him a voice and the power to control to a significant extent the present, so 
too the novel Kikoejoe may be seen as a document which gives faces and voices to 
those who have none. Kikoejoe is, quite explicitly, a prosopopoeia. This is evident 
from the acknowledgement in the novel that everybody is dead. In a passage which 
associates the transience of things - the passage of time and the passing of people -
with kikuyu (cf (287/272),72 the adult Fabian relates that "Everyone is silent and 
gone, and I have no one who can check my facts. It's all swept away, past, as though 
it had never happened. The rondavels are ruins, overrun by kikuyu, destroyed by 
weather and time" (168/159).73 
Furthermore, the narrator exclaims as follows about the fate of the characters 
he describes in the novel: "I obviously feel obliged to bring most of my characters to 
their end!" (269/255).74 Not only does this confirm the death of all the significant 
players in the action of the novel (and thus the urge towards closure and the narrator's 
awareness of this urge), but also the status of the text as a prosopopoeia. The narrator 
continues by relating the novel as prosopopoeia to the genre of autobiography itself: 75 
And, as is the case with so many of the characters in my narrative, I would- in 
all fairness - also like to describe my own death .... 
My own? Well, of course it is impossible to stage your own death in 
advance. That's why I have chosen the one sort of story where you aren't 
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obliged to do so - the autobiography. Because it is, after all,. the genre in 
which the main character can walk out alive at the other end, 1f not exactly 
inviolate. 
And even telling all this is also a way of dying, not so? To turn the 
hand against oneself? 
(269/255f6 
And of course, as Paul de Man (1979c) has persuasively argued, prosopopoeia is the 
trope par excellence of autobiography. This is so for the reason that it makes coherent 
and encloses what is really disorderly and open, namely the life of its subject: "One 
tells one's life, not because one has a face, but in order to give one to oneself, and to 
preserve rather than to lose it. In autobiography the self is not given in advance, but 
only emerges as what the biography outlines" (Frey 1985: 124; cf also Frey 1990a: 
155ff.; Miller 1989: 172).77 The passage from the novel cited above comes close to 
self-destructing in making explicit its own status as fiction and, in this way, to 
ironically destroying its fictionality precisely by drawing attention to its illusionary 
and hallucinatory nature. As a document of the dead which is, moreover, an 
autobiography, the novel may be said to be a double prosopopoeia. And in presenting 
itself as a fictional autobiography it may be said to be a prosopopoeia which undoes 
itself, which reveals itself as a construction of faces. That is, the novel, in interrupting 
its positing of faces, reveals itself to be not only a prosopopoeia but an ironic one: a 
prosopopoeia of a prosopopoeia. 78 
The important status of prosopopoeia in the novel is confirmed in the highly 
self-conscious way in which it occurs. It is surely notable that, in a text the avowed 
intent of which is to give a face to the faceless, a voice to the voiceless: to impose 
order on that which has none through narrative, there should appear so many instances 
of prosopopoeia. This preponderance of prosopopoeia, with the closely related trope 
catachresis, may be said to strengthen the hallucinatory effect of the novel already 
evident in, for instance, the recurring descriptions ofPa's drug-induced hallucinations 
and dreams. This hallucinatory effect is of great importance in Kikoejoe, serving as it 
does to highlight the working of memory and its interplay with hallucinations, 
dreams, visions, fortune telling, predictions and prophesies as the past flows into the 
present and the present into the past through memory (cf 13, 182/12-13, 173). This 
effect, and its link with time and repetition, is also evident in the preponderance of 
repetitive techniques, for instance the folding into each other of different characters. 
124 
The different figures and traits attributed to Kikoejoe may be said to have a 
hallucinatory effect, as does the eerie repetition of Dr Lyell in Oom Boeta (cf 136, 
249/129; 236) and of the past librarian Marge Brower in the name of the present one-
Elsabe Bouwer (140/133). Of course, it is possible also to detect this hallucinatory 
effect in the repetition of the word "hallucination" (hallusinasie) in the name Hotel 
Halesowen. Given the many hallucinations and hallucinatory effects in the novel, it 
becomes not only possible but inevitable to read the many fairly ordinary instances of 
personification and catachresis as themselves monstrous hallucinations. 
This is the case, for instance, in the description of many characters in bestial, 
or, more broadly, non-human terms. The Veteran is throughout the novel described as 
a crow (cf 42-43, 47, 74, 78, 108, 188, 216, 306/40, 44, 69, 74, 103, 179, 205, 290) 
and as a bat (cf 195/185).79 Reuben, significantly (given the importance of 
prosopopoeia in the narcissistic Pygmalion myth), is described as a statue (cf. 
97ff./92ff.). He is also described as a Roman soldier standing guard with his shield: 
"Reuben . . . came to stand at the edge of the terrace, like a sentinel with his shiny 
tray" (44/41 80; cf 111, 122, 124, 161, 167, 235, 264, 294/ 117, 129, 131, 170, 176, 
247, 278, 311). Fabian is described by Ma as "a praying mantis, rubbing his little 
paws together and keeping an eye on us all" (26/24)81 and as a snake (cf 82, 149/77, 
141).82 
This process also occurs in reverse, that is, with the attribution of human or 
animate qualities to what is non-human or inanimate. So, for instance, the locomotive 
of the train with which Charles Jacoby and his steed Valour arrive, blends into Valour 
when it seems to be described as a monstrous horse: "With a white mane streaming in 
the wind. With a tail flowing on the breeze. Head high up to the front. Neck 
chiselled in the course. Thick green turds bubbling from the hole [arse] when the 
train reached top speed beside the green, winding seam of the river" (99/95).83 A little 
later, the train "quickly and angrily, with a frown on its hurried forehead ... came 
snaking round Dynamite Krantz" (102/97).84 
The landscape, too, comes alive prosopopeically by means of catachresis: Tant 
Geert says "Amsterdam has so many faces" (3/3).85 Of the Karoo, when water is 
available, it is said that "The hungry earth drank" (68/64).86 With the arrival of the 
Veteran at Halesowen station, the landscape appears to be a body: "Together they 
stood looking at the brown plains shivering in the heat, the mirage puddles floating in 
125 
the hollows, and the train's tracks pressing into a single shiny eye in the 
distance"(42/40~ my emphasis).87 The description ofthe landscape which "shivers" in 
the heat and appears to have an "eye" (the tracks on the horizon) is explicitly linked to 
hallucination with the reference to "mirage", suggesting the hallucinatory effect of 
prosopopoeia as much as the prosopopeic effect of hallucination. During Mr Jacoby 
and Valour's train journey, "the backs of hills ... flew with him [Valour] like the 
brown haunches of mares" ( 1 00/96)88 and the tracks "stretched past the forbidding 
scowl of Dynamite Krantz" 1 00/96). 89 In a hallucinatory image, the skies are 
compared to the neck or throat of the universe: "Everyone was waiting for the first 
cool breath of the evening breeze, waiting for the Milky Way to appear on the black 
throat of the night like a sparkling necklace" (194/184).90 The human and the non-
human melt into each other: "'Kaffirs melt into the landscape,' Ma always said" 
(287/272),91 which is qualified by the Biblical assertion that "man is grass" 
(287/272).92 The activities of Poqo on the trains are described in a striking image: 
"He'd tell her about the trains that moved like zippers over the black chest of the 
land" (212/202).93 
The descriptions of the land by Pa continuously state the problematic nature of 
his relationship to it. This is evident, for instance, in the regular recurrence of chains 
of negative names (noted above) by means of which he addresses the farm: 
"'Soebatsfontein,' grumbled Pa. 'God-se-oog. Vemeukpan. Putsonderwater. 
Genadeloosrant. Pynlikheid. Perdevreklaagte'" (136/129).94 It is as if the land 
comes alive in its exemplification of these dreary names, while the very fact that the 
land is addressed serves to lend it a face as interlocutor. Pa's problematic relationship 
with the land is also described in terms of his hallucinations: "Around them stretched 
the endless Karoo night, ... the horizon that still beckoned as Pa dripped off the end 
of it and became landscape and stood spinning on the bedroom floor, stammering to 
explain: 'I melt offthe edge of the Camdeboo, I drip, I drip ... "' (112-113/107~ last 
ellipsis in text).95 Elsewhere, Pa pertinently personifies the land in hallucinatory 
terms: "'Lying dams,' Pa called the mirages dancing around us. 'God's eye,' he said 
and pointed at the son. 'The devil 's fist,' he pointed to a rocky hill with a knobbed 
boulder on top" (75/70~ my emphasis).96 Here the land is personified and given a face 
as something which engages in deceit and lies, significantly as a result of the 
hallucinatory effect of the mirages, something described by means of catachresis as 
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engaged in "dancing". In addition, the sun is metaphorised as God's eye and a hill is 
identified with the fist of the devil. These two examples are ominous in their 
suggestions of the supernatural qualities of what is an apparently ordinary landscape. 
In short, this passage, like so many others in Kikoejoe, presents the land in 
hallucinatory terms, principally through the use of catachresis and prosopopoeia to 
personify it. Additionally, it might be noted that this tendency to personify the land 
not only renders it representable by bringing it into the purview of the known, but also 
makes it strange through a radical defamiliarisation. The hallucinatory designation of 
the land may be related to the many names of the farm as an entity which forever 
changes and escapes signification while remaining the same. 
Later, in terms of the Beast-hunting expeditions of Fabian and the Veteran, the 
inadequacy of the many names of the farm are related to the inability to name evil 
(they are also related to the inability to name the unknown future, specifically with 
respect to the altercation between Ma and Tant Geert about the Veteran). These 
expeditions to investigate evil are playful and serious at the same time, and cannot be 
defined in conventional terms: 
And I stood behind her, unseen where I had paused on my way to the Veteran 
so we could commence our expedition to Dynamite Krantz. I stood there like 
a child peering down into a borehole who saw black water and frogs stirring in 
the depths, and who'd move out into the sun restlessly with the Veteran, 
somewhere in me the consciousness that this was a game, but also not a game 
-that we were going into a strange land, one that couldn't be baptised with 
one ofPa's names: Noupoort, Bitterfontein, Godverlaat, Bloedson, Kwelkaroo 
(294-295/279; ellipsis in text)97 
One might note, with regard to the hallucinatory terms by means of which the land is 
described, that the land is also described as having bad breath and is identified with a 
corpse: "'The land is dying', said Pa to Ma .... Later Ma said: 'It's hard to believe 
the land has developed such bad breath"' (161/152-153).98 This is the smell of trouble 
(165/156) and of death- "death's bad breath, everywhere" (175/166l9 - which is 
identified first implicitly (175/166) and then directly with the smell of Windpomp 
burning. 100 
Tant Geert's Borgward has a shiny nose (10/9-10i01 and a taxi a black snout 
( 66/62). The furniture seems alive, with talking doors - the doors are said to emit a 
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sighing "aai" sound (cf. 9/9)102 -, sleeping chairs (67/63) as well as a divan (78/73) 
and a table (98/93) with legs. 103 A balloon becomes a penis, while another has a 
"bum" (98/93); a pistol has an eye (cf. 152/144); later the balloons are said to "shiver" 
(102)/04 the copper rings of the curtains in the bedroom sing (cf. 105, 110, 111/100, 
104, 106) as Pa opens them. 105 The Pastor's electric guitar is said "growlingly" to 
"grumble" (91/87).106 The electricity generator cuts out: "Then the Lister gargled as 
it did when it was taking its last gulp of diesel" (91/87; my emphasis).
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The gigantic geyser is called "the donkey" (14/14). Reuben baptises the 
donkey 'Antjie Provee', after the Malay ancestor discovered by Tant Geert, thus 
lending it a face (cf. 37/35). The pipes of this contraption are said to "hum" (cf. 
14/14), "complain" (cf. 203) and emit a "faint gurgle" (110/104). 108 Pa says Reuben, 
whose responsibility this contraption is, "has trained the donkey to his hand" 
(15/14).109 Reuben chops wood, described as if it had a body, with which he feeds the 
donkey: "[Reuben] split the white flesh of the thorn wood with his axe" (16/16; cf. 
213/203; my emphasis). 110 The thorn wood is said to be eaten by the donkey, which 
becomes a giant monstrous being: "Behind him the red throat devoured the thorn 
stump in a wink. The big tank shuddered and the pipes running down the wall trilled 
and groaned. Steam filtered out of the joints of the pipes' elbows at the comers of the 
house" (215/204; my emphasis). 111 Reuben has to stoke the donkey, something which 
becomes suggestive of sexual intercourse as a result of the identification of the geyser 
with a woman: "'I'm stoking Antjie Provee until she moans tonight!' laughed 
Reuben" (215/204). 112 Reuben's desire for Tsitsi is described by means of a 
comparison between him and the donkey (215/204). The donkey itself becomes a 
gigantic, ejaculating penis in the following description: "The steaming water 
spluttered from the outlet pipe, spewed in an arch and took a handful of wind like a 
white-hot hand" (214/203). 113 This description is similar to that of the Thing's 
ejaculation as imagined by Fabian: "The Thing rolled on to his back, in the same 
moment that the crying ape had rolled away, found her feet and began running. The 
white seed spurted from his prick, jerking in long arches over his belly hair, to the 
warm river sand" (96/92; my emphasis). 114 It is further reminiscent of Willempie's 
ejaculation: ". . . Willempie won, his shining seed spurting in an arc right into the 
evening waters of the Fish" (194/185; my emphasis). 115 
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A variety of body parts are described in hallucinatory terms by means of 
catachreses and personifications. Thus Willempie and Fabian become little cyborgs, 
as their penises are implied to be wires: they are said to be "pulling wire" 
(194/185),
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and masturbation would consist of pulling one's wire. And the adult 
Fabian describes his memory as a telescope with which he is looking back at what 
happened, implying a kind of cyborgian dependence on a prosthesis to aid one's view 
of the past. 
Tant Geert describes the legs and heads of Karoo folk in terms of "lizards" 
(7/7); the Pastor's fingers are "spiders' legs" (90/85), as are the fingers of the man the 
adult Fabian meets in Florence (64/60)111. These figures are particularly significant as 
they are linked to Pa's hallucination (112/106) and recur in the following description 
(also related as it is to hallucination in terms of personification, as well as to the 
phenomenon of a mirage) of two railway workers: "Two men stood pumping the 
cocopan. They came riding along like an insect out of the mirage. The bobbing 
figures of the men looked like the legs of an approaching insect" (198/188). 118 The 
Veteran's "black eyes creep like beetles over Ma's bare shoulders" .119 Tant Geert's 
body is, prosopopeically, throughout described in animal terms: her "erect young 
nipples stared at him like a rabbit's eyes"(4/4), 120 while her breasts are described as 
"rabbits [pressing] their snouts against her bra" (5/4)121 and her womb as a 
"hedgehog" (5/5; cf 11-12, 150/11, 142). 122 The male sex organ is called not only 
"pizzle", "penis", or "prick", 123 but also significantly "cock" or "cock head" ( cf 50, 
145, 185/53, 153, 195): 124 
But what we didn't see was the Veteran among the river trees, where 
he stood motionless in his black uniform among the reeds. 
Tall and black he stood there, a bat on its hind legs, moaning with 
pleasure while watching us holding our little cocks in our hands. He stared at 
us dumbly and lifted his nose, smelling something of our heat. He had to 
suppress the grunting sigh in his throat when his veined cock started kicking 
and kicking in his hand and his seed pumped out, on to the sand at his feet. 
(195/185; my emphasis) 125 
The preponderance of catachrestic animal imagery here serves to transmogrify the 
Veteran into a monstrous bat with a cock spurting seed. Body parts become bodies 
themselves, independent beings which take on a life of their own. The figure of the 
bat is a recurrent one in Kikoejoe. It becomes a sign for the in-between state 
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characteristic of Kikoejoe, neither ape nor human, neither bird nor mouse: ". . . that 
hybrid animal, abandoned by evolution somewhere between bird [ voel] and mouse 
[muis]" (63/60). 126 This description is, in the Afrikaans text, linked to the passage 
quoted above. For the Afrikaans word for 'bat' is 'vlermuis', flying mouse. And the 
word 'voel' may refer not only to 'bird' but to the male member ('cock'). The figure 
of the bat is thus not only related to Kikoejoe and the other (as the in-between, 
indefinable) but also to male sexuality. 
Prosopopoeia appears explicitly in most of the poems quoted in the text: in the 
Tennyson (cf 141, 175, 196/134, 166, 186); in the Psalm (cf 86); and in the Nijhoff 
(84), 127 and in later passages where the land is transmogrified into a body of water. It 
might, finally, be noted that these instances of catachresis, metaphor and 
personification, all of which in some way or another lead to prosopopoeia, may be 
linked directly to conceptualisation and narrative coherence. Thus Dr Clark says "The 
wound is a talking mouth" (153/145). 128 Earlier, in terms of Dr Clarke's view of the 
therapeutic power of narrative as the talking cure (149/141 ), we are told that he and 
Tant Geert "played the pretentious little games all intellectuals are so fond of -
alluding to texts, establishing relations, digging around in the mind [geheue ]" 
( 148/140-141 ). 129 Self-reflexively, we are told here that reading, interpreting, and 
understanding are tropological activities. This is because these activities serve 
conceptualisation as a result of their tendency to draw relations and to function by 
means of substitution. But if they are tropological in general, then they are 
prosopopeic in particular: they allow the wound to talk. Yet, while serving to 
conceptualise, they also lend a monstrous, hallucinatory character to the novel, as 
tables and chairs come alive, penises become birds, fingers spiders, taxis animals, 
people crows or bats, the land a huge corpse or sea. 
The hallucinatory character lent to the novel by the instances of prosopopoeia 
cited above (and by the many others I do not have space to cite), may be said to fulfil 
a dual, mutually exclusive, ironic function in the novel. On the one hand the 
prevalence of this trope serves to further characterisation in the novel. Indeed, in the 
most literal sense, characterisation in its use of prosopopoeia lends faces and voices to 
characters by relating them to what they are not. On the other hand, the novel's status 
as realistic fiction engaged in the 'mining' of the past is subverted in that the tentative 
nature of its project is underscored in the dreamlike and hallucinatory ambience which 
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results from the tropes of prosopopoeia and catachresis. These tropes, and in 
particular prosopopoeia, thus enable an approach to Kikoejoe as a novel which self-
consciously constructs faces and, for this reason, at the same time interrupts them. 
Prosopopoeia, in other words, in this novel appears at one and the same time as a 
conceptualising trope and as the interruption of that conceptualisation. 
In giving faces to characters, or the land, or inanimate things, prosopopoeia 
makes them accessible to representation and reduces their alterity. But it also 
underscores precisely that alterity: it serves to alienate the self from the others, who in 
appearing appear as surprisingly other. The representation of the other - a 
representation by means of prosopopoeia - appears, that is, as inadequate: instead of 
clarifying the other it complicates that other. The representation of the Veteran as a 
crow or bat, to cite this example again, might be said to make him appear. But it 
makes him appear strange and monstrous and thus intimates his radical 
unknowability. This prosopopeic representation, indeed, is ironically interrupted as it 
is posited in that, in the words of Miller quoted above, it "encounters something 
unknowable, something, moreover, that is as much obscured as uncovered by being 
personified" (1990: 81 ). 
The reason for this is that the novel is subject to a radical incapacity -
something which it self-reflexively acknowledges, as was noted above - to recover 
the past adequately. As a result, one finds the refusal to represent and lend faces to 
what is, nonetheless, described. For Kikoejoe is, paradoxically, a novel the raison 
d'etre of which is to lend the past a face. It is an attempt to come to grips with the 
past, an attempt at Vergangenheitsbewaltigung, as evident from van Heerden' s remark 
cited above pertaining to "literature as Truth Commission" (cf. also Francken 1998: 
587, 588). Additionally, the novel is quasi-autobiographical, as was noted above. In 
short, this is a novel which attempts to deal with the past and which, simultaneously, 
claims that this is an impossible project. Or, perhaps, this is a novel which claims that 
one can deal with the past only by acknowledging that such a project is an impossible 
project, which is to say the only possible project (if a project is understood as 
something which never ends and always becomes). In terms of the discussion of the 
romantic fragment with reference to the romantic project (in the final section of the 
previous chapter), this means that the project of recovering the past must necessarily 
always be, self-consciously, fragmentary. Kikoejoe thus becomes a prosopopoeia of 
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the past which undoes that prosopopoeia as prosopopoeia by interrupting 
continuously - ironically, in other words - the conceptualisations it effects. This is 
evidenced in the novel by the incapacity already noted to unify the narrative in terms 
of an end, as well as by the incapacity - despite attempts (whether conscious or 
otherwise)- to determine Kikoejoe. 
4.5 Windpomp: The Other in the Burning Bush 
In this last section of this chapter, I consider one further example of the ironic 
procedure of Kikoejoe: that of the refusal - or inability- to represent the death of 
Windpomp, with his subsequent survival as trace of otherness. If Kikoejoe is, willy-
nilly, embodied in the novel and thus reduced, as I have indicated, then Windpomp is 
one character who does not appear at all and who may be said not to be represented in 
the novel. Amid all the attribution of faces and names noted above, this one character 
is radically faceless, even nameless, and remains beyond conceptualisation. 
The name 'Windpomp' may, indeed, serve to conceptualise him to an extent in 
terms of the implied comparison to a windmill. However, such a conceptualisation 
must remain utterly indefinite - there is no evidence at all in the novel that it is 
possible to infer from this name anything about Windpomp's 'essence', his nature or 
physique. If any link may be drawn, then it is with the landscape and, perhaps, 
unsurprisingly, with hallucination: the word "windmills" ("windpompe") is used to 
describe Pa's eyes and to suggest his disturbed condition (40/38i30 and, later, to 
emphasise the close and problematic relation he has with the land (247/234). 
Moreover, the name 'Windpomp' seems more like a nickname than a real name, and 
thus emphasises the lack of specificity of this character in a way similar to the Pastor 
or the Veteran, each of whom remains finally indefinable not least because they are, 
quite literally, nameless. 131 Windpomp remains as faceless as the faceless train 
drivers in Fabian's dream (149/142). 
Yet, despite this facelessness and the resemblance of his name to a nickname, 
Windpomp plays a central role in the narrative. Admittedly, as was noted above, 
there are other characters- in particular, black characters- in the novel who remain 
nameless and, one might add, faceless. These waiters, nannies and other servants 
become ghostly presences in the novel, presences who must be there (and whose 
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existence is, indeed, mentioned) but who are largely absent (in not being represented 
at length, if at all).
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They are essential for the running of Hotel Halesowen even if 
they do not fulfil a central role in this narrative. Or perhaps this should be rephrased: 
the army of servants on the margins of discourse do play a central role in the running 
of Hotel Halesowen, on the holiday farm, and in the narrative. But they do not 
become as directly involved in narrative events as I hope to indicate Windpomp does. 
To this extent Windpomp, as one among many faceless and nameless workers and 
servants, may be said to become emblematic of the faceless, the nameless and the 
voiceless. Indeed, it is the very absence of this figure - the fact that this figure is not 
figured except as absent - which lends Windpomp his central narratological role in 
Kikoejoe. 
As prosopopoeia, the novel Kikoejoe attempts, as I indicated above, to gather 
the past by giving it a face (and thus betrays it). But this novel also evidences the 
attempt to reduce this betrayal ironically. Neither of the two violent attacks which 
figure in the novel is described in detail. I refer here, respectively, to the rape of 
Tsitsi and the murder of Windpomp. This is, however, not to equate either the two 
events or the figures of Tsitsi and Windpomp. While Windpomp, as I continue to 
argue below, is radically absent from the novel, the same cannot be said about Tsitsi. 
Neither Windpomp's speech nor his thought is represented, while Tsitsi's continually 
is. While Windpomp is not represented at all in the novel, the quite elaborate way in 
which Tsitsi is interiorised by an avowedly first-person narrator, who seems not to 
interrupt that process consistently, is disquieting. 133 Moreover, she is subject to the 
same kind of lurid phantasy as that involving the Thing. Fabian, in a passage to 
which I have already referred, seems in highly graphic terms to imagine the Thing 
raping a female monkey (96-97/92). Similarly, he imagines Tsitsi engaged in private 
acts, which he describes in great detail (the important point being that he, as non-
omniscient narrator has no access to these acts). Thus he imagines her squatting and 
urinating: "She would squat in the night and think about Rhodesia. The evening 
breeze would touch her buttocks coolly. It was nice when the warm urine flowed and 
steamed warmly into the cleft of her buttocks. The grass would tickle her thighs and 
long after she 'd pinched off the last drop, she 'd squat there in her own steam" 
(226/215; my emphasis). 134 As is evident from these citations, Knox's translation, 
with its usage of markers indicating free indirect discourse, might in fact be said to 
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attenuate the reduction of Tsitsi's alterity evident in the Afrikaans text. For in the 
Afrikaans text (unlike the translation) there is no indication that Tsitsi habitually 
urinates in the grass before going to bed in the Cadillac, except for the simple word 
"saans", rendered as "every night" (226/215). Consequently, in the Afrikaans text 
there is little if any marker indicating that Fabian is imagining Tsitsi's nocturnal 
rituals. The Afrikaans text, instead, gives the impression of direct witness: it is as if 
Fabian is, disquietingly, not imagining Tsitsi as much as watching her and attributing 
to her various thoughts and pleasurable sensations. Of course, the markers of free 
indirect discourse in the translation serve to relativise the representation of Tsitsi' s 
act. 
Immediately prior to the rape of Tsitsi, Fabian imagines (or, less likely, 
watches) the Beast watching all the guests and servants who have congregated to 
witness Charles Jacoby's concert (255-257/242-244). At this point it becomes unclear 
who is imagining and watching what: the figures of the Beast Kikoejoe and of Fabian, 
each watching and waiting, blend into each other: 
And far away under the thorn trees where the darkness of night was gathering 
in pools, a paw pushed the branches back quietly. He saw Ma throw her head 
back and laugh, the shiny things on her ears. He saw Marge Bruwer bend and 
pick a red geranium which she put, unobtrusively, without even my noticing, 
next to Tant Geert's hand on the table. 
(255/242; my emphasis)135 
It is my contention that asides such as that in the passage above ("without even my 
noticing") serve to interrupt the representation and, indeed, the authority of the 
narrator. Such asides may be understood as parabases, interrupting the narrative 
conceptualisations effected in the novel. 136 But the question needs to be asked 
whether this interruption suffices to relativise - indeed, ironise - sufficiently the 
representation of alterity in the novel. Disquietingly, as Fabian (presumably) 
imagines the Beast playing with his pizzle, he imagines the Beast watching Tsitsi 
onanistically fondling herself (or sees her doing this, or he sees the Beast seeing her; 
cf 256/243). However, while Fabian imagines the marauding Beast in the act of rape, 
imagines (or sees) Tsitsi (as well as the Veteran) masturbating, the rape ofTsitsi is not 
represented at length. The reader is provided with unsettling impressions of violence 
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rather than an explicit representation of the act itself If the act is not imagined in 
detail, it is nonetheless imagined (or observed): 
Tsitsi struck on the inner thigh. First the shiny black skin with a whitish layer 
of fat beneath it. Then muscles, sinews, blood. Over the kikuyu, as she was 
dragged, her pelvis forced wide open, her eyes turned back, white in terror. 
Only Shena on her tongue now, moaning, white flecks of salt at the corners of 
her mouth. 
The door of the Cadillac was lying wide open and a city cur licked her 
blood from the gravel. First one dog and then eventually all of them - the 
spaniels and the fox terriers, the collies and the pavement specials, the 
boerbulls and the mongrels. They licked and nibbled at the grass and then 
went to vomit under the bluegums. 
Tsitsi, raped. 
(257-258/244)137 
One might speculate as to reasons why the rape of Tsitsi is dealt with in this incidental 
way. The rape of Tsitsi is never solved, the rapist never apprehended. After the rape, 
there are few references to Tsitsi and her fate (she commits suicide: 268/254). 
Instead, the narrator introduces into the narrative his attempts to sell his manuscript in 
New York (266/252), and intersperses into this account what seems to be a 
particularly gratuitous and unmotivated set of descriptions of his lover's suicide (cf 
281, 283-284/267, 268-269). Indeed, in thus downplaying the rape the narrator seems 
to enact the general indifference of white people towards it (cf 276/262), something 
noted by at least one reviewer: 
What does confuse me a bit about Kikoejoe is the way in which the horrific 
rape is underplayed. Does the writer not take it seriously, or is it symptomatic 
of the time in which the events occur that this matter passes so lightly (because 
whites would view such an act as less serious if it concerned a black woman)? 
Perhaps it is related to the feeling I got with regard to a climax for which the 
reader is prepared, yet which never really comes to pass. Or perhaps the most 
terrible thing which occurs (in the eyes of the white people on Soebatsfontein), 
ironically and ludicrously, is the fact that Charles Jacoby's lovely white horse 
nearly becomes the victim of an absurd monster hunt! 
)
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One might argue that the rape is not dealt with (nor described) in detail, and 
consequently does not figure prominently, for the reason that it cannot be described 
adequately. The presence of the rape in its absence in the novel would be a sign, not 
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of the author's lack of seriousness with respect to this event, but, on the contrary, of 
the vast importance of the event. In this case, the rape would, as it were, leave the 
narrator without words because in its otherness it exceeds any representation. It is 
significant that the reviewer cited above mentions the absence of a climax (something 
discussed at some length above vis-a-vis narrative teleology): the rape would then be a 
climax which is anti-climactic, that is, a climax which might be said to be interrupted 
and therefore incomplete and unenclosed. Ironically, the anti-climactic climax would 
be an indication of the seriousness of the event and the seriousness of the 
responsibility with regard to representation that it demands. The rape would then be 
present in this novel precisely through its absence. However, in view of the continual 
representation of Tsitsi' s interiority (as noted above), the relative absence of the rape 
from the novel appears suspect. It is possible, as J. M. Coetzee has indicated in White 
Writing, that the rape is one of those moments of otherness which do not surface in 
narrative because they have never been conceptualised in the Afrikaner (or white 
South African) psyche. 139 
In contrast to the modus operandi in evidence in the (non-)representation of 
the rape ofTsitsi, Windpomp's death is presented as a moment of absolute alterity. It 
radically unsettles narrative closure in the impossibility of the representation of 
otherness which he exemplifies as a figure which lies beyond representation. That 
Wind pomp is one of the most enigmatic figures in Kikoejoe should be clear from the 
fact that he does not appear in the novel and therefore remains unknown. This is the 
case even before his death. But subsequent to his death, he is radically absent and 
entirely inaccessible. It is as if Windpomp never was. He cannot be described and 
cannot be represented. He is nowhere. And yet the trace of Windpomp, in the 
perpetual smell of the burning haystack mingled with the smell of burning flesh, is 
everywhere and permeates everything. Windpomp never speaks, he is never 
described and we know almost nothing of him except that he is the cook Boe's partner 
and Fabian's friend Willempie's father. 
During and after the visit of Verwoerd to Cradock, a number of acts of protest 
and sabotage occur in the district ( cf 175, 178-179/165, 169-170). One of these 
involves the opening of farm gates, resulting in cattle entering into and grazing on 
dangerously green lucerne lands. The security forces arrive at Soebatsfontein in order 
to contain this situation (179, 184/170, 175), and commence menacing the people on 
136 
the farm (184, 185, 186/175, 176, 177). 140 Under the assumption that Windpomp is 
responsible for this act of sabotage, the monstrous commandant Reitz sets fire to the 
haystack in which Windpomp is hiding (185-186/176-177). From this point onward, 
as well as retrospectively, Windpomp may be said to function as a trace of otherness 
in the novel. 
There is one description of Wind pomp in the novel, but this description - brief 
as it is - is a description of a dream. The summer of 1960, and the events surrounding 
Windpomp's death in particular, "was a dreamed time, and will always remain so for 
me. Not because the domain of dreams is more beautiful and more easily digestible -
but, perhaps, more likely because the dream again and again interpreted reality better 
than I could do consciously as a mere youngster" (183/174). 141 Despite the assertion 
of the narrator that his dream could interpret reality better than he as child could, any 
suggestion that the world of dreams is somehow to be privileged over another, more 
real world is, simultaneously, dispelled (the passage claims at once that the dream 
could interpret reality better and that the domain of dreams is not more digestible than 
reality). After all, as indicated earlier, Kikoejoe is a novel of dreams and 
hallucinations. If Windpomp appears, it is in a dream: 
My troops wore gumboots- heavy was the tread of the workers' army!- and 
with our eventual victory, the writer woman [Olive Schreiner] rose again and 
so did Windpomp, Boe's husband, glowing, laughing from the red incinerator 
of the haystack; brushing glowing straw from his garments, stepping through 
wisps of red hot hay he strode, with hands full of wheat that dripped, melting 
through his fingers. 
(183/174i42 
This dream is, in the novel, explicitly related to Pa' s hallucinations - "I melt from the 
edge of the Camdeboo, I drip, I drip . . . " ( 113/1 07i43 - and with Fabian's frightful 
hallucination at the time when Reitz is setting the haystack alight - "Reitz's hands 
were molten scarlet on the pitchfork and his body began to melt and he flowed into 
his glowing boots ... " (186/177). 144 This is the only time in the novel that the reader 
comes, as it were, face-to-face with Windpomp (though Reitz also identifies him as 
"The one with the missing finger" [185/176]). 145 For the remainder of the novel, 
Wind pomp is neither present (because he is dead and gone) nor absent (because his 
burning smell pervades everything). 
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Fabian knows that a haystack can burn for many months: ". . . if hay was 
properly stacked, as ours was, it could smoulder for six months, charred on the 
outside, but ifyou scraped away the crust, it was molten red inside .... " (186/177).
146 
The smell, as well as the seemingly indefinite burning of the haystack, is emphasised 
throughout the remainder of the novel (and smells as such, as indicated above, are 
very much part of the texture of this novel) (cf. 236, 241, 245-246, 290, 291-292, 
294/224, 229, 233, 275, 277, 279). The haystack keeps on burning: Fabian imagines 
Boe waking up at night "and the smell of the burning haystack was everywhere in her 
blankets, her clothes, in her dreams; she couldn't shake it off'' (236/224).
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The adult 
Fabian associates this smell with the refusal to articulate certain things, such as his 
mother's relationship with the Veteran and Windpomp's death in the haystack: "Let it 
be, surrounding us like the smell of the burning haystack which was always with us 
those days~ everywhere, on the tennis courts, in the swimming pool, in the sitting 
room and the rondavels, the smell of the things that remained unsaid, of that which 
was kept silent" (245-246/233). 148 
Later, the deep-seated emptiness of Ma's life, that nothingness which she 
seeks to deny and on which she attempts to impose order by keeping records and 
making lists ( cf. 93/89), is described as the rending of a cloth which fragments the 
fictionalised sense constructed in her life, especially when Tant Geert proceeds to 
disabuse her rather exalted view of the Veteran. In the wake of the use of the 
metaphor of the rended cloth, the unspeakable nothing is said to appear like the smell 
of the haystack: 
She'd already lost so much, loss and longing had exhausted her, and the 
Season - the one that was going to mark Hotel Halesowen' s peak of success -
was threatening to unravel. 
And now she stood there, too tired to fight against the loss of her last 
stronghold: her major .... 
Ma stood there, feeling everything around her corning unstitched, in 
tatters. She gazed deeply into the fortune cup of that summer and everything 
she had wanted to deny, that she had tried to drown in Oude Meester, that she 
had tried to pass off with her jokiness, everything went sour and threatening 
and like the smell of that smouldering lucerne stack, sharp, smoky, with 
somewhere deep inside it, the stink of a body turning to red ashes. 
(294/279i49 
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As Ma' s attempt to construct sense, her textualising weaving of a cloth, comes apart, 
it is as if things are not only rent asunder but also take on the smell of the body in the 
haystack. Ma' s entire self-conceptualisation, her prosopopoeia of herself, appears not 
only as a tom, fabricated mask, but is in its destruction equated with the absolute 
alterity in the burning bush. The nothingness behind Ma's face-as-mask appears in 
the nothingness ofWindpomp's absence. 150 
Windpomp' s radical absence is reminiscent of the absolute alterity of God 
intimated in the theophany of the burning bush described in Exodus, something 
briefly discussed by Levinas (1996c: 72) in terms of the trace.ISl Significantly, the 
bush in which God appears to Moses without appearing, is not consumed and does 
not burn out (Exodus 3: 2-3) in a way which is reminiscent of the burning haystack in 
Kikoejoe. It is important to note that this theophany in the burning bush has a 
profoundly disturbing effect. The voice from the burning bush promises deliverance 
(Exodus 3:8) and commands Moses to "bring forth my people the children of Israel 
out of Egypt" (Exodus 3: 1 0). But Moses is unwilling to yield to the command from 
the burning bush, claiming he would not know what to say, that he would not be 
believed and, finally, that he is not eloquent. As a result, "the anger of the Lord was 
kindled against Moses" (Exodus 4: 14). God assures Moses that he will speak through 
Moses and Aaron (Exodus 4:12, 15). But this disturbance- because it is effected by a 
transcendent entity which is absolutely other, something in a bush which burns 
without end and without being consumed - disturbs without disturbing and, because it 
is a transcendent experience, cannot be said to have been properly experienced. 
Levinas (1996c: 72) says, enigmatically, that "The great 'experiences' of our life have 
properly speaking never been lived". These "great 'experiences'" cannot be lived 
precisely because they are transcendent in their absolute alterity. God's face remains 
invisible (or rather: beyond the visible and the invisible), hidden in the burning bush 
which burns without burning. "The theophany at the bush is the radical incognito of 
transcendence. Precisely because it is an experience of transcendence, it is missed~ 
the experience is not one" (Robbins 1995: 181 ). 
It is for this reason that Windpomp never appears in the novel, that the 
experience of his death - transcendent, radically other and unspeakably evil as it is -
is absent from the text. 152 And it is for this reason that Windpomp remains in the text, 
a constant presence in its absence, a reminder of the unsayable. As such, Wind pomp 
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exemplifies absolute alterity in Kikoejoe, while this novel becomes the work of 
memory of absolute alterity - a work, moreover, which is necessarily unworked in the 
face of that absolute alterity. Windpomp's radical absence from the novel - an 
absence I have claimed is beyond presence and absence - serves as a trace of 
otherness, just like the burning of a bush which is not burning or the smells emitted 
from a haystack burning endlessly. This absolute absence evident in the smell of 
burning flesh cannot be ignored and enclosed, and must also disrupt my reading of the 
novel at this point. 
In respect of the fact that Wind pomp never appears, one might associate him 
with the one other 'character' in the novel who never appears, is never made present, 
and remains an unknown enigma: Kikoejoe itself Kikoejoe is, indeed, described in 
the novel. However, as I have indicated, even though he is - quite problematically -
associated with Raka, he does remain indeterminable. If doubts ·remain as to the 
radical alterity of Kikoejoe, the enigmatic status of Windpomp allows for an 
allegorical reading of Kikoejoe as a novel which stages the problems of representing 
otherness. The refusal - or, rather, inability -to represent Windpomp makes him 
emblematic of otherness, and marks the novel as a self-reflexive attempt responsibly 
to represent otherness. Even when specific others (whether they be human or not) are 
represented, these representations are qualified continually and are, as it were, placed 
under erasure in being posited in the strangeness of the prosopopoeia employed. 
What this implies is that in Kikoejoe, as an allegory of the impossibility of 
representing otherness, not only is a refusal to represent otherness evident, but that 
refusal is itself interrupted. At the same time that the representation of otherness (as 
well as its refusal) is interrupted self-consciously, the novel must continue. And the 
continuation of the novel in the face of the impossibility of its project - the adequate 
recuperation of the past; the representation of the absent beyond absence- amounts to 
an interruption ofthe self-reflexive recognition of its own inadequacy. 
In the very act of allegorising the refusal to narrativise and thus represent 
otherness, that allegory must be untied and rended for the reason that such a refusal 
(or inability thematised) would amount to a characterisation and thematisation of the 
other as uncharacterisable and unthematisable. At the same time, simply refusing 
representation and its concomitant narrativising, presents no option for dealing with 
the quandary of otherness. Not only would such an outright refusal undo the text 
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entirely (for then there would be no point in proceeding), but otherness calls for 
representation, even if this representation consists in the refusal to represent. Not only 
must the representation of otherness be interrupted, but this representation must be 
interrupted continuously, for which reason the representation must continue. This is 
to say that the representation of otherness, subject both to a radical impossibility 
(which may be characterised as ethical) and an urgent demand (which calls for justice 
and may be said to be political), is caught in the double bind of irony. It is my 
contention that, in Kikoejoe, it is possible to find this double bind enacted. 
4.6 Notes 
1 My reading in this chapter is of the Afrikaans text Kikoejoe (van Heerden 
1996). However, for the reader's convenience quotations are taken from the 
English translation by Catherine Knox (van Heerden 1998). Page numbers in 
brackets without dates in each case refer first to this version of the text and 
then to the Afrikaans original. The Mrikaans text is provided in endnotes. In 
cases where comparisons between the Afrikaans text of Kikoejoe and other 
texts (such as Louw's Raka) seem important, or where a particular Afrikaans 
word or phrase seems to have lost a particular effect in Knox's translation, I 
have in some cases resorted to quoting the Afrikaans and English texts in the 
body of the text, without making use of endnotes. 
The problem of translation is not my main concern here. Nevertheless, 
because this particular translation does present problems - specifically vis-a-
vis my reading of Kikoejoe - a number of remarks are made in the notes with 
respect to what I perceive to be inadequacies in the translation. Quite major, 
substantial differences between the original Mrikaans text and the English 
translation are apparent. Apart from the problematic rendering of certain 
terms (which in some instances affect the reading I propose here: I point these 
out as they arise), a number of excisions have been effected. Thus, much of 
the Dutch poetry and many of the Afrikaans hymns have been left out in 
Knox's translation. In chapter 31 the translation merely mentions a Nijhoff 
poem where it is, nonetheless, cited in the Afrikaans text. But the poem is of 
importance, at least partly because Pa wants Tant Geert to repeat it (89/84) (it 
deals with loneliness and the rush of time); 'Halleluja' songs and a stanza from 
a Psalm have been left out of chapter 32 (91/86) (each is concerned to a 
greater or lesser extent with the insignificance of the human in the face of the 
non-human); little of chapter 60 remains after the excision of a whole poem 
and another stanza (176/167) (these are concerned with the effect of the father 
on the son, the uncanny repetition of the one in the other: each is striking in its 
unusual, hallucinatory imagery); in chapter 91 one Dutch stanza from a 
Nijhoff poem has been translated (264/250) and another excised (266/252) 
(each deals with the desire for escape, for otherness in travel). The excision of 
these citations from the translation is problematic because of the 
preponderance of prosopopoeia in them. 
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2 Translation modified. 
Daardie so mer? 'n Ander een? Of herhaal dinge hulself in ieder geval 
en maak dag en jaartal dus nie eintlik saak nie? Is elke verhaal nie 
maar 'n terugkeer na 'n vorige nie, 'n voortbouing, 'n aanvulling- of 
selfs 'n proses van verraad nie? 
Dit is tog waarin die geheue uitmunt: verraad teenoor die 
verlede en hulle met wie jy die verlede gedeel het. 
3 "meesterlik"; "die werk as geheel nie bevredig nie." All translations are by 
me unless otherwise indicated in the Bibliography. 
4 "Dalk was daar vanuit die staanspoor nie 'n oorkoepelende konsep wat die 
oordaad aan elemente moes bind nie." 
5 "hoe verder die verhaal ontwikkel, hoe meer breek dit oop in los brokkies. 
Trouens, die laaste aantal hoofstukke beweeg nie, en die herhalings en las- en 
stopwerk laat die indruk dat die skrywer self nie meer mooi weet hoe om sy 
verhaal afte sluit nie." 
6 "die een of ander opskudding of klimaktiese punt - al is dit dan 'n anti-
klimaks - waamatoe alles beweeg" 
7 "gebrek aan tematiese afronding" 
8 "Sy jongste boek wek die vermoede dat hy vir die groter visie van die Ianger 
prosa meer dissipline nodig het." 
9 Like Pakendorf, Kannemeyer (1997: 16) also expresses his disapproval with 
regard to the novel as whole. Interestingly, like Pakendorf he does so 
explicitly in terms of teleology: " ... the novel is constructed of tableaux 
without underlying motifs binding the events and steering them into a 
particular direction" [die roman word opgebou uit tablo' s sonder dat 
onderliggende motiewe die gebeure verbind en in 'n bepaalde koers stuur]. 
And Burger (1996: 1 0) complains that "Unfortunately it sometimes feels as if 
the comical incidents have been added merely for the sake of effect, while 
other passages leave the reader with the feeling that they have been included to 
lend the novel substance" [Ongelukkig voel dit soms asof die komiese 
insidente bloot ter wille van effek bygevoeg is, terwyl ander gedeeltes die Ieser 
met die gevoellaat dat dit ingesluit is om die roman bietjie lyf te gee]. The 
Afrikaans word used by Burger and rendered here as "substance" ("lyf te 
gee"), it may be noted, is telling: literally, it means "to give body". The point 
I am making is that such criticism of the perceived fragmentariness of 
Kikoejoe misses the point for the reason that the fragmentariness, precisely, 
desubstantialises the novel and its content. Kikoejoe renders problematic the 
very notion that otherness can be 'embodied'. 
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10 This attempt to gather the fragmentary and thematise it is also evident in my 
chapter on Kikoejoe, as graphically illustrated by the numerous lists it 
contains. These lists (of instances of prosopopoeia or catachresis of names 
for Fabian, of self-reflexive passages etc.), like the lists made by Ma (cf 
93/89) are futile attempts at imposing order onto the text of this novel. 
11 For a discussion of the novel as chacterised by this kind of sustained narrative 
and its tendency towards the coherence of conceptuality, see Brink (1998: 14, 
18). See also Marais (1996) for a discussion of the protocols of the novel and 
its implication in both the Enlightenment and Imperialist projects. 
12 "Soos ek gese het, navorsing is 'n vreemde ding. Dit lei jou partykeer waar jy 
nie gelei wil wees nie. Maar dit, Fabian, is die opwinding van navorsing. Jy 
dink nog een oomblik dat een gelyk is aan een, en skielik staan daar drie voor 
jou." 
13 "Tant Geertruida is lief om dinge altyd in dieselfde volgorde te doen. 'Dis 
omdat sy genealoog is,' se Ma. 'Dis presisie-navorsing ... "' 
14 Of course, my hypothesis that the text 'just is' fragmentary already gives it 
sense, interrupts its fragmentation by making it whole. This determination of 
the text as fragmentary must itself be interrupted permanently while being 
posited. As such, this note is an attempt to interrupt the argument of this 
chapter. Even though I wish to respect the sheer fragmentariness of this text, I 
cannot but (attempt to) explain it. 
Another problem I face in this chapter is that I attribute - and thus 
explain - the fragmentariness of the text in terms of the absolutely other 
(Kikoejoe, Windpomp ), thus reducing its otherness by claiming it to be a 
fundamental, guiding principle in the structure of the novel. The essentially 
fragmentary (the absolutely other) is used to construct a wholeness out of the 
text. This reduces the otherness both of the text and of the absolutely other. 
But my argument is that such reduction is inevitable and must be interrupted 
continually, that is, ironically- even as it occurs. See Chapter 3 (3.2.3) for a 
discussion of this point in terms of Levinas' s distinction between the Saying 
and the Said. 
15 This is not meant to be a full list of possible determinations of Kikoejoe in the 
novel itself Other references in the novel to Kikoejoe (or the Beast, the 
Thing) could be found and listed. However, it is part of my purpose not to 
provide such an exhaustive list. For such a list would merely strengthen the 
illusion that it is possible to determine and thus to know Kikoejoe. I wish here 
merely to insist on the diffuseness ofKikoejoe. 
16 In this Burger presumably follows a remark made by the Veteran (22/21). 
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17 "half-mens, half orang". An important precursor of Kikoejoe mig~t be Nadi~e 
Gordimer's novella Something Out There (1984: 117-203). In this text, wh1te 
suburbia is (or imagines being) terrorised by a creature "of the ape family" 
(1984: 119). The creature, which turns out to have been a runaway baboon 
rather than a hominid ( cf.199-200), comes to stand for the collective fear of 
Africa of white people, especially as the acts of the marauding animal are 
juxtaposed with the carefully executed sabotage by a band of guerrillas of a 
power station. 
18 Almal weet van die Dier, maar dit was die eerste keer dat ons hom 
gesien het. Hy is baie skaam, laat nooit volle spore nie, maar as jy die 
veld kan lees, sien jy die halfmane van vreemde palms, die 
hakskeenrand van 'n onbekende poot, die kneukelmerke van 'n 
halfmens .... 
Die hotelkelners noem die Dier Kikoejoe, want sommige 
oggende is daar rondom die verste rondawels happe uit die grasperk 
geruk. Die kikoejoeranke le losgeskeur en halfgevreet onder die borne 
verstrooi. 
19 "[Die blouape] weet nie of bulle mens of dier ruik nie". 
20 "Tyd kom druk teen haar aan, wil haar versmoor, haar teen die bed terugdruk. 
Sy voel hoe sy, sittende, stoei teen 'n swaar liggaam wat oor haar hyg en iets 
met haar wil doen. Sy weet net nie wat nie. Dit druk teen haar en bet geen 
naam nie. Dit het 'n asem, bedompig oor haar wang." 
21 "Dan is sy op die kikoejoe en sy is vry." 
22 I discuss the role of catachresis and prosopopoeia in the novel in greater detail 
below (4.4). 
23 " ... maar toe sy weg is, begin sy asem in en uit oor sy tong gly, asof dit 'n 
fisieke ding is" 
24 Translation modified. "Sy is verras oor sy maer, seningrige lyf en die are wat 
soos slange oor sy arms, bene en onderlyf kartel. Dit lyk, in die maanlig, soos 
swart wurms wat aan hom vreet. Sy gril toe hy sy lyf lig en sy die blink 
voelkop sien. . .. " 
25 Translation modified. 
Pa knip sy oe en by is in 'n boot op Mouillepunt se see. Die boot neem 
hom strome en winde in wat ons nie ken nie. Dit ruk en dobber en gly 
op onstuimige branders. Seebamboese bondel om die boot en Pa is nie 
alleen in die boot nie. Die lyf val teen hom aan soos die see die bootjie 
rondruk en dishy ofPa. Hulle stoei en Pa voel bedompige hare teensy 
gesig skuur, die sterk spierlyf wat teen hom pomp en hy voel die 
haarlose pensvel en die erekte piel. Die duiwelspote trap oor Pa se kaal 
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voete en hy voel hy word oorweldig. Dit is asof die asem oor hom kom 
en hom bedwelm. Sy lug opvreet. 
The word 'prick' is probably a more adequate rendition of 'piel ', which seems 
coarser than the rather clinical 'penis'. Knox herself elsewhere uses 'prick' to 
render 'piel'. The Afrikaans "S6 dik is sy piel" (273) becomes "That's how 
thick his prick is" (288). 
26 Translation modified. 
Die Dier grom liggies as die honde sy geil reuk teen die rivierbosse se 
takke teekom, hul hare op hul roe orent staan, en bulle tjankend 
terughol na die grasperke tussen die groothuis en die rondawels .... 
Sy pie ruik soos niks anders op aarde nie. Dit gee stoom af en 
die geur dryf deur die nag, verby die terras met die omgekeerde, 
slapende stoele, verby die motte wat om die stoepligte dwarrel, verby 
die stadshonde wat onder die motors inkruip en saggies tjank. 
Dit dryf af rivier toe en die slapende trop blouape in die 
doringbome roer onrustig. Bulle begin skellend op en af spring en aan 
die takke ruk. Sommige verloor hul balans, val op die fluitjiesriet en 
begin verward in die donker heen en weer hoi, teen mekaar hots, 
neerval en skarrelend padgee. 
Ek vlug uit my bed .... 
27 Translation modified. Where the Afrikaans passage quite strongly suggests a 
sense of otherness, this is attenuated in the translation by Knox. 
Hy kyk op na die sterre wat soos krummels oor die uitspansel 
uitgestrooi le en hy lig sy neus. Is daar reen te ruik? Is daar 'n ander 
geur op die aandluggie, iets anders as die vae reuk van mis van die 
krale af, die grasgeur uit die kikoejoe wat opstyg soos die eerste dou 
uitsif? Is daar 'n ander reuk as die van die nat sandbanke van die rivier 
en die perskebome agter die rondawels? 
Hierdie tyd van die aand kom die dik, klam geur van seep en 
stoom van die ablusieblokke na die terras opgewaai, die geur van Jeyes 
Fluid en sjampoe en naskeermiddel. Maar daar is iets anders wat 
Reuben nie kan plaas nie. Dit is 'n geur wat terseldertyd vreemd en 
bekend is. Hy lig sy arm en ruik ingedagte aan sy oksel - Ma is baie 
streng en sorg datal die kelners maandeliks 'n rolletjie Mum kry. Nee, 
dit is nie hy nie, alhoewel hy iets van homself in die geur herken. 
28 At least one critic (de Waal 1998: 31) has noted the prevalence of "the vivid 
smells that pervade" this novel. Smells, indeed, are emphasised throughout 
the novel and come to be a marker of otherness in the all-pervasive smell of 
Windpomp's burning corpse (see note 100). 
29 "gif-oog" 
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30 Dit is in 'n oorgeerfde, onbewuste deel van die psige wat die Dier skuil 
- kragte waarvan min te ken is. . . . Die geskiedenis wat d~e v~lwa~se 
Fabian probeer oproep, is 'n poging om dit wat weggesteek IS, d1e D1er, 
te leer ken. Hy het die dwang op hom om die Dier te tern, deur sy 
storie, sy geskiedenis, te vertel. 
Monsters word op sielkundige vlak beskou as baie diep, basiese 
kragte wat soos 'n vulkaan tot uitbarsting kom in 'n monsteragtige daad. 
In die geval van Kikoejoe is die monsteragtige daad die verkragting van 
die [sic] Tsitsi, oom Boeta se jong, swart huishulp. Die Dier is 
verantwoordelik hiervoor, die Dier wat in die onbewuste van elkeen op 
die plaas is. 
It is noteworthy that Burger mentions the monstrous rape of Tsitsi but ignores 
the killing ofWindpomp. In fact, most reviewers do not refer to Windpomp's 
plight at all. This is strange as this event is surely, with the rape of Tsitsi, the 
central calamity 'in' the novel. As far as I have been able to determine, apart 
from Ampie Coetzee (1997: 22), who describes the circumstances of what 
happens to Windpomp in some detail, only two other reviewers go as far as 
even mentioning Windpomp (HE 1998: 72; Francken 1998: 587). 
31 This is a questionable assertion for the reason that it makes Kikoejoe subject to 
the human, whether the human is defined in terms of the unconscious or not. 
Instead, it is my argument that Kikoejoe is radically exterior and, as such, 
disturbs the order of the human same. Burger's statement quoted above that 
the Beast is "present in the unconscious of each person on the farm" also 
involves an interiorisation of Kikoejoe which I would like to avoid. While it 
is, indeed, possible (even plausible) that Kikoejoe is present in the 
unconscious of each person on the farm, something which might be suggested 
in the novel itself (though, as I have indicated, the novel also in some passages 
suggests that the Beast is a very concrete apeman, while in others it would 
seem it is something non-human or super-human, such as God or time~ and so 
forth), this would be to determine and thus contain Kikoejoe. But this is, 
precisely, impossible, as I am arguing. 
32 For this reason I shall not be elaborating on the validity or otherwise of such 
an approach to this particular text. Nonetheless, the novel itself does present a 
psychoanalytic dimension (and a rather jaundiced one) in the shape of Dr 
Clark, the psychiatrist treating Pa for depression. Dr Clark quite explicitly 
relates story-telling to the talking cure of therapy (149/141). Van Heerden 
himself makes this link in an interview (de Waal 1998: 31). Burger's (1997: 
38) later introduction in psychoanalytic terms of the problematic relationship 
between the patriarch and his son on the one hand, and the patriarch and his 
land on the other, seems a potentially highly fecund way of dealing with the 
text, in particular vis-a-vis the farm novel or plaasroman ( cf. also Coetzee 
1997: 22; Francken 1998: 587). I do not focus on the relation between 
Kikoejoe and the farm novel, even though that relation is suggested in the 
novel (for instance in the passages dealing with Olive Schreiner and her The 
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Story of an African Farm). Van Heerden (de Waal 1998: 31) pertinently links 
the passages dealing with Schreiner to his mythologising of landscape: he and 
Schreiner share the Karoo, and "the resurrection of Olive" as "the resurrection 
of the imagination" is therefore ineluctably an aspect of the mythologising of 
the Karoo and its landscape (see also note 33; for a more detailed 
consideration ofthe relationship with the land, see my discussion ofMatlou's 
Life at Home in terms of the farm novel). This, in tum, van Heerden relates to 
his fictional modus operandi: " ... I left the Karoo when I was 14 and it's 
mythologised in my mind. Maybe that's part of my way of mythologising 
characters. . . . [Good literature] creates myths, it's a way of mythologising 
our existence". One might argue that this mythologising of the land and of 
characters is problematic, in particular because van Heerden appears in this 
way to feed attempts to name and represent the other. 
33 "Het mythische niveau is vooral daar bereikt waar de bewoners van 
Soebatsfontein voelen dat er krachten zijn die groter zijn dan zijzelf en die zij 
niet vermogen te kennen. Die krachten zijn gelncameerd in het legendarische 
Dier dat Kikoejoe of Steppewolf ... wordt genoemd." 
As I noted above (note 32), the importance of the mythological is 
emphasised by van Heerden in an interview (de Waal 1998: 31). The 
mythological is overtly related by van Heerden to the Karoo landscape which 
forms the setting of so much of his work. Of course, the Thing is towards the 
end of the novel related to the mythologising, and consequently to the 
memorising, of evil in the form of the dragon (292/277). Any attempt finally 
to determine Kikoejoe must fail in the face of the refractoriness of evil, just 
like the hunting expeditions of the Veteran and Fabian are doomed to failure: 
"I should have withdrawn myself, yes, because after all evil cannot be known" 
(292/277 [Translation modified. "Ek moes my onttrek het, ja, want die 
boosheid is tog nie te ken nie"]). This last statement of Fabian's is 
problematic in that it serves to suggest quite explicitly that what defines evil is 
that it cannot be known, which is to say that evil is that which cannot be 
known. Paradoxically, the narrator of Kikoejoe here claims that evil can be 
known in not being known. 
34 See notes 32 and 33. 
35 It should be noted that few if any of the English or Dutch reviews of Kikoejoe 
that I have come across make the link with Raka. 
36 '"Dit is die vroue wat hom eerste gewaar het,' se Ma oor die Veteraan se 
geparadeerdery"; "Die vroue het hom die eerste gewaar/in die loom 
namiddag". 
37 "half-mens, half-orang" 
38 I discuss this and provide more extensive references below, m my 
consideration of prosopopoeia in Kikoejoe. 
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39 Apart from the importance of the circular motif in Raka, circularity itself has 
been shown to be an important structural principle of the poem. Grove (1966: 
29) argues that "the question is whether this victory [of Raka over Koki] 
should not be seen as part of a larger law: that of a neverending process of 
cultural flowering and destruction" ("die vraag is of hierdie oorwinning nie 
gesien moet word as onderdeel van 'n groter wetmatigheid nie: die van 'n 
nimmereindigende proses van kultuurbloei en -ondergang"). This circularity 
might, in fact, according to Burger (1997: 36) explain the title of Kikoejoe, as 
"The reference to a kind of grass which grows in summer and is dead in 
winter, might symbolically indicate the continual, cyclical return of the 
monster, generation after generation, just as that summer season also keeps 
turning 'round and round' Fabian's memory" ("Die verwysing na 'n grassoort 
wat in die somer groei en in die winter dood is, kan simbolies dui op die 
voortdurende, sikliese terugkeer van die monster, geslag na geslag, soos 
daardie somerseisoen ook 'al om en om' in Fabian se geheue bly draai"). This 
would link Kikoejoe and Raka even more closely. 
40 "Sentraal in die werk as dramatiese spanningstuk staan . . . die teenstelling 
Koki-Raka. Dis 'n teenstelling wat die hele gang van die verhaal beheers." 
41 "Koki is die geestelike Ieier wat begaan is oor die moontlike verlore gaan van 
'n kosbare besit. ... " 
42 "Raka is die ene brute liggaamlike krag" 
43 "Teenoor die natuurwese Raka is Koki die kultuurmens .... " 
44 "liggaam-gees, drif-denke, instink-rede, chaos-orde" 
45 "Teen so 'n mag is die kultuurgemeenskap alleen hestand as 'n kultuurbesef 
(bv. deur die waaksaamheid en optrede van die streng geestelike aristokaat) in 
sy midde lewend gehou kan word. 
"Basies het ons hier dus 'n spanning tussen natuur en kultuur, en die 
kultuurgemeenskap is - soos ons bier duidelik sien - tot ondergang gedoem 
sodra Raka-waardes van 'n bloot liggaamlike bestaan vir hom aanneemlik 
begin word." 
46 See Olivier (1992: 184-218) for a consideration ofLouw's view of the role of 
the intellectual as spiritual aristocrat. See also Steyn (1998: 1044) for Louw's 
view (expressed in 1968) of the Afrikaner nation in terms of "the French 
nobility, the entire European nobility" ("die Franse adel, die hele Europese 
adel"). In the same way as the nobility in Europe was "swallowed by the 
peasant population" ("opgegaan het in die landsbevolking"), the Afrikaner 
nation is in danger of being swallowed by "the great mass of black people" 
("die groot massa swart mense"). This would enable one to link the 'noble' 
Koki also to the 'noble' Afrikaner nation as such. 
47 "vertolking wat hy uit 'n gesprek met die digter afgelei het" 
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48 "'Hy (nl. Van Wyk Louw) het gewys op die geestelike verwildering van 'n 
kultuurgroep wat hom te geredelik oopstel vir vreemde invloede.' As tweede 
verklaring: 'die biologiese feit dat die vergeestelikte mens wat op 'n hoer 
kultuurtrap staan, in die algemeen veel stadiger aanwas as die minder 
bevoorregte, soms minder intelligente, maar meesal sinnelike natuurmens, en 
dat hierdie proses op die lange duur 'n groot bedreiging vir die geestelike 
beskawing van die Westerse mens kan beteken."' See also Steyn (1998: 323). 
49 In this regard Olivier (cf 1992: 45ff.) notes N. P. van Wyk Louw's anti-
Semitism and pro-Nazi sympathies in the 1930s (the years just prior to the 
publication of Raka in 1941). See also Steyn (1998: 126-129, 250-251). 
Steyn defends Louw by emphasising that Louw's anti-Jewish remarks were 
made in private letters. 
50 "vertroebelend werk" 
51 "problematies"; "dit [is] reeds histories 'n verklaarde simbool" 
52 "Ek eet my hoed op as Heathcote MacKenzie sy regte naam is." 
53 Translation modified. "Die Veteraan het met sy aankoms op Soebatsfontein 
homself voorgestel as 'Heathcote MacKenzie Esquire OBE, Veteraan El 
Alamein." The translation necessarily loses the ambivalence of the Afrikaans 
word "voorgestel", which could mean either "introduced" or "(re)presented", 
the latter suggesting a degree of falsehood lacking in the former. 
54 "Hy het na die son opgekyk en homself daaraan herinner dat hy 'n veteraan 
van die woestyn is. . . . 'Heathcote MacKenzie,' het hy saggies geoefen. 
'Heathcote MacKenzie'." 
55 Elkeen het 'n ander naam vir ons plek. Die Veteraan praat van die 
Guest Farm .... Ma noem die plek Hotel Halesowen .... 
Juffrou Marge Bruwer, tant Geertruida se vriendin wat in die 
biblioteek werk, noem ons plek 'n 'vakansieplaas' .... 
Tant Geertruida praat van 'The Farm' of 'De Boerderij', 
atbangend van watter stad vars in haar geheue is. . .. 
Pa noem die plek Soebatsfontein, of Moordenaarskaroo, of, as 
die politiek hom temeergedruk maak: Kafferland. As hy pas een van 
Zane Grey se cowboyboekies verslind het, praat hy van Dodge City. 
56 "Ma roep agter Reuben aan. 'Jack! Waamatoe loop jy nou, my jong? Jack!' 
Jack is die naam wat witmense vir swart mans gebruik. Waarom Ma nou 
besluit het om vir Reuben Jack te noem, weet ek nie." 
57 Daardie hanger man, hy met die tande so wit soos die 
doringhout wat hy kloof, kan my eet. Hy kan in my byt asof ek 
waatlemoen is, tot in die binneste soet. Daar waar dit die rooiste is, 
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daar, ja daar, moet hy my eet, die honger man, die skinkbordman, die 
kikoejoeman, die ... 
Sy prewel name vir hom; haar eie woorde waarmee sy hom 
liefkoos. 
This passage is striking in its use of prosopopoeia: names are given to an 
absent one, Reuben, who is absent on different levels. Apart from being 
absent to the reader, the 'separation of the selves' is enacted in that Tsitsi and 
Reuben have no means of access to each other because of Tant Retha and 
Oom Boeta, who jealously guard Tsitsi (cf. 238/226). It might be noted 
parenthetically that it would be possible, though I have not done so here, to 
read this separation in terms of the interplay of allegory and irony, strikingly 
reminiscent as it is of the distance between the lovers in Stendhal's Chartreuse 
de Parme which, to de Man, thematises allegorically "The myth .. . of the 
unovercomable distance which must always prevail between the selves" 
( 1983: 228). 
The names given in this passage, moreover, operate in terms of 
catachresis. Not only is Reuben linked to the Beast ("the kikuyu man"), but 
sexual intercourse is described in terms of the body as fruit. If Reuben is "a 
hungry man", then his hunger will be sated in eating the watermelon which is 
Tsitsi. The intimate nature of the link between catachresis and prosopopoeia, 
discussed in Chapter 3 (3.3.2), is apparent here. 
A problematic aspect of this particular passage - also in evidence 
throughout Kikoejoe (see notes 125 and 134-137 for further examples)- is that 
the narrator, as I put it above, attributes thoughts to Tsitsi. He imagines her 
imagining Reuben's desire for her, and later goes so far as extensively to 
imagine Reuben's imagining his and Tsitsi' s passionate intercourse ( cf 
234ff./222ff.). As we saw at the start of this chapter, the narrator explicitly 
casts doubt on the veracity of his memories, thus implicitly questioning and 
relativising his ability to penetrate the thoughts of others (rather than claiming 
to be able to do so): this is an avowedly non-omniscient narrator. Yet the 
narrator presumes to enter the thoughts of 'his' characters in the way 
omniscient narrators have traditionally done, using free indirect discourse. 
And as J. M. Coetzee (1988b: 123) has pointed out, "The key characteristic of 
free indirect speech is that the presence of a narrating intelligence is not 
asserted: the narrator slips behind or into the intelligence of the character". 
Clearly, within the ambit of Kikoejoe, as a text asserting its own lack of 
dependability vis-il-vis the past - and the others of the past - such a move 
would seem to counteract the scepticism of the novel with regard to itself, and 
might subvert its self-subvertive claims. Alternatively, one might argue that 
the narrator attempts to relativise his attribution of thought as well as speech in 
Kikoejoe by self-reflexively drawing attention to it, as well as by explicitly and 
continuously ironising it with reference to the avowed inadequacy of his 
narrative to encapsulate the past: after all, the entire novel is an attribution of 
speech and thought to others. It is difficult to see how fiction could be 
produced without such attribution. My point in this chapter is precisely that, 
while this attribution - indeed, embodiment - does occur, and while the novel 
is thus a prosopopoeia which gives face/s to what has none (Kikoejoe; 
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individual characters, the past), such prosopopoeia is ironised in being 
interrupted continuously (for instance, by means of the kind of editorial 
interjections noted at the start of this chapter), if perhaps not consistently and 
at all levels (see note 125). See in particular Cosser (1992, 1993) for a 
consideration of free indirect discourse (including free indirect thought and 
speech) within the South African context. 
58 Knox leaves the Afrikaans word untranslated: "pupiltjie". 
59 This is rendered as "corporal" (cf 22, 76) or "corporaltjie" (cf 46, 76) in 
Knox's translation. The Afrikaans is "korporaaltjie" (cf 21, 43, 71). On at 
least one occasion the Veteran does call Fabian "corporal" (1311124), 
"korporaal" in Afrikaans. The Afrikaans "Werda, korporaaltjie!" (I 71) is 
rendered only as "Who goes there?" (180). 
60 This is rendered as "soldier'' (121) and "corporal" (131) in Knox's translation. 
The Mrikaans is "soldaatjie" (115, 124). 
61 This is rendered as "discipeltjie" ( cf 71) by Knox. 
62 This is rendered as "big boy" in Knox's translation (I 57). The Afrikaans is 
"rammetjie" ( 149). 
63 This is rendered as "little champ" in Knox's translation (136). The Afrikaans 
is "resiesperdjie" (129). 
64 Prosopopoeia may further be linked to the proper name as that which survives 
death or, at least, outlives that to which it refers, thus enabling it to survive. 
As Derrida (1992: 425, 432) puts it, 
The name calls beyond presence, phenomenon, light, beyond the day, 
beyond the theater. It keeps . . . what is no longer present, the 
invisible: what from now on will no longer see the light of day. . . . I 
am not my name. One might as well say that I should be able to 
survive it. But firstly it is destined to survive me. In this way it 
announces my death. 
I discuss the importance of prosopopoeia in Kikoejoe in more detail in the next 
section (4.4). 
65 See the discussion by Robbins (1995: 179-182) in the context of the theophany 
of the burning bush. I elaborate on this encounter vis-a-vis the encounter with 
otherness in Kikoejoe, specifically as exemplified by the figure of Windpomp, 
at the end ofthis chapter (4.5). 
66 One might note that 'Kikoejoe' is, strictly speaking, not a proper name at all. 
This is evident from the fact that it is translated by Knox as 'Kikuyu'. The 
word Kikoejoe might thus be said not to name: it possibly constitutes an 
151 
attempt on the part of the narrator (and author) not to determine whatever it. is 
that Kikoejoe signifies. I use the word 'Kikoejoe' to preserve a degree of tts 
otherness in an English discussion of an Mrikaans text, although it should be 
noted that such otherness would of course not be visible in the Afrikaans text: 
there the otherness of the designation 'Kikoejoe' would lie in the fact that it is 
a name which is not a name (as confirmed by the translator's decision to 
translate it). See Derrida (1985) for a consideration of the untranslatability of 
the name. See also note 131. 
67 The phrase 'invention ofthe other' is Derrida's (cf 1992: 335, 341ff.). 
68 "deur die oe van 'n kind". Van Heerden refers, among other novels, to Mark 
Behr's The Smell of Apples (1995} which makes use of the same basic 
narrative technique: that of a child's narrative interspersed with that of the 
child as adult. 
69 "tipe ontginning van die verlede". See van Heerden (1992) for an elaboration 
of his view of the writer as historiographer. 
70 See note 13, above. 
71 Translation modified. 
. . . hy begin bewe van ingehoue frustrasie en kry Oupa se testament 
uit, en Ma moet vir tant Geert roep om familiesake te kom bespreek, 
die ingewikkelde trust en die familieplaas. . . . Hoe, vra Pa vir tant 
Geert, gaan ons die trust tot niet kry? 
[Almal] is deel van die ingewikkelde spel wat Oupa vanuit die 
graf met sy afstammelinge speel. 
'Maarekwil uit!' roepPa. 'Ekwil vrywees!'. 
72 On this association, see further notes 39 and 92. 
73 "Almal is weg en stil, en ek het niemand by wie ek my feite kan kontroleer 
nie. Dit is alles weggeveeg, verby, asof dit nooit bestaan het nie. Die 
rondawels is murasies, verniel deur kikoejoeranke, die weer en die tyd." 
74 "Ek voel klaarblyklik 'n verpligting om die meeste van my karakters tot aan 
hul einde te bring!" 
75 That this novel is quasi-autobiographical is something noted by more than one 
reviewer (cf Kannemeyer 1997: 16; Smuts 1996: 27), and by van Heerden 
himself (de Waal 1998: 31): "The novel's fibre is autobiographical but its 
details are not". 
76 Translation modified. 
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En soos die geval is by so baie van die karakters in my verhaal, sou ek 
- in aile regverdigheid - graag ook my eie dood wou beskryf .... 
My eie? Nou ja, dit is tog onmoontlik om jou eie dood vooraf 
op te voer, daarom het ek die een soort verhaal gekies waar jy nie 
onder die verpligting is om dit te doen nie - die outobiografie. Want 
dit is immers die genre waarin die hoofkarakter lewend anderkant kan 
uitstap, sy dit dan nie ongeskonde nie. 
En om s6 te vertel, is tog ook 'n manier van sterf, nie waar nie? 
Die hand aan sigself slaan. 
77 I am, of course, aware of the so-called 'de Man controversy': the revelations 
that de Man wrote for anti-Semitic Belgian newspapers during the Second 
World War, and the subsequent suggestions that de Man's critical modus 
operandi was some or other subliminal attempt to exculpate himself (or make 
it impossible to attribute guilt). This is not the place to enter into a detailed 
consideration of these issues (see Hamacher et. a!. 1989). But, within the 
South African context, Ngwenya's (1989) dismissal of de Man's approach to 
autobiography must be mentioned. This dismissal seems to be based on a 
misreading of de Man: he never claims that autobiography is impossible or 
that it is somehow indistinguishable from fiction, "that the writer of 
autobiography has no control over the material which constitutes his life", as 
Ngwenya claims he does (1989: 67). Nowhere does de Man assert that 
autobiographers conceive ofthemselves "as the passive agents of language" or 
as being "wholly created by language" (1989: 68). On this point, see also 
Miller (1987: 9-10; 41-59). See also Chapter 1, note 6. 
78 The next pages might seem rather long-winded to some readers, as I spend the 
remainder of the section citing instances of prosopopoeia in Kikoejoe in order 
to confirm the preponderance of this trope in the novel, as well as to 
emphasise its hallucinatory effect. The main points are summarised in the last 
two pages of the section. Readers who find themselves in agreement with 
these points are advised to proceed to this summary (pp. 130-132). 
79 "Lank en swart staan hy daar, 'n vlermuis op sy agterpote . . . " ( 185). Knox 
renders this as "Tall and black he stood there, an upright bat" (195), which 
does not quite as strongly suggest the hallucinatory nature of the Afrikaans 
description of "a bat on its hindlegs". 
80 Translation modified. "Reuben [het] met sy blink skinkbord soos 'n skildwag 
op die rand van die terras kom staan ... " 
81 "Partykeer lyk jy vir my soos 'n hotnotsgot wat sy pootjies vryf en almal 
dophou." 
82 This is lost in Knox's translation. She renders the Mrikaans "seil" (77) 
(which may be used to describe the movement of a snake) as "crawled" and 
"slid" (82) and as "slither" and "gliding (149). But Fabian is explicitly related 
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to a snake (149/141). A more adequate rendition of 'seil' would therefore be 
the verb 'snake' (or possibly 'glide'). 
83 Translation modified. "Met maanhare wit in die wind. Met 'n stert wat vloei 
op die bries. Kop hoog vorentoe. Nek gebeitel in vaart. Dik groen drolle 
borrelend uit die hol wanneer die trein volspoed bereik teen die groen 
kronkelsoom van die rivier." Knox's translation clearly relates this description 
to Valour (for instance in rendering "hol" as "arse"), while the Afrikaans 
passage is rather more ambiguous and may arguably be related to both the 
horse and the train. Perhaps inevitably, in Knox's translation many 
catachreses (with their prosopopeic effects) are lost. 
84 Translation modified. "Dan vinnig, met 'n vies gesig en 'n frons op sy haastige 
voorkop, kom die trein om die Dinamietkrans geseil" 
85 "Amsterdam het soveel gesigte" 
86 "Die honger aarde suip." 
87 Translation modified. "Hulle het saam gestaan en kyk na die bruin vlakte wat 
in die hitte bibber, die plasse lugspieeling wat in die laagtes dryf, en die trein 
se· spore wat noutrek tot 'n enkele blink oog in die vert e." Apart from the 
landscape being described by means of prosopopoeia in this passage, the train 
too comes alive. Rather than the more usual 'treinspore' (railway tracks), the 
phrase 'trein se spore' (train's tracks) is used, suggesting that the train is an 
animal with tracks. 
88 "die rile van heuwels [ vlieg] soos die bruin boude van merries saam met hom 
[Valour]" 
89 "strek tot by die nors frons van die Dinamietkrans verby" 
90 Translation modified. "Almal wag op die eerste koel stote van die aandwind, 
wag dat die Melkweg aanstons helder soos 'n halssnoer oor die swart hals van 
die nag sal kom le." The Afrikaans "hals" is ambiguous (meaning either 
'throat' or 'neck'). Knox uses "breath" to render "stote", which intensifies the 
degree of prosopopoeia in the description of the night. However, seeing that 
this description is followed by Willempie and Fabian 'pulling their wires' 
("draadtrek" [185] - masturbating), the sexual connotation of 'stoot' 
(Afrikaans slang for sexual intercourse) is lost. She also renders "swart" as 
"dark", which might be more adequately rendered as black (especially given 
the prominence of the discourses of racism and apartheid in the novel). 
91 "'Kaffers smelt in die landskap in,' se Ma altyd" 
92 "die mens is gras". Knox renders this as "man was made of dust", but it may 
be important to maintain the reference to grass, not only because of the 
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Biblical phrasing but because kikuyu is a type of grass. This would serve to 
strengthen the suggestion that the Beast Kikuyu is time itself 
93 Translation modified. "Van die treine wat soos ritssluiters oor die swart bars 
van die land beweeg, sal hy haar vertel." 
94 Translation modified. "Soebatsfontein,' brom Pa. 'God-se-oog. Verneukpan. 
Putsonderwater. Genadeloosrant. Pynlikheid. Perdevreklaagte". The English 
translation inserts the following clause which does not occur in Kikoejoe: "and 
then rattled off more ofhis favourite place-names". 
This is one arbitrary example among many ofPa's addressing the land 
in this way. See Knox's useful list of literal translations of Afrikaans place 
names (313). 
95 Translation modified. "Om hulle strek die Karoonag eindeloos ... , die 
horison wat steeds wyk, die einder waarvan Pa afdrup soos hy landskap word 
en tollend op die kamervloer staan en stamelend verduidelik: 'Ek smelt van 
die Kamdeboo se rand af, ek drup, ek drup ... "' 
96 Translation modified. "'Liegdamme,' noem Pa die mirages wat om ons dans. 
'God-oog,' se hy en wys op na die son. 'Die duiwel se vuis,' wys hy na 'n 
klipkoppie met 'n knoets klip bo-op". 
97 Translation modified. 
En ek staan agter haar, ongesiens, op pad om uit te glip na die Veteraan 
sodat ons die tog Dinamietkrans toe kan begin. Ek staan daar soos 'n 
kind wat afloer in die oog van 'n boorgat en diep daar onder swart water 
en paddas sien roer, en ongerus in die son sal uittrek saam met die 
Veteraan, met iewers in my 'n bewustheid dat dit spel is, maar ook nie 
spel nie- dat ons 'n vreemde land instap, een wat nie gedoop kan word 
met een van Pa se name nie: Noupoort, Bitterfontein, Godverlaat, 
Bloedson, K welkaroo ... 
98 Translation modified. "'Die land is aan die doodgaan,' se Pa aan Ma. 
Later se Ma: "n Mens sal nie dink die land het so 'n slegte asem gekry nie'". 
99 Translation modified. "die dood se slegte asem, oral" 
I 00 It is as if all these various smells are concentrated into that "other smell" 
("ander geur") (142/135; translation modified) which accompanies the arrival 
ofVerwoerd and the devastating consequences of that arrival. See note 28. 
101 Knox translates "die blink neus" (9-10) as "the shiny bonnet" (10) of the 
Borgward. This rendition loses the prosopopeic effect of the Afrikaans. 
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102 This is rendered as "creaking" by Knox, which loses not only the catachrestic 
suggestion that the doors are somehow alive, but also a certain onomatopoeic 
effect. 
103 Knox correctly renders "tafelpote" as "table legs". Nonetheless, this 
translation does not connote bestiality (as the Afrikaans does). 
104 Knox renders the Afrikaans "bibber" as "bobbed". This refers to the 
movement of the balloons, as the Afrikaans also does. But the prosopopeic 
suggestion that the balloons are alive and are experiencing cold (or heat) is lost 
in translation ( cf 42/40). 
105 The Afrikaans "sing" is rendered as "tinkled" by Knox (105). The 
prosopopoeia is lost in her translation. 
106 "grommend ... brom". The latter word is not rendered by Knox. 
107 "Toe roggel die Lister soos hy maak die oomblik voordat hy sy laaste sluk 
diesel vat." 
108 "sing", "kla", "vae geroggel". Knox renders "dreun" - which describes the 
sound emitted by the geyser without suggesting that it is alive - by "groaned" 
(213/203) which most certainly enhances the prosopopeic effect. 
109 "[het] die donkie na sy hand geleer" 
110 "met sy byl [kloof Reuben] die wit vleis van die doringhout". The second 
instance cited refers to the "white flesh of the thorn wood" ("die witvleis van 
die doringhout"), rendered as "white thorn-wood" by Knox. 
Ill Translation modified. "Agter hom vreet die rooi keel die doringstompie in 'n 
oogwink op. Die groot tenk sidder en die pype wat teen die mure afloop, tril 
en kreun. Deur die litte van die pypelmboi! om die mure se hoeke syfer 
stoomwater." 
112 Translation modified. "'Ek stook vir Antjie Provee dat sy steun vanaand!' lag 
Reuben." 
113 "Die stoomwater spat uit die aflaatpyp, dit spuit in 'n boog en vat soos 'n 
witwarm hand 'n handvol wind." 
114 "Die Ding het op sy rug omgerol, en op dieselfde oomblik dat die huilende 
wyfie-aap wegrol, haar voete vind en begin hardloop, het die wit saad uit sy 
piel gespuit, ruk-ruk in lang boogstrale oor sy penshare en die warm 
riviersand." 
115 "Willempie wen: sy blink saad spu met 'n boogtot in die Vis se aandwater." 
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116 "draadtrek". This is rendered by Knox as "masturbating". 
117 "akkedisse", "spinnekopbene" 
118 "Twee mans staan en pomp die koekepan. Hulle kom soos 'n gogga uit die 
Juqspieeling aangery. Die knikkende mansfigure lyk soos die pote van 'n 
kr·-.oende gogga." One might note that the word 'pomp' (like stoot- see note 
90) is Afrikaans slang for sexual intercourse, something suggested in the novel 
in Fabian's imagined description of Reuben's imagined description of 
intercourse with Tsitsi (212/202) and of Willempie' s and Fabian's 
masturbation (194/185): "We both pumped busily .... " ("Bedrywig pomp 
ons" [translation modified]). 
119 Translation modified. "sy swart oe kruip soos torre oor Ma se kaal skouers" 
120 "regop tepels [staar] na hom ... soos die rooi oe van konyne" 
121 "sagte base wat met hul snoete teen haar bra pyn" 
122 "krimpvarkie" 
123 "peester", "penis", "piel" 
124 "voelkop", "voel". These words are rendered as "penis head", "willy" and 
"penis" by Knox, thus losing the catachresis in translation. Literally 
translated, 'voel' means 'bird'. 'Cock' would therefore be a more adequate 
rendition. 
125 Translation modified. 
Maar wat ons nie sien nie, is die Veteraan onder die rivierbome, 
waar hy stil tussen die riete in sy swart uniform staan. 
Lank en swart staan hy daar, 'n v/ermuis op sy agterpote, 
steunend van genot terwyl hy ons dophou waar ons ons klein voele in 
ons hande hou. Hy staar stom na ons, en hy fig sy neus, hy ruik iets 
van ons drif, hy moet sy snorksug in sy keel onderdruk toe sy beaarde 
voe/ in sy hand begin skop-skop en die saad uitpomp op die sand aan 
sy voete. 
This passage is problematic in its impossible reporting of an event to which 
the narrator claims he had no access (see note 57). However, in this case the 
narrator explicitly interrupts his conceptualisation of the event represented by 
means of the aside "But what we didn't see was the Veteran among the river 
trees". This aside (and there are other examples in the novel: cf note 135) 
may be understood, with the numerous other editorial interjections in the 
novel, as an example of parabasis. The function of the parabasis would be to 
interrupt and thus relativise the representation proffered here. It is my 
contention that this interruption is ironic, and that irony tends towards the 
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undoing of the allegory of otherness in Kikoejoe. But this is not to claim that 
this interruption is constant, or that it functions on all levels of the novel. I 
consider problematic instances of conceptualisation which do not seem to be 
interrupted clearly vis-a-vis the novel's allusions to VanWyk Louw's Raka 
(see above, 4.2) as well as the representation (or otherwise) of the rape of 
Tsitsi (see below, 4.5). 
126 " ... daardie hibriede dier deur evolusie gelaat tussen voel en muis" 
127 These last two references are to the Afrikaans text only for the reason that the 
relevant stanza of the Psalm and the entire poem by Nijhoff have been excised 
from the English translation. 
128 "Die wond is 'n mond wat praat." 
129 Translation modified. "speel die pretensieuse speletjies wat alle intellektuele 
speel - bulle verwys na tekste, le verbande, tas in die geheue rond." 
130 The English translation, perhaps inevitably, loses this association as a result of 
the choice of not translating Windpomp' s name. Of course, the description of 
Pa' s eyes as windmills further strengthens the hallucinatory effect of 
prosopopoeia in the novel. 
131 The same applies, of course, to Kikoejoe/Kikuyu, whose 'name' is translated 
and therefore to an extent loses its status as proper name. In Kikuyu, 'Tant', 
'Ma' and 'Pa' are not translated, thus lending these words the status of names. 
But, as I suggested above (note 66), the decision not to translate these 'names' 
seems to be a sound one to the extent that they have a 'foreignising', othering 
effect on the translation. On 'foreignising' translation, see Venuti (1986; 
1991) as well as my discussion in Chapter 5 (5.3.1). 
132 J. M. Coetzee, in his collection of essays White Writing, has identified such 
absences as being characteristic of the farm novel as genre (cf 1988: 71-72; 
see my note 139, below). To the extent that Kikoejoe follows in the wake of 
the farm novel ( cf Coetzee 1997: 22) - even if van Heerden sees it as a 'hotel 
novel' (cf. Wasserman 1996: 4)- one might argue that the text all too easily 
slots into the conventions of that genre. I do not in this chapter focus on 
Kikoejoe in terms of the farm novel (see note 32), though this could no doubt 
have been a useful and interesting exercise. See Chapter 5 ( 5. 5) for a closer 
consideration of the absence of the black other from the farm novel and 
plaasroman. 
133 I indicated one of the many instances above (see note 57} 
134 "Op haar burke sit sy in die nag en dink aan Rhodesie. Die aandluggie vat 
koud oor haar boude. Dit is lekker as die warm urine uitkom en in haar 
boudgleuf opstoom. Die grassies kielie haar dye en lank nadat sy die laaste 
druppel afgeknyp het, sit sy so gehurk in haar eie stoom." 
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135 "Daar ver onder die doringbome, waar die nagdonkerte al poele maak, druk 
d~e p~ot die takkies saggies weg. Hy sien Ma haar kop agteroor gooi en lag, 
dte blmk goed aan haar ore, hy sien hoe Marge Brower terugbuk en 'n rooi 
malvablom pluk en dit onopsigtelik, sonder dat selfs ek dit opmerk, langs tant 
Geert se hand op die tafel neersit . . . " 
136 See note 125. 
137 Translation modified. 
Tsitsi met 'n haal oor die binneboud. Eers die blinkswart vel 
met daaronder 'n witterige vetlaag. Dan spiere, sening: bloed. Oor die 
kikoejoe, soos sy gesleep is, haar heupe wyd oopgebeur, haar oe 
witgedop van skrik. Net Sjona nou op haar tong, prewelend, wit 
korsies sout in haar mondhoeke. 
Die Cadillac se deur le wyd oop en 'n stadsbrak kom lek haar 
bloed van die gruisklippers af Mettertyd is hulle almal daar: die 
spaniels en die foksterriers, die langlaagtes, die kollies en die pavement 
specials, die boerboele en die basters. Hulle lek en vreet die gras en 
gaan braak naderhand onder die bloekombome. 
Tsitsi verkrag. 
138 Wat my bietjie dronkslaan omtrent Kikoejoe, is die wyse waarop die 
gruwelike verkragting onderspeel word. Neem die skrywer dit nie so 
emstig op nie of is dit simptomaties van die tyd waarin die gebeure hul 
afspeel dat die saak ligtelik verbygaan ( omdat wittes so 'n daad minder 
emstig sou bejeen waar dit 'n swart vrou aangaan)? Moontlik hou dit 
verband met die gevoel wat ek ervaar het m.b.t. 'n klimaks waarop die 
Ieser voorberei word, wat nooit werklik volvoer word nie. Of miskien 
is die verskriklikste ding wat gebeur (in die oe van die wit mense op 
Soebatsfontein), ironies-lagwekkend, die feit dat Charles Jacobie [sic] 
se lieflike wit perd byna die slagoffer word van 'n absurde monsterjag! 
139 I am thinking here particularly of Coetzee's analysis of the emptiness of the 
landscape, as well as of the occlusion of black people (in particular, of their 
labour) from much 'white writing', what he calls a "failure of the historical 
imagination" (1988c: 9; cf 1988d, 1988e). See Chapter 5 for a closer 
consideration of the occlusion of black people from the pastoral mode as it 
occurs in the so-called farm novel. 
It would be instructive to compare the way in which the rape of Tsitsi 
is dealt with in Kikoejoe with the way the rape of Lucy Lurie is dealt with in J. 
M. Coetzee's most recent fiction, Disgrace (1999). The first and most 
important point is that, in this text, the rape is central to the narrative, while, in 
the case of Kikoejoe, it is not, as I have indicated. Indeed, within the broader 
context of Kikoejoe, the rape seems almost incidental, while in Disgrace the 
rape is at the centre of the narrative. It is implicitly juxtaposed with sexual 
harassment and the fall into disgrace of David Lurie after an affair with a 
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student, Melanie Isaacs (see, for instance, one of the episodes during which he 
makes love to her [1999: 24-25]). This leads to Lurie's departure from Cape 
Town to stay with his daughter, Lucy. In Disgrace, the rape itself is described 
in as little detail as - even less detail than - the rape of Tsitsi. But the narrator 
in Disgrace never presumes to enter the minds of others. His knowledge is 
limited, marked as it is by his separation from others. Of the rape itself the 
reader reads nothing. Instead, s/he reads the horrifying things David sees - the 
shooting of the dogs (1999: 95-96)- and experiences- being set alight (1999: 
96) - and reads of his fear of what might be happening to his daughter. Yet 
the rape is the central figure in the novel, also as far as the confrontation 
between Africa and the 'West' (cf 1999: 95, 201-202, 204) is concerned. In 
the end, subsequent to the rape and her resultant pregnancy, Lucy stays on the 
'farm' and accepts the arrangement suggested by Petrus: that he will look after 
her and the child in exchange for the 'farm' (her dowry). Lucy tells her father 
to go back to Petrus and "Say I accept his protection" (1999: 204), despite his 
protestations. Thus she becomes a "bywoner" ( 1999: 204) on her land, as 
Petrus, the new Mrican farmer, reclaims Africa. As should be evident from 
the above, the rape of Lucy in Disgrace functions on many levels and is 
central to the novel with regard to issues involving power and gender, 
colonisation, and the relationship with the land and animals. 
140 They had already come to the farm at least once before, during the day of 
Verwoerd's visit to Cradock, because of the suspicion that Pa was involved in 
supposedly subversive meetings and in a "programme of action undermining 
the preparedness of the youth" (174/164 [Translation modified: "program van 
optrede wat die weerbaarheid van die jeug ondermyn"]; cf 157-158/149). 
During this raid they had dealt with Pa, Ma, the workers and the guests in a 
very high-handed manner. 
141 Translation modified. "is, en sal altyd vir my so bly, 'n gedroomde tyd. Nie 
omdat die domein van drome mooier en meer verteerbaar is nie - eerder 
miskien omdat die droom telkens die werklikheid beter gei"nterpreteer het as 
wat ek as bogkind dit bewustelik kon doen." 
142 Translation modified. 
My troepe dra rubber-waterskoene en swaar is die voeteval van die 
arbeidsleer, em met die oorwinning, uiteindelik, staan die skryfvrou 
[Olive Schreiner] weer op en kom Windpomp, Boe se man, gloeiend, 
glimlaggend uit die rooi binne-oond van die hooimoed [sic]; warm 
strooihalms stof hy van sy klere af, deur brokke vuurrooi hooi tree hy, 
stap met handevol koring wat smeltend van sy hande aftap. 
143 "Ek smelt van die Kamdeboo se rand af, ek drup, ek drup ... " 
144 "Rooi smelt Reitz se hande om die gaffel en sy lyf begin smelt en hy vloei in 
sy rooi stewels in. . . . " One might at this point note the recurrence in the 
novel of images of fluidity. Perhaps these images of melting and other 
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p~ocesse~ in~~lving altering states suggest the lack of permanence of time, 
With the mab1hty finally to determine either the past or the other. 
145 Translation modified. "Die een met die afvinger." 
146 " ... as 'n hooimied goed gepak is- soos ons s'n -brand hy vir ses maande 
swart van buite, maar as jy die kors wegkrap, is dit binne blakerend rooi. ... " ' 
147 "en die geur van die brandende mied is oral, in haar klere, in haar drome; sy 
kan daarvan nie loskom nie" 
148 "Laat dit maar daar, laat dit om ons wees soos die reuk van die brandende 
mied daardie dae heeltyd om ons was, oral, op die tennisbaan, in die swembad, 
in die sitkamer en die rondawels, oral die geur van dit wat ongese bly, van dit 
wat Iiefs verswyg word." Of course, one needs to distinguish between what is 
repressed and what cannot be said. The smell ofWindpomp's burning corpse 
becomes associated in the novel with both these modes of silence. On the one 
hand, his death would seem to be too horrific to be described, while it 
nonetheless calls for representation in its continual presence as odour on the 
farm. On the other hand, with this smell present all the time, it comes to stand 
for that which is kept quiet. Like so much else which is repressed and remains 
unspoken by the characters, the smell ofWindpomp remains unarticulated. 
149 Translation modified. 
Sy het reeds s6 baie verloor, verlies en verlange het haar afgetakel, die 
Seisoen - dit wat Hotel Halesowen se grootste seisoen moes wees -
dreig om uit te rafel. 
En nou staan sy net daar, te moeg om haar te verset teen die 
wegneem van die laaste houvas: haar majoor ... 
Ma staan daar en voel hoe dinge om haar aan flarde tarring. Sy 
kyk diep in die fortuinkoppie van daardie somer in en alles wat sy wou 
ontken, wat sy wou dooddrink met haar Oude Meester, wat sy wou 
wegpraat met haar grappighede, alles word suur en dreigend soos die 
ruik van daardie smeulende mied: skerp, rokerig, met iewers diep 
geborge in die brandreuk die stank van 'n lyf wat stadig in rooikool 
verteer. 
150 Perhaps one should rather claim that this nothingness does not appear, because 
(after all) it cannot be represented. Nothingness cannot be represented 
because it is truly beyond the phenomenal realm and therefore transcendent: it 
is an absence beyond the dichotomy absence/presence, the radical separation 
of death, something the experience of which cannot be experienced. 
Similarly, Windpomp is dead, yet the trace of his otherness in death persists as 
a reminder of something which never was, of an immemorial past. Certainly, 
Windpomp can be said to escape all signification for the reason that he never 
is represented in the novel. His presence and absence in the burning haystack 
and, consequently, in the novel is a reminder of absolute alterity: Windpomp 
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simply is not located within the purview of this novel or its reader. In this 
regard, compare the comments above on autobiography and death, as well as 
the discussion which follows in which the experience of absolute alterity - that 
of death, of nothingness, or of the concrete other - is related to the experience 
of transcendence in the trace of otherness. 
151 My discussion of this theophany is indebted to that ofRobbins (1995). 
152 This is not to reduce alterity to evil, but to insist that it is not necessarily 
ethical. See Chapter 3 note 1. 
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ChapterS 
Life at Home: Irony, Otherness and the Farm Novel 
5.1 Introduction 
Joel Matlou's Life at Home and Other Stories (1991) consists of stories which trace, 
broadly speaking, the coming of age of a young boy, Medupe, in the Pretoria district. 
However, this process cannot be circumscribed in terms of a latter-day, South African 
Bildungsroman. On the contrary, Matlou's stories, while evidencing a great deal of 
self-consciousness and reflection, also disrupt the unitary subjectivity upon which 
such a novel would have been premised. The content of the collection may be 
described, following Andre Brink (1998a: 26), as consisting of "'ordinary' 
experiences like living on a farm, or working on the mines, or courting a girl, [turned] 
into an extraordinary vision of hell". 
This comment encapsulates my points of departure in this chapter. In the first 
place, Brink's reference to the 'ordinary' may be understood as an allusion to Njabulo 
Ndebele's distinction between the ordinary and the spectacular and thus suggests a 
direct link between Matlou's work and Ndebele's. This link is strengthened by the 
narrative of urbanisation implicit in Brink's remark, from which I take my cue to 
discuss Matlou's work against the background of its relation with the South African 
farm novel and plaasroman. 1 And, finally, Brink's suggestion that Life at Home turns 
'ordinary' experiences "into an extraordinary vision of hell" suggests the degree to 
which Ndebele's project is exceeded by Matlou's work, not least in its emphasis on 
suffering. 
In this chapter I consider the relation between irony and otherness as it appears 
with regard to the way in which Matlou's Life at Home reinvents the farm novel. My 
reading of Life at Home will argue that this text continues the farm novel but, in so 
doing, radically disrupts it. And this disruption enables the appearance of the other 
without its appearance in the farm novel (see below, 5.5). Life at Home may be read 
against the farm novel because it gives a voice and a face to that which is voiceless 
and faceless in the farm novel, namely the black labourer. As the fictionalised 
autobiography of an urbanised farm labourer, Life at Home may be said to become a 
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prosopopoeia: it constructs a face for the narrator. This narrator is, moreover, 
exemplary of the labourer absent from the farm novel. 
But if it is a prosopopoeia of otherness in the farm novel, then it is such a 
prosopopoeia which also disrupts the face given to the narrator. The text does not, 
that is establish some new narrative in which the other appears in a whole, coherent 
' 
and apparently closed-off form. This is so for the reason that the narrative draws 
attention to the disruptive nature of its ordering impulse: ironically, this text is as 
much about homelessness as it is about life at home. Indeed, the text suggests that 
there is an otherness at the heart of the domesticity with which it concerns itself Life 
at Home disrupts the nationalist teleology of the farm novel without, however, 
allowing itself to be inserted in some new narrative teleology. 
This point is of particular importance for the reason that my reading largely 
follows J. M. Coetzee's investigations of the farm novel and plaasroman. Coetzee is 
self-critically aware of the danger of the kind of reading in which he (as well as I) 
engages. Reading the other, Coetzee says, is reading absence. And this reading of 
"the other: gaps, inverses, undersides; the veiled; the dark, the buried, the feminine; 
alterities. . . . It is a mode of reading which, subverting the dominant, is in peril, like 
all triumphant subversion, of becoming the dominant in turn" (1988: 81). Elsewhere 
Coetzee {1992f: 106) characterises his procedure in White Writing as "soured ... by a 
certain relentless suspiciousness of appearances" and continues by saying that he is 
"now suspicious of such suspiciousness" for the reason that it amounts to a reversal, a 
positing of a new 'truth' that may itself be a mystification which would have to be 
treated with suspicion: " ... a demystifying criticism privileges mystifications" 
{1992f: I 06). 
I am conscious that my reading, too, is in danger of simply amounting to an 
inversion, whether ofNdebele's criticism or of the farm novel and pastoral tradition in 
South African writing: my reading might mistakenly be taken to suggest that Matlou's 
work amounts to a simple inversion of the farm novel. For this reason my procedure 
here will attempt to do justice to Matlou's text by not reducing its alterity, by refusing 
simply to invert terms. 2 I shall, in other words, attempt to read Life at Home without 
setting it up as being 'triumphant' (to use Coetzee's term) or somehow 'exemplary' of 
the triumphant subversion of this or that theory or genre, "exemplarity being a 
property that is put in question by the uniqueness of each literary act", as Derek 
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Attridge puts it (1994: 250). Rather, I shall attempt to maintain the singularity (in 
Derrida's terms, the datedness) of this text while, nonetheless, reading it. 
5.2 Matlou, Ndebele 's Aesthetic and Irony 
Matlou's stories initially enjoyed prominence largely due to praise by Njabulo 
Ndebele in influential essays published in the 1980s. 3 In the course of a discussion of 
new township writing, including Matlou's story "Man Against Himself', Ndebele 
(1991a: 55) states that "The significance of these stories for me is that they point the 
way in which South African literature might possibly develop". Ndebele's praise for 
Matlou' s work must be situated within the context of his larger project, and it is to a 
consideration of that project that I now turn. Not only does Ndebele's aesthetic 
deserve closer scrutiny because of his praise for Matlou, but because of the central 
place of irony in it. 
· Briefly, Ndebele's essays urge a departure from what he, following Lewis 
Nkosi, calls "the journalistic, informational ambience" of fiction writing and towards 
a "storytelling, narrative ambience", a move away from the "spectacular" and towards 
the "ordinary" ( 1991: 31 ). This is a move towards depth and interiority and away 
from the exteriority of "posturing and sloganeering" (1991a: 47). To Ndebele the 
"spectacular" is typical of so-called "Protest Literature" (1991a: 40; cf 1991a: 44-47). 
It results in "the complete exteriority of everything" and lacks "subtlety'' (1991a: 43). 
The "ordinary", by contrast, "is defined as the opposite of the spectacular" (1991a: 
50). It is just this break with the tradition of the spectacular and the movement 
towards the interiority of the ordinary "within which vistas of inner capacity are 
opened up" (1991 a: 56), which is celebrated by Ndebele in terms of, among others, 
Matlou' s stories. 4 
In "Redefining Relevance", Ndebele's scheme is developed in terms of the 
identification of irony as the necessary trope of depth, complexity and art. By 
extension, irony for Ndebele becomes a necessary underlay of the ordinary in contrast 
to the surface sloganeering of the spectacular: Ndebele states that, unlike the 
"propagandist", the artist "can never be entirely free from the rules of irony" (1991b: 
67). This is a significant statement in that it suggests a dialectic which would, 
ironically, cast doubt on Ndebele's rather stark contrast between the spectacular and 
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the ordinary. If the artist can never be entirely free from the rules of irony, then the 
implication would be that the work of art can never come to rest in a position of 
finality. Such a finality would be impossible for the reason that irony, in interrupting 
the narrative line, works disruptively. 5 It would be impossible in absolute terms to 
distinguish between a text which may be characterised as 'ordinary', and another 
which is 'spectacular': just as Albie Sachs claims "that there is bad in the good, and 
... that there can be elements of good in the bad" (1990: 20), so one might say that 
there is the spectacular in the ordinary and that there can be elements of the ordinary 
in the spectacular. Irony just does not work in terms of clearly established binaries; as 
I attempted to indicate earlier in this thesis, irony always involves an element of 
otherness within the same. In this case, the otherness which cannot be shut out is the 
spectacular. This is not to revalorise the spectacular but simply to specify Ndebele's 
approach to irony, a trope that characterises the aesthetic in terms of which he 
celebrates Matlou's work. The point is that Ndebele's approach to irony is 
inconsistent: it is valorised as the necessary underlay of his aesthetic, and therefore of 
the ordinary, and yet the ordinary is contrasted in rather stark, apparently mutually 
exclusive terms to the spectacular. The ordinary, which is characterised in terms of 
irony, turns out to be an unironic category in its spectacular disavowal of the 
spectacular. 
This is something noted by Tony Morphet in an illuminating discussion of 
Ndebele's aesthetic (with that of Sachs).6 Morphet approaches Ndebele and Sachs in 
terms of the thrust of their systems as "redemptive" (1990: 135): each celebrates 
indeterminacy, but in terms ofthe incorporation of such indeterminacy into the overall 
system of the text by means of irony. Morphet points out that the redemptive thrust 
evident in Ndebele and Sachs tends "towards 'complexity' 'contradictions' 'hidden 
tensions' 'ambiguity' 'imaginative recreations' and the exploration of specific genres. 
In both papers the case they are arguing against is given as the static, predictable, 
formulaic rehearsals of fixed positions" (Morphet 1990: 135). 
It would seem as if this passage situates Ndebele and Sachs within a project 
which respects otherness. After all, terms such as "complexity" and "contradictions" 
imply the presence of an otherness which subverts the ability to offer clear-cut, single-
minded resolutions to problems. Yet, as Morphet goes on to indicate, the redemptive 
thrust ofNdebele's and Sachs's systems tends towards a teleology and, consequently, 
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to a new set of fixed positions. The celebration of openness and experience evident in 
the quotation above, is qualified by Ndebele's discussion of irony which "recalls, at 
the same time that it works to displace, the formalist construction of irony" (Morphet 
1990: 135). For the New Critics (whom Morphet discusses under the heading 
'formalists'), "irony was the literary figure precisely because it was through it that the 
openness to complex experience could be sustained without damage to the formal 
order of the work" (1990: 135).7 What Morphet calls the liberal/formalist settlement 
(cf 1990: 134) of intellectual enterprise, is characterised by such a conception of 
irony, which Morphet proceeds to call "incorporative irony' (1990: 136; Morphet's 
italics). But this settlement has been subverted by the dramatic irony of a revisionism 
characterised by a teleology which identified "the goal of revisionist cultural practice 
with the notion of correct political practice" (1990: 138). This confluence of cultural 
and supposedly correct political practice, with its emphasis on concrete positions is, 
according to Morphet, the butt ofNdebele's and Sachs's protest: " ... what both are 
protesting against is the absence of the ironic vision from current cultural practice; 
and . . . what they are calling for is something akin to a return to the incorporative 
modes of the earlier [liberal and formalist] settlement, . . . with one important 
difference" (1990: 138). This important difference between Ndebele and Sachs is to 
be found in the nature of the teleology of each: while Ndebele's project concerns "the 
Black oppressed" (1990: 140), and would tend towards the end of such oppression, 
Sachs "presents the ascendancy of the ANC as something akin to the fulfilment of 
history" (1990: 140). But regardless of the degree to which Ndebele and Sachs might 
disagree as to details, Morphet convincingly shows each to be implicated in a 
teleology, a narrative tending towards the closure of liberation. And he indicates the 
extent to which irony is subordinated to such an end: it is as if, now that liberation 
and/or the ascendancy of the ANC has been attained, "the opportunity emerges once 
more for the incorporative procedures of a formalist irony" (1990: 140).8 
Morphet shows the incoherence of such a position. Ndebele's conception of 
irony, in its celebration of ambiguity, contradiction and openness, is itself 
contradictory because it is offered within the framework of the teleology of national 
liberation. As Morphet (1990: 141) puts it, Ndebele's conception of irony is 
characterised by contradictory impulses, by both the "formalist rules of indeterminacy 
and inclusive tension" and the "revisionist rules of relocation and solidarity". As a 
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result, "The position is incoherent. The indeterminate contradictions of human 
experience must be resolved to demonstrate the victory of a determinate ideological 
position". Ultimately, for Morphet both Ndebele and Sachs "founder on the issue of 
closure. Both appeal to the notion of incorporative irony for the sake of greater range, 
flexibility, complexity and openness, but neither is able to relinquish the fixed point of 
closure in the framework of social action to which they have committed themselves" 
(1990: 142). 
Morphet thus calls for a conception of irony which will not result, as 
incorporative irony does, in closure. Closure, after all, is implicit in what Morphet 
designates a formalist conception of irony, as his choice of the term 'incorporative' to 
designate such a conception in fact implies. Irony would resolve contradiction and 
incorporate ambiguity and would thus necessarily tend towards closure. It would, 
indeed, be a "principle of structure" (Behler 1990: 102) which would organically unify 
the literary text (cf Dane 1991: 153). Even if such a view of irony apparently 
celebrates complexity, ambiguity and otherness, it does so merely to incorporate them 
into the text in order thus to close them off in it. Against such a view of irony vis-a-
vis contemporary South African cultural and literary practice, Morphet would like to 
see a conception of irony which works "across the lines of the multiple discourses that 
are constructing the cultural nodes and spaces ofthe society" (1990: 143). This would 
be a view of irony which does not settle the otherness of contradiction or ambiguity 
by incorporating it into the text or relocating it in some or other "solidarity criticism" 
(Sachs 1990: 20). On the contrary, it would work in a "translocative" (Morphet 1990: 
143; his italics) way, crossing borders and unsettling orders. I would claim that such a 
translocative conception of irony may be aligned to the conception of irony employed 
in this thesis, seeing that it is concerned precisely with the way in which the closure is 
rendered problematic through the interruption of conceptualisation characteristic of 
narrative as teleology. 
Matlou's work may be said to disrupt the narrative teleology implicit in 
Ndebele' s project; as well as his conception of irony in the service of that teleology. 
Indeed, as Dorothy Driver ( 1992: 117) notes, N debele' s project, which rests on the 
work ofMatlou and others, is also exceeded by that work: "Ndebele first called for a 
writing of the 'ordinary' in 1984, after reading Matlou (among others), and now 
Matlou has written the 'ordinary' in a way which extends, rather than conforms to, the 
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critic's decree". Morphet also considers the degree to which Ndebele's work is 
exceeded by Matlou's writing. This he does by elaborating on the teleological nature 
of Ndebele's project, specifically in terms of its relation to both a "universalizing 
framework inherited from the Enlightenment" (1992: 130) and a framework which is 
"anti-universal and particularistic" (1992: 131) and derives "from the traditions of 
Romanticism and Nationalism" (1992: 131). It is important, from the perspective of 
this thesis, to note Morphet's assessment ofNdebele's project as caught between these 
Enlightenment and Romantic/Nationalist impulses, something which characterises his 
project as "post nationalist" (1992: 137). For Ndebele's project may be said to trace a 
movement into modernity (cf Pechey 1998: 64). In short, his aesthetic situates the 
'rediscovery of the ordinary' in terms of "a return to the pre-modem experience of 
'peasant' life in South Africa" (Morphet 1992: 138), an experience characterised by 
"some field of perception and understanding within black life which has remained 
uncontaminated by the public discourses of the White establishment, the urban black 
milieu and the liberation movement" (1992: 133). Despite Ndebele's (1991: 19) 
disapproval of fiction which, in dealing with peasant life, "soon shifts to the towns", 
the complicated process of urbanisation is implicit in Ndebele's project to rediscover 
the ordinary, return to roots, and attain an essentially African freedom from 
oppression (cf Pechey 1998: 64). Ndebele's teleology, whether it is nationalist or 
'post nationalist', is thus imbricated with the changing relationship to the land. And 
Ndebele's celebration ofMatlou's work must be recognised as being founded on the 
latter's portrayal of rural, in particular peasant life, as it moves away from the farm. 
As such, it might be useful to approach Ndebele's appropriation ofMatlou's work (as 
a demonstration of the 'rediscovery of the ordinary') in terms of the farm novel. After 
all, Ndebele's project involves the retrieval of history and its renarrativisation in terms 
of black experience (cf Morphet 1992: 134), and specifically in terms of the recovery 
of the reality of black peasant experience (cf Morphet 1992: 131, 138, 140; Pechey 
1998: 64). 
Indeed, Brink's critique of Ndebele rests on his apparently unquestioning 
acceptance of the nature of reality, something which would allow one to call 
Ndebele's a realist aesthetic. Brink (1993: 52) avers that Ndebele's project "does not 
seem to me to go far enough. It is the real itself ... which requires reinvention". 9 To 
Brink, this reinvention of the real is always involved in the turning of history into 
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story. He describes this process in the following way: " ... the obvious links with the 
determining influence of tradition are suspended~ an imaginary opening is created 
which makes it possible for events that originally appear fixed in time and space, 
canonised by convention, sanctioned by authority, to be reinvented" (Brink 1993: 54). 
This would imply that the 'reinvention of the real', including that brought about by 
Matlou, would necessarily exceed the conceptual categories constitutive of what is 
deemed to be the real. The "imaginary opening" created by Matlou's work which 
suspends the "determining influence of the tradition", would also suspend 
conventionalised attitudes pertaining to the real. This particular "imaginary opening" 
disrupts, apart from Ndebele's project, also the farm novel as one "tradition" within 
which Matlou's work may be read (I return to this latter disruption below.i
0 
As far as the disruption of Ndebele's project is concerned, Morphet (1992: 
139) indicates how Ndebele domesticates Matlou's work in order to fit it into his 
teleological project by not recognising how the disruptive power of the stories 
exceeds "his [Ndebele's] own boundaries" (1992: 139). Matlou's stories are, for 
Morphet (1992: 140), the creation "of an extraordinarily self-aware, disordered, 
consciousness" and employ "a profoundly reflexive authorial strategy". They are an 
"account of absolute internality" yet "succeed in constructing a coherent identifiable 
external world". It is this combination of the interior and the exterior which, to 
Morphet, is an indication that Matlou's work exemplifies less the ordinariness of the 
"pre-modem 'storyteller"' than that of a "post modem 'fabulist'" (1992: 140). 
This is to say that, according to Morphet, Matlou's work does not fit into 
Ndebele' s scheme of things. On the contrary, his work disrupts the teleology of 
nation and for this reason also Ndebele's aesthetic with its emphasis on a return to a 
pre-modernity which would be the locale of the ordinary, a wellspring to nourish 
black intellectuals threatened with white or black urban entrapment ( cf Morphet 
1992: 133). 
For the reason then that Matlou's work refuses to be boxed neatly into a 
teleology of nationhood and freedom - a teleology which, moreover, appears in both 
the farm novel (as I argue below [5.5]) and in Ndebele's aesthetic - but, on the 
contrary, disrupts such a teleology because its irony is disruptive and unsettling rather 
than incorporative, this chapter suggests a departure from Ndebele' s reading of 
Matlou against the tradition of spectacle. Instead, it might be more profitable to tum 
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to a consideration of the disruptive, indeed ironical, relationship between Matlou's 
work and the farm novel. 11 
Matlou's work disrupts notions of a unified, interiorised subjectivity situated 
within a universe ordered in terms of a clearly defined telos, such as Morphet claims 
Ndebele's project evinces. His work may be characterised as opening the self to the 
other in the disruption of self-centred conceptions of time and space as linear and 
enclosable, assumptions characteristic of the farm novel in the wake of which 
Matlou's work follows. That is, far from exemplifying the triumph of the subject (no 
matter how ordinary), Matlou's suffering, even persecuted, protagonist is subject to a 
radical alterity within. Moreover, I argue that Matlou' s text, quite apart from whether 
its protagonist is portrayed as triumphant or alienated, 'transports' the reader into 
otherness: it opens the reading self to otherness in the course of the unsettling 
experience of reading Life at Home. 
The importance of an otherness within is, interestingly, something suggested 
by Ndebele himself but not developed with reference to Matlou's work. In an aside 
(framed by his discussion ofMatlou's "Man Against Himself'), Ndebele (199la: 53) 
considers the ordinary as constituting "the active social consciousness of most 
people". At this point he introduces into his discussion the notion of an alterity 
within, without however following through the implications of his statement: 
We are confronted here with the honesty of the self in confrontation with 
itself Literature cannot give us lessons, but it can only provide a very 
compelling context to examine an infinite number of ethical issues which have 
a bearing on the sensitisation of people towards the development of the entire 
range of culture? [sic] 
(Ndebele 199la: 53) 
I shall be approaching this alterity within, which according to Ndebele entails the 
confrontation of the self by itself in the text and leads to a confrontation with the 
reader ("We"), in terms of the form of this text. For it is in the formal characteristics 
of Life at Home that the disruptive otherness of this text appears. 
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5.3 Form and Strangeness 
In a recent consideration of cultural innovation in terms of the encounter with the 
other, Derek Attridge emphasises the degree to which the emergence of the other 
takes place in reading (1999: 24). Following Sartre, he argues that reading entails a 
reinvention, an invention which follows the invention of the text, with a text being 
considered "not a fixed set of signifiers or signifieds but something like a field of 
potential meaning awaiting realization without wholly determining it in advance. . .. 
Reading involves working against the mind's tendency to assimilate the other to the 
same" (1999: 25). 
The encounter with what is other which occurs in reading entails "my singular 
and active relation to the particular configuration of possibilities represented by the 
text that is the site of alterity" (1999: 26). This leads Attridge to the following 
important proposition: "Rather than the familiar model of the literary work as friend 
and companion, sharing with the reader its secrets, I propose the work as stranger, 
even and perhaps especially when the reader knows it intimately .... " (1999: 26). 
This 'strangeness' of the text, encountered in reading, is linked by Attridge to form. 
He distinguishes between on the one hand creative labour which entails "the 
manipulation of ideas, the construction of arguments, the representation of previously 
existing entities in a new light, or the imagination of hitherto nonexistent entities", 
and on the other hand creative labour which "is combined with, and is in a certain 
sense always subject to, the selection and arrangement of words" (1999: 26). Thus 
Attridge claims that "the creative achievement is a formal one, whatever else it may 
be. The commonest current name for works of this kind (though it is certainly not 
without its problems) is literature" (1999: 26). 
Despite the various problems (enumerated by Attridge, but with which I shall 
not directly concern myself here) attendant upon such a designation of texts as 
'literary' on the basis of form, Attridge believes "the focus on formal singularity and 
otherness (which are not separate properties) has a certain usefulness" (1999: 26). 
This usefulness lies in the recognition that otherness is staged in works which are 
formally innovative. This innovativeness entails a reconsideration not only of the 
"sounds and shapes" (1999: 26) of words in their links with other words, but also of 
their links with culture and history: "The formal sequence ... functions as a kind of 
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staging: a semantic and emotional performance" (1999: 27). The apprehension of 
otherness in a text is what gives rise to its meaning, something which in turn arises in 
repeating it. This repetition- which is reading - is a performance which stages the 
otherness consequent upon the strangeness of the text. Repeating the text in reading it 
is a staging, the "intense but distanced playing out of what might be the most intimate, 
the most strongly felt, constituents of our lives" (1999: 27). Attridge concludes that 
"Without the crucial functioning of form, there would be no sense of staging. In the 
reading of literature, one might say, meaning is simultaneously formed and 
performed" (1999: 27). 
In this regard, Attridge's contention with regard to critical methodology is 
important. To do justice to a text, in particular a strange one, is not to reduce its 
strangeness: 
The creativity required in a just response to the otherness of a literary work, 
therefore, involves not only a singular affirmation of the work's singularity 
based on an apprehension of its inventive reordering of the cultural matrix but 
also an affirmation of its occurrence, in being read, as an intellectual-
emotional event. A straightforwardly discursive, analytic commentary, 
valuable though it may be, cannot make these affirmations. Only a new, 
unpredictable, singular, creative act, as an inventive event in its turn, can do 
justice to a literary work as a literary work. 
(1999: 27i2 
What this implies is that the critical commentator must herself or himself be creative 
in her/his response to the text s/he discusses. If the response is not creative, it will 
flatten out the otherness of the text being considered. For Attridge's argument 
(admittedly in simplified form) is that creativity entails a confrontation with the other. 
In terms. of this thesis, and my own modus operandi, the conceptualisations I make 
here need to be (creatively) disrupted if the otherness of the texts I consider is to be 
respectfully maintained. The text must not be boxed into a narrative which allegorises 
otherness, which makes sense of the strange. I hope to do this by resisting what must 
be recognised as, ultimately, Ndebele's flattening narrative about Matlou's text. 
It is also for this reason, as intimated in the opening remarks to this chapter, 
that the strangeness of Life at Home will be a constant, disruptive presence in my own 
attempt to read this text. My consideration of Life at Home is constantly exposed to 
the possibility of simply again reducing its otherness by forcing it into my 
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conceptualisation of it. This means that my conceptualisation of this text in terms of 
the farm novel must itself also necessarily be disrupted.13 I hope to indicate that Life 
at Home, in its strange peculiarity, implies less a narrative teleology (whether of 
nation or liberation) than an infinite 'narrative' sphere which cannot be 
encompassed.14 
The strangeness of Life at Home intimates otherness in its form as short story 
cycle following in the wake of the farm novel. But this otherness is also an otherness 
within: both the reader of the text and its protagonist (as claimed above with reference 
to Ndebele's reading of "Man Against Himself') are subject to otherness discovered 
in the self. After a consideration of the strange form of this text, I shall proceed to an 
examination of this otherness within. 
5.3.1 Strangeness: The Critics 
Apart :from Ndebele's comments on Life at Home, little sustained critical work has 
been done on this text. This is not to suggest that Matlou's work has somehow been 
undervalued. On the contrary, as the discussion above of Ndebele's approach to 
Matlou attests, it has been celebrated as a new departure in South African English 
fiction. However, unlike Ndebele - who we have seen notes the break from the 
spectacular evident in Life at Home without, nonetheless, placing enough emphasis on 
its radical interrogation of the real - critics have generally remarked on the 
strangeness of this text in terms of just this disruption of the real. 
In view of the strangeness of the stories, Life at Home does not seem to fit 
comfortably into any particular tradition. So, for instance, Driver (1992: 116) asserts 
that this volume "opens up a mythic space that seems to me to be quite unfamiliar to 
and uncontainable by South African English literature as it is currently known". 15 
And Brink (1998a: 27) recognises in Matlou' s work, among that of others, "the 
regenerative powers of South African literature", while Mike Kirkwood ( 1991: 9), in 
his introduction to the volume of stories, notes that Matlou' s work is not categorisable 
in terms of any "overt political standpoint" and, as a result, that it "challenged" its 
first readers (who expected political commitment) when individual stories started 
appearing inStaffrider magazine at the end of the 1970s (cf. Ndebele 1991a: 53). 
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This strangeness of the stories is evident in the language which is employed in 
them. Driver (1992: 117) notes that "Matlou' s use of English is often idiosyncratic, 
and some of the stories' magical quality may rest in the sudden surprise of 
grammatical oddity".
16 
This is language which disrupts the conventions of what is 
still in some circles admiringly referred to as 'Standard English'. Here a writer to 
whom English is not a mother tongue employs that language in a way which makes it 
foreign, that is, others it. The numerous Setswana and Afrikaans phrases and words, 
not all of which are rendered in English in the text, would have an estranging effect on 
a reader unfamiliar with these languages. Even where the Setswana and Afrikaans are 
rendered in English, the text has an estranging effect on the reader in its apparently 
clumsy or unidiomatic phrasing. This might mean that the language employed in Life 
at Home entails a strategy of authenticity, of claiming an other English. 17 
In this regard, it may be useful to take note of the procedure of so-called 
'foreignising translation', underscoring as it does the possibility of rendering an 
original in such a way as to enable it to resist being incorporated into the canon of the 
target language. This strategy entails not eliding the otherness of the original being 
translated, so that the reader of the translation remains aware of the fact that the text 
comes from a context other than that of the reader. As such, Matlou's estranging use 
of English serves as a trace of the otherness of his text, specifically vis-a-vis its status 
as an English text within the canon of South African English literature. 18 
But this disruptive strangeness also results from the form Matlou employs: that 
of the short story cycle. If Life at Home has been, comparatively speaking, neglected 
in critical discussion, then this might be as a result of the strangeness of the stories or 
chapters. Critics might simply not know what to do with this text. It is my hypothesis 
that this critical impasse might, at least partially, be attributable to the form of the 
text. Indeed, Brink (1993: 53) notes that Life at Home "can be read either as a series 
of short stories or as a (very short) novel". This implies that its form is to a greater or 
lesser extent indeterminate, if not undecidable. The form of this text as short story 
cycle calls for closer attention with regard to its strangeness. 19 
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5.4 The Short Story Cycle 
In an examination of Ivan Vladislavic's Missing Persons (1989), Sue Marais (1992) 
provides an illuminating discussion of the short story cycle in South Africa?
0 
She 
notes that "The short story cycle or integrated collection of stories is a form in which 
a conflict between the exigencies of unity and diversity ... is implicit" (Marais 1992: 
41). Such cycles may be characterised as tending towards either unity or diversity. In 
the case of the first, the cycle may be characterised as making use of "integrative or 
centripetal strategies" (Marais 1992: 42), whereas in the latter "atomistic or 
'centrifugal' forces ... work to dissociate stories in a narrative cycle" (1992: 41). 
Marais notes a number of forces which work centrifugally: discontinuities may be 
present, such as "the reader's sense of closure in individual stories, and the variety in 
type or genre" (1992: 42). Centripetal strategies may range from an "external framing 
device" to "internal and more subtle linking devices" (1992: 42). Among the latter 
devices may be 
a pervasive tone or mood ... ; a central character, often a narrator-focaliser or 
character-focaliser ... , whose reappearance in consecutive stories ... creates 
a sense of connectedness . . . ; a fixed or limited set of other characters who, in 
isolation or in combination, occupy several if not all of the stories and who 
may be linked by familial bonds or a genealogical sequence . . . ; and a 
common fictionalised setting- a localised rural town ... , a region ... , or a 
city. . . . Finally, to the internally cohesive strategies listed above may be 
added other more subtle or elusive devices such as the repetition-with-
variation of motifs, metaphors, themes, and phrases which assume a 
significance larger than the instances of their individual expression. 
(Marais 1992: 42) 
Repetition (with variation) thus appears to be a fundamental characteristic of the short 
story cycle as form, in particular in its centripetal guise. According to Marais (1992: 
43), one of the important consequences of integrative, centripetal strategies is "a 
strong sense of community or place". She uses the term 'community persona' to 
describe this effect and states that such a 'community persona' "assumes a 
significance over and above the sum of its individual members, and place and 
community may acquire an idyllic or even mythological dimension" (1992: 43). 
Marais therefore notes that it is not surprising that "the modern short story cycle has a 
marked association with regionalism" (1992: 43) as well as with realism: "Generically 
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speaking, then, the short story cycle would appear eminently suited to a 
verisimilitudinous depiction of regional communities" (1992: 43). 
Among the examples of South African short story cycles cited by Marais 
(1992: 44) which may be said to tend towards realism and regionalism is Pauline 
Smith's The Little Karoo (1925). Indeed, both her The Beadle (1926) and The Little 
Karoo exemplify characteristics of the short story cycle. The various techniques 
employed by Smith, which link her stories to one another, serve to create a cohesive, 
believable portrait of a particular region. Certainly The Little Karoo may be said to 
exhibit characteristics of the short story cycle, seeing that overlapping elements 
(characters, setting and the like) occur in different stories. Moreover, one finds some 
narrative elements, such as the figures of the miller and Esther Shokolowsky/ 
Sokolowsky, the farm Harmonie and Mijnheer van der Merwe, in both The Beadle 
and The Little Karoo, which would link the two texts in terms of Smith's larger 
oeuvre (cf Smith 1972: 7, 11, 39; Smith 1990: 32, 36; Driver 1984: 62). One might 
argue that the Aangenaam valley within the Platkops district of the Little Karoo 
assumes just the kind of 'community persona' Marais identifies as typical of the short 
story cycle in its centripetal guise. And, to confirm the status of Smith's work in 
terms of the short story cycle, Coetzee has indicated that she makes use of similar 
authorial techniques in her two texts mentioned above, including free indirect speech 
(cf 1988b: 123ff.) and transfer (cf 1988b: 117).21 
These various authorial techniques serve to connect the stories in The Little 
Karoo to one another as well as to The Beadle. But, of course, these two texts (and in 
particular The Little Karoo) not only exhibit characteristics of the short story cycle but 
also of the farm novel. For this reason, and because I believe that Life at Home, 
similarly, has the form of a short story cycle and is affiliated to the farm novel, I 
would now like to consider more closely the farm novel before I continue my 
discussion of the form of the short story cycle vis-a-vis Life at Home. 
5.5 The Farm Novel and the Absence of the Other 
The farm novel and plaasroman have been extensively theorised over the last few 
years, in particular by J. M. Coetzee in three essays in his 1988 collection White 
Writing_l2 Coetzee (1988c: 4) notes the predominance of the pastoral over "its twin 
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genre, the utopia" in the literature produced by white South African settlers, and 
relates this phenomenon to the status of the whites of South Africa as "unsettled 
settlers". The focus of such unsettled settlers is related to the retrospective guise of 
the pastoral rather than the prospective gaze of the utopia. The pastoral thus serves an 
ideological purpose in establishing a representation of settlement and territoriality, 
something at the heart of the modem conception of nation (cf Noyes 1997). But this 
process occurs precisely because the settler is unsettled and alienated, and because 
there is no nation. The farm novel constructs a past which elides the nomadic by 
foregrounding, in the justificatory mode of the pastoral, the thrift and labour of the 
white settler as against the vices of the city (cf Coetzee 1988c: 3-4). It tends to 
proffer a coherent representation of the settled land as the foundation of the nation. 
In "Farm Novel and Plaasroman", Coetzee characterises Olive Schreiner's The 
Story of an African Farm (1883) as a pastoral text, but qualifies this by stating that her 
work forms part of an "antipastoral tradition" (1988: 81) within which her 
representation of the farm, rather than being a "realistic representation of an African 
stock farm [should be read] as a figure in the service of her critique of colonial 
culture. . . . Schreiner is anticolonial both in her assertion of the alienness of 
European culture in Africa and in her attribution of unnaturalness to the life of her 
farm" (1988: 66). Coetzee here, importantly, draws attention to the realist nature of 
the farm novel. Within it, realistic representations of Mrican farms conventionally 
appear. But in the case of Schreiner such realistic representations attain figural status 
and, as it were, move beyond the confines of a realist aesthetic (even if they remain 
founded upon such an aesthetic). That is, according to Coetzee, Schreiner unsettles 
the realist conventions of the farm novel in her representation of an African stock 
farm, which is what allows The Story of an African Farm to move in a direction 
beyond the pastoral. Pauline Smith's The Beadle and The Little Karoo, by way of 
contrast, are firmly situated within the confines of the pastoral.23 
But Smith's work also, in its way, serves to render problematic the relation 
with the real. Coetzee (1988: 68-69) notes, for instance, that Smith's invention of the 
African farm is peculiar in that it is not markedly African. Instead, Smith's work 
seems to offer "a regional answer" (1988: 69; Coetzee's italics) to the "crisis on the 
platte/and' (1988: 78), to "a rural order ... clearly in crisis" (1988c: 6) as a result of 
urbanisation. Smith's work encapsulates the pastoral tradition as a "nostalgia for 
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country life" (1988: 75; cf. 1988: 76, 1988b: 125), a way of life- precapitalist and 
characterised by "classic peasant social organization" (1988: 71) - which has been 
lost. According to Coetzee (1988: 78, 79), one finds the conflict between the old and 
the new, the peasant and the capitalist, country and town, dramatised in and at the 
core ofboth Smith's work and the Afrikaansplaasroman. 
Despite the significant differences between Schreiner and Smith, and between 
Smith's two books (cf. 1988: 70), Coetzee does posit some important commonalities. 
The first of these is the closed-off nature of their representations of the farm. Coetzee 
(1988: 64) describes Schreiner's African farm as being situated within a Karoo which 
has a topography spanning a "limitless plain beneath limitless sky" and a 
chronography "extending from prehistory to a posthistory after man". 24 The farm is 
situated somewhere "between the infinitesimal and the infinite", yet is described as 
carrying on "its self-absorbed existence" (1988: 64; my emphasis): it is "a tiny 
community set down in the midst of the vastness of nature, living a closed-minded 
and self-satisfied existence" (1988: 65; my emphasis). Although Smith's farm 
Harmonie and its setting, the Aangenaam valley, are described as "desolate" and "the 
poorest of Platkops valleys" (Smith 1972: 7), Coetzee shows that their desolation is 
soon forgotten. Not only is Harmonie situated in a kind of Eden, but "The mythic 
values that accumulate around the valley are those of the womb: closure ... and 
fruitfulness" (Coetzee 1988: 67; my emphasis). Each farm, Smith's as well as 
Schreiner's, "seems to lie outside history" (Coetzee 1988c: 4). One therefore needs to 
note the paradox inherent in the farm novel as a pastoral form evincing an a-historical 
regionalism. 
The second commonality pertains to the ethnically other on the farm. 
According to Coetzee (1988: 71-72), 
silence about the place of black labour ... is common not only to Schreiner 
and Smith but, by and large, to the Afrikaans plaasroman, and represents a 
failure of imagination before the problem of how to integrate the dispossessed 
black man into the idyll (or in Schreiner's case the anti-idyll) of African 
pastoralism. 
While Schreiner may be characterised as being antipastoral and Smith pastoral, a 
characteristic of each is "the occlusion of black labour from the scene" (1988c: 5). 
Schreiner, by attacking the sloth, "idleness, ignorance, and greed of colonial society" 
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(1988c: 4), and Smith, through her "selective silence about hired labour" (1988: 72), 
thus both remain within a broadly pastoral tradition,~ respectively indicting and 
celebrating rural life. 25 Broadly speaking, the relation to the land, Africa, is 
constituted in terms of the absence of labour (Schreiner) and the celebration of white 
labour (Smith). Driver- while asserting that, even if "black-white relations [are not] 
more than briefly dealt with, they are given an allusive force in The Beadle, acting as 
a reminder of the potentialities of inequality and oppression" (1984: 50)- has stated 
that Smith's fiction "is not directly concerned" with "the indigenous people" (1984: 
49)?6 
This absence from the farm novel of "the indigenous people" (the silence 
about them which constitutes the "occlusion of black labour") may, retrospectively, be 
understood as being ironic for the reason that this absence today has a disruptive 
effect on the farm novel. Because the survival of the farm as well as of the cohesive 
region of which it formed part historically depended on the labour of black people, 
their absence merely hides the inevitability of their presence in the novel as well as 
the region from which they are excluded. This is to say that it is possible to read the 
absence of black people from the farm novel as being present in its absence: the 
absence of black people from the farm novel has become notable and visible. 
27 
Absence appears, and it appears as a structural necessity of the farm novel for the 
reason that the occlusion of the ethnic other serves the important purpose of 
suggesting the cohesiveness of the land: its familiarity is not disrupted by the intrusion 
of otherness. Through the occlusion of the ethnic other the land becomes a region, an 
extension of the self as owner of his land. 28 
As the absence of the other today appears noteworthy, one might venture that 
it is possible to claim that the other itself appears, palimpsestically, in the farm novel, 
disrupting the narrative from which it has been excluded (cf Coetzee 1988: 81). And 
such a disruptive appearing of the other in the farm novel, without nonetheless 
appearing in it (the other is absent and can, on the most literal level, not appear in the 
farm novel), means that the other may be said to be no longer entirely absent from the 
farm novel, nor entirely present in it. The other 'in' the farm novel may thus be said, 
from our vantage point, to be beyond presence and absence. It is possible to read the 
farm novel ironically by making the other appear without making it appear. That is, 
the other might be said to disrupt the conceptual schema of the farm novel. As I have 
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intimated, this is particularly the case as far as its regional character is concerned to 
the extent that it is just this regionalism which depends on the occlusion of otherness 
(be it of the ethnic other, or of the land made landscape and thus brought into human 
ken). 
Driver (1984: 48) has elaborated on the regional character of Smith's work by 
pointing out that she is more than a merely regional writer. 29 But, as I have argued 
vis-a-vis the form of the short story cycle, her writing is certainly evocative, in what 
may be called a realist mode (cf Driver 1983: 22-23), of a particular region with its 
local colour. The occlusion of otherness discussed above may be said to strengthen 
the regional nature of Smith's texts. 
But the regional nature of Smith's work is also strengthened as a result of the 
fact that she employs specific techniques which may lend her work the characteristics 
of a short story cycle. At this point I return to a consideration of the short story cycle 
as form. 
5. 6 Life at Home as Short Story Cycle 
I have been arguing that - as a result of the deployment of elements from the short 
story cycle, as well as of similar authorial techniques, in order to create a fictional 
world in a very specific part of the South African Little Karoo - a strong sense of 
cohesiveness is created in Smith's work. It is important to repeat that this 
cohesiveness of form and, particularly, of the representation of a region, is dependent 
on that which it excludes: black labour. Indeed, with reference to the genre of the 
short story cycle in general and the regionalism characteristic of much apartheid 
writing in particular, Marais (1992: 45) argues that "the ostensible reality to which 
such a regionalism refers is premised not only or innocently upon a clearly defined 
sense of place and period, but frequently also upon a distinct ethnic or cultural 
identity", something which she relates to the racially exclusivist thinking culminating 
in and characteristic of apartheid. Against this kind of regionalism, and in terms of 
the fact that the short story cycle may exhibit not only centripetal but centrifugal 
tendencies, Marais (1992: 43) importantly argues that this genre has the potential "to 
represent not only the impulse in any society or community towards association and 
cohesion, but also the opposing impulse towards dissociation and estrangement". 
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Recent South African short story cycles in particular have tended to express "the 
divisive experience" of apartheid and to "capture the alienation, dislocation and 
fragmentation _ the collapse or lack of a sense of community and a regional identity -
in contemporary South African experience" (Marais 1992: 45). Some collections do 
affirm "a defiant if tenuous sense of community" (Marais 1992: 45). But, on the other 
hand, and in terms of "the implicit dualism of the short story cycle", Marais claims 
that texts such as Zoe Wicomb's You Can't Get Lost in Cape Town (1987) and, most 
radically, Vladislavic's Missing Persons, depict "a perplexed sense of misplacement 
and guilt" (1992: 45). 
I would add Matlou's Life at Home to this latter group of texts. Indeed, what 
Marais says of Missing Persons might, I would claim, be said with equal justice of 
Life at Home. It is worth quoting the following description of Missing Persons at 
some length. According to Marais, this text 
represents the most radical and disturbing eschewal and subversion in the local 
short story cycle to date of the 'fiction' of a collective sense of community and 
identity, or a shared history and destiny, in South Africa. In its place the 
collection confronts the legacy of apartheid as a hangover of isolation and 
irreality which at times borders on the hallucinatory, the surreal and the 
grotesque - a landscape in which identifiable and familiar locales dissolve into 
bizarre and unstable mental terrains. Moreover, its exposure of the textuality 
of contemporary South African history and its depiction of the extremities of 
an alienated vision/version of South African reality entail a postmodern 
dissolution or sliding of the ontological boundaries between the empirically 
verifiable and the fictional or imaginary, the personal and the public, the 
comic and the tragic, mundanity and absurdity, reality and nightmare, 
innocence and guilt, and history and fantasy. . . . It thus paradoxically but 
acutely captures the consciousness of dislocation and frustrated striving for 
that elusive sense of belonging, a national identity, which so characterises this 
particular society in the throes of the interregnum. 
(Marais 1992: 45-46) 
It is around just such oppositions that Matlou's text, too, is constructed. The effect of 
its spatial and temporal dislocation, which may be directly related to its form as short 
story cycle, similarly "borders on the hallucinatory, the surreal and the grotesque" _3° 
Life at Home similarly subverts the traditional centripetal, integrative short story cycle 
(tending as the latter does towards regional cohesiveness and a sense of community). 
But, unlike a text such as Missing Persons, this text is also explicitly cast in the mould 
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of the farm novel. It may therefore be read not only as subversive of the short story 
cycle, but also of the farm novel. 
The one part of Marais's description of Missing Persons which I do not 
believe can unproblematically be transferred to Life at Home, concerns what she calls 
the "frustrated striving for that elusive sense of belonging, a national identity, which 
so characterises this particular society in the throes of the interregnum". On the 
contrary, I intend to show that Matlou's text exhibits no such longing and striving and 
that, like Vladislavic's, and "Unlike previous writers who have utilised the short story 
cycle form in this country to convey a sense of community and regional identity", it in 
the end "presents no such comforting fictions" (Marais 1992: 55). Instead, Life at 
Home may be read as generating an irony which results from a "regional identity" 
premised upon the tendency to elide otherness. The text disrupts the sense of 
cohesion characteristic of the short story cycle and, I would argue, of the farm novel 
by presenting the experience of the other who has been all but elided from the farm 
novel. 
Matlou's work may, then, be approached in terms of both the farm novel and 
the short story cycle. In view of the discussion of the short cycle, one may 
characterise Smith's work as exhibiting predominantly centripetal characteristics. In 
terms of the conventions of the farm novel, her fictional world is, finally, bound to a 
cohesive representation of the land as region. But Matlou's stories tend centrifugally 
to disrupt space and to make diffuse what had seemed a specific, regionally coloured 
locale (that ofMabopane, the Pretoria district and the Magaliesberg area stretching to 
Rustenburg). The sense of cohesiveness- what Morphet calls "a coherent identifiable 
external world" (1992: 140)- is, as soon it has it has been created, disrupted. And 
this dislocation is, significantly, linked to the farm setting of the initial stories. 
Even though the stories which make up Life at Home started appearing in the 
1970s (as noted above), and thus may not have been conceived as a cycle, they are 
nonetheless connected to one another as a result of repetitive strategies which shape 
individual stories and link them to one another. So, for instance, the figure of the 
Moruti in the story "Farm-boy" is repeated in "Life at Home" (27; cf 20)?1 The 
designation ofMedupe's parents' life on the farm as that of"slaves", suggested in the 
first story (cf 14-15), is repeated in the second (cf 23, 25, 27, 30, 33, 34).32 As far as 
the setting of Life at Home is concerned, repetition also plays an important role. The 
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locale sketched in "Farm-boy" is highly specific. The text provides a detailed 
description of a specific region: 
The farm where we lived was called Sterkfontein and it was under the 
mountain of the Magaliesberg near Pretoria North. We were not far from the 
nursery of Mr Malan and Son where trees are sold. Our farm was in the bush. 
We lived in a one-roomed house with a bed and table and one bench, but no 
windows. Near the house there was a big marula tree. We used to make fire 
with wood, not coal. In front of our house we had built a small, round room 
with reeds, which is called 'sebesong', where we used to cook food. 
(12) 
This passage provides the reader with highly specific references to the locality 
("Magaliesberg", Pretoria North", "the nursery of Mr Malan and Son"). The 
description of the house which follows is repeated, with some differences, in "Life at 
Home" (24). The reader is also informed that "Our farm was in the bush", an 
assertion made again later (cf. 15, 35). By the last story ("My Ugly Face"), which 
recapitulates the first story in presenting the reader with an account of when and how 
"I came to light" (87), the reader is informed that "We were living in the bush" (87). 
But the difference is that the locale has now become diffuse and unspecified, and that 
the people are described as being "destitute" (87) and sleeping in "tents" (88). "My 
Ugly Face" also blends into "Life at Home" in its repetition of the enigmatic saying 
"Speech is silver, silence is golden" (87; 34).33 
In "Farm-boy", the narrator says "My father did not drink beer or smoke" (14), 
an assertion repeated later: "Matlou did not drink or smoke" (25). In "Man Against 
Himself' this is repeated with regard to the narrator: "Many people were happy to 
visit me as they knew I was a peace-lover and didn't drink or smoke" (75). The 
repetition of this information makes the figures of Matlou and his son blur. 
Elsewhere, Mr Matlou is described enigmatically as smiling "for the last time with his 
missing teeth" (34). This makes Mr Matlou blend into the man who hires labourers at 
the offices as R.P.M: he "was a black man with three missing upper teeth" (54). 
In "Life at Home", the narrative describing how Matlou and family leave the 
farm for the Boekenhoutfontein township is interrupted by a strange episode which is 
presented under the heading "Croco and Impa" (36ff.). The impala returns in "Man 
Against Himself' in the description of the surreal landscape which confronts the 
narrator after he flees the mine with his pay: " ... I crossed a ditch in which a half-
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eaten impala lay" (70). This half-eaten impala evokes the description in the earlier 
story of the attack on the impalas by the crocodiles and thus lends this description a 
certain hallucinatory character, an effect strengthened by the apparently deadpan way 
in which the half-eaten impala is mentioned. Moreover, just before the impala is 
mentioned, the narrator states that "Two black men and a white man on a tractor 
looked at me, surprised" (70). Perhaps unsurprisingly, these men are linked to the 
narrator's father, Mr Matlou, and to Oubaas Dick, who are more than once described 
on a tractor (cf 12, 19, 25). 
These apparently trivial details stand out in a text which seems random, 
containing as it does 'stories' (the text is called Life at Home and Other Stories). 
Details such as these, with many other repetitions (such as the use of terms like 
"clever" and "careless"), serve to connect the stories into a short story cycle. They 
help make Life at Home more than merely a loose collection of stories, yet less than a 
fully-fledged novel.
34 
Life at Home is established as something between a novel and a 
short story collection: it might be said to be a short story cycle and, as such, already 
disrupts the narrative teleology of the novel as genre. 
In addition to the preponderance of apparently irrelevant details (which are, 
moreover, repeated), a number of unsettling self-reflexive moments recur in the text. 
Thus, in a section of the story "Life at Home" with the heading "Matlou and Family", 
the reader is informed that "Mr Matlou and his family were slaves. Life at Home says 
Matlou's family were 'swop-shops"' (27). Similarly, "Life at Home says Matlou did 
not have a reference book, even his wife did not have one" (29). Each of these 
instances of self-reflexivity draws attention to the constructedness of Life at Home in 
the course of the description of the enslaved position of its protagonists. In addition, 
it is made quite clear in the text that these protagonists are the Matlous, and that their 
third child Medupe (30), who explicitly offers himself as the narrator (cf 11-12), is in 
fact Joel Matlou himself. One of the pen sketches to be found in the text, portrays a 
woman carrying a child on her back. The child says "Mama", while the woman says 
"Aag Aiii Joel shut up!!" (88). And, in "My Lifestyle", the narrator says his name is 
Joel, although his employer "scratched" that name and called him "Ou Kaak" (51). In 
"Man Against Himself', the narrator is called by a friend who addresses him as Joel 
Matlou ( 60-61 ). These recurrent self-reflexive moments serve to connect the different 
stories. 
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Indeed, the most immediately apparent concrete exemplification of the form of 
this text as short story cycle is the fact that the individual identified at the start as "the 
little son ofMr Matlou" (11) is the central figure in the text. This protagonist appears 
in all the stories save "Carelessman was a Madman". As noted, Medupe/Joel Matlou 
is explicitly identified as the narrator of four of the stories in which he appears (of 
these it is only the story "Life at Home" which seems to have a third-person narrator). 
In these stories, which consequently appear unrelated yet sustain an 
interconnectedness among them (or which are related yet in many ways seem 
unconnected), Matlou traces the life of the youth Medupe (11, 15, 17ff., 30, 89, 96) or 
Joel (51, 60, 88) Matlou, who says "I am Mr Joel Medupe Matlou ofMabopane" (73). 
This youth moves with his family from the farm to the city and becomes variously an 
entrepreneur, a gardener and a miner. Indeed, the fact that the protagonist of Life at 
Home shares a name with its author suggests that Life at Home is presented as the 
fictionalised autobiography of Joel Matlou. But this autobiography is disrupted 
through the hallucinatory character of the stories, which has a disruptive effect on a 
realist aesthetic or narrative teleology. 
The hallucinatory effect is also of some importance for the reason that a 
tension might be said to result in Life at Home between on the one hand the 
dreamlike, hallucinatory atmosphere presented and, on the other hand, the harsh 
realities with which the text deals. Indeed, throughout the text suffering appears as a 
central motif. The protagonist of this text is not at home and not secure. This lack of 
security, of not being at home at home, is already suggested in "Farm-boy". While 
the story steers clear of any direct comment, the fact that the narrator's mother "was a 
'kitchen girl"' (12), as well as the assertion that there is no progress at the farm, 
prepares the reader for the end of the story: ". . . a plan was made for us to leave the 
farm for ever" (22). In the course of "Life at Home", Medupe's father (Mr Matlou) 
and his family do finally steal away from the farm and move to another home in 
Boekenhoutfontein. 35 The description of the dusty township is bleak. As the narrator 
puts it, "Life at home was really like at hell. But everything was all right. . . . Matlou 
was the owner" ( 40). As I continue to argue below, the move to the township appears 
as a repetition of (rather than an escape from) the suffering characteristic of life at 
home on the farm. As such, the move to the township might be said to disrupt the text 
centrifugally (a break from the farm occurs) while simultaneously unifying it 
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centripetally in equating, to a degree, life on the farm with life in the township. Each 
is life at home; moreover, neither offers a true sense of being at home. 
5. 7 The Farm Novel, Datedness and Life at Home 
While Life at Home starts off on a farm, by the end of the second story that locale has 
been left behind: the Matlous move from the farm to a township. The text therefore 
traces the process ofurbanisation.36 That the Matlou family moves from the farm to 
the city suggests the insufficiency of the kind of farm life experienced by them and, 
indeed, little if any nostalgia- so characteristic of the farm novel in the pastoral mode 
- is in evidence in this text. 
Despite the process of urbanisation, which provides the basic narrative 
impulse of this text, the farm of the first two stories remains an important reference 
point against which the later stories may be read. In its representation of farm life 
from the perspective of the black working-class family which ensures its survival, and 
in transcending the representation of life on the farm and the mode of realism of the 
farm novel which is dependent on the occlusion of that on which it is dependent 
(namely black labour), Matlou's Life at Home may be read as moving towards the 
transcendence of the pastoral. In this sense, Life at Home might be a concrete 
exemplification of Coetzee's (1988: 81) contention that "the silences in the South 
African farm novel, particularly its silence about the place of the black man in the 
pastoral idyll ... speak more loudly now that they did fifty years ago". Matlou's may 
be read as just such a voice which subverts the farm novel and lets its silences speak 
by subverting its formal coherence and the cohesiveness of its landscapes. Matlou's 
voice, that is, may be understood as constituting a voice of alterity in the farm novel. 
If this is the case, it becomes possible to read the farm novel in terms of, or against, 
Matlou's response to the narrative of farm life from the perspective ofthe master. 
Yet Matlou's response is by no means a simplistic inversion of terms. Instead, 
as I hope to show, Matlou does not offer an other cohesion, an other closure. On the 
contrary, his work may be understood as unsettling such neat inversions and thus 
moving beyond a whole set of conventional oppositions (among others Ndebele's 
between the ordinary and the spectacular). As noted above, Ndebele's celebration of 
Matlou implicitly relates his work to narratives of peasant life. This relation may be 
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extended to the farm novel, at least partly because Life at Home starts off as a 
representation of life on the farm. Moreover, the text might be said, like the farm 
novel and plaasroman, to dramatise the conflict between the peasant and the 
capitalist. 
The first two stories/chapters of Life at Home are concerned with life at home 
as life on the farm, while suggesting the tension between a slavelike life on the farm 
and a possibly liberating life away from it. As a "Farm-boy" (11) Medupe is at home 
on the farm, while his father and mother work as virtually indentured labourers ( cf 
23). Medupe knows things only children who live on farms do, such as that "Pigs do 
not live in the water, but a pig can put its head under water for nearly ten minutes 
without breathing!" (16). As a farm-boy, "My real play was to climb trees, make wire 
cars, chase the small pigs and throw apples all over the trees. Also, I used to play 
with water by opening the taps" (16). The narrator describes farm life as "better than 
living in the location. Farm life is 100% safe. But at the farm there is little progress" 
(14). Despite its disadvantages, he claims that "Farm life is better than town life" 
(17). But this assertion is immediately disrupted because in this, the first story, 
Medupe' s father is already starting to make plans to escape the lot of the peasant by 
moving to Boekenhoutfontein. 
This is a project he pursues in the next story, "Life at Home". Despite the fact 
that logically as well as chronologically "Life at Home" follows "Farm-boy", in it 
many of the points made in the first story are repeated, as I showed above. But "Life 
at Home" is marked from its beginning as being different from "Farm-boy", for it 
apparently employs a third-person narrator where the earlier story is written in the 
first person. Even though the opening line of "Life at Home" does employ the first-
person plural - "Where we were, we could really feel what the life of a slave was 
like" (23)- the third-person narrative of the story has the effect of suggesting an other 
perspective on the circumstances of life on the farm as described in "Farm-boy". The 
"we" of the first line links "Life at Home" to the first-person narrative that is "Farm-
boy", while formally the two stories are to be distinguished in terms of the 
predominantly third-person narrative of "Life at Home". 37 But this narrative mode is 
disrupted when the narrator again briefly, and apparently inexplicably, slips into first-
person narration. This 'slip' occurs in a description of Baas Dick, the farmer: "His 
188 
head was not bald but his feet showed us that he was old enough to be slow, no one to 
blame" (31; my emphasis). 
It is significant that the 'slip' into first-person narration occurs in a description 
of the "Baas", a description in turn embedded in a description of an encounter 
between the farmer and his farm hand, Mr Matlou. The farm hand is making plans 
(cf 30) to escape from the farm with his family. In order to do this "they wanted to 
apply for reference books" (31). Matlou and family are without identity papers: their 
'paperlessness' is evident in the fact that Matlou is a tractor driver "without a licence" 
(25), and he and his family do not have the passbooks that black people in apartheid 
South Africa were required to carry when travelling, which means that they cannot 
leave the farm and its environs. They are indeed slaves: they have no freedom of 
movement. When the family leaves the farm they are described as "escaped convicts" 
and as "bandits ... on the run" (35). Baas Dick agrees to provide the family with 
reference books: "For the boss it was very simple. The following day they were taken 
to the commissioner for their books. They were fixed without any problems" (32). In 
this way the members of the family are incorporated into apartheid bureaucracy: the 
precondition for the freedom of leaving the farm is to give up freedom from that 
bureaucracy. 38 
Matlou calls his master by the name: "Baas Dick! Baas Dick! Baas Dick! It 
is me." (31 ). It is at this moment that the narrative briefly slips into the first person, 
identifying the narrator with the Matlous (perhaps strengthening the suggestion that 
the narrator is their son). The encounter between farmer and worker is described as a 
meeting "face to face with his favourite boss about their problems" (30). This 
encounter with otherness, this face-to-face encounter, is not limited to Matlou and his 
wife's encounter with the boss, but also extends to the narrator who, in bearing 
witness to this event, as it were suddenly is present at this scene, in a sense becomes 
Mr Matlou and his wife: 
'Baas Dick! Baas Dick! Baas Dick! It is me.' 
Without any problem the boss opened the old wooden door. He was 
wearing morning shoes and '1945 World War pyjamas'. His head was not 
bald but his feet showed us that he was old enough to be slow, no one to 
blame. 
(31; my emphasis) 
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The antecedent of the pronoun "us" is unclear. The first-person pronoun "me" in Mr 
Matlou's phrase "It is me", suggests that the pronoun "us" refers to Mr Matlou and his 
wife, but it also by implication refers to the narrator and his reader. The boss's feet 
"showed us" that he was old. The reader and narrator read the signs of senescence in 
the boss's feet. That is, it is not only Mr Matlou and his wife who encounter Baas 
Dick, but also the narrator and reader of Life at Home. This may be confirmed with 
reference to the opening line of"Life at Home": in reading this story, this text, we are 
transported to the farm, "we could really feel what the life of a slave was like" (23). 
The reader of Life at Home is forced into an encounter with Baas Dick, but also with 
Mr Matlou and his family, as well as with peasant life as indentured labourers on a 
farm in apartheid South Africa. 
This suggests that the otherness of the encounter described here involves 
substitution of the self for the other. In the encounter with otherness, the self itself 
becomes other. While I claimed above that the reader in a sense is present or becomes 
Mr Matlou and his wife, it is important to underscore that s/he is present and bears 
witness only to the extent that slhe is not present and does not become these 
characters. The reader is present at the scene in her or his absence, and becomes the 
characters in not becoming them. In the act of reading, the singular event being 
narrated is repeated 'in' the reader. The self experiences an alterity within, an alterity 
which, moreover, implies a singularity that inescapably involves her or him and 
nobody else. After all, it is this reader who is reading and who is, consequently, 
confronted with the otherness of and in the text. It is this reader (in the irreducibly 
singular experience of reading this other text) who is transported into an other space 
and time, and who thus encounters also the other in the text, while simultaneously 
remaining the same - if altered - individual reading the text. I read the story here, 
now, while typing at the computer, while at the same time I become an other and am 
altered in my encounter with Baas Dick, with life on the farm as a slave. I am here 
and I am there: I am myself and I am an other. I am substituted for the other. 
My consideration so far of an otherness within the reader hinges on two 
important discussions: that of Derrida ( cf 1992a) on the deportation of the date, and 
that of Levinas ( cf 1996d) on the concept of substitution. These two notions are 
closely related: in the deportation of the date the reading self is transported into an 
encounter with otherness, enforcing a responsibility which was not chosen by the self 
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but occurs in an unpredictable way in the course of the act of reading. This 
responsibility arises outside of the volition of the reader in the course of her or his 
reading of a text that s/he might or might not have chosen to read. One could say that 
the reader to a certain degree surrenders herself or himself to the text. Even though 
reading admittedly is an (inter)activity, it therefore nevertheless does to an important 
degree entail passivity in the face of the otherness to which it gives access or, rather, 
which confronts the reader. 
It should be noted that Derrida (1992a: 388) insists as follows on the 
singularity of the date: "This you [the date], which must be an I ... always figures an 
irreplaceable singularity. Only another singularity, just as irreplaceable, can take its 
place without substituting for it. One addresses this you as one addresses a date, the 
here and now of a commemorable provenance". The date cannot be substituted 
because of its "irreplaceable singularity". But this use of the term 'substitution' does 
not cancel out a Levinasian approach. The other, as much as the date commemorated, 
is always past, always singular and always irreplaceable. Yet the self here and now 
encounters it. The self has a certain responsibility for the other, for the date. 39 This 
responsibility entails, among other things, respecting its otherness. The self is 
responsible for the otherness of the other and, indeed, for the other itself It is in this 
sense that the self must be - and is - substituted as hostage for the other. This is a 
responsibility for the other who is substituted by the self, so that the self s identity is 
broken up by the intrusion of otherness into the self In Levinas's terminology, the 
self is, as a hostage of the other, persecuted by the other in her or his obsession with 
the other - in this case, with the event of the other encountered in the act of reading. 
This persecution of the self by the other arises precisely because the self, in her or his 
radical responsibility for the other, is substituted for the suffering, persecuted and 
naked other. The other's suffering becomes the seirs suffering. The other "is the 
persecuted one for whom I am responsible to the point of being a hostage for him" 
(Levinas 1981: 59). The self herself or himself is substituted for the other because of 
the singularity of the self No one can replace me in my responsibility for the other as 
the self cannot be substituted in the act of substituting itself for the other: "I am then 
called upon in my uniqueness as someone for whom no one else can substitute 
himself' (1981: 59). It is in this sense that the self becomes the hostage of the other. 
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According to Levinas, the self is affected by otherness, but "without the source 
ofthe affection becoming a theme of re-presentation" (1996d: 81). That is, the other 
which affects the self, in its irreducible pastness (as noted in Chapter 3) remains 
always outside the purview of the self s gaze: the other, as trace, is not a phenomenon 
but an enigma. In "Substitution", an essay which later was to form the central chapter 
of Otherwise than Being, Levinas designates this 'unrelating relation' an "obsession": 
"The term obsession designates this relation which is irreducible to consciousness" 
(1996d: 81). In its irreducibility to consciousness, this strange relation with the other 
"overturns" consciousness while manifesting itself in it. As such, "obsession 
traverses consciousness contrariwise, inscribing itself there as something foreign, as 
disequilibrium, as delirium" (1996d: 81). The self, in the encounter with the other, is 
dislodged by something an-archic, without origin - the encounter is beyond the 
opposition between order and disorder. As I argued in my earlier discussion of 
Levinas, the other disturbs the order of the same without disturbing it. As he puts it, 
"Disorder is but another order, and the diffuse can possibly be thematized. . . . 
Anarchy troubles being beyond these alternatives" (1996d: 81).40 Because of the 
irreducible pastness of the other, it always exceeds the attempt of the self to contain it. 
As a result, "the Ego is evinced in the ascendancy of the Other over the Same to the 
point of interruption, leaving it speechless: an-archic, obsession is persecution. Here 
persecution does not amount to consciousness gone mad; it designates the manner in 
which the Ego is affected and a defection from consciousness" (1996d: 81). 
The important point which I would like to emphasise here is that, in its 
disturbance which does not disturb, the other disrupts the self s satisfaction. Levinas 
compares this disturbance of the "foreign", which results in "disequilibrium", with 
"delirium". The disturbance of the self by the other appears as a kind of madness. 
The selfs coincidence with itself, "the return to self of consciousness" (1996d: 84)-
which Levinas designates the philosophical description of identity (cf 1996d: 83ff.)-
is broken up by the other so that the self no longer coincides with itself, a process he 
suggests is akin to delirium, a state of excitement, mental confusion, hallucination. 
Yet Levinas continues by claiming that the obsession or persecution of the self by the 
other "does not amount to consciousness gone mad". This is because Levinas, too, is 
confronted with the dilemma that to describe otherness, and the encounter with the 
other, is to reduce its otherness. To describe this encounter in terms of delirium is to 
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incorporate it into an order: "Disorder is but another order. . . . ". Thus Levinas 
interrupts his determination of the encounter with the other by claiming that such an 
encounter cannot be characterised as "consciousness gone mad". Rather, obsession, 
which is persecution, "designates the manner in which the Ego is affected and a 
defectionfrom consciousness" (1996d: 81; my emphasis). The point, importantly, is 
that the encounter with otherness takes place both inside and outside of consciousness, 
seeing that "this relation overturns consciousness and manifests itself there" ( 1996d: 
81). It takes place in a kind of"No-place" (Levinas 1996d: 87; cf Waldenfels 1995: 
44). That is, the encounter with otherness exceeds consciousness so totally that it is 
beyond the opposition between consciousness and non-consciousness. While it thus 
resembles delirium, it cannot be determined as madness because then it would still be 
defined in terms of the opposition between presence of mind (or sanity) and a being 
beyond oneself. This is to say that the encounter with otherness, which exceeds 
consciousness, also exceeds intentionality, retaining as the latter does "the initiating 
and inchoate motif of a voluntary intention" (1996d: 82). 
For Levinas, the responsibility for the other thus exceeds consciOusness, 
intentionality and freedom: " ... for consciousness, responsibility is always strictly 
measured in terms of freedom, and thus always limited" (1996d: 82). Consequently, 
Levinas places the philosophical notion of identity as the coincidence of 
consciousness with itself - the return or recurrence of the self to itself - in question. 
The self-identity of the self is radically placed in question in the encounter with the 
other: ". . . persecution [is] a placing in question anterior to questioning, a 
responsibility beyond the logos of the response, as though persecution by the other 
(autrui) were the basis of solidarity with the other (autrui)" (1996d: 82). This is to 
say that the process of substitution for the other, which Levinas characterises as the 
ethical unrelating relation to the other, implies an infinite and radical responsibility for 
the other. Waldenfels (1995: 44) puts this point succinctly: 
Levinas takes this kind of responsibility as original substitution. Through this 
substitution, I become a corporeal hostage of the Other and have to substitute 
myself for him with life and limb, and that in a radical form. The 
responsibility for Others that originates at this point does not mean a pure co-
responsibility, which would presuppose self-responsibility and which would 
be grounded in compassion, benevolence and empathy. On the contrary, I am 
responsible by substituting myself for the Other. 
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The reader of Life at Home, I am arguing, in being involved in and bearing witness to 
life on the farm, is made responsible for the other's life on the farm by being included 
by the other - or, rather, substituting for the other - in the encounter with that 
existence. But at the same time the otherness of life on the farm is not reduced: life 
on the farm, and the singularity of the life on the farm of this family, remains 
irreducibly other to the self. This otherness is apparent in that the description of life 
on the farm is other to that described in the farm novel. Life on the farm is described 
here from the perspective of the black labourers on whose labour it is built.41 That the 
farm does not belong to the people who work it is made explicit right at the start of 
Life at Home, a point implicitly linked to the political situation in apartheid South 
Africa, as suggested by the reference to the South Mrican flag which "was still in the 
air" (as if its presence were temporary): 
It all started like a dream, when I was a farm-boy near the Magaliesberg 
mountain. The South African flag was still in the air, waving its colour-signs. 
I must have been very little then, because I could only see as far as 1 000 
metres. I was born on the farm of a white family. I was the little son of Mr 
Matlou. Really, I was a farm-boy. 
(11) 
Moreover, the fact that the people who do the work do not own the farm, is suggested 
particularly strongly in "Life at Home". The "wealthy farmer" (23) "looked after his 
staff' (24): "He built houses, fed the staff, transported their children to school and to 
hospital, and guarded them at night when they were asleep. The farmer thought he 
was doing well, that he was a good farmer and not like other farmers" (24). However, 
"his people were slaves and suffering". In view of the bondage of his "staff', the fact 
that the farmer "guarded" them at night - with "four dangerous police dogs" (14) -
appears ominous. Guarding the farm is meant not only to protect the people on the 
farm, but to keep them there, something suggested in the later description of the farm 
as a "jail" (35), as noted above. 
The Matlous live "on one of the farmer's properties" (24), yet another 
indication of unequal distribution of aflluence and power. This "wealthy farmer" 
employs other farmers to oversee his farms: "Matlou's family was so worried because 
after every two years there would come a new farmer on their land. The farmers were 
changing land after two years, but Matlou's family must always remain on the land 
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with new farmers" (24). While Mr Matlou has to work extremely hard, "[waking] up 
early in the morning to feed birds, pigs, cattle, cats and dogs" (25), the farmer "woke 
up at ten o'clock" (25). Mr Matlou 
used to work seven days a week without any time off The farmer did not 
want anyone to help him because, he said, Matlou was a hard-working man 
and a 'good boy'. He was working hard so he could feed his children and his 
wife. His wife was a 'kitchen girl' with a good old reputation. Also, she was 
a hard worker. 
"Matlou did not have a clocking-off time for his work" (29). He works all the time: 
"Sometimes his 'boss' (the farmer) would call him at night, using the sound of a gun, 
to help him at the garages of their two old-model Ford station-wagons. When Matlou 
heard the sound of a strong gun he would know that his boss wanted him nearer" (29). 
The lot of these landless peasants is strikingly described in Life at Home as "a hard 
work to unsuccess" (25). 
As should be evident, Life at Home differs from the farm novel in particular in 
taking the vantage point of the black, embodied other on the farm. Taking this 
ptlrspective, I am arguing, confronts the reader of Life at Home with the otherness of 
the life of the black other on the farm, so different from the kind of farm life described 
in the farm novel. Yet the singularity of this otherness is maintained, I would argue, 
as a result of the formal devices employed in this text.43 One such device occurs in 
the 'slip' from third into first-person narrative which opens the (reading) self to the 
other, which substitutes the (reading) self for the other with which s/he is confronted 
in reading. 44 
The opening of the reading self to an alterity within her- or himself may also 
be illustrated in terms of the specificity of Life at Home, in particular as far as space 
and time (places, dates, times) are concerned. In this specificity Life at Home 
markedly differs from the farm novel, as implied in my discussion of the (apparent 
lack of) historicity of that form. 45 The highly particular dates and times in evidence in 
this text are not only uncharacteristic of the farm novel as pastoral text, but reinforce 
the singularity and separateness of each story and act centrifugally to dissociate them 
from one another. At the same time, the specification of the locale of the stories with 
their constant reference point, namely home - the farm close to the Magaliesberg and 
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Pretoria (cf. 11, 12, 23-24, 29, 34) and Boekenhoutfontein!Mabopane (cf. 22, 33, 36, 
48, 54, 61, 73, 75), places which are, moreover, regionally linked - serves 
centripetally to connect them. The stories have the 'same' locale as reference point: 
home (albeit different homes), while that reference point is circumscribed by various 
datelines. 
As noted above (5.5), Life at Home starts with a detailed description of the 
regional locale which forms its setting. In this regard, Coetzee's (1992e: 61) 
comment pertaining to the pastoral mode is germane: "At the center of the mode, it 
seems to me, lies the idea of the local solution. The pastoral defines and isolates a 
space in which whatever cannot be achieved in the wider world (particularly the city) 
can be achieved". The "idea of the local solution" is important with respect to Life at 
Home for two reasons, both of which pertain to Matlou's move beyond the pastoral. 
In the first place, this idea contrasts with the paradoxical lack of specificity, the a-
historical nature of the regionalism of the pastoral as well as of its inverse, the anti-
pastoral (such as evident, according to Coetzee, in Schreiner). The rather bizarre 
specificity of place and time in Life at Home perhaps does not invoke, oppose or resist 
the pastoral as much as it leaves the pastoral behind. Secondly, Coetzee's comment is 
significant also in that it would seem to make explicit, when applied to Life at Home 
as a text beyond the pastoral, the degree to which this text does not offer solutions 
(whether local or otherwise). Where the pastoral mode, as evident for instance in the 
farm novel, is nostalgic for a way of life which has passed, and does attempt to offer 
local, often nostalgic solutions - in view of my discussion above of the farm novel, I 
am thinking more of Smith than Schreiner - Life at Home is far from nostalgic with 
regard to farm life and uncompromisingly bleak in its assessment of possible solutions 
to the problems of modernisation and urbanisation. These latter factors, of course, as 
I indicated above, constitute the raison d'etre of the farm novel as pastoral form. 
As far as the strange specificity with regard to locale and time characteristic of 
this collection is concerned, one should note that such specificity is a recurrent 
technique of the text. That is, the specificity of the descriptions exacerbates the 
hallucinatory nature of the text rather than rendering it more 'real', more historical, as 
might have been expected. The preponderance of specific, indeed singular, dates and 
times does not seem in any way to communicate essential information or familiarise 
the reader with the text. On the contrary, the very irrelevance of these data lends them 
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an air of the absurd which I would claim exacerbates the reader's sense of 
homelessness in the text. 
The dreamlike sequence in "Farm-boy", when the boy is attacked in his sleep 
by the Moloi Mogwapa (17-19), is one case among many which might be used to 
illustrate this point. This strange, magical realist sequence, 46 is prefaced by a specific 
reference to a date: "The day was a Saturday of June 1962" (17). Later the reader is 
informed that "Now the time was half past nine (9.30 p.m.)" (17) and that "At about 
12.30 a.m. the Mogwapa or Moloi opened the window by style" (18). After the Moloi 
has "hammered a big needle into the top of my head to kill me" (18), one reads that 
"In the morning at about six o'clock the young John woke up and went to his usual 
play. I was left dying" (18). The relevance of the highly specific information with 
regard to date and time is unclear: it does not seem to make any difference when 
exactly this event occurred. And yet, within the space of a page, the reader is given 
such information four times. The significance of the information, of course, is its 
insignificance: it serves to highlight the strangeness of the sequence in its apparently 
irrelevant specificity, its very real historicity. Part of the strangeness of this dreamlike 
sequence is that it seems to be offered as being perfectly run-of-the-mill, as not being 
strange at all. Indeed, this episode is sketched as one among many other, apparently 
more ordinary ones. The deadpan insertion of such an apparently magical incident, 
with the highly specific information pertaining to the singular date and time of its 
occurrence, highlights its strangeness. 
It should also be noted that, while highly specific dates and times are provided, 
this information is as often as not pertinently relativised. The narrator refers to "a 
Saturday of June 1962", "about 12.30", "about six o'clock" (17-18~ my emphasis). 
The moment a certain air of historicity is lent to this strange, magical episode (thus, as 
I have been arguing, rendering it even stranger in its apparent ordinariness), this 
historicity is simultaneously disrupted. If such a thing were possible, one might say 
this episode- and Matlou's text generally- evidences vague specificity. Such 'vague 
specificity' (or singular generality) disrupts itself and might, in terms of my 
consideration of irony in this study, be called ironic. 
Indeed, this kind of 'vague specificity' is involved also with what I above 
called the 'transportation' of the reading self into the text, and into an encounter with 
the other. This 'transportation' of the reader is dependent on the 'deportation' of the 
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dates in the text. As this is a point of some importance to my argument with regard to 
an otherness within, I would like to consider at some length Derrida's illuminating 
discussion of the date vis-a-vis the work of Paul Celan. Derrida (1992a: 389-390) 
notes that 
It is necessary that the mark which one calls a date be marked off, in a singular 
manner, detached from the very thing which it dates; and that in this de-
marcation, this deportation, it become readable, that it become readable, 
precisely, as a date in wresting or exempting itself from itself, from its 
immediate adherence, from the here and now; in freeing itself from what it 
nonetheless remains, a date. It is necessary that the unrepeatable (das 
Unwiederholbare) be repeated in it, effacing in itself the irreducible 
singularity which it denotes. . . . It must efface itself in order to become 
readable, to render itself unreadable in its very readability. For if it does not 
annul in itself the unique marking which connects it to an event without 
witness, without other witness, it remains intact but absolutely indecipherable. 
It is no longer even what it has to be, its essence and its destination, it no 
longer keeps its promise, that of a date. 
The date must be deported if it is to be readable. If it is to be a date at all, it must be 
'de-marcated' from the absolutely singular event which it commemorates, for it would 
not be decipherable as commemorating that unique event if the other were not to bear 
witness to that event via the date which stands in for - substitutes - the absolutely 
other, thus enunciating "the possibility of a recurrence" (1992a: 394). The date is 
deported from the event and thus read in the text; this deportation of the date implies 
the transportation of the reader, the other who bears witness to the event. 
A date is per definition singular and unrepeatable, yet must in principle be 
repeatable and therefore generalisable if it is to readable. Derrida (1992a: 380-381), 
quoting Celan's exclamation "'Aber das Gedicht spricht ja! Es bleibt seiner Daten 
angedenk, aber - es spricht'. . . . ('But the poem speaks! It is mindful of its dates, 
but it speaks .... ')", notes that 
despite the date, in spite of its memory rooted in the singularity of an event, 
the poem speaks; to all and in general, to the other first of all. The "but" 
seems to carry the poem's utterance beyond its date: if the poem recalls a date, 
calls itself back to its date, to the date when it writes or of which it writes, as of 
... which it is written, nevertheless it speaks! to all, to the other, to whoever 
does not share the experience or the knowledge of the singularity thus 
dated .... 
(Derrida 1992a: 3 81) 
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It would seem that a text is rooted to its singular date and speaks of that date. · The 
otherness of the text is apparent in its datedness. Yet this text, in its otherness, speaks 
to an other, to an other who or which is itself dated. The text speaks from its date to 
an other date. The dates 'or the text are necessarily in the past and the future. In 
speaking to a future date, the date of the text becomes generalised in its singularity: 
" ... writing at a certain date [means] not only writing on a given day, at a given hour, 
but also writing to [a] the date, addressing oneself to it, committing oneself to the date 
as to the other, the date past as well as the promised date" (1992a: 381). 
But the date, even as it effaces itself in order to become readable - as it annuls 
in itself "the unique marking which connects it to an event without witness" (1992a: 
390) - remains irreducibly other. In its substitution for the irreducibly other, it is in 
itself another singularity, unique and specific at the same time as, in order to be 
readable, generalised and 'vague'. And in this substitution for the other without 
substituting it, the date is like the reader. For s/he, too, reads the unreadable in 
encountering otherness in the text via the date. The reading of the date necessarily 
reduces its otherness and the otherness of the event which it signifies. But this 
reductive reading must, in turn, be reduced in order to maintain the absolute 
singularity of the other being read. The recurrence of the event in the date which 
marks its occurrence must be recognised as not being an absolute recurrence, but as 
marking "the spectral return of that which, unique in its occurrence, will never return. 
A date is a specter" (Derrida 1992a: 394). 
In commemorating, and thus signifying something which is irreducibly other, 
yet allowing it to recur spectrally, the date is like a shibboleth: it is like a password 
which gives the reader access to the event it commemorates. Derrida notes this with 
regard to the fact that more than one event can be signified or commemorated by the 
same date: "The date itself resembles a shibboleth. It gives ciphered access to this 
collocation, to this secret configuration of places for memory" (1992a: 402). A series 
of singular, apparently unconnected events and places can be invoked by a single date, 
which allows them to be reconfigured as a "collocation" in memory. The point here is 
that the date always refers to a singular event, but in its potential reference to such 
singularity it can also, and must be able to, link disparate, apparently unconnected 
events to one another in aleatory fashion. This suggests that a particular date is less a 
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point in time than a singular multiplicity of singularities. The date, in revealing the 
event, may and does also reveal other events which may become readable in terms· of 
yet other, similarly dated events. As much as the date discloses as shibboleth, it also 
indicates the infinite absence of an infinite number of other events marked by the 
same date. The date thus marks an irreducible absence not only in its commemoration 
of an absolutely irreducibly other event (which it nonetheless allows to 'recur' and 
thus to become readable, thus transporting the reader into otherness), but also in other 
similarly dated events. 
This is to say that the date hides as much as it reveals: it refers to this event, 
and to an infinite number of others which it does not explicitly commemorate but 
which would have occurred on that date all the same: "The date (signature, moment, 
place, gathering of singular marks) always functions as a shibboleth. It shows that 
there is something not shown .... " (Derrida 1992a: 413). Even though Derrida's 
reading of the date as shibboleth is specifically, singularly a reading of a number of 
poems by Paul Celan, this is the case as far as any kind of language is concerned: "In 
a language, in the poetic writing of a language, there is nothing but shibboleth" 
(1992a: 413). 
What Derrida says about the date applies not only to texts which are explicitly 
dated. All texts are necessarily dated: a text much be repeatable, its singularity and 
otherness in principle effaceable. 47 And it applies, too, to the date in general. 
Nonetheless, given that dates and times play such a prominent role in Life at Home, 
one might say that this text seems particularly mindful of dates.48 
Yet Derrida indicates (as noted above) that the text speaks despite this 
mindfulness of the singularity of the date (or dates) of which it speaks. The 
absolutely singular date of the text, from which it is written and to which it refers, 
recurs in the reading of the text. Despite the absolutely irreducible otherness of the 
text evident in the absolute singularly of its date, the text speaks. In fact, it is because 
rather than in spite of this otherness that the text can speak: "Instead of walling it up 
and reducing it to the silence of singularity, a date gives it [the text] its chance, its 
chance to speak to the other!" (1992a: 382). The text as other is due to its date but 
also due to an other date, at which it is read. Derrida (1992a: 382) notes that this 
means the text speaks of its date only in as far as it "acquits" itself of that date 
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without, however, "disavowing" it. Even though it is eternally marked by its date, it 
"absolves", and must absolve, itself 
It absolves itself of it so that its utterance may resonate and proclaim beyond a 
~in~larity w~ich might otherwise remain undecipherable, mute, and immured 
m 1ts date - m the unrepeatable. One must, while preserving its memory, 
speak of the date which already speaks of itself: the date, by its mere 
occurrence, by the inscription of a sign as memorandum, will have broken the 
silence of pure singularity. But to speak of it, one must also efface it, make it 
readable, audible, intelligible beyond the pure singularity of which it speaks. 
Now the beyond of absolute singularity, the chance of the poem's 
exclamation, is not the simple effacement of the date in a generality, but its 
effacement faced with another date, the one to which it speaks, the date of an 
other strangely wed or joined in the secrecy of an encounter, a chance secret, 
with the same date. 
(Derrida 1992a: 382) 
It is just this kind of singularity - "a Saturday of June 1 962", "about 12. 30", "about 
six o 'cloc!i' (17-18; my emphasis)- which is in evidence in Life at Home, but which 
is simultaneously (already in being posited in its singularity and otherness) also 
qualified and generalised. Not only do these dates and these times imply other dates 
and times (mine, yours, others') in being mentioned, but in being mentioned in this 
way the necessary generalisation and effacement which would make them readable 
are enacted in the qualification of their specificity. That is, these dates and times -
which are other but already, in their "mere occurrence", speak of themselves - are 
incorporated into a general economy of the sign. But the trace of their singularity 
remains in their singularity which is indeterminable. These dates and times contain 
within themselves the otherness of the text, an otherness which is ironically 
interrupted as it occurs, for otherwise it would not be readable. But the date of the 
other who reads is "the same date" as that of the text: the date has not been 
'disavowed'. The reading other's date is, in the encounter with the text, "strange I y" 
(Derrida 1992a: 3 82) the same date as that of the text. Reading the text, the self is not 
only confronted with otherness in the reading encounter, but that encounter entails the 
intemlption of the self by the other. As I read the text, its singular date is repeated 
and becomes mine. I experience the date of the other on the date of my reading now. 
My date is also an other's date. The text, in its otherness, confronts me with an 
otherness within myself 
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5.8 Suffering 
As I noted above in my discussion ofLevinas's notion of substitution, the self-identity 
of the self is radically placed in question in the encounter with the other. I also noted 
there that this interruption of self-identity in the encounter with otherness is compared 
by Levinas with madness, and that this comparison itself is interrupted so as to 
prevent the determination of the encounter with otherness as madness. A second 
important point with regard to the encounter with otherness needs to be made: that, 
despite the interruption of self-identity, the self is not alienated from itself Levinas is 
quite clear on this point. The constitution of the self is 'dependent' on an encounter 
with otherness. As Waldenfels (1995: 44) puts it, "substitution [does not] stand for 
alienation, because this would imply that there is already a self that becomes alien to 
itself'. The subject- who is a subject in being subject to the demands of the other (cf 
Waldenfels 1995: 42)- is an entity that consists of an alterity within, rather than of a 
self identical to itself. If the self has an essence, then that essence would be that it has 
no essence. The self is alienated from itself in denying its own alterity and its related 
responsibility to what and who is other: "Paradoxically it is qua alienus- foreigner 
and other -that man is not alienated" (Levinas 1981: 59). 
Furthermore, as I also noted above, in terms of the logic of substitution the self 
is persecuted in the persecution of the other. But this persecution must not be 
misunderstood as being mere "compassion, benevolence, and empathy" (Waldenfels 
1995: 44). The suffering of the other is the suffering of the self. J. M. Coetzee has 
put this in eloquent terms: 
The body with its pain becomes a counter to the endless trials of doubt. (One 
can get away with such crudeness in fiction; one can't in philosophy, I'm 
sure.) 
. . . . Let me put it baldly: in South Africa it is not possible to deny the 
authority of suffering and therefore of the body. . . . And let me again be 
unambiguous: it is not that one grants the authority of the suffering body: the 
suffering body takes this authority: that is its power. To use other words: its 
power is undeniable. 
(Let me add, entirely parenthetically, that I, as a person, as a 
personality, am overwhelmed, that my thinking is thrown into confusion and 
helplessness, by the fact of suffering in the world, and not only human 
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su~ering. These fictional constructions of mine are paltry, ludicrous defenses 
agamst that being-overwhelmed, and, to me, transparently so.) 
(1992a: 248) 
One does not grant the authority of the suffering body: it is beyond volition. The 
suffering of the other, as Coetzee puts it, overwhelms the self. Or rather, it 
overwhelms himself, his self. The self who is Coetzee, overwhelmed by suffering, 
experiences an unbearable, radical, and infinite responsibility for the other, who 
suffers. This responsibility for the other experienced by the self as "being-
overwhelmed" is as good a description as any of Levinasian substitution with its 
concomitant persecution of the self by the other who is persecuted. The suffering 
body of the other calls for a response, for a responsible response (cf. Levinas 1996d: 
87). In Coetzee's case, such a response at least partially entails "fictional 
constructions". And these responses, no matter how "paltry" and "ludicrous" they 
may be, no matter how much they may seem to be "defenses", are, nevertheless, 
responses to suffering. 
It is important to note that no response to the suffering of the other, no matter 
how responsible, can ever be adequate. This is, of course, not to claim that any 
response will do. But Coetzee's denigration of his fictions in terms of their 
inadequacy as responses not only implies a degree of self-conscious irony (as does 
also his reference to the allegedly sophisticated superiority of philosophy over 
fiction), but acknowledges that nothing can- and may be allowed to- prevent one's 
"being-overwhelmed" by suffering.49 
In view of my discussion ofthe Levinasian notion of substitution, I would now 
like to tum to the question of suffering in Life at Home. While the reader of Life at 
Home, in reading the text, discovers an otherness within her- or himself (by being 
transported in order to bear witness to events, a process I have attempted to link to the 
deportation of the date) this otherness within the reader is augmented by the 
description of the protagonist of the text as an alienated, suffering man. In other 
words, while one must distinguish between on the one hand the alienation suffered by 
the protagonist (an alienation which in the text is suggested to be the consequence of 
material conditions such as exploitation on the farm and in the mine, as much as the 
inauthenticity of his existence) and, on the other hand, the otherness within discovered 
by the reader of Life at Home, this representation of the protagonist nonetheless would 
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seem to disable further the ability of the reader comfortably to settle down, as it were 
at home, in the text. so The text is· other and strange; singular in its form, language, 
artd dates. And its otherness is augmented in its descriptions of suffering and 
madness. 
Suffering unremittingly forms part of Life at Home. Indeed, this suffering has 
its origins in the status of the narrator-protagonist and his family as peasants very 
much caught up in a localised version of pastoral on a farm, and later township, in 
apartheid South Africa. It is in order to escape from the life of a suffering and 
enslaved pastoralist on a distinctly unpastoral farm that the Matlous leave the farm to 
join the stream of humanity looking for solutions in the city, in the township with its 
apparent access to job opportunities in factories or mines. However, as I have 
intimated, these solutions prove to be problematic and it is the suffering of the 
protagonist, his consequent alienation from himself, and the exacerbation of the 
reader's alterity within (consequent upon the suffering of the other), which I would 
like to emphasise in my discussion. 
The story "Man Against Himself' is an evocative, disturbing account of what 
being "an iron or steel hunter" ( 42) entails, that is, what it is like to be black and 
working a mine in apartheid South Africa. In this story, Medupe decides to try for 
work at the Rustenburg Platinum Mine (R.P.M.) at Bleskop (53). The story 
commences with a frenzied rush to board trains (54ff.), with the protagonist running 
out of money and, consequently, being forced to sleep in a toilet (55). As the story 
proceeds, the link between capital and apartheid is made clear: the prospective 
employees have to hand in their passes (54, 59, 60). Moreover, they are subjected to 
humiliating communal medical check-ups (60). 
Despite this depiction of deprivation and suffering, Ndebele claims that in 
"Man Against Himself' "there is a sense of the ordinary that is the very antithesis of 
spectacle" (199la: 50) for the reason that "There is no unearned heroism here; instead 
there is the unproclaimed heroism of the ordinary person" (199la: 53). Suffering and 
deprivation would make poignant the narrator/protagonist's journey away from and 
back towards home. The story might thus be described, following Ndebele (199la: 
51), as "a long odyssey of suffering". 
Noyes (1997: 26) has argued as follows with reference to narrative teleology 
and the notion of nation: 
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In the time stretched out between the beginning and the end of a tale we 
experience a departure and a longing for home, an Odyssey in which na~ated 
experience gains meaning by virtue of its disparity from the promise of 
fulfilment on which the narration is founded. . . . In the m5(hology of delayed 
return the pathos of nation is told as a spatialization of life. 1 
Narrative is premised upon an absence from home, which means that narrative 
structurally tends towards breaking down in the return home of the absent one, 
something which ends the narrative and closes it off (cf Noyes 1997: 28, 31). As 
Noyes {1997: 25) argues, "The sedentary basis of national unity - that is to say its 
territoriality - is self-evident". But this modem understanding of the nation as 
constructed upon sedentary life, is based on "the mythology of a departure and a 
return home [which] serves as a tale of sedentary life and an exclusion of nomadic 
life" (Noyes 1997: 24).52 That is, the journey enacted by narrative is conditional upon 
the necessary arrival home at the termination of the journey. The journey is finite. 
The suffering which figures so strongly in "Man Against Himself', and which is 
articulated in highly explicit terms (cf. 72, 73), would thus constitute a necessary rite 
of passage, "a kind of initiation story" (Ndebele 1991a: 51) on the way home. 
Ndebele (1991a: 51) confirms that, after having undergone "such brazen and 
humiliating exploitation", the protagonist "[emerges] from the entire experience 
feeling triumphant". To Ndebele this is suggested in a passage he characterises as 
evincing "deeply philosophical contemplation" (1991a: 51). This passage describes 
the narrator's escape ( cf 68) from the mine. He has worked underground for twenty-
four days and waited another six days for his pay. During these six days he has 
wandered around aimlessly (68), not realising that he "was on the verge of a complete 
mental breakdown" (69). Finally, the narrator is handed the money for which he has 
"risked my life and reason" (69). The remarkable passage to which Ndebele refers 
then follows: 
... I just thrust it [the money] into my empty pocket and walked out of the 
main gate towards the bush to free myself That time life was not endless but 
everlasting. The earth was once supposed to be flat. Well, so it is, from 
Hlatini to Northam. That fact does not prevent science from proving that the 
earth as a whole is spherical. We are still at the stage that life itself is flat -
the distance from birth to death. Yet the probability is that life, too, is 
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spherical and much more extensive and capacious than the hemisphere we 
know. 
(70) 
Ndebele cites this passage as a sign of the ordinary in its "discovery of complexity in 
a seemingly ordinary and faceless worker" (199la: 51), but then moves on without 
considering the passage at any great length. But the passage is deserving of closer 
scrutiny. In it Matlou moves, with dizzying speed, from a specific locale to infinite 
extension. The result is a deeply unsettling confrontation with alterity, an opening of 
life conceived as an enclosed totality to a disruptive infinity which exceeds it. The 
moment of freedom is interrupted by something which defeats understanding, namely 
the possibility that life resists being narrativised and thus ordered, that history is 
profoundly non-narrative ( cf Jameson 1981: 82). Just like the earth was once 
supposed to be flat, even though science has in the meantime proved it to be spherical, 
so life is still supposed to be "flat". It is flat because it measures "the distance from 
birth to death", a distance which results from being given the order of 
autobiography. 53 
The alterity discovered by the protagonist in himself is a consequence of the 
incapacity of the subject to be 'at home' with himself: he is deeply split, that is, not 
only as a consequence of an inauthentic existence, something resulting from 
alienating labour in an apartheid mine, factory, or on a farm, but also because his self-
sufficiency and ability to contain the story of his life is put in question. His 
representation of himself, which is necessarily narrative in nature, is inadequate to his 
life in that it necessarily leaves something out because life, indeed history, is 
profoundly non-narrative. This is to say that any representation of the self (which 
would necessarily be a na"ative representation) is at once fragmentary and denies 
that fragmentariness. It denies its fragmentariness in that it presents itself as a whole: 
narrative offers a face. But the face offered by narrative is necessarily premised upon 
the exclusion of something else: the face excludes otherness in order to appear. 
Any representation presupposes alterity within itself because it is necessarily 
incomplete and fragmentary. Alterity is a structural necessity of narrative. And the 
subject of Life at Home in this passage may thus be said to discover alterity within 
(his version of) himself 54 The self is not self-identical; the 'recurrence' of the 
consciousness of the self to itself, to put it in Levinas's terms (cf 1996d: 82ff.) is 
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necessarily interrupted by another. And in this interruption of self-identity by the 
other, which exceeds representation and yet is presupposed by representation (in that 
representation is dependendent on what it excludes), the self discovers that in its 
suffering it substitutes for the other. The narrative representation by the self of itself, 
attempting to exclude as it does otherness, already implies the introduction of 
otherness into the account. The self in the passage quoted above may be said, in his 
suffering, to recognise the otherness within himself which is part of the identity of the 
subject (as subject to the other). Even though "life itself is flat", this is only a stage 
similar to that which "once supposed [the earth] to be flat". He recognises that any 
view of the life of the self which excludes otherness - what we do not know, or 
exclude, or ignore - is "flat". 
But this flatness is one-dimensional in its perspective on life. It is true that life 
may be narrativised and may, as a result, appear to trace the distance from birth to 
death, just as it is true that the earth is, quite literally, flat from Hlatini to Northam. 
However, of course, even though the earth may appear flat in the presence of the self, 
it is not flat at all but a curve (as science has proved). Similarly, even though it might 
appear, in the supposed presence of the self (for instance in autobiography), to be 
possible to measure the distance between birth and death and designate it life, it is 
entirely possible that such a measurement is an imposition from the outside which 
lends order to what has none. That is, in autobiography the complexity of life is 
reduced in order to render that life comprehensible. Only in reducing that complexity 
- in excluding otherness - does one become able to narrate the life of the subject of 
autobiography. ss 
The feasibility of such a procedure is radically questioned in this passage: 
"Yet the probability is that life, too, is spherical and much more extensive and 
capacious than the hemisphere we know". Life is probably not flat at all, but a sphere. 
In fact, what we know of life is only the half of it ("the hemisphere we know"). The 
other half cannot be known, which means that life is "much more extensive and 
capacious" than what we know. It is for this reason that life (as sphere) always 
exceeds our (flattening) narrative of it. The passage thus moves from the teleological 
linearity of realist narrative to the spherical nature of identity faced with infinity; the 
passage disrupts conceptuality. 
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Autobiography, like narrative generally, inevitably leaves something out. As I 
argued above, alterity (the infinity of alterity) is presupposed by the structure of the 
representation and narration of the self. And in this passage the self who is about to 
set itself free after having suffered immensely on an apartheid mine, is confronted by 
just this alterity. It is an alterity which is not to be known, and which exceeds all 
representations made of it. It is an alterity, that is, which interrupts all attempts to 
enclose it and which disrupts the neat narrative of the self. 
Moreover, importantly, this is an alterity which interrupts the self-satisfaction 
of the self. Instead of being satisfied, or, indeed, 'triumphant' at his escape from a 
hellish existence (as Ndebele would have it), the protagonist experiences a sense of 
intense, hallucinatory dislocation bordering on madness. 56 The passage under 
discussion is followed immediately by the following sentences: "The black dots in my 
eyes turned brown, like a dagga-smoker or a dreamer. I felt like a political asylum-
seeker, running to Tanzania. To get to Northam I had to cross two compounds. I ran 
like hell until I crossed A and B Compounds" (70). The freedom that the self wants 
eludes him. Like "a dagga-smoker or a dreamer", the protagonist experiences a 
bizarre sense of spatial and temporal dislocation further heightened by his encounter 
with a set of random, strange events marked, as elsewhere in Life at Home, by 'vague 
specificity' as far as dates and times are concerned. The narrator is on the run and 
does not find peace and freedom: "Far from the ploughing men I crossed a ditch in 
which a half-eaten impala lay. Birds were singing, animals roaring. At 8 p.m. cars 
passed me, one after another and I started to fear for my life. I hid under small 
bridges or in the long grass" (70). 
The end of "Man Against Himself' may appear triumphant. The story ends 
with the narrator back home, in Mabopane: 
There was nothing which worried me. I had thought that getting back to 
Mabopane's dusty roads would lead me to suffer, but eating alone was almost 
more than I could bear. I learned to forget yesterdays and to think of 
tomorrows. Each morning in the township, I said to myself: 'Today is a new 
life.' I overcame my fear of loneliness and my fear of want. I am happy and 
fairly successful now and have a lot of enthusiasm and love for life. I know 
now that I shall never again be afraid of sleeping under a tree alone, regardless 
of what life hands me. I don't have to fear blasting. I know now that I can 
live one day at a time and that every day is a time for a wise man. 
(75-76) 
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However, far from exemplifying the triumph of the narrator over suffering, this 
passage is highly ambivalent. Each suggestion of (triumphant) release or escape is 
qualified. Despite his reassurance that "There was nothing which worried me", the 
narrator avers that his return home to Mabopane is far from unproblematic. His fear 
"that getting back to Mabopane' s dusty roads would lead me to suffer" is born out in 
the apparently incoherent sentence within which it is contained. This sentence 
continues with the qualification "but eating alone was almost more than I could bear" 
(my emphasis). Despite the earlier assertion that "Many people were happy to visit 
me as they knew I was a peace-lover and didn't drink or smoke" (75), no mention is 
made of companionship. Instead the narrator appears not only as incoherent and 
lonely, but pathologically afraid of such loneliness. His repetition of the reassurance 
that he has made a new start ("I learned to forget yesterdays and to think of 
tomorrows. Each morning in the township, I said to myself: 'Today is a new life'") 
seems hollow, in particular when read with the following repeated assertions: "/know 
now that I shall never be afraid of sleeping under a tree alone. . . . I know now that I 
can live one day at a time . ... " (75-76; my emphasis). The repetition of such 
assertions (that the narrator has overcome fear and gained wisdom) would seem to 
suggest that this is not the case at all. Moreover, this apparent freedom at home is 
further qualified by the slightly earlier assertion that "Even I was happy. If suffering 
means happiness I am happy" (73). 
Even if the narrator has gone home to Mabopane, then, the return home is far 
from unproblematic. This is something already suggested by the ambiguous opening 
of"Man Against Himself'- it is unclear what the referent of"where" in the following 
passage is: 
He must work before the sun goes down. The life of a man is very heavy in 
his bones and his future is a deep unknown grave. 
One day when I was alone, struggling to get money, and far away from 
my home where no one lives or grows, I met a man from Zululand called 
Dlongolo. 
(53) 
It is not really clear from this passage whether "where" refers to "far away" or to 
"home". A reading of "home" as a dismal place "where no one lives or grows" is 
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particularly persuasive in view of the last story of the collection, where the narrator's 
family is described as living in complete destitution (cf. 87ff) and with little scope for 
the kind of enriching life which results in "growth". This is also suggested with 
respect to life on the farm, where there is "little progress" (14) and life in the 
township: "Life at home was really like at hell" (40). Life at home, far from 
appearing as a self-enclosed world enabling self-satisfaction, does seem to be life in a 
place "where no one lives or grows". 
Even if this passage were not to describe home itself, what it would 
nonetheless underscore is the condition of not being at home. Even if it were not to 
be home "where no one lives or grows", then this phrase would still describe where 
the narrator is, which would in any event describe his absence from home, security 
and domesticity. That is, either the narrator at home is at a dismal place, or he is not 
at home at all. Instead, as I have shown, he is an alienated, suffering man. 
Homelessness thus appears as the condition of the narrator/protagonist of Life 
at Home. The title of the collection is deeply ironic: Medupe leaves his home, the 
farm, and never returns to the farm. (Of course, the farm is shown in the first two 
stories not to have been properly a home at all.) Life at home is life on the road. The 
journey has no end, and home is an alien place. The collection depicts the pathos of a 
wandering and consequently suffering protagonist. This suffering leads to the 
breakdown of narrative on the most literal level: the border between reality and fiction 
is disrupted as a result of the hallucinatory consequences of suffering. 
Whether one considers "Man Against Himself' in isolation (as Ndebele was 
forced to) or in the context of the collection, the apparently "triumphant" note on 
which the story ends has a false note to it. 57 The ending of the story is not really an 
escape from the hallucination resulting from suffering. The suffering Medupe 
experiences on the mine is merely a prelude to insanity and hallucination, and if the 
ending of the story is triumphant at all, then this is an interlude between the suffering 
and hallucination of this story and that of the final two. In view of this deep-seated 
rootlessness, Ndebele's celebration of "Man Against Himself' as an exemplification 
of the ordinary becomes questionable. The man described in the story, instead of 
emerging out of his 'initiation' intact, is deeply split, as suggested by the title of the 
story. Indeed, I have been arguing that the story is concerned with the disruption of 
the self by an alterity within, an alterity bordering on the experience of madness. 
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Madness is figured even more explicitly in "Carelessman was a Madman" (the 
story which immediately follows "Man Against HimselP'). This story, bewilderingly, 
if one reads Life at Home as a text evincing a measure of narrative teleology, as it 
does as a result of its centripetal tendencies (as discussed in 5.6 [above]), seems to 
interrupt the unit consisting of the first four stories in its radical difference from those 
stories. These stories form a unit, given their similar narrative technique (each, apart 
from "Life at Home", is predominantly a first-person narrative), as well as the fact 
that the same protagonist occurs in each and that his fortunes are traced in a more-or-
less linear way as he moves with his family from the farm to the city in order to work. 
If "Carelessman was a Madman" disrupts the (admittedly shaky) teleological 
tendency of the first four stories by introducing another protagonist (Mr David 
Letshwene [77]), then it is restored only to an extent in the last story, "My Ugly 
Face", with the return of Joel!Medupe to the narrative. At the end of the collection 
Medupe asserts "My name is Medupe", and his interlocutor replies "My lost son, I am 
your mother" (96). However, even though the return to the mother might signify a 
return home, the collection ends without reaching its end, namely home. 58 This is 
made clear in the final sentences of the collection: "Then she took me on her back, 
like a small hitch-hiker, and we returned to South East. On the way while I was on 
her back I slept and she just kept on going' (96; my emphasis). 
Even if "Carelessman was a Madman" serves to interrupt the degree of 
narrative cohesion created in the first four stories, there are nevertheless links between 
this story and the earlier ones. The locale remains broadly that of the Pretoria region, 
with its references to Winterveldt (77), Moretele (77) and Hammanskraal (78). And, 
importantly, the story is linked to "Man Against HimselP' in its elaboration of the 
notion of madness, something suggested in the passage discussed at length above. 
Despite Medupe's complete absence from the narrative, there are markers of 
similarity between him and the protagonist of that story (such as the Scotch tie each 
wears [cf 72, 78]). Moreover, this character is linked to Mr Matlou and family's 
escape from the farm by being described with exactly the same phrase: "The man just 
disappeared with the water and was never seen again" (86, cf 35; my emphasis). 
This is to say, at the considerable risk of over-simplification, that the form of 
Life at Home moves from specificity to generality, from a broadly centripetal to a 
centrifugal cycle. There seems to be a tendency within the collection away from a 
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broadly realist aesthetic to a disruption of the assumptions underpinning such a mode 
in the last two stories. s9 The point needs to be made, of course, that the first stories of 
the collection by no means fit snugly into such an aesthetic. Nor, as I indicated in the 
previous section, are they simply a continuation of the farm novel. As I noted there, 
the farm novel is disrupted in, among other ways, the magic realism of certain 
episodes of Life at Home. But the last two stories make even less sense in terms of a 
realist aesthetic, blending as they do what seem to be elements of realism - as well as 
links with earlier stories - with respectively madness and magical elements. 
In the previous section I already devoted some attention to one such instance 
of magic realism in "Farm-boy", that pertaining to the attack on Medupe by the 
Moloi. Another apparently magical moment occurs during the strange episode when 
Matlou and his family steal away from the farm to Boekenhoutfontein. The episode is 
rendered odd by the language used there, which tends towards a distortion (or 
supplementation) of reality. Oddly, Matlou and his family are described as 
"[breaking] into the jail and the daring escape was made" (35~ my emphasis). The 
preposition "into" could be an instance of what I have termed 'foreignising 
translation', and thus an othering mechanism, or it could signify that Matlou and his 
family are not really escaping. 60 After the escape, they are described as "bandits ... 
on the run. Detectives are watching on TV2. But Matlou's family is never seen 
again" (35). It is not only as if the family's disappearance from the farm is described 
as a disappearance from the face of the earth, but as if- magically - their escape is 
itself recorded by means of a massive surveillance system, something which would 
seem evocative of magic realism in the deadpan assertion of this improbability (and 
further suggests that the family is, in an almost Kafkaesque way, imbricated with 
apartheid bureaucracy). 
In itself, "Carelessman was a Madman" is not magical, but its central figure 
nonetheless engages in extraordinary behaviour, reported repeatedly: "I tell you, he 
used to chew his pillow until 3.30 a.m" (77~ cf. 80, 82). The story in the collection 
which is most markedly magical is "My Ugly Face". In the night, "At about two 
o'clock in he morning", Medupe is raped by "an animal like an ape": 
The animal approached us and touched my forehead. After that the animal 
started to kiss me nicely like a person. It put its tongue inside my mouth and I 
even started to exchange kisses with it. It was dark. It was a female animal. 
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It touched me all over my body and wanted to undress me. It acted like a 
perso~ and lay on .top of me. It was serious with my body. Time and again 1 
was ktssed. My fnends looked on without helping me. 
(91) 
In this episode the borders between human and animal, as much as between the 
plausible and the improbable, the credible and magical, appear to blur. Indeed, the 
otherness of this episode is stressed, as elsewhere in Life at Home, by means of the 
deadpan way (itself a trait of magic realism, as noted above) in which it is 
encountered: 
Then the animal grew tired and it started to move back into the bush. We 
stood up and ran away. On the road at about five o'clock in the morning I 
found that my trousers in front were wet with the animal's work. It was a 
surprise to find that the animals in South East want to sleep with human 
beings. 
(91) 
After Medupe' s friend, his "right hand" (95) dies, he is alone. He decides to return to 
South East camp, his home of homelessness "where my mother had left me alone, 
with people I did not know" (95). During his journey, Medupe "never slept on the 
road during the night because I knew that female animals would rape me 
continuously. I didn't want to father an animal child" (95-96). Medupe's friend has 
died as a result of having been attacked by rats: "At the middlenight we heard things 
biting our toes" (94). Medupe and his friend, strangely, hear rather than feel the bites. 
After they wake up (which they had not done while their toes were being bitten 
because "Our sleep was heavy ... and the biting did not hurt us" [94]), the friend 
starts complaining about the pain in his toes and body and Medupe discovers "that all 
his nails were gone and blood was coming out" (94). Eventually, "big rats came out 
from under the jersey fast, like a rolling stone" (94). The friend "fell slowly onto the 
floor, like a wanted man who had been shot by police, or a cowboy in a film" (94-95). 
As should be clear from these examples, commonplace assumptions with 
regard to the nature of 'reality' are overturned: reality and magic blur. Furthermore, 
supposedly commonsensical expectations concerning the linearity of time and space 
are overturned. In this story, "the hemisphere we know" of"Man Against Himself' is 
transcended through the compression of time and space. Medupe is born, carried by 
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his mother, grows up, journeys, and is carried off by his mother again, all within a 
couple of pages, while the locale is an unspecified place called South East camp not 
far from Zimbabwe. The reader is told, "We decided to walk to the capital city, which 
was very far away" (89). But no indication is give~ of which capital this may be. The 
infinite (or at least nonspecifiable) time and space of this last story, with the 
consequent dizzying and hallucinatory sense of the indefinite, contrasts starkly with 
the regionalised, indeed domesticated, landscaped setting of the farm novel as well as, 
to a degree, of the earlier stories. 
In Life at Home, then, the apparent totality of the farm novel is opened to the 
perspective of the infinity of otherness. The protagonist is homeless at home; he does 
not arrive home at the end of the collection; the real is disrupted in moments of 
madness, hallucination and magic, all of which exceed "the hemisphere we know". 
All this may be taken to imply that Life at Home interrupts the teleology of nation 
shown by Noyes to be so clearly imbricated with narrative: Medupe' s suffering is 
suffering with no end and no resolution. Instead, this collection confirms Noyes's 
(1997: 35) speculation that "Perhaps the only story that can be told about a person and 
a nation is the story of leaving a place which was never home in search of an unseen 
place which is; and the story of departing and returning home to find everything 
different and everything the same". 
Infinite alterity disrupts the supposed totality of narrative teleology and makes 
closure impossible. As such, Matlou's work may be said to open out the flattened 
narratives of the self evident in the farm novel, a form dependent on the occlusion of 
otherness - in particular, of the black labourer - for its efficacy relative to the 
narrative of nation. One might add, finally, that Matlou's work also disrupts 
Ndebele's conception of irony within this disruption of the teleology of nation, in 
particular as evident in the farm novel. Ndebele's conception of irony, as I have 
argued, may be characterised as being premised on a view of irony which understands 
it as offering closure by transcending contradiction. But the irony to be found in 
Matlou's work does not work incorporatively. Rather, one might say that it dislodges 
the tropicality of autobiographical prosopopoeia and unsettles its closure. Matlou's 
work, in dislodging the tropicality of the farm novel (as much as of autobiography), 
and in unsettling its teleological movement towards closure premised on an organic, 
nostalgic, inherited relation to the land, may aptly be read not as employing irony as 
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much as generating it. This is to claim that Life at Home's relation to the farm novel 
may be defined in terms of irony, if not the irony to be found in Ndebele's aesthetic. 
Irony in Matlou's stories can be linked to questions of identity involving self and 
other, questions which are imbricated with issues of form. This is evident in the 
disruption of the narrative line and its concomitants, linear time and space in Life at 
Home. Matlou's work disrupts linearity by establishing what might be called an 
'aesthetic of the sphere',
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thus also opening the reader to an otherness within. In this 
regard, Pechey's (1998: 67) recent comment vis-a-vis J. M. Coetzee might as well 
apply to Matlou: 
Coetzee is a textual exile who nonetheless lives at home; his aesthetic 
migration is exactly the very precondition of his ethical engagement with 
exactly where he is. . . . Reading him, the world becomes for us politically 
and culturally - and not just geographically - a sphere, a surface upon which 
any point is a centre. 
Similarly, in Matlou's work life at home ironically signifies a migrancy at the heart of 
domesticity; within the supposed linearity of narratives are always to be found the 
absences of others. In its interruption of the farm novel without establishing a new, 
enclosable narrative, Life at Home may be said to propose an endless narrative sphere 
"upon which any point is a centre" rather than a plane which may be interrupted, or 
inverted, at any point before still attaining its end. 
5.9 Notes 
I Elsewhere, Brink more explicitly discusses Matlou's work vis-a-vis Ndebele's 
emphasis on the 'ordinary' (see 1993: 52ff.). I consider the importance of 
peasant experience and urbanisation in more detail in my discussion . of 
Ndebele' s aesthetic and its appropriation of Matlou in the section whtch 
follows, and return to this point in my discussion of Life at Home vis-a-vis the 
farm novel. 
2 In this regard, Coetzee's scepticism about criticism is worth bearing in mind: 
"But what is criticism, what can it ever be, but either a betrayal (the usual 
case) or an overpowering (the rarer case) of its object? How often is there an 
equal marriage?" (1992e: 61). Derek Attridge's postulation is that "an equal 
marriage" is not possible, but that a "new, unpredictable, singular, creative act, 
as an inventive event in its tum, can do justice to a literary work as a literary 
work" (1999: 27). 
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3 The essays concerned are "Turkish Tales and Some Thought~ on South 
African Fiction" (cf. 1991: 33) and "The Rediscovery of the Ordmary: Some 
New Writings in South Africa" (1991a: 47-48, 50-54). 
4 In addition Ndebele's celebration ofMatlou must also, crucially, be related to 





See Chapter 3 (3.2.3, 3.3.1) for a discussion of irony and narrative. 
Morphet's discussion is a response specifically to Sachs's positi~n paper 
"Preparing Ourselves for Freedom" (1990). In his response to thts paper, 
Morphet relates Sachs's work to an essay by Ndebele which predates it, 
"Redefining Relevance" (1991b). Despite Morphet's focus on these papers 
only, his discussion has broader implications for Ndebele's aesthetic. 
See Chapter 2 (2.2.1) for a discussion ofNew Critical assumptions as regards 
irony. 
8 See above, Chapter 1, for a discussion of the critical dismissal of irony, where 
I show that Chapman makes a similar move. In fact, as I indicate there, 
Chapman's view of irony (a view which he sets up in order to reject irony) is 
not very far removed from that ofNdebele. 
9 Similarly, Peter Hom (1993: 14) points out that Ndebele neglects to recognise 
that '"realism' is a highly problematic concept, that the nature of 'reality' rests 
on a number of unqueried assumptions". This problematic acceptance of the 
notions 'realism' and 'reality' implies quite a stark opposition between what 
seems real and what does not, without, however, asking "why certain things 
appear 'natural' or 'realistic' to us, and others not". 
10 In addition, it serves as another reason to question Ndebele's assimilation of 
Matlou for his aesthetic. Right at the start of the text, the category 'real' 
appears problematic when the reader is told "It all started like a dream, when I 
was a farm-boy near the Magaliesberg mountain" (Matlou 1991: 11). The 
entire text of Life at Home thus stands in the sign of the unreal or, at least, the 
dreamlike. 
11 This move beyond Ndebele clearly does not mean to imply a cancellation of 
his project. On the contrary, it might be construed as a continuation of that 
project if the latter can be characterised as a call "for a post-heroic culture of 
irony" (Pechey 1998: 57). 
12 It may be interesting parenthetically to note here that Attridge's formulation 
would situate his approach firmly within a Romantic, post-Schillerian idiom in 
that it emphasises the coincidence oftheory and practice. Sychrava (1989: 51) 
dismisses such coincidence of theory and practice as "contrived" and defines it 






Schi~leria~ heritage of critical theory. See Chapter 2 for a more detailed 
constderatton of Sychrava's notion that irony is a sentimental phenomenon. 
In the chapter on Coetzee's Age of Iron I examine more closely the relation 
between the reader and the text in terms of respect for and trust of otherness. 
One might argue that Matlou, in his disruption of narrative as evident in the 
form of Life at Home, moves beyond narrative. See my discussion below 
(5.8). 
D:iver's contention, of course, explicitly involves the notion of canonicity. 
Life at Home seems uncontainable within the canon of South African 
literature. That is, it would seem resistant to attempts- like that ofNdebele-
to incorporate it into a canon, something which would imply the reduction of 
its otherness. See Attridge ( 1994) for a discussion of otherness and the canon. 
See also my brief discussion below of' foreignising translation'. 
As should be evident from Driver's statement, she relates the strangeness of 
Matlou' s work explicitly to the language he uses. Indeed, it is through the 
form of the words and the way he uses them that the "magical quality" of his 
work may appear. Driver thus implies a link between the language of Life at 
Home and its strangeness, which she defines as "magical". This might suggest 
that Matlou' s work evinces characteristics of so-called magic realism, 
something picked up as well, in fact, by other critics (Brink 1998a: 26-27; 
Chapman 1996: 376). 
Magic realism might offer an intriguing link between Matlou's work 
and Ndebele's aesthetic, in particular as far as the provenance of Ndebele's 
key terms 'ordinary' and 'spectacular' is concerned. Scott Simpkins points 
out that "the inception of magic realism" may be traced to "a reaction to the 
'blind alley' of photographic realism. . . . Realism, in effect, produces a text 
plagued by the ordinary, the too real. And imagination, another aspect of the 
'real,' is given short shrift at best. As Borges' narrator in 'The Secret Miracle' 
says, compared with his imagination, 'the reality was less spectacular. . . . "' 
(1988: 116; his ellipsis). Magic realism appears as an escape from the 
"ordinary" of photographic realism and towards the "spectacular" of the 
imagination. That is, as Simpkins (1988: 116) argues, "magic realism 
demonstrates its hopeful scheme to supplement the realistic text through a 
corrective gesture, a means to overcome the insuffiencies of realism (and the 
language used to ground realism)". But this spectacular nature of magic 
realism is doomed to failure if it is, indeed, an attempt at 'correcting' the real 
through supplementing it- it engages with the real on the terms of the latter by 
proffering a new "realism heightened by magic" (1988: 118). As a result, 
"there is undoubtedly something unsatisfactory about the strategy of magic 
realism .... " (1988: 117). 
It might be worthwhile considering more closely the dissatisfaction 
with the 'spectacular' quality of magic realism expressed by some its 
practitioners (cf Simpkins 1988: 117-118), and Ndebele's dissatisfaction with 
the spectacular nature of so-called 'protest' writing which results in surface 
217 
exteriority empty of deeper significance. This is not an avenue I have the 
space to explore, though the terms used here to de~cr.ibe magic realism do bear 
a striking similarity to those used by Ndebele. It ts Important to note! thoug?, 
the absence of the category 'magic realism' in Ndebele's essays co~s.tdered ~n 
this chapter, in particular as Matlou's. work wou~d seem to, exhtbt~ cert~n 
magical tendencies. The absence of thts category m Ndebele s consideratiOn 
of Matlou' s work is all the more glaring in view of the importance of peasant 
experience in both Ndebele's project and in magic ~ealism: Jame~on (1?86: 
302) identifies the latter in terms of "a kind of narrative raw matenal denved 
essentially from peasant society, drawing in sophisticated ways on the world 
ofvillage or even tribal myth". Jameson (1986: 302) does complicate this link 
between peasant experience and magic realism by noting "the problem of the 
political or mystificatory value, respectively, of such texts, many of which we 
owe to overtly left-wing or revolutionary writers .... ". 
See also note 46, below. 
17 See Ashcroft et. al. (1989: 7-8, 195-197) for a discussion of English and 
english(es). Walder (1998: 42-55) provides a recent summary of the politics 
of language use in postcolonial practice. 
18 See Venuti (1986; 1991) for a theoretical elaboration of 'foreignising 
translation'. 
See Derrida (1985, 1992a) for a consideration of the untranslatability 
of "the marked differences of languages" (1992a: 408) in a multilingual text, 
especially with respect to the consequent singularity and otherness of the text 
which appears in its resistance to translation. In principle, Life at Home would 
be an untranslatable text because of the multiplicity of languages in it. With 
reference to Celan's poem "In Eins", Derrida writes "What seems to bar the 
passage of translation is the multiplicity of languages in a single poem, all at 
once" (1992a: 399). 
19 With reference to Zoe Wicomb's You Can't Lost in Cape Town (1987), Sue 
Marais (1995: 42 note 5) notes that many short story cycles are met with 
"critical confusion". Thus Wicomb's text, which Marais persuasively argues 
should be taken as constituting a cycle of short fictions, was initially described 
by critics as episodes of a novel, a kind of Bildungsroman, and as being novel-
like. 
In my opening remarks to this chapter, I too of course use the term 
Bildungsroman with reference to Life at Home. 
20 See also Marais (1995). 
21 Coetzee defines transfer "as the rendering of (imagined) foreign speech in an 
English stylistically marked to remind the reader of the (imagined) foreign 
original" (1988b: 117). Thus Smith's relation to the English she lets her 
Afrikaans characters use is complex. 
This procedure may be compared to (or contrasted with) Matlou's use 
of 'foreignising translation', as discussed above. But it should be pointed out 
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that, to Coetzee, Smith's use of transfer and free indirect speech is a sign of 
her domestication of the Afrikaans language in order to "create in the echo 
chambe~ ofth: English pro~e tradition felicitous effects that cohere neatly with 
the Afrtkaner s myth of htmself as Israelite" (1988b: 126). That is, these 
techniques allow her to create a prose similar to that of the Authorised 
Version. Her domestication of Mrikaans enables her "to validate the 
homegrown Calvinist myth in which the Mrikaner has his type in the 
Israelite" (1988b: 118). (One might add that one of the most important 
examples of this would be Herman Charles Bosman.) Ridge (1983: 207) 
rejects this view and claims that Smith's rendering of Afrikaans in English 
unsettles the English reader's prejudices- a view which would allow one to 
consider Smith's use of transfer in terms of'foreignising translation'. 
22 The essays are "Farm Novel and Plaasroman" (1988), "The Farm Novels of C. 
M. van den Heever" (1988a) and "Simple Language, Simple People: Smith, 
Paton, Mikro" (1988b). See also Ampie Coetzee (1996: 134) for a summary 
of some of the characteristics of the farm novel, in particular with reference to 
its "closed-off unity" and pastoral nature. 
23 Driver (1990: ii) qualifies this by asserting that, "Like Olive Schreiner before 
her, Smith presented the farm as a pastoral retreat even while recognising the 
intellectual and moral dangers of life in an insular community". 
24 Coetzee refers to Schreiner (1982: 35, 38). 
25 Coetzee makes the point that "Pastoral in South Africa ... has a double tribute 
to pay. To satisfy the critics of rural retreat, it must portray labour; to satisfy 
the critics of colonialism, it must portray white labour" ( 1988c: 5). 
26 Elsewhere Driver asserts that Smith's stories contain "various analogical 
reverberations" (1990: xiii) which indirectly address racial issues: "Such 
political commentary remains, of course, deeply repressed in Smith's writing. 
But it is there" (1990: xii). Driver detects a tension in Smith's work between 
"critique and nostalgia" (1990: xv). 
Michael Chapman (1996: 189) notes the absence from much 'white 
writing' of racial issues. According to him, "few white writers of the 1920s 
and 1930s felt the need to devote attention to intrusive racial issues". Ampie 
Coetzee (1996: 139) traces this absence of the black people whose land has 
been taken by white farmers to contemporary farm novels: 
In the "speculative histories" (the words of Magda in In the Heart of 
the Country . . . ) of Coetzee and Schoeman and Etienne van Heerden 
... voices are conversing in silence, without human intercourse, about 
the past, about a story that has already ended - monologues moving 
through time. They have created themselves in words that alienate. 
And the servants, those who have no land, who have always said: 
"Mies is die mies", "Ja mies", "Dankie, mies"- their voices cannot be 
remembered .... 
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27 One might note here Mrs Curren's description, in Age of Iron, of a photograph 
in which she appears as a child. She ponders the absence of the (black) 
labourers from this photograph. The garden which is shown in the b~ckground 
must have been tended. Yet there is no evidence in this representation of the 
garden that this was the case. Mrs Curren speculates that, if the garden was 
tended not by her grandfather, then it was not rightfully his. The absent 
labourers are now remarkable in their absence: 
Who, outside the picture, leaning on their rakes, leaning on their 
spades, waiting to get back to work, lean also against the edge of the 
rectangle, bending it, bursting it in? 
Dies irae, dies ilia when the absent shall be present and the 
present absent. No longer does the picture show who were in the 
garden frame that day, but those who were not there. 
(Coetzee 1991: 102) 
Michael Marais ( cf. 1993: 2ff.; 1 0) has considered this passage in terms of the 
politics of representation. 
28 See Steward Crehan (1998) for a consideration of how land becomes 
landscape, in the course of a critique of Coetzee's 'rewriting of the land' as 
constituting both "a complex literary articulation" of the disavowal of 
ownership of the land and a subversion of the "kinds of discourse built around 
such an articulation" (1998: 5). 
29 Coetzee also qualifies his already quoted assertion that Smith's representation 
of the farm is a "regional answer'' to the crisis on the platte/and by stating 
parenthetically that "from [this] it does not necessarily follow that The Beadle 
is a regional novel" (1988: 69). 
30 I noted above the fact that the entire collection stands in the sign of the unreal 
and dreamlike (see note 10). I consider the hallucinatory nature of Life at 
Home at greater length below. 
31 In the later story he is specified as being Mr Matlou: information is posited, 
but subsequently amended, something which disrupts the reader's 
conceptualisation of characters, acts and events narrated in the text. 
Numbers in brackets without dates refer to Matlou (1991). 
32 I noted above the centrality of repetition-with-variation in the short story 
cycle. For an important consideration of the role of repetition in fiction, see 
Miller (1982). Miller's discussion is particularly pertinent to my consideration 
of Life at Home and, indeed, Kikoejoe and Age of Iron, in that he recognises 
the potentially hallucinatory effects of repetition (cf 1982: 6ff.). 











It. should go without saying that no aesthetic value judgment is implied here 
With respect to the novel or short story collection (or cycle) as genre. 
The name of this township might be significant in that it is also the name of 
Paul Kruger's farm (Kruger was an Afrikaner nationalist president of the old 
Zuid-Afrikaanse Republiek). That the Matlous move from one form of 
enslavement to another is suggested by their metaphorically moving from one 
farm (that of Baas Dick and the various other owners of the farm) to another (a 
to~ship ?amed after the farm of an Afrikaner hero). See note 38 and my 
consideratiOn below of the escape from the farm as an escape into apartheid 
bureaucracy. 
As I noted above (5.2), the process of urbanisation is implicit in Ndebele's 
work, too. See Graham Pechey (1998: 64ff.) for a discussion of Ndebele's 
project vis-a-vis the experience of urbanisation. Clearly this process is related 
to Ndebele's emphasis on peasant as opposed to urban experience. 
This initial use of the first-person narrative mode in "Life at Home" also links 
the story with the other first-person narratives in the collection, all of which 
are narrated by Medupe/Joel. While the stories are thus linked, in particular in 
terms of narrative mode, what I claim about the relation between "Life at 
Home" and "Farm-boy" also applies to the relation between "Life at Home" 
and subsequent (first-person) narratives: they are both linked and dissociated 
in terms of narrative mode. Moreover, one might argue that the first-person 
narratives are also linked to the two third-person narratives ("Life at Home" 
and "Carelessman was a Madman") as a result of the recurrence of aphorisms. 
See also note 33. 
This is confirmed later in the text. "Life at Home" is echoed in "Man Against 
Himself' when a friend tells Joel "This place is a jail" (61), referring to the 
mine. Thus the farm, from which the family escapes, and the mine are linked. 
Entrapment on the farm is followed not by liberation but by entrapment in the 
apartheid world outside the farm. 
Below I consider at greater length the date, as well as its importance in Life at 
Home. 
Levinas (1996d: 180 note 9) adds a footnote in which he explains that "The 
notion of anarchy introduced here precedes the political (or antipolitical) 
meaning popularly ascribed to it". 
A. Coetzee notes the paucity of texts dealing with farm life and the issue of 
land from the perspective of the dispossessed. As apparent from his claim that 
Plaatje's Native Life in South Africa (1916) "is also - as far as I know, in 
English (and I cannot judge in the other nine languages) - the only text 
concerning land and farming which could specifically be considered part of 






marginalised" (1996: 132; his italics), Coetzee seem_s unaw_are of Matlou's 
work and the degree to which it, precisely, concerns Itself w1th the farm and 
the land. 
This demeaning description of adults as children is reported more than once in 
Life at Home (cf. 12, 27, 50). For a considerati?n of the origins and ef!ects of 
such 'allochronism', see Fabian (1983). One might note that allochromsm has 
the effect of denying the 'embodied other' "coevalness as the problematic 
simultaneity of different, conflicting, and contradictory forms of 
consciousness" (Fabian 1983:146). According to Fabian, cultural difference is 
temporally simultaneous - it is coeval in a "radical contemporaneity" 
(1983:xi). It already grasps the other by situating her or him within another 
time which is circumscribed by and contained within the time of the self. This 
strategy is not to be confused with Levinas's insistence on the irreducible 
pastness of the other. The former precisely claims to incorporate the other 
within the present of the self by situating her or him within the past of the self. 
A fairly recent example of such an allochronic move is reported in the South 
African Sunday Independent. The British Telegraph's Stephen Glover called 
Nelson Mandela, during his trip to Britain, a "child of Empire [who] always 
believed in Western, especially British values" (Bliksem 1996:10; my 
emphasis). Glover is then quoted concluding the article in the following way: 
"Standing there in Westminster Hall, he may still see us a little with the eyes 
of a Tembu child, as being more important than we really are. But that is not 
really the reason why we like him so much. Even in criticising what we have 
done wrong, he offers us the forgiveness of a friend" (1996:10; my emphasis). 
But Levinas claims that the other can never be encompassed by the self 
and for this reason is always anterior to the attempt of the self to grasp the 
other. 
I have mentioned devices such as the deployment of languages other than 
English (Setswana, Afrikaans) and of an other English, as well as the form of 
the short story cycle, with apparent non sequiturs and logical slips such as the 
oscillation between third and first-person narrative in "Life at Home" 
discussed above. 
I must stress again that, despite my approach to Life at Home in terms of its 
'embodiment' of the black novel in the farm novel, this thesis is less 
concerned with 'embodied' (ethnic, gendered) others than with otherness 
itself. My argument in this chapter thus concerns less the giving of a face to 
an 'embodied' other (though this is doubtless an important point) than it does 
the degree to which otherness is figured in the text: the degree to which the 
reading self discovers the other in her or himself, and the degree to which the 
refusal to maintain a particular representation of the 'embodied' other ironises 
it. 
Even though all texts are 'dated', I would like to claim that specific dates and 
times are generally speaking of less importance, and accordingly less 
prominent, in the farm novel than in Life at Home. This is certainly the case 
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with respect to The Story of an African Farm, The Beadle and The Little 
Karoo, though one would have to consider other examples of both the farm 
novel and plaasroman before generalisations could be made with a measure of 
certai~ty. ~o~etheles~, thi~ relative lack of specificity as far as date (as well 
as, by tmphcatton, settmg) IS concerned has been noted by Coetzee and linked 
to the pastoral (or anti-pastoral) mode of the farm novel ( cf 1988: 64 ff. ), as 
quoted above (5.4) 
46 '!3Y 'magical.realism' I understand a mode ofwriting in which the supernatural 
Is presented m a deadpan way: the apparently abnormal is presented as normal, 
and magic lurks in the ordinary. Referring to his play We Shall Sing for the 
Fatherland, Mda (1997: 281) puts this as follows: 
. . . in this play the interaction between the living and the dead is 
presented in a matter-of-fact manner, in the mode of magic realism. In 
magic realism the supernatural is not presented as problematic, or as 
contradicting our laws of reason. It does not contradict empirical 
reality. It is not a matter of conjecture or discussion. It happens and is 
accepted by other characters and by the reader as an event. 
Mda interestingly relates his mode of writing to his experience of his culture 
as "magical". He also explicitly relates this magic to peasant culture in his 
opposition between urban and rural areas: 
I wrote in this manner from an early age because I am a product of a 
magical culture. In my culture the magical is not disconcerting. It is 
taken for granted. No one tries to find a natural explanation for the 
unreal. The unreal happens as part of reality. The supernatural is 
presented without judgement. A lot of my work is set in the rural 
areas, because they retain that magic, whereas the urban areas have lost 
it to Westernization". 
(Mda 1997: 281) 
See note 16 for a possible link between magical realism and Ndebele's 
aesthetic. 
47 Derrida plays with the double sense of"dated" by asking "How, then, can that 
which is dated, while at the same time marking a date, not date?" (1992a: 
390). The double structure of the date appears here: the date dates the poem 
both by marking its singularity, and it also makes the poem readable by 
inserting it into history, by dating it: " ... a poem dates if it ages, if it has a 
history, and is of a certain age" (1992a: 390). 
48 Of the three texts I consider in this thesis, only Age of Iron is explicitly dated 
("1986-89" [Coetzee 1991: 181]). Life at Home, of course, as noted above, 
consists of stories/chapters which initially appeared separately. Although both 
Age of Iron and Kikoejoe quite clearly stipulate the year in which the action of 




and of Kikoejoe 1960 (cf. van Heerden 1996: 1)-:- an~ although each text is 
dated to the extent that it commemorates event/s, m netther of these texts are 
dates and times as recurrently and explicitly mentioned as in Life at Home. 
That Coetzee' s comment with regard to his fiction is ironic, and ironic in 
terms of my use of the term in this thesis, seems to be the case with reference 
to his definition of stories in terms of irresponsibility ( cf. 1992a: 246). 
Coetzee seems to be warning readers of his work not to take it as adequate. If 
his work is, as Coetzee avers, a response to suffering, and if that response to 
suffering is inadequate (but "paltry, ludicrous defenses"), then the reader must 
be warned against taking it too seriously. Coetzee's work does not consist of 
totalities which would contain plenitudinous responses to the suffering of the 
other. Instead, as stories, they are irresponsible responses or, rather, as 
Coetzee qualifies, they exemplify "responsibility toward something that has 
not yet emerged" (1992a: 248). That is, one might argue that Coetzee's works 
interrupt their status as adequate, serious responses - apparently responsible 
responses. This seems to suggest, with Levinas, that any responsible response 
would have to take account of the infinite nature of responsibility for the 
suffering of the other. That is, perversely, in a radical sense no response is 
fully responsible, and all responses are to some extent irresponsible. And this 
implies that an apparently 'irresponsible' response, which ironically 
recognises its own inadequacy as response, might in fact be more responsible 
than an entirely serious response blind to its own inherent inadequacy. The 
language of irresolution, to this extent, might be more responsible than that of 
blind resolution. Elsewhere, in an interview which deals among other things 
with his directionlessness while studying in the US, Coetzee puts this as 
follows: "A real resolution would have been to hurl myself bodily into the 
anti-imperialist struggle (I use that language in a spirit of irony~ yet what other 
language is there?)" (1992d: 337). 
On suffering, the body, and writing, see also Coetzee's remarks in his 
"Jerusalem Acceptance Speech" (1992g: 98-99). 
A consideration of irony in terms of the philosophy/literature (or 
criticism/poetry) dichotomy would take us too far here (see Chapters 2 and 3). 
As should be evident from this sentence, as well as from the foregoing 
consideration of substitution, my discussion of the suffering of the protagonist 
of Life at Home does not necessarily suggest a link between that suffering (in 
terms of alienation) and Levinas's perspectives on substitution. In other 
words, I am not suggesting that it is only possible to engage in a 'Levinasian' 
analysis of suffering as otherness within the protagonist. As implied by my 
phrasing, suffering in Life at Home could be profitably read in terms both of 
'persecution' by or 'obsession' with the other, and of a Marxian or Sartrean 
analysis of alienation. However, I do not have the space in this thesis to 
devote extensive attention to such analysis. And my focus in this thesis is not 
on the question of alienation. I wish merely to draw attention here to possible 
contiguities between my analysis - which draws on Levinas's notion of 
substitution (and, indeed, its concomitant terms 'persecution' and 'obsession') 
in order to suggest an otherness within the reader which enforces her or his 
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substitution for the otherness being encountered ~ and Marxian and Sartrean 
analyses of suffering and alienation. 
51 Noyes (1997: 21) specifically situates his examination of the link between 
na!ion and narration vis-a-vis a collection of essays edited by Bhabha (1990). 
Wtth respect to the teleology of narrative as journey, see also Brink (1991: 7), 
who claims "the archetype of narrative is the journey or the quest". 
52 The celebration of the sedentary and exclusion of the nomadic are moreover 
characteristic of the farm novel, as I argued above (5.4). ' ' 
53 As I noted above, as a consequence of a number of self-reflexive moments 
Life at Home may be said to be presented as a fictionalised autobiography of 
Joel Matlou. 
54 This alterity within the self is quite independent from the status of the self as 
happy or satisfied, or otherwise. It is a structural alterity. 
55 In this respect, I quoted Frey in the previous chapter: "One tells one's life, not 
because one has a face, but in order to give one to oneself, and to preserve 
rather than to lose it. In autobiography the self is not given in advance, but 
only emerges as what the biography outlines" (Frey 1985: 124). 
56 Compare my discussion above of the link between madness and the 
persecution of the suffering self by the other in Levinas' s description of 
substitution. 
57 At the time of N debele' s consideration of "Man Against Himself' ( 1986), the 
collection Life at Home had of course not been published. Nevertheless, a 
consideration of this story within the context of the collection would serve 
only to confirm that Ndebele's attempt to appropriate Matlou for his project in 
terms of "Man Against Himself' is problematic. The story in itself, as I have 
shown, is far from unambiguous with respect to the triumph of its narrator-
protagonist. 
58 Clearly, this 'return to the mother' invites psychoanalytic consideration, m 
which I nonetheless do not wish to engage in this thesis. 
59 I have claimed that the early parts of the narrative evoke the farm novel in its 
depiction of the farm, albeit from the perspective of the workers rather than 
the master. 
60 On this point, see notes 35 and 38. 
61 I am indebted to Dennis Walder for this phrase. 
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Chapter 6 
Age of Iron: Confession, Irony and Otherness 
6.1 Introduction 
Mrs Curren is dead. The letter she writes to her absent daughter in America gives a 
face and voice to her through an autobiographical recounting of her last days. Upon 
her death, Mrs Curren leaves behind this confessional letter which, in being read, 
gives her voice. In re-presenting her, this letter allows the dead one to speak, if 
falteringly. As Mrs Curren is dead but lives again in the text of Age of Iron, her 
survival may be said not only to be textual but, above all, explicitly prosopopeic. 
That the novel is a prosopopoeia should be clear from the fact that Mrs Curren 
is dead. And that she lives on through her letter is suggested explicitly in the 
following passage: 
This is my life, these words, these tracings of the movements of crabbed digits 
over the page. These words, as you read them, if you read them, enter you and 
draw breath again. They are, if you like, my way of living on. Once upon a 
time you lived in me as once upon a time I lived in my mother; as she still 
lives in me, as I grow towards her, may I live in you. 
(120i 
This letter from the dead enables the survival of the dead within the living who read(s) 
it. It functions as a face for that which has no face; as such, the text is a death mask 
for Mrs Curren. A dead person has no face and, therefore, any face returned to her 
would have to be a mask. Nonetheless, this text-as-death-mask allows the dead to 
assume the face of the living. If the prosopopoeia gives a face to the absolutely other, 
then this amounts to a reduction of the otherness of that absolutely other entity: the 
reader, in reading Age of Iron, might appear to get to know Mrs Curren, not only to 
'see' her but through her and thus, in a sense, to have access to her being. Yet Mrs 
Curren, in her absolute alterity as a dead person who, moreover, as a character in a 
fiction, has never been, is irreducibly other and radically resists its reduction. It is for 
this reason that the prosopopoeia that is Age of Iron is, and must be, interrupted 
continuously. 
One way in which this particular prosopopoeia is interrupted relates to its 
confessional nature. Age of Iron is a novel which thematises confession and which, 
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occasion engages in what she explicitly calls confessing (cf 67, 124-125, 150-151, 
178).
2 
Thus characterised as a confessional text, the ending of Age of Iron should 
hold the promise of absolution, as confessions do. Indeed, a number of critics have 
argued that Mrs Curren is saved at the end of Age of Iron. 
Thus, in her discussion of Vercueil, Susan VanZanten Gallagher posits this 
character as the instrument ofMrs Curren's salvation: 
As he listens, he prompts and facilitates the story. And while telling and 
writing that story, Mrs. Curren saves her soul. 
With Mr. Vercueil' s silent assistance, she learns that one cannot earn 
salvation, but one can accept grace. By giving her confession to Mr. Vercueil 
to deliver and by relying on his physical care in her final days, Mrs. Curren 
puts her life into the derelict's hands .... [In] her naming of 'mutual election', 
Mrs. Curren has found a final peace for her soul. She no longer fears 'Dies 
irae, dies ilia', the day of wrath which will reduce the age to ashes, as 
described in the traditional requiem mass. Instead, her death will bring 
release, and she envisions herself becoming ash and blowing away. 
(1991: 204; my emphasis) 
The optimism evident from this citation is striking. Also striking is the absence of 
any detailed textual analysis to support Gallagher's optimism regarding Mrs Curren's 
fate (or the fate of her soul). Instead, Gallagher seems to fall back on Calvinist 
notions of election and predestination, which she rather unconvincingly (and certainly 
without supporting textual evidence) attributes to Mrs Curren. The reference to 
"mutual election" (179) in my view misses the complexities of Mrs Curren's and 
Vercueil's relationship. This phrase seems to me to suggest the fortuitousness, 
indeed, haphazardness, of their meeting and relationship, something intimated when 
Vercueil responds to Mrs Curren's question why he chose her by admitting that he did 
not? The only reason he came to her house was because "You didn't have a dog" and 
"I thought you wouldn't make trouble" (169). Initially Mrs Curren feels that Vercueil 
has chosen her, that she is a chosen one, with all the religious and quasi-mystical 
associations this entails (which might be linked to the idea that Vercueil might be an 
angel). But, in a characteristic gesture, she dismisses the idea that she has been 
chosen by Vercueil as soon as she articulates it: "But I did not choose him. He chose 
me. Or perhaps he merely chose the one house without a dog. A house of cats" (II). 
And, of course, so it happens to be, as Vercueil in the end admits (169). It should also 
be noted that, right from the start, Mrs Curren disavows the possibility that Vercueil 
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be noted that, right from the start, Mrs Curren disavows the possibility that Vercueil 
might be an angel (cf 12ff.). Far from being an Angel of Death; a harbinger of 
salvation, or an agent of an electing God, Vercueil is simply a homeless person with a 
dog. This is not to deny that Vercueil is associated in the novel by Mrs Curren with 
an angelic messenger (cf 28, 44, 146, 153). But she explicitly disavows such 
associations even as she draws them: "Vercueil has disappeared again, leaving the dog 
behind. A pity about Vercueil. No Odysseus, no Hermes, perhaps not even a 
messenger. A circler-around" (128). Indeed, it is part of my argument in this chapter 
that Mrs Curren continuously interrupts the conceptualisations she makes of others.
4 
A reading such as that of Gallagher cited above, despite referring to "the ambiguous 
Mr. Vercueil" (1991: 203), too easily assimilates characters like Vercueil (but also 
Mrs Curren and, in fact, the novel itself) into a Calvinist moralism. 
Like Gallagher, Benita Parry believes that Mrs Curren is saved in Age of Iron. 
She reaches this conclusion in terms of her indictment of this novel in particular, and 
of Coetzee's fiction in general, as "dissipat[ing] the engagement with political 
conditions it also inscribes" (Parry 1998: 164). Parry's condemnation of Age of Iron 
is formulated on the basis of her belief that the novel intimates salvation for Mrs 
Curren while refusing to hold out hope for a better social future. It is worthwhile 
quoting this passage at some length: 
A novel which speaks an intimacy with death was welcomed in reviews as an 
allegory where the narrator's affliction with cancer is a figure of a diseased 
body politic- and certainly this is a connection which her rhetoric insistently 
makes. But since the narrative of Mrs Curren's dying occupies a different 
discursive space from the story of South Africa's bloody interregnum, her 
terminal illness is detached from the demise of a malignant social order~ while 
her salvation, effected by Vercueil, the tramp-as-figure-of-deliverance who 
ensures that in the disgraceful state of the old South Africa she will die in a 
state of grace, also draws attention to the absence of any prospect of another, 
transfigured social order. This withholding of a gesture to the politics of 
fulfilment in a novel which does intimate a personal redemption is made all 
the more conspicuous because the aspiration of the oppressed for 
emancipation detaches the narrator from an attachment to a liberal-humanist 
ethic~ and the text's refusal to countenance the hope for a tomorrow . . . is 
perhaps the strongest signification yet of the fiction's urge to mark its 
disengagement from the contingencies of a quotidian world in transition from 
colonialism. 
(Parry 1998: 162-163~ my emphasis) 
228 
As is the case with the Gallagher passage cited above, there is a surprising lack of 
textual detail in evidence here which would support the notion that Mrs Curren at the 
end of the novel will enjoy "salvation", "deliverance" or "personal redemption". This 
is despite the lengths to which Parry goes in order to make her point about Coetzee's 
alleged separation of the private and the public, the personal and the political, a point 
which seems to depend on the notion that Mrs Curren is saved. It seems simply 
inadequate and unconvincing to state in categorical fashion that this is "a novel which 
does intimate a personal redemption" if this rather important aspect of the argument is 
made without any referencing (or indeed arguing) to substantiate why this should be 
the case. 
Parry phrases this critique of Coetzee in terms of his alleged refusal to give 
voice to the ethnic other, yet at one and the same time indulging - in both Age of Iron 
and In the Heart of the Country- in feigning woman's writing: 
But why does a male novelist take the risk of simulating woman's speech, 
indeed her self-constitution in language . . . while this same white novelist 
refrains from dissembling the voices of those excluded from the dominant 
discourse (where such voices are audible, their status as written by a white 
narrator is made apparent), instead elevating their silence as the sign of a 
transcendent state? 
(1998: 158) 
According to Parry, "the effects of bestowing authority on the woman's text, while 
withholding discursive skills from the dispossessed, is [sic] to reinscribe, indeed re-
enact, the received disposal of narrative power, where voice is correlated with cultural 
supremacy and voicelessness with subjugation" (1998: 158). Coetzee's fiction in 
effect merely reinscribes (white) cultural supremacy. 
David Attwell, in his accomplished rejoinder to Parry's contention that 
Coetzee's novels do not engage with (ethnic) otherness, in effect argues the contrary 
case (of course, I simplify somewhat here). According to him, there are numerous 
interlocutors "in Parry's sense" (1998: 168) to whom Mrs Curren speaks and who 
speak to her, and there is a sense of political fulfilment in Coetzee' s work ( 1998: 177-
178). But Attwell does not address in more detail the apparent inconsistency in 
Coetzee's fiction pointed out by Parry (the eschewal of giving voice to the ethnic 
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other, while, simultaneously, speaking as a woman). That is, Attwell does not draw 
attention to the possibly problematic fact that Mrs Curren is a female narrator.s 
While he does not specifically address the question of gender, Marais's 
approach to Coetzee's fiction in terms of its refusal to 'embody' otherness (cf. Marais 
1998: 52) seems perhaps the most fruitful avenue for a possible response to the 
question of gender raised by Parry. Marais examines Coetzee's deployment of 
Blanchot's treatment of the Orpheus myth in both Age of Iron (cf. 1997: 293ff.) and 
The Master of Petersburg (cf. 1997: 321ff.), and develops this examination in order to 
argue that Coetzee's refusal to attempt to represent the other amounts to a 'looking 
away', a 'shutting' of the eyes in the very process of meta-representationally 
approaching the other (cf. 1998: 49ft). The gaze towards the other is averted, that is, 
in terms of the terminology I have been using in this thesis, disrnpted even as it 
occurs. The representation of the other, which is called for and remains inevitable, is 
interrupted as it is posited. The articulation by the narrator of her intercourse with 
otherness is put in question in the act of articulation. 
At least two instances of such 'looking away', of this 'averted gaze', may be 
cited. The first is the self-consciously fictionalised representation by Mrs Curren of 
Florence and William's time together after Mrs Curren has left them. Mrs Curren 
describes what they do, as if she were an observer. But even as she provides this 
representation she asserts it while subverting it by claiming "All of this happened. All 
of this must have happened" ( 40; my emphasis). This representation of what others 
do is presented as if Mrs Curren were an omniscient third-person narrator, and thus is 
lent a certain objectivity which might be said to elide otherness. But the self-
conscious way in which Mrs Curren draws attention to her narrating act is an anti-
illusionist ploy to relativise that act and its representation as representation.6 As 
Attwell notes in his consideration of this passage, "despite the stark otherness 
registered by Mrs Curren when she confronts the material base of urban black life, she 
refuses to allow it to condition her apprehension of Florence's world entirely" (1998: 
169; my emphasis). 
The second example of this procedure concerns the death of 'John'. Marais 
has considered this passage at length (cf. 1998: 50ff.). The point I wish to make is 
simply that Mrs Curren represents the moment of death without representing it. She 
quite self-consciously describes her imagining the boy's death by stating that "He is 
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with me or I am with him: him or the trace of him" (159). Mrs Curren represents not 
'John' but- as other (moreover, as absolutely, radically other because he is dead)-
his "trace". She describes herself as being "here in my bed but ... there in Florence's 
room too" ( 159). Mrs Curren is and is not a present observer of' John' as "beside him 
I stand or hover" (159). As Mrs Curren describes what she sees, she acknowledges 
that she sees nothing. Or, rather, she acknowledges that what she sees she sees 
because she does not see: it is only because she is refusing to represent the scene that 
she can represent it in its otherness at all: "His eyes are open and mine, though I write, 
are shut. My eyes are shut in order to see" ( 159). The representation of the other and 
of the other's death necessarily elides otherness. It is only ever through a ~efusal to 
represent otherness - by 'shutting' one's eyes - that otherness can be represented. 
The 'shutting' of the eyes, as that which enables writing the other, problematises the 
written representation of the other. It offers itself not as a representation, but as a 
non-representation. 7 
Similarly, one might argue that the positing of Mrs Curren's voice ts 
interrupted as it occurs. As I go on to indicate, this is certainly the case as far as her 
authority - in particular, her authority as the subject of a confessional narrative- is 
concerned. One might foreseeably extend this claim with reference to Mrs Curren's 
status as a female narrator, though, as pointed out above, this is not my aim at this 
point. I therefore leave Parry's objection and a possible response to it in abeyance 
with the final observation that, possibly, the interruption of the elision of otherness 
through representation in Age of Iron might (self-reflexively) interrupt any 
representation, or speaking on behalf of, including Coetzee' s speaking as a woman. 
A final critic who considers the novel as entailing redemption for Mrs Curren 
is David Attwell who, in an interview with Coetzee, suggests that Mrs Curren is 
released by death: "What releases Elizabeth, finally, is death; in fact, the pact she 
enters into (or allows herself to fall into) with her Angel of Death, the derelict 
Vercueil, seems increasingly to represent the promise of absolution as the novel 
develops" (Coetzee 1992a: 249-250; my emphasis). Coetzee responds to this 
assertion by countering as follows: "As for your question about absolution for 
Elizabeth, the end of the novel seems to me more troubled (in the sense that the sea 
can be troubled) than you imply" (Coetzee 1992a: 250). 
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I wish to argue, against what must be characterised as the optimistic (if 
nuanced) readings of Age of Iron by Gallagher, Parry and Attwell, that Mrs Curren's 
fate is by no means clear, just as her confession - upon which the absolution to which 
Attwell refers would be premised - is not uncomplicated. It is not certain at all 
whether she enjoys redemption. The novel seems to me, as I shall argue below, to 
imply the opposite of salvation or, at the very least, to suspend the question of 
whether Mrs Curren is saved in view both of an ending which is enigmatic and 
undecidable and a narrative which is confessional but incomplete. Instead of being a 
narrative of hope or despair, the novel seems to complicate just such supposedly 
discrete alternatives. 
In a perceptive reading of the novel, Marais (1993) manages to suggest the 
complexities involved in making sense of the novel and, consequently, of its effect. 
Initially he argues that Age of Iron "is ultimately an optimistic novel" (1993: 6) 
because Mrs Curren "is aware of the idea of an alternative, ethical community" ( 1993: 
7). However, this initial optimism is tempered in Marais's interrogation of the 
possibility of attaining such an alternative by means of the novel. He asserts that 
"Age of Iron is haunted by a sense of its own social insignificance" (1993: 22). The 
novel is thus "ontogenetic" (1993: 16). Marais later develops and complicates this 
notion vis-il-vis Age of Iron as a novel evincing "ontogenetic anxiety" (1997: 342), a 
crucial insight to which I return below. Nonetheless, Marais (1997: 303) continues to 
claim that Age of Iron is, ultimately, optimistic. According to him, Age of Iron may, 
in Levinasian terms, be characterised as an 'ethical work'. He thus claims that "The 
generous movement of the novel involves an absolution, rather than loss, of self'. 
This is a claim which I treat with scepticism in this chapter. 8 I would like to argue, 
instead, that the novel seems to tend towards uncertainty and undecidability, as 
suggested by, for instance, Derek Attridge. In an examination of Age of Iron, Attridge 
{1994: 254) has characterised it in terms of its undecidable play "between two 
alternatives, the naturalizing and the allegorizing". As Attridge argues, "Rather than 
oscillating between naturalization and allegorization, the novel stages both these 
modes ofwriting and reading simultaneously and undecidably" (1994: 254; cf 1994a: 
68-69). 
In any event, whether the novel might be argued to lead to redemption or not -
even if one were merely to claim that the text is a vehicle for Mrs Curren's 
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redemption, with her possibly "living on" (120) in the reader(s) of the novel - this 
survival is itself made radically uncertain because of its explicit dependence for 
delivery, and thus possibly deliverance, on an undependable other.9 As Marais (1997: 
343) notes, the delivery of the letter is dependent on "an unreliable inebriate, 
Vercueil". In subjecting her confession to Vercueil- as well as to the reader(s) of the 
text - Mrs Curren in effect renders uncertain the redemptive potential of her 
confession, and possibly of all confession. Moreover, the necessary suspension of 
truth, in terms of its provisional status, in secular confession should give one pause 
before asserting the unambiguous redemption of Mrs Curren. 
I would now like to tum to a closer examination of the phenomenon of 
confession in order to explore this claim further, as well as to complicate the broader 
notion that confession implies redemption. 
6. 2 Confession, Salvation and Truth 
Perhaps the reason for the strange optimism evident in the three readers cited above is 
to be found in the confessional mode of the novel. 10 Gallagher (1991: 204), for 
instance, mentions "salvation" and "confession" in virtually one breath. Now, 
according to Foucault (1980: 62), traditionally, and certainly in religious terms, 
confession does bear with it the promise of salvation: " ... it exonerates, redeems, and 
purifies him [the one who confesses]~ it unburdens him of his wrongs, liberates him, 
and promises him salvation". And Coetzee notes that 
Confession is one component in a sequence of transgression, confession, 
penitence, and absolution. Absolution means the end of the episode, the 
closing of the chapter, liberation from the oppression of the memory. 
Absolution in this sense is therefore the indispensable goal of all confession, 
sacramental or secular. 
(1992: 251-252) 
But with the secularisation of confession, salvation becomes a problematic moment 
within confessional discourse: 'truth', which is what is needed to end the confession -
"The end of confession is to tell the truth to and for oneself' (Coetzee 1992: 291)-
becomes a questionable category (it is no longer relatively clearly located and 
accessible outside or inside the self), while 'absolution' requires the forgiveness and 
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grace of an authority which, in the case of sacramental confession, remains 
unquestioned but, in the case of secular confession, is no longer readily available. 
Coetzee' s essay on confession, indeed, seeks to 
follow the fortunes of a number of secular confessions, fictional and 
autobiographical, as their authors confront or evade the problem of how. to 
know the truth about the self without being self-deceived, and of how to bnng 
the confession to an end in the spirit of whatever they take to be the secular 
equivalent of absolution. 
(Coetzee 1992: 252)11 
In this passage, it is not only truth and absolution which appear problematic, but also 
the end of confession. If truth and absolution are uncertain, then the end of 
confession, which is to achieve absolution for the confessing subject, becomes 
uncertain. This, in turn, of course implies that it will become difficult to end off 
confessional narratives: if the attainment of the end purpose of confession remains 
uncertain, even infinitely deferred, then it must become a real problem to end 
confessional narratives, something further complicated by self-consciousness and its 
tendency "to draw out confession endlessly" because of its "endless awareness of 
awareness" (1992: 275). Coetzee considers how just this "problem of ending is 
solved" (1992: 275) by reading three major confessional episodes in Dostoevsky. 
The self-consciousness characteristic of confession complicates the telling of 
truth, which would end the confession (cf Coetzee 1992: 291). The project of the 
confession, which may be defined as the telling of truth by the subject of discourse of 
itself, remains an infinite project for the reason that that truth is, in principle, 
unverifiable (cf 1992: 266). In fact, it is a characteristic of confession (as it is of 
autobiography and, indeed, of narrative as such), that the truth is not revealed as much 
as constructed. Ironically, therefore, as Coetzee realises, confession might be its own 
impossibility. It is not a question merely of confession covering up as much as 
revealing the truth of the confessing subject; on the contrary, it is a question of the 
confessing subject recounting truth, which therefore, in being constructed (at least in 
the sense that the selection of truth entails its construction), cannot be accepted as 
fully true. 12 As far as autobiography is concerned (as much as confessional narrative), 
one might leave something out because, after all, memory entails selection: "You tell 
the story of your life by selecting from a reservoir of memories, and in the process of 
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selecting you leave things out. . . . So to call autobiography - or indeed history - true 
as long as it does not lie invokes a fairly vacuous idea oftruth" (Coetzee 1992c: 17). 
Truth is not merely the absence of lies; it is premised upon a totality which 
would transcend the process of selection and therefore construction. Truth, if it is to 
be true, should not be constructed. Especially secular confession, which operates in 
the absence of such supposedly transcendent truth, has to face the dilemma of 
sceptical self-consciousness which complicates, if not renders impossible, the end of 
confession. In an interview, Coetzee expresses this point as follows: "All of us, both 
great and small, face the problem of how to bring our confession to an end. . . . 
Against the endlessness of skepticism Dostoevsky poses the closure not of confession 
but of absolution and therefore of the intervention of grace in the world" ( 1992a: 249). 
In Dostoevsky, according to Coetzee, confession is superseded by absolution, which 
reintroduces grace into secular confession. But the problem of ending a confession 
remains, as it is precisely the possibility of grace which is put in question by the 
scepticism and cynicism of secular self-consciousness (cf Coetzee 1992: 291-293; 
1992b: 392-395). It should not be surprising, then, that the confessional narrative that 
is Age of Iron should have a problematic ending. 13 Indeed, with respect to Coetzee's 
reading of Dostoevsky in terms of the crisis of secular confession, Attwell, despite his 
optimistic reading of Mrs Curren's end (and the novel's ending), makes the important 
poir.t that in the case of confession "what is required finally is grace, for which there 
is no secular equivalent" (Coetzee 1992a: 247). 
As pointed out above, salvation and forgiveness are consequent upon the 
disclosure of the truth, the possibility of which is rendered doubtful in the secular 
forgoing of truth as (religious) transcendence (something which per se is necessarily a 
consequence of denying the existence of a supersensory realm inhabited by God). 
6. 3 Everything, Double Thought and the Consciousness of Non-Consciousness 
The nexus of otherness and irony in Age of Iron, I would claim, is confession. As a 
confessional narrative, Age of Iron is subject to irony for the reason that confession, as 
reflection on the self by the self, enacts a doubling of consciousness. In a confession 
the subject of discourse is the subject in a double sense, as Foucault (1980: 58-59), 
linking the Western compulsion to confess with individualisation, has argued: "The 
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truthful confession was inscribed at the heart of the procedures of individualization by 
power". According to him, "our civilization possesses no ars erotica. . . . [It] is 
undoubtedly the only civilization to practice a scientia sexualii' (1980: 58).
14 
The 
purpose of this science of sexuality, as of the ars erotica in other societies, is to tell 
the truth about sex. But this truth is to be revealed in "the infinite task of extracting 
from the depths of oneself, in between the words, a truth which the very form of the 
confession holds out like a shimmering mirage" (1980: 59), while in the societies 
practising an ars erotica "there is formed a knowledge that must remain secret . . . 
because of the need to hold it in the greatest reserve, since, according to tradition, it 
would lose its effectiveness and its virtue by being divulged" {1980: 57). 
The compulsion to confess thus implies a surfacing of truth from the depths of 
the psyche, which allows Foucault to link sexuality and confession to the production 
of truth, something "thoroughly imbued with relations of power" (1980: 60). The 
compulsion to confess, ''the formidable injunction to tell what one is and what one 
does, what one recollects and what one has forgotten, what one is thinking and what 
one thinks he is not thinking" (1980: 60), constitutes "An immense labor to which the 
West has submitted generations in order to produce - while other forms of work 
ensured the accumulation of capital- men's subjection: their constitution as subjects 
in both senses of the word" (1980:60). This subjection entails a doubleness neatly 
caught in the double sense of the word 'subject': the veracity of confession is 
guaranteed "by the bond, the basic intimacy in discourse, between the one who speaks 
and what he is speaking about" (1980: 62). The enunciating subject is also the subject 
of enunciation. Confession thus entails a doubling of consciousness, a splitting of the 
confessing person into a conscious subject speaking about its consciousness. 
This doubling of consciousness, moreover, in the secularisation of 
confessional discourse characteristic of a scientia sexualis, entails not only a 
consciousness of consciousness (which leads to a potentially infinite confession for 
the reason that the veracity of the confession is subject to the subject and in principle 
not empirically verifiable), but also entails a consciousness of non-consciousness. 
The doubling of consciousness characteristic of confession must lead to a 
consciousness of non-consciousness because the confessant is required by her or his 
confessor to confess everything: "For us, it is in the confession that truth and sex are 
joined, through the obligatory and exhaustive expression of an individual secret" 
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(Foucault 1980: 61 ).
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This "exhaustive expression of an individual secret" by the 
confessant requires that "the bonds of discretion or forgetfulness" (1980: 62) be 
broken. Not only is it required of the confessant to confess what s/he remembers but , 
also what s/he has forgotten. The confession should contain not only an account of 
those transgressions of which the subject of the confession is conscious, but also of 
those of which s/he is no longer conscious. That is, it is part of the structure of the 
confession to bring (or return) the non-conscious to consciousness. Another way of 
putting this would be to claim that it is an important part of confession to reduce the 
non-conscious, as that which is other to consciousness, to consciousness. What is 
outside of (or next to) consciousness but nonetheless exists in a relation of 
simultaneity to it (for the non-conscious is also that which defines the conscious), is 
now inserted into consciousness. The forgotten is remembered; the non-conscious 
become conscious is narrated with the conscious to meet the injunction of the 
confessor. 
I should perhaps qualify at this point, in an aside and at some risk of repetition, 
what I mean by a 'consciousness of non-consciousness'. This formulation is intended 
to evoke de Man's characterisation of irony as "a consciousness of non-
consciousness" (1983: 216; see 3.3.1, above). 16 It should therefore not be assumed 
that I am claiming that the doubling of consciousness characteristic of confession 
actually leads to the ironic consciousness of non-consciousness: this would be an 
impossibility, since to be conscious of something is precisely to render it conscious-
it can no longer be non-conscious. The impossible simultaneity of consciousness and 
non-consciousness, on the other hand, is characteristic of irony, though it inevitably 
leads to the allegorisation of that irony. This is not to equate confession with irony, 
but merely to indicate the ironic potential of confession, something, moreover, borne 
out by the narrative nature of confession. From this vantage point, confession would 
appear as involving irony in its splitting of the subject. But this is a splitting which in 
addition entails the impossible simultaneity of consciousness and non-consciousness 
and the rendering thinkable of double consciousness in reducing it to narrative. But 
even if confession cannot be said necessarily to lead to an ironic consciousness of 
non-consciousness, it can be said at the very least to lead to the consciousness that 
there are non-conscious details - that is, details outside the purview of consciousness 
-which are to be confessed through remembrance. Such consciousness, ironically, 
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threatens the confessional enterprise as it in principle makes impossible a final 
conclusion, namely the full truth (as I argue below). The confessing subject finds 
him/herself in the position of being conscious simultaneously of that of which s/he is 
conscious (and can remember) and of that of which s/he is not conscious (and must 
remember). Two aspects of this argument may be linked with irony: the first is that 
this consciousness of non-consciousness ironically threatens the confessional project 
in the very act of remembering (because the remembering can never be guaranteed to 
be complete); the second is that the narration of the non-conscious amounts to its 
being reduced to consciousness, that is, allegorised. 
This is to claim that both the confessant and confessor participate in an 
impossible project for the reason that it is never possible to authenticate the non-
conscious. Or rather, it is in the nature of the non-conscious not only to define the 
conscious, but also to threaten it. If the confessant is to render an account of 
everything, including what s/he has forgotten, then there can be no guarantee that 
what slhe remembers is everything. Indeed, the very fact that s/he has forgotten 
something entails the possibility that s/he has forgotten something else, too. The 
injunction to confess everything is, by its nature, an impossible requirement. But it is 
not only impossible: it also opens the confessional project to an inescapable 
uncertainty implicit in the potential that one has not remembered everything, or if one 
has, that one has, indeed, remembered incorrectly. 
I need to make the point right away that my consideration of confession takes 
place in full awareness of the current, and controversial, space inhabited by 
confession in South Africa in the context of the Truth and Reconciliation 
Commission. While I depend quite heavily on Foucault's- as well as Coetzee's-
consideration of confession, it should be emphasised that the former is framed by an 
investigation into the historical proliferation of sexual discourse. Consequently, 
Foucault's interest is in the extension of confessional discourse from the institution of 
the church into everyday life, in particular as regards talking about sex. The 
compulsion to confess takes place within a whole range of institutions (cf Foucault 
1980: 63) which demandfoll confession in order for absolution, or forgiveness, or a 
cure to be granted. Similarly, the TRC also demands 'full disclosure' (as one crucial 
precondition among others) in order to agree to amnesty for applicants. It is part of 
the pact the applicant enters into with the TRC that s/he recount the foil truth. If I 
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argue here that a full account of the truth is, in principle, impossible and that, 
consequently, absolution (or amnesty) is rendered problematic if not downright 
impossible, then I do so less with reference to the TRC than with respect to Foucault's 
analysis of the compulsion and injunction to confess. I do not wish here to engage in 
an analysis of the TRC and its protocols vis-a-vis confession, though such an 
investigation would no doubt be fascinating and might have important consequences. 
But I do wish to make very clear that I am not arguing that it is impossible to confess 
the truth, or even the full truth. I am, however, arguing that it is never possible to 
know with full certainty that what one has confessed and what one believes is a full 
confession of the full truth, is in fact a full confession. 
In this regard, Andre Brink (1998b: 37) has recently argued that the TRC is 
caught in "the double bind that the kind of whole the exercise is aimed at can never be 
complete and that ultimately, like all narratives, this one must eventually be 
constructed around its own blind spots and silences". Clearly there is a huge 
difference between on the one hand arguing that it is never possible to make a full 
confession (as I do in terms of the uncertainty to which such a confession is 
necessarily subject as regards its finality), and on the other hand that confession 
always necessarily entails (consciously) hiding something. That is, it is only ever 
possible to make as full a confession as one can, but it is never possible to be 
completely certain that such a confession is in fact complete. This is not for a 
moment to suggest that it does not matter whether one engages in wilful obfuscation 
or deception in the course of one's confession. No confession can ever be full, which 
is not the same as claiming that any confession will do. On the contrary, there are 
conditions of sufficiency to be met, conditions which are determined juridically. For 
a confession to be deemed sufficient, it must meet such conditions, including the 
condition that it must be full, or, rather, as full as possible. Furthermore, there is no 
way of determining that a given confession is full, but there are ways of determining 
whether it is not full. Non-consciously not telling everything is not the same as 
consciously not telling everything. 
The potential, even necessary, incompleteness of confession has severe 
consequences for the confessant. For one thing, it radically questions the possibility 
of true self-knowledge. If it is possible to keep amending a confession by positing 
another truth than the one it had been assumed was the truth, as Coetzee shows to be 
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the case as far as "a Pozdnyshev or a Rousseau" is concerned, then the authority of the 
confessant must be put in question: 
If the confessant is in principle prepared to shift his ground with each new 
reading as long as he can be convinced that it is 'truer' than the last one, then 
he is no more than a biographer of the self, a constructor of hypotheses about 
himself that can be improved on by other biographers. In such an event, his 
confession has no more authority than an account given by any other 
biographer: it may proceed from knowledge, but it does not proceed from self-
knowledge. 
(Coetzee 1992: 273; cf. 255ff., 292ff.) 
Confession becomes autobiography, and autobiography becomes autrebiography (cf. 
1992b: 394). Coetzee does complicate this cynicism in an interview with Attwell by 
describing his essay as staging a debate between cynicism and grace: "Cynicism: the 
denial of any ultimate basis for values. Grace: a condition in which the truth can be 
told clearly, without blindness. The debate is staged by Dostoevsky; the interlocutors 
are called Stavrogin and Tikhon" (1992b: 392). Nevertheless, Coetzee's essay, in the 
end, veers towards the cynicism of autobiography as autrebiography, as does, it would 
seem to me, Age of Iron in its apparent insistence on the shamefulness of Mrs 
Curren's confession and its necessary incompletion. This latter point is particularly 
evident in Mrs Curren's insistence on shame and shamefulness, an insistence which 
significantly often accompanies confessional moments in the text (cf. 78, 100, 109, 
115, 150-151 ). For Coetzee notes a second consequence of the incomplete confession 
for the confessant. In his analysis of confession, an incomplete confession, one which 
can be improved upon by rendering a "'truer' explanation", would result in shame for 
the confessant: 
... to the extent that the new, 'deeper' truth is acknowledged as true, the 
response of the confessant must contain an element of shame. For either the 
confessant was aware of the deeper truth but was concealing it, in which case 
he was deceiving his confessor; or he was not aware of the deeper truth 
(though now he acknowledges it), in which case his competence as a 
confessant is in question. . .. 
(1992: 273) 
Of course, in principle one confesses (or would confess) precisely that which is 
shameful. And a confession is supposed to be shameful rather than shameless ( cf. 
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Coetzee 1992: 274; 1992: 282; 1992: 290). Nonetheless, Mrs Curren's expressions of 
shame in Age of Iron serve to suggest primarily, in view of the discussion above, the 
incompletion and thus inadequacy of her confession. In fact, one might argue that 
these expressions of shame self-reflexively draw attention to the provisional status of 
the novel: the expressions of shame would put in question the "competence" of the 
confessant. The point is that expressions of shame, in particular expressions of shame 
about shame, lead to potentially infinite confessions, as Coetzee shows (cf 1992: 282, 
290). Another cause for infinite confession, one in which absolution is deferred, may 
of course be that the confessor lacks authority and is therefore an incompetent 
confessor, a possibility which I consider in the final section of this chapter. 
I would like now to turn to a closer consideration of some of the passages in 
which Mrs Curren expresses her shame. But before doing so, I wish to provide a brief 
summary of the imbrication of confessional narrative with alterity in terms of my 
consideration above of the consciousness of non-consciousness. 
Requiring an account of everything, including of the non-conscious, 
confessional narrative would seem to tend towards the elision of alterity - it reduces 
everything to the realm of the same defined by the consciousness of the subject. But 
it is this very requirement which reintroduces what is other to the project of 
confession, and potentially renders it an always incomplete, always provisional, and 
always fragmentary project. Otherness, and an otherness which refuses to be reduced, 
is thus part and parcel of the confessional project. This realisation by the confessant 
is ground enough for shame, for it is the shameless realisation that a confession can 
always only be provisional (cf Coetzee 1992: 274). Confessing with an open mind, 
in the consciousness that one's consciousness might not - and probably does not -
suffice to render a true confession of everything, is itself ground for confession. 
6. 4 Age of Iron as Confessional Narrative 
6. 4.1 Confession, Shame 
Mrs Curren's "competence" (Coetzee 1992: 273) as a confessant, then, is put in 
question in Age of Iron. This becomes particularly clear in her expressions of shame, 
linked as they are to the confessional status of her discourse (her letter, her narrative, 
the novel). In particular, her competence as confessant is put in question in her 
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expressions of shame about shame. I want to argue that Mrs Curren's painful cancer 
is metaphorised as shame and that it both constitutes and interrupts her confession, 
which means that this continual interruption of confession may be characterised as 
irony. In this section I examine examples of the ironic nature of Mrs Curren's 
confessional procedure. 
After having borne witness to the hellish suffering of the townships (cf 
Hoegberg 1998), Mrs Curren has gone for a drive with Vercueil. She tells him how 
disturbing she found these events, in particular the death ofBheki: "'I was shaken,' I 
said. 'I won't say grieved because I have no right to the word, it belongs to his own 
people. But I am still- what?- disturbed" (113). This disturbance is directly related 
by Mrs Curren to the otherness of Bheki, to what she calls "his deadness, his dead 
weight" (113). She makes this important observation on the disturbance by the other 
of the selfs satisfaction with reference to her fear of 'forgetting' (cf 111) and her 
self-loathing as a result of reentering the "ordinary" (109). She is disturbed not only 
by the death ofBheki, but by the fact that to her "It seems like a bad dream" (109). 
She is disturbed by the elision of otherness as much as by that otherness. To her there 
is something shameless about the absence of"urgency" (109) which is also evident in 
her not being able to bring herself so far as to carry through her planned self-
immolation: "I lose my sense of shame, become shameless as a child. The 
shamefulness ofthat shamelessness .... " (109). 
The sense of shame is quite directly linked to a sense of urgency, of an 
awareness of and disturbance by otherness, while losing that sense of shame and thus 
becoming shameless is itself something intensely shameful. This confirms that there 
is no escaping otherness: it is impossible to leave behind the shame attendant upon, in 
this case, the suffering and death of the other, and the work of mourning is infinite. 
For leaving it behind and moving on is in itself an act filled with shame: there is an 
infinity of shame in shamefulness as much as shamelessness. It is not clear when, or 
if, this shame will ever end. This should not be surprising - the endlessness of 
confession suggests the absence of grace, itself linked to the impossibility of ever fully 
fulfilling one's responsibility towards otherness (be it the otherness one has not 
remembered to confess, or the otherness of the other person to and for whom one 
remains responsible). I am, of course, not suggesting that it is possible to equate the 
other with shame, but that shame is part of the disturbing effect of otherness (at least 
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in terms of Mrs Curren's experience of the confrontation with otherness at this point). 
It is not possible to deal with otherness once and for all. 
This last claim may be substantiated further with reference to Mrs Curren's 
critique of absolution implicit in her desire not to get over the trauma she has 
experienced, not to yield to what she calls the "ordinary" (1 09), to get over getting 
over things, as she tells Vercueil: 
'You think I am upset but will get over it. Cheap tears, you think, tears 
of sentiment, here today, gone tomorrow. Well, it is true, I have been upset in 
the past, I have imagined there could be no worse, and then the worse has 
arrived, as it does without fail, and I have got over it, or seemed to. But that is 
the trouble! In order not to be paralyzed with shame I have had to live a life of 
getting over the worse. What I cannot get over any more is that getting over. 
If I get over it this time I will never have another chance not to get over it. For 
the sake of my own resurrection I cannot get over it this time.' 
(115) 
The only way to get over shame, if it is linked to confession - which it must be, 
seeing that Mrs Curren is confessing in Age of Iron in general and at this point in 
particular - is to render the confession as fully as possible and to attain absolution at 
the end of the confession. But what Mrs Curren is saying in this passage is that the 
absolution implicit in getting over shame is precisely what must be absolved, at least 
for the sake of"my own resurrection". Mrs Curren's resurrection is conditional upon 
a confession of shame leading to absolution which in itself is shameful: even if one 
has to "[get] over the worse" if one is "not to be paralyzed with shame", nonetheless 
just that "getting over the worse", that dealing with shame, is shameful in turn and 
must be got over. Both the shame and getting over it appear unbearable and must be 
got over. And the only way of getting over getting over, of getting absolution for the 
absolution one has enjoyed, is "not to get over it", that is, not to get absolution. 
The absolution one enjoys at the end of one's confession, of course, ends the 
confession: there is nothing left to get over, and one is on the path to being resurrected 
into a new, redeemed life. But Mrs Curren claims that the prerequisite for her 
resurrection is not to enjoy absolution, that is, by implication, not to end her 
confession. As long as absolution remains deferred the confession must continue. 
The continuation of the confession, in turn, is the precondition for an absolution 
which remains a possibility without certainty. 11 For Mrs Curren to remain in a 
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disturbed state of acuteness with regard to the problems and the pain and the suffering 
of people in the townships and elsewhere, her confession must have an uncertain 
outcome. If the outcome - absolution - were certain, there would be no point in 
continuing to confess, and therefore to write, and therefore to live. As a result the 
reader finds a proliferation of confessions in Age of Iron. Many of these confessions 
pertinently concern the issue of shame. 
One such instance occurs by means of a reference to Hawthorne's The Scarlet 
Letter (104-105). This reference serves to underscore the futility of Mrs Curren's 
projected spectacular self-immolation in front of the Houses of Parliament, an act 
which I would argue is lent a confessional aura by Mrs Curren. 18 She decides against 
this act of protest (as much as confession) because she is afraid it may be 
misunderstood, that is, that the truth about this deed may never be known. In order to 
ascertain that her act does communicate its intended protest, she would have to exhibit 
a letter signalling what the import of her intent was. But there is no guarantee that 
such a letter would make the slightest difference in people's perceptions. In fact, it is 
not even certain which letter Mrs Curren would have to paint on the car to explain her 
action. 
Mrs Curren illustrates this dilemma with reference to The Scarlet Letter, 
which in that novel is, of course, the letter A indicating shame (the shame of 
adultery). According to Mrs Curren, Hester Prynne "wears the A for so many years 
that people forget what it stands for. They forget that it stands for anything" (105). 
The letter A, and by extension Mrs Curren's act, is subject to the possibility of being 
misunderstood. Hester Prynne's scarlet letter A, according to Mrs Curren, no longer 
stands for Adultery but for anything. Furthermore, it is crucial to note that the letter A 
is supposed to stand for the shame of adultery, as well as that it is this shame which 
disappears with time as the letter loses its content. Hester Prynne, as it were, moves 
beyond the need for absolution with time as her letter loses signification. Or perhaps 
this should be rephrased: with time the question of absolution loses significance as the 
letter loses signification. This is to say that the letter is an inadequate expression of 
shame, for the shame disappears and thus - regardless of what happens in The Scarlet 
Letter, or whether the novel expresses sympathy for and shame about the treatment 
meted out to Hester- with the disappearance of shame the letter no longer forms part 
of a confessional narrative tending towards absolution (or its opposite). 
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As a matter of fact, it should be noted that it has been claimed that Hawthorne 
wrote The Scarlet Letter in protest against Puritanism and in an attempt to come to 
terms with the role some of his Puritan ancestors had played with regard, for instance, 
to witch trials in the 17th century. Thomas Connolly (1970: 8-9) remarks that 
Hawthorne was extremely sensitive about the fanatical roles played by his 
paternal ancestors in the early days of New England. A deep family guilt 
settled upon him, and this guilt undoubtedly prompted him to critical attacks in 
his literary works on the rigours of Puritanism. In 'The Custom House' ... he 
publicly confesses that shame and guilt. 
In a sense, then, this novel may be read as constituting a confession of sorts, an 
admission of shame and guilt from Hawthorne's side. This much is suggested by the 
introductory section to The Scarlet Letter (referred to by Connolly in the citation 
above). The point Hawthorne makes in The Scarlet Letter is that branding somebody 
with a letter of shame (or forcing such a person to wear it stitched to clothing) is an 
inhumane and thus inadequate (ill-suited because excessive) form of punishment for 
crimes such as adultery (presuming adultery is a crime at all). Mrs Curren's reference 
to The Scarlet Letter, then, is significant not only in that it too deals with shame, 
which is precisely what Mrs Curren is experiencing and confessing: in particular, this 
reference is apt because The Scarlet Letter is also a confession expressing 
Hawthorne's shame about the acts of his Puritan ancestors towards people like Hester 
Prynne. The Scarlet Letter expresses shame at the shameful way Hester Prynne was 
forced to shame herself, at the shamefulness of that shame. 
A further point to make relating to The Scarlet Letter and shame is that it 
surely is significant that, just after the passage which refers to the scarlet letter A, Mrs 
Curren calls Bheki and 'John', and the other children of iron like them, the "new 
puritans" (75), "the rising generation, who do not drink" (75). This 'new puritanism' 
is evident, for instance, in the way Bheki and 'John' manhandle Vercueil because of 
his drinking (cf 41-44). As is evident from the novel, it is these children of iron, 
these 'new puritans', who occasion shame in Mrs Curren: as a result ofBheki's death 
and the events linked to it, Mrs Curren fights against the indifference of the ordinary 
in order to retain the sense of distress and, indeed, shame it has caused in her life ( cf 
109).19 
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Given that Mrs Curren compares her self-immolation to the inadequate 
expression of Hester Prynne' s shame (inadequate because it loses its significance and 
inadequate because it puritanically, excessively marks the shame of adultery), and 
that, as I have argued, a confession would be precisely an expression of shame, one 
might argue that Mrs Curren's projected suicide would be an inadequate expression of 
shame and would not lead to absolution and redemption for Mrs Curren. The shame 
of which it would be an expression is the shame of apartheid, as suggested by her 
calling the Houses of Parliament "the house of shame" (104) and by her already 
mentioned association of the children of iron with the Puritans (the agents of shame in 
The Scarlet Letter). This identification of shame with the root cause apartheid implies 
Mrs Curren's complicity in apartheid. Her projected suicide would be an inadequate 
confession not only because, clearly, it could not possibly be proper atonement for the 
evils of apartheid (what could it achieve?) but, moreover, in that it might be 
misunderstood and come to stand, like Hester's A, for anything?0 In addition, Mrs 
Curren forgoes self-immolation and her consequent disappearance into ash, with its 
letter from which shame is erased (or to which shame might possibly not even be 
attributed), in favour of another letter. This is the letter to her daughter which she 
continually interrupts, while she writes it, with expressions of shame. Mrs Curren's 
letter to her daughter- Age of Iron -is thus defined by shame. 
Mrs Curren's continual expressions of shame characterise her letter as a self-
subverting confession, one which self-reflectively confesses its own inadequacy. In it 
Mrs Curren confesses the shame of her confession, a shame which results from its 
inadequacy and its incompletion. Age of Iron as confession is dependent on shame for 
its existence as confession. Mrs Curren's expressions of shame are therefore 
productive of the novel in evincing what Marais calls "ontogenetic anxiety", 
something "which is generated by a self-reflexive awareness that the strategy of 
excession by which they [Age of Iron and The Master of Petersburg] negotiate 
language's antipathy to alterity is grounded in language and therefore in the violent 
mediation of otherness" ( 1997: 342). 
The very fact that language - which mediates between self and other and thus 
violently reduces otherness in its being said - is used in a novel like Age of Iron, 
makes problematic the attempt of such a novel not to reduce otherness. Moreover, it 
gives rise to an awareness that even the attempt at not reducing otherness already 
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amounts to reducing it. Not determining otherness amounts to determining it as non-
determined. This implies that any attempt to exceed the determination of otherness, 
which attempt would necessarily occur in language, in particular if that determination 
were situated in a novel, is doomed to fall back into a determination of otherness and 
would implicate the novel in the violence of reducing otherness. In Coetzee's case, 
there is a metafictional awareness of just this double bind, something which leads to 
and is detectable from the ontogenetic anxiety evinced by his novels. This 
ontogenetic anxiety is evident already in the fact, noted above, that the delivery of the 
letter is dependent on Vercueil: Age of Iron "seriously questions its ability to ensure 
that the reader receives its gift oflove", as Marais (1997: 343) puts it with reference to 
Vercueil. But the novel's ontogenetic anxiety "is also strongly apparent in its self-
reflexive obsession with the politics of representation" (Marais 1997: 343). Marais 
relates this to Mrs Curren's lack of authority (cf 1997: 344). 
Marais (1997: 346) dismisses the possibility that the novel's ontogenetic 
anxiety may simply be explained "in terms of the tired, postmodernist trope of self-
subversion through which the text draws attention to the conditions of its own 
impossibility". Far from being a "tired, postmodernist trope", this textual self-
subversion - as evident too in Mrs Curren's self-subverting confessions - may be 
taken as generative of the novel. In interrupting itself, the novel continues and must 
continue; precisely because it is inadequate it cannot end. The ontogenetic anxiety 
evident in the novel, in drawing attention to its inadequacy (specifically as confession, 
but also vis-a-vis its status as representation of otherness), evinces a relativising of its 
representational procedures. This argument is similar to the one made earlier in this 
thesis, namely that representation of the other is called for precisely because the other 
exceeds all representation (see 4.5, above). If representation were adequate it could 
end; because it is inadequate it must continue, if only so as to be interrupted 
continuously by the alterity it elides but which, in its refractoriness to representation, 
insists on justice - on just representation - impossible and infinite and therefore 
necessary though that project is. 
According to Marais (1997: 266), Age of Iron, "rather than represent[ing] and 
so foreclos[ing] on the other . . . seeks to perform the ethical in its relation with the 
reader". I would agree with the second part of Marais's claim (that Age of Iron 
involves a staging of alterity in terms of its relation to the reader)?1 But I would 
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question whether it is the case that the novel forgoes representation of the other. 
Rather, I would claim that the novel does engage in the representation of otherness but 
draws attention to the inadequacy of its doing so. When Attwell (1998: 170) sees the 
purpose of Mrs Curren's 'construction' of what "must have happened" (40) as 
"oppos[ing] the possibility of an alterity so radical that there are no grounds for 
intersubjective recognition", I would agree with him that Coetzee does indeed engage 
in representations of otherness, as Attwell seems to be suggesting given his insistence 
that the novel suggests "grounds for intersubjective recognition". Attwell ( 1998: 171) 
also agrees with Coetzee's statement in Doubling the Point that "In Africa the only 
address one can imagine is a brutally direct one, a sort of pure, unmediated 
representation" (1992e: 68). As Attwell notes, Coetzee continues by stating that "the 
task becomes imagining this unimaginable" (1992e: 68). And this unimaginable to 
which Coetzee refers clearly pertains to another, indeed, an other kind of 
representation. It is in this light that I make the claim in this chapter that 
representations of otherness, with their concomitant 'moments of recognition', are 
interrupted even as they are posited. The novel's representation of the other and of 
otherness, that is, is placed under erasure and becomes a representation which does 
not represent, which is not a representation, certainly not the kind of "pure, 
unmediated representation" Coetzee rejects. 
Age of Iron is a novel which draws attention to the problematic status of its 
(and any) representation of the other in order thus to foreclose on the inevitable 
foreclosing of otherness attendant upon representation. Such a self-questioning, self-
subverting, self-interrupting procedure is metaphorically compared by Mrs Curren 
with a crab walking sideways: 
And this is the one to whom I speak my heart, whom I trust with last things. 
Why this crooked path to you? 
My mind like a pool, which his finger enters and stirs. Without that 
finger stillness, stagnation. 
A way of indirection. By indirection I find direction out. A crab's-
walk. 
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Mrs Curren explains to the addressee of the novel- the reader, her daughter- that the 
"crooked path" to her is necessary because without it there would be not only 
"stillness" but "stagnation", an idea related to the indifference of the ordinary which 
Mrs Curren fears falling back into ( cf 1 09). The "crooked path" in this passage refers 
directly to Vercueil: he is the one "whom I trust with last things". But the "crooked 
path", because it refers to Vercueil, may also be taken to refer, self-reflexively, to Mrs 
Curren's discourse. Marais (1997: 345) points out "the implicit analogy between 
Vercueil, the bearer of the letter in which Mrs Curren gives her self to her daughter, 
and the novel, the bearer of Coetzee' s gift of self to the reader". 
Elsewhere, in a highly detailed analysis of various images of writing in Age of 
Iron, Marais argues that "the novel does not end with Mrs Curren's death but with the 
birth of her new identity. . . . Mrs Curren's afterlife is ... a life of being read .... 
Through the act of reading, the word takes on flesh" ( 1993: 17, 18, 20). Marais links 
this metamorphosis of the word into flesh with the issue of readerly responsibility in 
the text. Through the reading of the text, Mrs Curren, whose flesh has become words, 
will be resurrected and her words will take on life, become flesh once again ( cf 1993: 
20). According to him, the reader has the responsibility of co-determining the ending 
of the novel and "becomes, willy-nilly, not only the novel's co-author, but also an 
author of history" (cf. 1993: 23). Marais develops this idea in a later discussion of the 
novel in which he claims that the reader-as-other inspires, in a sense authors, Age of 
Iron, thus enacting "Coetzee's refusal to supplement history and thereby violate the 
alterity of the reader" {1997: 304)?3 The important question then becomes "how the 
reader responds to the text" (1997: 304), the latter understood as constituting an 
endeavour "to perform the ethical" ( 1997: 311 ). If Vercueil bears the letter to Mrs 
Curren's daughter, then the novel bears the letter to the reader. This argument is 
strengthened by Marais's observation that the novel's ontogenetic anxiety is dealt 
with meta-representationally through the introduction of the notion of trust. 
It is part of Marais's argument that the novel-as-genre tends towards the 
elision of otherness. 24 This means that the novel-as-genre cannot be trusted with the 
representation of otherness, which precisely entails that the novel must be trusted. 
The novel-as-genre is as untrustworthy as Vercueil, about whom, it will be recalled, 
Mrs Curren says "Because I cannot trust Vercueil I must trust him" {119) and again "I 
trust Vercueil because I do not trust Vercueil" {120). As Marais {1997: 346) puts it, 
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"In terms of the analogy between Vercueil and the novel, Coetzee seems to be arguing 
that, because of its unsuitability for the task with which it has been entrusted . . . the 
novel must be trusted". 
This is also to claim that the novel is to be read in a spirit of uncertainty, and 
that its outcome must remain uncertain. The novel is to be a "crooked path" which 
must be negotiated with care. That "the crooked path" may refer not only to Vercueil, 
but also to Mrs Curren's discourse, is further confirmed by Mrs Curren's assertion 
(already quoted at the beginning of this chapter) that "This is my life, these words, 
these tracings of the movements of crabbed digits over the page" (120). The text of 
Age of Iron is Mrs Curren's life, and it is formed by her "crabbed", that is, her surly, 
irritable, perverse "digits". But the "digits" do not only refer to her fingers but, in 
keeping with the idea that she is what she writes, to the words she writes. For the 
word "crabbed" denotes handwriting which is cramped and hard to decipher. 
Moreover, the word "crabbed", in describing handwriting, refers to the wayward gait 
of the crab. Mrs Curren writes 'crab's writing', a crooked, uncertain path which is 
hard to decipher. It must be hard to decipher, crabbed, crooked and uncertain if it is to 
be trusted. This is to say that the novel must be other if it is to be trusted. Before 
resuming my discussion ofMrs Curren's crabbed writing, I would like to consider this 
point more closely. 
Excursion A: The Otherness of the Texr5 
Derek Attridge makes the point that the effectiveness of Coetzee's works as literature 
"is not separate from the importance these works have in the ethico-political realm, 
but rather that it constitutes that importance. . . . Coetzee' s handling of formal 
properties is bound up with the capacity of his work to engage with - to stage, 
confront, apprehend, explore - otherness" (1994: 244). Elsewhere Attridge has 
succinctly examined the notion of trust with respect to the figure of Vercueil.26 
Paradoxically, it is in the nature of trust that uncertainty be presupposed: 
Trust is a relation to the future that is based on no rational grounds~ to entrust a 
task to someone in the certainty that it will be done is not to trust, but merely 
to act on the basis of advance knowledge~ trust, like a pure decision, is born of 
uncertainty and uncertainty alone. It fully emerges only in the case of 
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someone who, like Vercueil, cannot be trusted even to carry out the most 
trivial of tasks. 
(1994a: 64-65) 
One might ask, though, whether it is ever possible "to entrust a task to someone in the 
certainty that it will done", as Attridge claims it is. Vercueil might be particularly 
untrustworthy, but it is nonetheless impossible to know with certainty that anyone will 
in actual fact carry out a set task. This is so because the other (indeed, all others) 
exceeds the knowledge of the self. The other is unpredictable to a greater or lesser 
extent precisely because s/he is other. Similarly, it must be said that the notion of 
"advance knowledge" is a convenient fiction on Attridge's part to draw a clear line 
between the untrustworthy Vercueil and the untrustworthy other: no knowledge of the 
other is ever advance knowledge for the reason that such knowledge would have 
access to the future. This is not to reject Attridge's broader argument, but merely to 
say that the other (any other, including Vercueil) must be trusted because the other 
cannot be trusted. Attridge does tend in this direction when he states further on that 
"Another way of putting this is that there is only one kind of trust that truly deserves 
the name: trust in the other" (1994a: 65) and that "to write is therefore to trust the 
other who will read - other because unknowable and unfixable in advance" (1994a: 
66). It is just this unknowability and unfixability of any other which calls in question 
Attridge's clear demarcating line between the figure of Vercueil and other others 
(including readers), while also making problematic Attridge's claim that "otherness is 
always perspectival and . . . is always produced', that "there is no transcendent 
other", and that "the other does not come from elsewhere, but is a product of the 
identical constituting act that produced the self/same" (1994a: 65). Even though 
Attridge claims to be drawing heavily on Levinas' s notion of otherness ( cf 1994a: 78 
note 7, 80 note 17; 1994: 256, 262 note 17), such statements would seem to be 
antipathetic to Levinas's notion of otherness. For Levinas, as I showed in Chapter 3, 
the other does come from elsewhere and is transcendent in always exceeding just the 
kind of "identical constituting act" of the same to which Attridge refers. On the 
contrary, if one were to follow Levinas in claiming that the other is unknowable in 
advance (as Attridge correctly claims), then this would already put paid to the notion 
that it is possible "to act on the basis of advance knowledge" (1994a: 64). If the other 
is "unknowable and unfixable in advance", then the other is transcendent to the self 
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despite the implication of Attridge's claim that the other may be known subsequently. 
Attridge's (1994a: 69) later claim that "to apprehend the other as a general 
phenomenon is to take away its otherness" is quite correct: the singularity of the other 
is enigmatic and resists all reduction towards being a phenomenon. But, as Attridge 
also notes parenthetically, "At the same time, of course, no concrete instance can 
exhaust the issue" (1994a: 69). The implication of these statements is that the other, 
even though unique, specific and singular, is necessarily, as enigma, transcendent and 
therefore cannot be thematised. 
Despite this demurral on my part with respect to Attridge's appropriation of 
Levinas' s conception of otherness, his important point that the formal innovation of 
Coetzee's work is tied to his exploration of otherness nonetheless remains. Indeed, as 
Attridge (1994: 249) states (after having argued that there is "an ethical dimension to 
any act of literary signification"), there is "a sense in which the formally innovative 
text, the one that most estranges itself from the reader, makes the strongest ethical 
demand". This is at least partly the case because the literary text, and in particular the 
"formally innovative", challenging literary text, resists being reduced to the flattening 
narrative of analytic explanation (cf Attridge 1994: 250). That is, it disrupts the 
reduction of its own otherness and enforces ever closer scrutiny as a result of its 
uncertainty. This is only to say that such a text is enigmatic in resisting reduction 
(whether phenomenological or otherwise). The uncertainty which I argue 
characterises Age of Iron, with regard to the issue of confession and absolution as 
much as with regard to that of trust, thus appears as its trace of otherness. 27 This 
enigmatic quality is the result of uncertainty, itself consequent upon the deferral and 
interruption of its reduction to the same. 
Excursion B: Etymologies 
Associating 'crab' with writing in terms of otherness, as I have done here, is of course 
not to exhaust the rich semantic field of 'crab' and words related to it in the novel. 
Marais (1997: 280-281) notes that the Latin word 'cancer' means crab, which serves 
to relate the words 'crab' and 'crabbed' to cancer. Since the association of 'crab' and 
'cancer' rests on a false etymology, however (seeing that neither word derives directly 
from the other, and that non-classicists might be unaware of the link between the 
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words in Latin), this association must be linked with the many instances of false 
etymology in the novel and must be treated with suspicion. It is significant, in fact, 
that the novel advertises its reliance on false etymologies. Thus Mrs Curren tells 
Vercueil that the word 'charity' comes''from the Latin word for the heart" (20), but in 
an aside immediately admits that this is "a lie: charity, caritas, has nothing to do with 
the heart. But what does it matter if my sermons rest on false etymologies?" (20). 
One might ask, with Mrs Curren, what it matters if she uses false etymologies. 
And the answer to this question, I would venture, is that such overt falseness serves at 
once to assert and to subvert Mrs Curren's authority. 28 Indeed, Mrs Curren's modus 
operandi suggests a waywardness similar to that of the 'crab's-walk' in terms of 
which she finds direction in indirection. For the direction vis-a-vis the derivation of 
words she posits in her implicit assertion of her authority (in this case, as classicist, 
which imbues the entire novel with its references and debts to the classics)/9 is an 
indirection. Her procedure is thus ironic: her authority, as it is posited, is interrupted. 
This statement could also be inverted: Mrs Curren, in interrupting her positing 
of her own authority, posits that authority again. As much as Mrs Curren's authority 
is disavowed in being asserted, it is also asserted in being disavowed. To state that an 
etymology is false is also to state that one knows that it is false. Some truth is to be 
found at the core of each of the etymological lies Mrs Curren tells: "There is no lie 
that does not have at its core some truth. One must only know how to listen" (171). 
This is, of course, not to suggest that lies are true, but that the distinction between lies 
and truths are not clear cut. Apparent truths might have to be viewed with suspicion. 
Authority is never beyond doubt. Mrs Curren thus takes a position which subverts its 
own positionality. Her play with etymology is a play with the authority of her 
position: she does not take her position seriously, but attempts to locate its position 
beyond the confines of right and wrong. Mrs Curren's attempts to sow suspicion of 
etymology (while paradoxically asserting its importance) in the mind of the reader 
force the reader to treat with wariness not only her various etymological expositions 
(cf 26, 51, 68, 78, 103, 119, 176) but also her entire letter. At the very least, the 
reader is warned not to take these expositions (or the letter) at face value. 30 
One might also in this regard note the motif of anagrams and Mrs Curren's 
attempts to relate apparently unrelated words to one another as if they were anagrams 
(cf 126, 157-158, 171) and her various translations (and mistranslations), especially 
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from Latin ( cf 150 , 168, 173, 176, 179). Latin plays an important role in this text. 
Most if not all of the etymologies expounded upon by Mrs Curren are based on Latin. 
In addition, Mrs Curren as classicist explicitly characterises herself in terms of 
prosopopoeia. She calls Latin "A dead language . . . a language spoken by the dead" 
and says her job was "Giving voice to the dead" (176). Latin etymology is used in 
order to connect shame, as mortification, with death: "Death in life" (78). Shame is 
defined as "The name for the way in which people live who would prefer to be dead" 
(78). 
This definition, which takes its cue from etymology and must thus be treated 
with suspicion (yet seriously), names shame. The issue of names is central in Age of 
Iron. The status of names seems suspect: names are uncertain, often unknown.31 Mrs 
Curren's daughter remains nameless, while the real names of Vercueil, Bheki/Digby, 
Florence's children Hope and Beauty, Florence herself, her husband William and 
'John' remain unknown. Mrs Curren assumes that 'John' is a "nom de guerre" (155) 
and questions whether Johannes "was ... his true name" (155; cf. 34, 35, 40, 93, 108, 
134). The uncertainty surrounding names may be linked to Mrs Curren's general lack 
of authority and suggests the limits of her knowledge of others ( cf. Attridge 1994a: 
62, 78-79 note 8; Marais 1997: 301). Her discourse is not clear cut: it is a mode of 
"indirection". She is aware that her writing, its deviousness, is considered with 
suspicion by the "new puritans", who are said to be "Suspicious of devious discourse, 
like this" (75). The link between Mrs Curren's lack of authority and naming is also 
suggested when Mr Thabane asks Mrs Curren, in her confrontation with the criminal 
violence of the State at Site C, "What is its name?" (90). 
An important implication of this association is that the reader, who after all 
reads and thus attempts to make sense of, unravel and disentangle the novel, thus 
reducing the otherness of the text, and who is made suspicious of the text through the 
instances of false etymology, uncertain anagrams, (mis)translations, and unknown 
names, is cast in the position of the "new puritans" who want things to be clear cut 
and are suspicious of "devious discourse". This association is confirmed by Marais 
(cf. 1997: 305, 313), who notes that the reader of the novel may be related to the 
reader in the novel, namely Mrs Curren's daughter who, it will be remembered, is also 
described as being "like iron" (68). The implication for Marais is that the relationship 
of the reader to the text is suggested in the text to be one which "forecloses on the 
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otherness which the text endeavours to 'intimate"' (1997: 305). Not only does the 
issue of Mrs Curren's (lack of) authority therefore serve to strengthen the self-
subversive nature of the novel, but the role of the reader also involves ontogenetic 
anxiety because of the reader's tendency to flatten out narrative and reduce the 
otherness of the text (that is, the tendency not to respect the otherness of the text). At 
the same time, the text may be said to encourage the suspicion with which the reader 
must view the novel, a suspicion in turn linked to its ontogenetic anxiety ( cf Marais 
1997: 345). The reader must be suspicious of the novel- something implied by Mrs 
Curren's relativised authority - in order to do it justice by respecting its otherness, 
which entails its recognition as other (as an entity which is other and therefore 
resistant to being reduced in being understood: to the realm of the same). The reader 
must respond responsibly to the text, which entails respecting its otherness. This is 
encouraged in the text by the interruption of Mrs Curren's authority as narrator, as 
classicist, and as liberal, even as that authority is posited. 
6.4.2 Confession: Cancer, Shame and Pain 
After these brief excursions into the respect that the otherness of the text commands 
and into the link of uncertain (indeed absent) etymology and names to Mrs Curren's 
lack of authority, I would like to return to my consideration ofMrs Curren's 'crabbed' 
writing. In view of the (quasi-)etymological association with cancer, this writing may 
refer to her cancer-ridden body, especially in view of the fact that, as noted above, self 
and text are associated if not identified in the text.32 What is more, Mrs Curren 
explicitly relates her cancer to shame by metaphorising shame as cancer: "I have 
cancer from the accumulation of shame I have endured in my life" (132). 33 She 
explains to 'John' that cancer comes about as a result of "consuming yourself in 
shame and loathing" (132) and causes the body "to eat away at itself' (132). And this 
consuming oneself in shame and loathing is of course the stuff of confession, which is 
why it should not be surprising that Mrs Curren associates her cancer with her story. 34 
She imagines 'John' thinking "What is the point of consuming yourself in shame and 
loathing? I don't want to listen to the story of how you feel, it is just another story, 
why don't you do something?" (132). 35 It is clear from this that Mrs Curren assumes 
her story is a consequence of her shame, which eats away at her like her cancer. Seen 
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in this light, Mrs Curren's "crabbed" writing, her cancer-ridden writing, is her 
shameful writing, her confession. In this regard, it is significant that Mrs Curren 
associates truth with the pain caused by her cancer and the pain of the death that will 
inevitably follow: 
There is no truth but the shock of pain that goes through me when, in an 
unguarded moment, a vision overtakes me of this house, empty, with sunlight 
pouring through the windows on to an empty bed, or of False Bay under blue 
skies, pristine, deserted - when the world I have passed my life in manifests 
itself to me and I am not of it. My existence from day to day has become a 
matter of averting my eyes, of cringing. Death is the only truth left. Death is 
what I cannot bear to think. At every moment when I am thinking of 
something else, I am not thinking death, am not thinking the truth. 
(23) 
Mrs Curren here admits to not being able to face death. It is unbearably painful to 
conceive ofthe absence ofthe self. Because of its irreducible alterity, death cannot be 
properly thought. Yet it must be thought, because it is truth. Death here appears as 
the transcendent unthought which, nonetheless, cannot be avoided. Avoiding thinking 
death is avoiding thinking truth. In view of the discussion above of 'looking away' 
and 'averting' the gaze towards the other, it is significant that Mrs Curren makes clear 
that she tries to avoid the absolute alterity of death by "averting my eyes". Death, in 
its absolute alterity, cannot be represented and contained. Instead, in looking at death 
one cannot but look away, a paradoxical process again reminiscent of Mrs Curren's 
'crab's-walk'. Mrs Curren can face death only by, quite literally, not facing it. 
It is also significant that "averting my eyes" is here juxtaposed with 
"cringing". Mrs Curren cringes, presumably in fear and trembling, from the truth of 
death. Yet there is also the suggestion here of shame. If Age of Iron is a confessional 
narrative, it is, by equal measure, an attempt at coming to terms with otherness. This 
much can be inferred from Mrs Curren's various confrontations with otherness, as 
noted above with reference to various critics' categorising of Age of Iron as a novel 
which 'stages' otherness, be it the otherness of other humans (such as Vercueil, 'John' 
and Bheki, suffering in the townships) or of cancer and death. In the novel, Mrs 
Curren must come to terms with and learn to bear the truth of her death. Given the 
importance ofthe confessional nature of this narrative, with its various expressions of 
shame, the word "cringing" suggests not only shame but also a link between otherness 
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and confession. It seems there is something shameful about the averting of eyes, the 
cringing in the face of otherness. 
Yet this leaves one with the question of just how otherness is to be faced. If 
eyes are to be 'averted' in order to preempt the gaze of possession and control, but 
such a procedure is simultaneously shameful, as is suggested in the passage above, 
then the self is, indeed, caught in an ironic double bind. This point would, possibly, 
further substantiate my earlier claim that the representation of otherness cannot be 
forgone. In short, the suggestion here seems to be that the gaze at the other must 
continue while not continuing, that the confrontation with otherness entails a looking 
at and looking away at one and the same moment. This impossible procedure could, 
in terms of my consideration of irony in this thesis, be characterised as ironic. 
In practical terms, Mrs Curren's answer to the quandary of facing the other 
without reducing its otherness seems not to be to forgo representing that otherness, 
but to represent it without representing it. In Marais's terminology, "through 'writing 
with eyes shut', Coetzee seems to suggest that it is possible to draw the other in 
fiction without foreclosing on it" {1998: 51). Coetzee's is an "aesthetic that draws the 
other and thus attempts to expose the reader to alterity during the literary encounter" 
(1998: 56). This 'drawing' of the other, which I take to be the representation of the 
other without representing it, without making it present and thus attempting to reduce 
its otherness, is enabled, if at all, in Age of Iron by means of the various self-reflexive 
othering strategies to be found in this novel, one of which I have attempted to discuss 
at some length (the expressions of shame and shame about shame). 36 Of course, this 
'impossible' attempt to represent and not represent otherness is painful in the extreme. 
It is no simple solution: facing the other (or rather, being faced by the other) is an 
extremely disturbing event.37 
It is therefore highly significant that Mrs Curren associates writing with pain 
(that is, the pain caused by her cancer, something vividly described in the course of 
the novel [cf. 9, 66, 169]) or, put even more strongly, acknowledges that writing and 
pain go together: " ... without pain no writing: a new and terrible rule" (159). Mrs 
Curren has to experience pain in order to write because she cannot write when she has 
taken pills against the pain. Only when she has taken pills can she escape the pain 
associated with her condition, yet "when I have taken the pills, nothing is terrible any 
more, everything is indifferent, everything is the same" (159). The pills, that is, have 
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the effect of reducing otherness. It is not only the otherness of invasive pain which is 
reduced, but otherness as such. When she has taken pills against the pain, Mrs Curren 
experiences the 'indifference' she associates with the 'ordinary' (cf 109ff.). This 
indifference is, quite literally, against difference: it reduces "everything" to "the 
same". The pills which result in this indifference are "like smoke-flares. I swallow 
them and they release a fog inside me, a fog of extinction. I cannot take the pills and 
go on with the writing" (159). 
One might note, however, that there is also another kind of writing presented 
in the novel, a writing which makes no sense and of which Mrs Curren cannot 
recognise herself as the author. The pills not only reduce otherness by making 
"everything . . . the same", but also enforce a confrontation with otherness for the 
reason that they cause Mrs Curren to hallucinate. The hallucinations she experiences, 
as a result of the Diconal she takes, on one occasion result in a new kind of writing 
which Mrs Curren explicitly associates with otherness: "Once I came to myself facing 
the wall. In my hand was a pencil, its point broken. All over the wall were sprawling, 
sliding characters, meaningless, coming from me or someone inside me" (167). 
The point here is not only that, ultimately, there is no escaping otherness. On 
the one hand Mrs Curren's writing is rendered impossible by the pills, while, on the 
other hand, the kind of writing which does result from them is a writing without sense. 
This is to say that the "sprawling, sliding characters" produced by Mrs Curren "or 
someone inside me" - in itself possibly a reference to the otherness of cancer within 
her, as suggested in the novel by means of comparisons of the cancer with, for 
instance, "a child inside that I cannot give birth to. Cannot because it will not be 
born. Because it cannot live outside me" (75)- is an absolutely other writing. This 
would tie in, of course, with the Levinasian notion that the other 'is' transcendent, 
unknowable and meaningless. Such a writing is an other writing, a writing which 
does not allow its otherness to be reduced. It does not mediate meaning. But it also 
does not enable commerce with the other because it falls outside the economy of the 
same. If Age of Iron consisted of such writing, it would be unreadable. It might have 
offered otherness, but one would not have read it. Instead of such a writing, what we 
do find in Age of Iron is representational discourse which can make sense and offers 
otherness yet which attempts ironically to disrupt that sense of otherness. The novel 
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is at once constituted by the attempt to render otherness and the attempt to render that 
rendering problematic. 
In terms of my argument in this chapter, that confession is the nexus of irony 
and otherness in Age of Iron, one might claim that Mrs Curren's confessional 
narrative offers a face to otherness and simultaneously de-faces that face by drawing 
attention to the problematic nature of the confession, including the possibility of 
absolution subsequent to a completion of the confession which remains deferred. In 
order to deal with her shame, her cancer, her pain, Mrs Curren must write and confess. 
To this extent, as I have argued, her shame and cancer enable the existence of the 
novel. But the fact that there is always more shame to confess, prolongs the 
confession and therefore the possibility of confessing more, and so on. This sideways 
nature of confession is its 'crab's-walk'. 
This notion is related to the idea with which this chapter commenced, namely 
that Mrs Curren lives on in the text of the novel. I would therefore now like to tum to 
the final section of this chapter, in which I more closely consider the status of Mrs 
Curren's textual survival vis-a-vis confession. If Mrs Curren does survive textually, 
in Age of Iron, one might ask oneself whether this is as a result of her confession 
having been completed, thus leading to an afterlife in absolution, in a state of grace. 
If this is the case, then those critics who consider the novel to end on a positive note, 
with Mrs Curren's salvation, will have been correct in their assessment of the novel. 
Writing in this novel is associated not only with cancer and shame (as 
indicated), but also with life. Not only does Mrs Curren associate her life and her 
afterlife, as I argued above, with the text she is writing, but with reference to her 
contemplated suicide she makes the point that, "For as long as the trail of words 
continues, you know with certainty that I have not gone through with it: a rule, 
another rule. Death may indeed be the last great foe of writing, but writing is also the 
foe of death" ( 1 06). 
6.5 The Confessor(s) and the End of Confession 
As noted above (6.3), otherness is part and parcel of the confessional project, if only 
for the reason that confession makes a totalising demand on the confessant' s 
compulsion to confess everything. As a result, as Coetzee (1992: 291) notes vis-a-vis 
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Dostoevsky, "the self cannot tell the truth of itself to itself and come to rest without 
the possibility of self-deception". But otherness is also an important component of 
the confessional procedure on another level: the confession of the confessant requires 
an other to whom the confession is made. Every confession requires an auditor: 
The confession is a ritual of discourse in which the speaking subject is also the 
subject of the statement; it is also a ritual that unfolds within a power 
relationship, for one does not confess without the presence (or virtual 
presence) of a partner who is not simply the interlocutor but the authority who 
requires the confession, prescribes and appreciates it, and intervenes in order 
to judge, punish, forgive, console, and reconcile. . . . [The] agency of 
domination does not reside in the one who speaks (for it is he who is 
constrained), but in the one who listens and says nothing; not in the one who 
knows and answers, but in the one who questions and is not supposed to know. 
(Foucault 1980: 61-62) 
The figure of the confessor thus presupposes a power relation. If the subject of the 
confession subjects herself to herself, and thus enacts the doubling of consciousness 
discussed above, then s/he also subjects herself to the power of the other to whom the 
confession is addressed and who would be empowered "to judge, punish, forgive, 
console, and reconcile". The various figures who may act as confessor(s) to Mrs 
Curren therefore bear closer scrutiny. 
At least two figures are explicitly identified as confessors in Age of Iron. The 
first of these is Vercueil, while the second is Mrs Curren's daughter. The fact that 
Age of Iron is presented as a letter addressed to her daughter, and that the novel is a 
confessional narrative, places Mrs Curren's daughter in the position of confessor to 
her mother. 
If the addressee of this text, namely Mrs Curren's daughter, is implicitly 
placed in the position of the confessor, then this means that, by extension, the reader 
of the novel is also placed in this position. This point bears on Marais's view, 
discussed above (6.4), that the reader becomes involved in the text and in a sense 'co-
authors' it in constructing its end. As I argued there, the text demands respect for its 
otherness. But this respect for the otherness of the text also entails the subversion of 
the authority of the reader: the reader cannot impose her reading on the text, and thus 
loses a degree of authority and autonomy herself. That is, as necessarily lacking 
competence the reader cannot be in the position to grant Mrs Curren absolution and 
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redemption. The implication of this is that the reader, as a confessor to Mrs Curren, 
lacks the competence to absolve her, an idea which would tie in with the infinite 
responsibility the self has to and for the other (be the other the text, Mrs Curren, 
Vercueil, Bheki, or 'John'). 
The reader must be responsible for the other: for the text s/he reads, but also 
for Mrs Curren herself. Marais thus implicitly casts the reader in the role of confessor 
to Mrs Curren for, as he puts it, the self-reflexivity of the text amounts to "a 
transferral of authorial responsibility to the reader" (1993: 23). This has the 
consequence of placing the responsibility for Mrs Curren's salvation (in textual terms) 
on the reader, who must co-determine the ending of the novel. Marais (1997: 301) 
notes that the epistolary mode of the novel foregrounds its performative dimension 
and continues by pointing out that the relationship between Mrs Curren and her 
daughter, the "writer-surrogate in the novel and the reader-surrogate in the novel[,] 
mirrors the actual relationship between Coetzee and his reader". But Mrs Curren's 
relationship with her daughter also "reflects her relationship with Vercueil" (Marais 
1997: 301), which means too that the absence of Mrs Curren's daughter is stressed?8 
Indeed, according to Marais, Mrs Curren's daughter "increasingly assumes the status 
of an absence in the novel" (Marais 1997: 301). The confessor is not only, nor 
necessarily, Mrs Curren's daughter (the apparently intended reader), but also any 
reader of the novel. As such, the text figures alterity in the absence of the confessor 
as reader. But even if this alterity is, by implication, figured, the text does not allow 
for it to be figured finally for the reason that such alterity is potentially infinite. The 
text figures as many others as will read it. Moreover, the text performs a doubling 
movement which figures the alterity of the self who reads: as such, Age of Iron 
confronts the reader with her otherness, thrust as s/he is into the role of confessor to 
Mrs Curren. 
If one investigates more closely the role of the confessor in Age of Iron it 
becomes clear that doubt is cast on the ability of the confessor to grant absolution 
which would lead to salvation (in textual terms or otherwise). At any rate, the point 
for which I would like to argue in concluding this chapter, is that the undecidability 
which I claimed above characterises this novel, and which is implicit (but to my mind 
not articulated fully enough) in Marais's characterisation ofreaderly responsibility, is 
necessarily a function of the novel's attempt to respect otherness. Part of this attempt 
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lies in the way attention is self-reflexively drawn in the text to the problematic nature 
of Mrs Curren's confessional narrative, as I have spent the bulk of this chapter 
arguing. Another problematic part of her confession pertains to the status of her 
confessor. 
This much is clear in the portrayal of Vercueil, as discussed above (cf. 6.1, 
6.4). This character is not only analogous to the text (as I have indicated Marais 
convincingly shows) but is also a confessor figure. In a passage discussed at some 
length above (6.4), Mrs Curren casts Vercueil as confessor to her when she says "this 
is the one to whom I speak my heart, whom I trust with last things" (74). The relation 
between Mrs Curren and Vercueil becomes ever closer, even to the extent that Mrs 
Curren calls this "Mr V" (75) her "shadow husband" (174) and herself"Mrs V'' (174). 
She has, of course, from the start entrusted the "Private papers" (28), the text of the 
novel, to him; that is, she has entrusted her confession to him, which makes him not 
only the bearer of the confession but, as she acknowledges, the confessor too: "He, Mr 
V, to whom I speak. Speak and then write. Speak in order to write" (75). Seen in 
this light, the phrase "last things" refers not only to the delivery of the letter to her 
daughter, but also to the very important last thing to be done before death, namely to 
confess (cf Coetzee 1992: 284). 
If Mrs Curren is to confess to Vercueil, and gain absolution, then Vercueil 
must be a competent confessor. But this is a matter of some uncertainty in the novel. 
In an important passage Mrs Curren engages in a confession directly addressed to 
Vercueil, but also to her daughter and therefore, by extension, to the reader: 
'It is a confession I am making here, this morning, Mr Vercueil,' I said, 
'as full a confession as I know how. I withhold no secrets. I have been a good 
person, I freely confess to it. I am a good person still. What times these are 
when to be a good person is not enough! ... 
A deep groan came from Vercueil's throat. I craned over, but all I 
could see was the stubble on his cheek and a hairy ear. 'Mr Vercueil!' I 
whispered. He did not stir. Asleep? Pretending to sleep? How much had 
passed him by unheard? Had he heard about goodness and heroism? About 
honour and shame? Is a true confession still true if it is not heard? Do you 
hear me, or have I put you to sleep too? 
(150-151) 
Apart from being an important passage in terms of relating confession and shame, this 
passage also, crucially, casts Vercueil as confessor. Moreover, the authority of the 
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confessor is cast in doubt, as he has fallen asleep. The result is that the status of the 
confession as truth is also made uncertain, as indicated by Mrs Curren's question: "Is 
a true confession still true if it is not heard?" And most importantly, the figures of 
Vercueil, Mrs Curren's daughter, and the reader overlap in Mrs Curren's question: 
"Do you hear me, or have I put you to sleep too?" 
What this passage suggests is not necessarily that Mrs Curren's confession is 
invalid, but that its adequacy is uncertain, indeed undecidable. There is the possibility 
that the confession may be adequate (and that it may therefore lead to the truth, to 
absolution, and to salvation), but there is also the possibility that the opposite may 
happen. 39 It is this undecidability which I think must be maintained in Age of Iron, as 
is suggested by the explicit putting in question of the confessor figures in the passage 
above, something which strengthens the argument made in this chapter that Mrs 
Curren's confession might not be adequate as articulated in her expressions of shame 
and shame about shame. 
The consequence of the uncertain status of Mrs Curren's confession is simply 
to disrupt the face it posits for the other. That is, the prosopopoeia that is Age of Iron 
cannot but offer a face to what has none, but this face is self-consciously, self-
reflexively disrupted. The disruption of this face, as it appears in this confessional 
narrative, suggests that the face is posited, that it is given, and that it must not be 
taken as the other. It is a representation of the other which conceptualises that other 
and therefore must be interrupted continually, ironically. 
Considered in these terms, the enigmatic ending of the novel must remain 
enigmatic if the otherness of the text and indeed of Mrs Curren and V ercueil, is to be 
respected. The enigma may not be reduced to a particular reading with its particular 
stance with regard to the novel's 'optimism', Mrs Curren's 'salvation', or Vercueil's 
'angelic' nature. One can perhaps infer that Mrs Curren gets Vercueil to kill her: just 
before the end she says it is high time "to put an end to this sorry story" (179), the 
story of and as her life. She adds: "Not that I doubt Vercueil would help". That Mrs 
Curren makes a decision to end her life with Vercueil's help is, furthermore, 
suggested by her calling up her daughter "to say goodbye" (180). But such a reading 
is subject to uncertainty: it is possible that Mrs Curren simply feels that the end is 
nigh, that when she implies Vercueil will help her put an end to the "sorry story" she 
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simply means he will help with "last things" (179) in general. Possibly Mrs Curren 
gains absolution from the angelic Vercueil. On the other hand, possibly she does not. 
This would seem to be suggested by the chilling final sentence: "From that 
embrace there was no warmth to be had" (181). Vercueil's embrace seems to suggest, 
if anything, damnation rather than deliverance. One might further speculate what it 
means that Mrs Curren says "For the first time I smelled nothing" ( 181 ). It would, for 
instance, be possible to relate this enigmatic sentence to the text's meta-
representational consideration of aesthetics, especially because the absence of sense 
implies an-aesthesia. If aesthetics implies awareness and perception, as its etymology 
suggests, then Mrs Curren's pills are literally anaesthetics which blunt the senses and 
lead to indifference. As I showed above (6.4), significantly the pills are shown to 
oppose writing because they desensitise Mrs Curren. At one point Mrs Curren 
speculates, in terms of the pills she takes to lessen the pain, about what it would feel 
like to die: "Must one die in full knowledge, fully oneself? Must one give birth to 
one's death without anaesthetic?" (129). The fact that Mrs Curren smells nothing 
would suggest that one may in fact die 'with' anaesthetic, that death anaesthetises: 
incomprehensibly, at the moment of death it would be possible to smell nothing. This 
nothing might be the nothing that is death, which in itself would suggest that after life 
there is nothing, that no absolution and certainly no redemption or resurrection is 
possible. 
Whatever plausible ending one might construct, the novel culminates, as 
Attridge (1994: 252) notes, "in a final sentence that is beyond all letter-writing". This 
would also apply to the penultimate sentence, which would seem to be a description 
by the self of the death of the self: "He took me in his arms and held me with mighty 
force, so that the breath went out of me in a rush". Elsewhere, Attridge (1994a: 69) 
elaborates as follows on the final sentences of the novel: " ... we cannot be sure 
whose allegory this is, Mrs. Curren's in a letter to her daughter or Coetzee's in a 
sentence that abandons the conceit of the continuously written letter, nor exactly what 
is being allegorized in the final, hardly triumphant coldness". That Mrs Curren dies 
just prior to the end of the novel is, textually speaking, problematic and in itself 
should underscore that any attempt at determining the ending of the novel must be 
questionable. As Attridge points out, it is not possible to determine whose this last 
sentence is. It might be, impossibly, Mrs Curren's, for it forms part of her letter. Yet, 
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after all, in the previous sentence the breath has gone out of her "in a rush", which 
would seem to indicate this is not her sentence. It might be Coetzee's, or some other 
narrator's sentence, but there is no unambiguous indicator in the novel which would 
allow one to decide once and for all to whom the sentence belongs. 40 
The ending of Age of Iron is an enigma and, I would claim, must remain so. 
This means that this ending must remain unread even as it is read, and that any 
account of it must be unread, as I have attempted to do here. 
6.6 Notes 
1 Numbers in brackets refer to Coetzee (1991). 
2 Very little critical work has been done on the confessional status of Age of 
Iron. Apart from scattered observations, only two studies have appeared 
which devote more than cursory attention to this aspect of the text (see 
Robinson 1992, Whittick 1996). However, neither of these studies considers 
confession in terms of the approach I follow in this chapter: as constituting the 
nexus between irony and otherness. This is an approach to the text which has 
not to my knowledge been followed. 
3 The word 'election' here is ambiguous, as it might connote both being chosen 
(the reading Gallagher seems to favour in terms of election as predestination) 
or choosing. It would be possible to argue that Mrs Curren and Vercueil 
mutually elect or choose each other. But, equally, one might argue that a 
'mutual election' - in being mutual - complicates the notion of choice: one 
elects as much as one is elected. That is, the ambiguity of 'election' allows for 
a reading of the relation between Mrs Curren and Vercueil as being an 
ambiguous one in which it is not possible to decide, finally, who has chosen 
and who has been chosen. As my argument below should make clear, I prefer 
this latter approach. 
4 In this regard, see Marais (1997; 1998), who argues in Levinasian terms that 
"Mrs Curren is unable to metamorphose Vercueil because she is possessed by 
his alterity. Her attempt to transform him is interrupted by her encounter with 
the infinity of his otherness, and this enables love, that is, a movement of 
infinition from same to other" (1997: 297; my emphasis). 
I need, at the start of this chapter, to acknowledge my indebtedness to 
Marais's work. His Levinasian reading of Coetzee, in particular of Age of 
Iron, is exemplary. If I reach different conclusions it is because my focus is 
different: this study is not engaged in an attempt to read Coetzee (or other 
novels) in Levinasian terms, but to approach irony from within a Levinasian 
conception of otherness, and to investigate the way such an approach may be 
used to examine the novelistic staging of otherness. Where I disagree with 
Marais's understanding of Levinas this is perhaps as a result of my greater 
insistence on undecidability, uncertainty and unpredictability, something 
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which is apparent in an understanding of irony as constituting an infinite 
interruption, an interruption also of interruption which offers no univocal 
grace or absolution but, on the contrary, serves to disturb the self and the same 
without disturbing them. Similarly, my focus is more on the disruption of 
systems of cognition - including of reading - than it is on presenting a cogent 
framework such as a 'Levinasian aesthetic' from which to approach Coetzee's 
work. In short, Marais throughout suggests a quite deliberate effort on 
Coetzee's part to stage otherness in Levinasian terms (cf. 1997: 289; 1997: 
295-296; 1997: 307-308; 1997: 324; 1997: 328) in order, as he puts it 
elsewhere (1998: 48), to allow the novel to 'rival' rather than 'supplement' 
history and thus to "inscribe a relation to the other that falls outside the sphere 
of mastery". This leads Marais to the crucial insight that Coetzee, by means of 
a 'Levinasian aesthetic', "in all of his novels, endeavours to represent not 
otherness, but the way in which otherness is routinely foreclosed upon by 
attempts to represent it" (Marais 1998: 48). My approach here, on the other 
hand, does not suggest a conscious (authorial) deployment of irony in Age of 
Iron (nor, for that matter, in Life at Home or Kikoejoe). This is of course not 
to put in question either the validity of Marais's modus operandi or his 
conclusions, but to indicate their difference from mine. 
5 This seems to me to be a worthwhile, indeed urgent, point to explore, but one 
which I cannot pursue here at great length as this thesis is not primarily 
concerned with 'embodied' - for instance gendered or ethnic - others (see 
Chapter 3 note 3). Despite this proviso, I do below touch on Parry's concerns 
in terms of my consideration of authority and representation. See Brink 
(1996) for a consideration of the problematic nature of the idea that the self 
cannot and should not write as (or about) the other. According to Brink, a 
prohibition on the "presumption" to speak in the voice of another "would 
impose on the writer the literary and existential equivalent of the politics of 
apartheid" (1996: 13). Brink further justifies his position by arguing for a 
"faithful" rendering of the lives and utterances encountered. In addition, the 
suppression of voices "would have been yet another form of betrayal - that of 
history itself' (1996: 17). History calls for the responsible rendering of the 
other. In this respect, my position in this thesis would seem to approach 
Brink's: that the responsible representation of the other is called for, that the 
'presumption' of attributing thoughts and words is inevitable in fiction. The 
point I make in this chapter is precisely that such representation at once takes 
place and is interrupted ironically in Mrs Curren's confession. Brink does 
qualify the position sketched above by noting that the appropriation of voice 
involves issues of power "in a society where women are denied a voice, a male 
speaks 'on behalf or the silenced, or when in a racist context a white 
appropriates the voice of a black" (1996a: 9-10). See also note 7, below. 
6 See Coetzee' s comments on "anti-illusionism" and realism in an interview 
with David Attwell (1992d: 27ff.). 
7 See note 57, Chapter 4 (above), for a consideration of the attribution in fiction 
of thought, as well as speech, to others, in particular through free indirect 
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discourse. In terms of my consideration of Mrs Curren's attribution of 
thoughts to 'John' ("In his lap he holds the pistol that, for this interval, keeps 
the hunters at bay, that was his and Bheki 's great secret, that was going to 
make men of them. . . . His mouth is dry but he is not afraid' (159; my 
emphasis), an attribution which is interrupted as it is posited, one might argue 
that van Heerden's strategy of interrupting his conceptualisations of otherness 
is less clearly evident, and perhaps less successful than Coetzee's in Age of 
Iron. 
8 Marais's claim relating to the absolution of the self seems problematic, framed 
as it is in Levinasian terms. His argument is that "the writing self is liberated 
from ontological solitude by the replacement of the 'I am I' with the 'I am 
for"' (1997: 303). Even though Levinas's philosophy as regards freedom is 
not ofprime importance in this thesis, I did indicate (Chapter 3, 3.2.1, 3.2.2.1) 
that Levinas suggests a link between on the one hand Western philosophy 
understood as ontology and, on the other hand, freedom. When writing that 
"the writing self is liberated from ontological solitude", Marais seems to be 
suggesting that the self is liberated from freedom itself But, as his next 
sentence confirms, ethical responsibility is all but liberatory: "Structured as 
responsibility, he [the writing subject] is now subjected to the reader-as-other" 
(Marais 1997: 303; my emphasis). The infinite responsibility of self to other 
can never be transcended, thus binding the self to her or his responsibility for 
the other into all eternity (cf Llewellyn 1991: 22). The death ofthe self does 
not end the responsibility of the self for the other ( cf Llewellyn 1991: 54). 
Put in simple terms, the supporter of apartheid (whether as leader- such as 
Verwoerd- or follower) still bears responsibility towards others for apartheid. 
Death does not absolve one of responsibility. 
9 Even if one were to argue that delivery has indeed occurred - after all, here the 
novel is, in the reader's hands - this delivery is nonetheless veiled in 
uncertainty for Mrs Curren, which means that she has to trust Vercueil. This 
must imply, in turn, that the outcome of her trust is uncertain. I discuss the 
importance of the notion of 'trust' in Age of Iron below (6.4.1). See also note 
17. 
10 See Robinson (1992) for a useful theoretical introduction to confessional 
narrative. 
11 Perhaps it needs to be pointed out that I draw on Coetzee's essay on 
confession ("Confession and Double Thoughts: Tolstoy, Rousseau, 
Dostoevsky") for two reasons. The first reason is that it is, in its own right, an 
incisive, scholarly consideration of confession, in particular of secular 
confession. Secondly, of course, though one cannot draw parallels too closely 
in this regard, the essay does suggest a degree of continuity with regard to 
Coetzee's fictional work, something underscored by the discussion of Age of 
Iron by Coetzee and Attwell in the interview in Doubling the Point which 
immediately precedes "Confession and Double Thoughts". On a 
terminological note, I follow Coetzee's usage in his essay. As Coetzee 
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explains, "I use the term confessor to denote the one to whom the confession is 
addressed and the term confessant for the one who confesses" (1992: 419 note 
5). 
12 This is a point already broached in the two preceding chapters (see 4.4, 5.8) 
but which, nonetheless, bears repeating here. Otherness is an inherent part of 
autobiography as narrative for the reason that narrative can never be total. 
Even though narrative exhibits a totalising tendency, and tends to 'flatten out' 
infinity by attempting to 'contain' it within itself, this tendency does not imply 
the successful negotiation of the truth. Rather, it amounts to suppressing the 
inherently fragmentary nature of narrative, in other words, that narrative does 
not tell the truth for the reason that it posits the truth. To this extent, truth is 
precisely that which eludes language. Similarly, I argue that narrative 
inevitably, and necessarily, posits a face for otherness. But this face, because 
it is posited, is not a face: it is a mask. Narrative as prosopopoeia thus does 
not reveal the other. This should not be taken to suggest that truth is 
equivalent to otherness. Nonetheless, to the extent that the other, like truth, 
always exceeds my representation of it, there does seem to be a certain 
analogy between these terms. 
13 I am assuming without further ado that Age of Iron, if it is a confessional 
narrative, is a secular confession. In this regard (and at the risk of being 
facile) one could cite Mrs Curren's view of heaven as entailing nothingness 
( cf 22, 27). This point could, in addition, be argued with reference to 
Coetzee's parodic rewriting ofDante (cf Hoegberg 1998). 
14 For the purposes of my argument I accept Foucault's distinction between a 
scientia sexua/is and an ars erotica without examining in greater detail its 
feasibility. Even if the distinction were to be problematic, I do not believe that 
my point here depends on this distinction. It seems to me that the essential 
point Foucault makes is that a secularised Western society attempts to exercise 
control over the subject by means of, among other things, the injunction to talk 
about sex. On the face of it the distinction seems to be rather straightforward. 
Whether Foucault is historically or culturally speaking correct is a matter of 
documentary evidence. He does mention (1980: 70) that an ars erotica has 
always been part of the tradition to which he ascribes the practice of scientia 
sexualis. Here he refers to 'mystical' experiences (possession, ecstasy). 
Another way of thinking about it is that scientia sexualis might actually 
function as a kind of ars erotica in the West, with the "production of truth" 
creating its own "intrinsic pleasures" (1980: 71). I am indebted to Herselman 
Hattingh for some of these points. 
15 Foucault does qualify this everything by noting that the terms in which the 
confession was rendered might be said historically to have become more 
limited. After the Council of Trent, the Catholic pastoral prescribed an 
avoidance of the kinds of intimate details which had earlier been called for so 
as to render a full confession, such as "description of the respective positions 
of the partners, the postures assumed, gestures, places touched, caresses, the 
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precise moment of pleasure - an entire painstaking review of the sexual act in 
its very unfolding" (1980: 19). Foucault notes that, while "Discretion was 
advised" and "while the language may have been refined, the scope of the 
confession ... continually increased" (1980: 19; my emphasis). 
16 In addition, in keeping with Coetzee's extended discussion of confession (and 
with this thesis as a whole), my use of the phrase 'consciousness of non-
consciousness' (rather than, say, 'consciousness of the unconscious') 
constitutes a further attempt on my side to steer clear of psychoanalytic 
terminology. 
17 This uncertainty is surely a crucial element of Age of Iron, and may be linked 
to the question of trust, which I discuss in much more detail below. Mrs 
Curren must trust Vercueil because she cannot trust him, and the author 
(whether the fictional author, Mrs Curren, or the real one, Coetzee) must trust 
her text because she cannot trust it. Trust is conditional upon uncertainty. 
18 This claim could be substantiated initially with reference to Marais's (1997: 
280) argument that "there is a very close analogy, even identification, between 
self and text" in Age of Iron. Marais relates this identification to Mrs Curren's 
desire to redeem herself, which link, I would claim, confirms the "meta-
representational debate" (Marais 1997: 280; cf. 300ff.) as well as the 
confessional status of the novel. Marais discusses the importance of Mrs 
Curren's attempts at self-redemption, the first of which is her plan to set 
herself alight in front of the Houses of Parliament. As an attempt at self-
redemption this act suggests a confessional undertone. 
19 In this regard, it might also be significant that Mrs Curren is, on the most 
literal level possible, shamed by street children (in their way also children of 
iron) when they grope at her, searching for valuables, while she urinates where 
she lies (144-145). 
20 That it would not achieve anything or make any difference, is suggested by 
Mrs Curren's dream of Florence's indifference to her act ( cf 163-164). See 
Marais's discussions ofthis dream (1993: 9-13; 1997: 281-284). 
21 This claim is similar to Attridge's (cf. 1994: 244; 1994a: 69) contention that 
Coetzee's work stages otherness, and that an important strategy in this regard 
is the degree to which his texts, and in particular Age of Iron, resist the 
reduction of their otherness (cf 1994: 250). One needs to distinguish carefully 
between Attridge's claim that otherness is staged or performed in Coetzee's 
work (a claim with which I agree, and on which I elaborate below vis-a-vis the 
text's interruption of itself and consequent excession of the reader's attempt to 
comprehend finally and thus reduce the otherness of the text), and his claim 
that "the other is thematized" in Coetzee's work (Attridge 1994: 249; cf 
Attwell 1998: 167). The latter notion is problematic because the other cannot 
be thematised. On the contrary, the other escapes any attempt at being 
thematised. 
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22 One might note that the phrase "By indirection I find direction out" constitutes 
a reference to Hamlet (II.i.66): "By indirections find directions out". The line 
is spoken by Polonius in an exchange with his servant Reynaldo, advising the 
latter on how to go about gathering information about Laertes' activities in 
Paris (that is, by means of circumlocution). Polonius' injunction to Reynaldo 
to spy on Laertes is echoed in the King's later request that Rosencrantz and 
Guildenstem spy on Hamlet (II.ii.1 0-18). The reason for this request is 
"Hamlet's transformation" (II.ii.S), which is a result of his grief at his father's 
death, his anger at his mother's all too quick marriage to his uncle, the 
encounter with the Ghost (who asserts that Hamlet's uncle is his father's 
murderer), and his subsequent decision "To put an antic disposition on" 
(I.v.180). These references to Hamlet suggest a link between that play and 
Age of Iron, a link strengthened by further references to the play. Hamlet, in a 
confrontation with Polonius in which he appears mad, invokes the metaphor of 
a crab's-walk: "For yourself, sir, shall grow old as I am - if like a crab you 
could go backward" (II.ii. 202-204). In a confession to Vercueil, Mrs Curren 
says "I have no voice, and that is that. The rest should be silence" (149), 
alluding to Hamlet's dying words:" ... the rest is silence" (V.ii.363). 
Apart from the potentially rich suggestions with regard to authority and 
death, each of these characters (Hamlet and Mrs Curren) may be characterised 
as 'mad'. Mrs Curren imagines her daughter "poring over this letter, this 
confession, this madness" (178). It is striking that Mrs Curren here 
characterises her letter not only as a confession, but as "madness". Mrs 
Curren is elsewhere in the novel characterised as mad by a policewoman: 
"Sy's van haar kop af' (143) ("She's out of her mind"). This link between 
Mrs Curren's confession and madness is, arguably, strengthened by the 
references in the novel to Hamlet. 
It might be of interest to note here that Coetzee, via Foucault and 
Lacan, has recently published an essay on madness in Erasmus. Significantly, 
in this essay Coetzee considers The Praise of Folly as a "monologue of Folly 
[in which] Erasmus rehearses a well-established political role: that of the fool 
who claims licence to criticize all and sundry without reprisal, since his 
madness defines him as not fully a person and therefore not a political being 
with political desires and ambitions" (1996: 84). Coetzee claims that The 
Praise ofF olly "sketches the possibility of a position for the critic of the scene 
of political rivalry, a position not simply impartial between the rivals but also, 
by self-definition, off the stage of rivalry altogether, a nonposition" (1996: 
84). One might thus argue that what both Hamlet and Mrs Curren, each of 
whom is referred to as being mad (whether or not they consciously assume "an 
antic disposition"), attempt to do, is to transcend the politics of rivalry. In 
fact, politics is here characterised, via Girard, as a particular kind of madness, 
the madness of rivalry (cf 1996: 93ff., 106). In this regard, it is significant 
that Mrs Curren is shown to have severe misgivings about the implicitly 
rivalrous discourse of politics in her rejection of the injunction to say 'Yes' or 
'No', to choose for one or the other position. Her position, as a confession 
which is 'madness', is explicitly characterised as an attempt to move beyond 
the positions implied by 'Yes' and 'No': "I meant to go through with it: is that 
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the truth? Yes. No. Yes-no. There is such a word, but it has never been 
allowed into the dictionaries. Yes-no: every woman knows what it means as it 
defeats every man. 'Are you going to do it?' asked Vercueil, his man-eyes 
gleaming. 'Yes-no,' I should have answered" (106). Later, in a long 
monologue addressed to 'John', Mrs Curren decries the injunction to utter the 
'Yes' (in response to 'John's' presumed rejection of Mrs Curren's story- see 
below, note 35). There are many other words, words which are suppressed 
when one is only allowed to say 'Yes' or 'No' (132-133). 
Coetzee' s essay is of further interest because of its self-conscious 
examination of the ironic double bind within which one finds oneself - as 
Foucault does - when attempting to speak on behalf of madness (cf 1996: 
85ff.). In addition, the essay is notable for its hesitancy in characterising 
Erasmus's Folly as ironic (cf 1996: 84, 97). Only in so far as irony might be 
characterised as implying a hierarchy of knowledge - a position I have argued 
in this thesis is problematic- would I go along with Coetzee's hesitation: "To 
attribute irony to her [Moria], to call hero eiron, the dissembler, is to put her 
back in the position of the subject supposed to know .... " (1996: 97). As 
Coetzee himself writes in a subsequent endnote (1996: 249), "In the notion of 
the key that will unlock Erasmus's irony or paradox I detect an ambition to 
freeze it in a single, locked position". Irony, as I have argued in this thesis, 
does not amount to a nonposition. It is not possible, whether through madness 
or otherwise, to escape from the politics of rivalry (as Coetzee also notes: cf 
1996: 84). However, even if it is not possible not to take positions, it is 
possible not to take positions seriously. Not taking any particular position 
seriously does amount to taking a position vis-il-vis the politics of rivalry, and 
this position is one of (apparent) madness, a madness against the madness of 
rivalry (cf 1996: 93ff.). On irony and positionality, see Chapter 3 (in 
particular 3.3.2, above). 
23 Marais is here alluding to Coetzee's "The Novel Today" (1988£), in which he 
argues that the novel should 'rival' rather than 'supplement' history'. See also 
note 22 (above). 
24 See Chapter 3 (3.2.3, above). 
25 I have discussed some of the notions which follow in an earlier part of this 
thesis (5.3). My consideration of them here forms part of an attempt to link 
otherness to the singular text that is Age of Iron, in particular with regard to 
the problem of trust as it appears both in the text and with regard to it. While 
my discussion here thus considers the otherness of the literary text with regard 
to the trust of the reader, the earlier discussion attempted to make more 
general points about the link between strangeness and form. 
26 According to Attridge, Vercueil, because he is "outside any of the normal 
codes that govern interpersonal relations (which is also to say, outside the 
codes of the realist novel)", would seem to be "the least appropriate repository 
for anyone's trust" (1994a: 62). 
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27 As Attridge (1994: 250) notes, this is the case even though Age of Iron is 
Coetzee's apparently most 'realistic' text to date, as some critics have 
claimed, seizing on aspects such as its clearly specified locale and realist 
narrative techniques (cf Gallagher 1991: 193~ Macaskill and Colleran 1992: 
68~ Attwelll993: 120~ Norris Easton 1995: 586, 596). 
28 On Mrs Curren's lack of authority, see Attwell (1993: 121-122). 
29 The novel is saturated with classical references, and this footnote merely 
directs the reader to significant discussions of some of these references: 
Thucydides (cf 73fT.), Hesiod (cf Marais 1997: 277, 312), Virgil (cf 176; 
Gallagher 1991: 193, 196-197~ Marais 1997: 321; 1998: 51) and Dante (cf 
Roberts 1996; Hoegberg 1998). The Orpheus myth has received a full 
treatment vis-a-vis Blanchot from Marais (1997, 1998). 
30 That the issue of etymology is treated far from unambiguously by Coetzee 
should serve to support my argument here (that etymology enacts the positing 
and interruption of authority). Coetzee has expressed his suspicion of, if not 
disregard for, etymology, flatly claiming "Words do not bear their histories 
with them as part of their meaning" (1988b: 126). Yet, in an interview with 
Attwell (1992d: 340}, he has himself employed etymology to discuss the 
novel. 
31 See my consideration of names in terms of prosopopoeia (4.3, above). 
32 In view of my discussion of etymology, this association of writing. and cancer 
too would have to be treated with suspicion. 
33 Significantly, Mrs Curren also associates cancer with power, as is suggested in 
her following words to Vercueil: "Power is power, after all. It invades. That 
is its nature. It invades one's life" (107). Like cancer, power creeps into 
everything and takes over one's entire life. The fact that Mrs Curren 
associates power with cancer would strengthen the association between cancer 
and shame: it is precisely, the novel suggests, the political power of apartheid 
which is a major cause ofMrs Curren's shame. 
34 Mrs Curren not only associates her cancer with her writing, but also with 
language generally: "My true attention is all inward, upon the thing, the word, 
the word for the thing inching through my body" (36). She also associates it 
with reading. As she explains, she tries to avoid the word when reading: 
"When I read I read warily, jumping over lines or even whole paragraphs 
when from the comer of an eye I catch the shadow of the word waiting in 
ambush" (37). 
3 5 One might note that story here itself becomes a marker of otherness ("another 
story"~ my emphasis). This is borne out by Mrs Curren's claim that, when one 
is only allowed to say 'Yes' or 'No', otherness is suppressed in that "all the 
time you feel other words stirring inside you like life in the womb" (133). 
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36 This point would also reiterate that, as I noted, Marais (1997: 346) is correct in 
dismissing the possibility that the novel's ontogenetic anxiety may "simply be 
explained in terms of the tired, postmodemist trope of self-subversion through 
which the text draws attention to the conditions of its own impossibility". 
While indeed drawing attention, if not to its own impossibility then at least to 
the problematic nature of the possibility of its existence, then this serves self-
reflexively to cast doubt on and thus relativise its status as representation of 
otherness. 
37 Of course, as noted above (4.4), the other disturbs without disturbing. This is 
because the disturbance of the other is transcendent and cannot be brought 
within the purview of the self and her representing act: it escapes the gaze of 
the self even as the self gazes at the other. Such a disturbance, one might 
suggest, is even more disturbing than disturbance, for a disturbance which 
does not disturb disturbs even disturbance. 
38 This absence is explicitly figured in the novel through the namelessness of 
Mrs Curren's daughter, as I indicated above. 
39 In any event, the possibility of salvation and absolution is already radically put 
in question if confession is secularised, that is, in the absence of faith and 
grace (see my discussion of secular confession, above, 6.2). 
40 Similar uncertainty would, by implication, affect the dates quoted after (or at?) 




It remains briefly to summarise the most important points made in this study. 
It became apparent, in the course of Chapter 2, that there is little agreement on 
the politics of irony in critical discussions. Nevertheless, it also became clear that 
there is a definite link between irony and otherness. 
Chapter 3 attempted to offer a consideration of Emmanuel Levinas' s 
conception of ethics in terms of his understanding of the other as face and trace. In 
this chapter, I attempted to situate Levinas's work with regard to phenomenology and, 
in this way, to offer a summary of his view of otherness. The dilemma of respecting 
the other appeared of particular importance here. The tendency of language to 
foreclose on otherness by reducing it must be interrupted, while otherness must, 
nonetheless, be Said. The chapter concluded with an attempt to relate Levinas's 
conception of otherness - as the interruption of conceiving of otherness - to Paul de 
Man's conception of irony as permanent parabasis. This attempt is marked by the 
consideration of the relation between irony and otherness in terms of the tropes of 
prosopopoeia and catachresis. If the other has no face (because the face would have 
been posited), then the face of the other would amount to a mask, a reduction of the 
other by the same. This face-as-mask must be interrupted if the other's otherness is to 
be respected. That is, any representation of the other must be interrupted continually. 
Any representation of the other is a prosopopoeia of otherness (in that it gives 
otherness a face) and therefore a catachresis (for the other has no face and must be 
given one). This last section of Chapter 3 concluded with the acknowledgement that it 
is not possible not to have a position, not to position oneself vi s-il-vis the other and, in 
the process, that it is not possible not to give to the other, prosopopeically, a face. But 
the task with which the self is faced is ironic in that it consists at once of positing and 
interrupting the face given to the other. 
In Chapter 4, van Heerden' s Kikoejoe was read as an attempt to do justice to 
the absolutely other by fragmenting the prosopopoeia of otherness. The novel was, 
that is, read as an allegory of the refusal to narrativise otherness and as being caught 
in the double bind of irony. 
Chapter 5 attempted to offer a reading ofMatlou's Life at Home, a text which 
formally disrupts the conceptualisations of the (South African farm) novel. This text 
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also exceeds the determinations evident in Njabulo Ndebele's celebration of it as a 
'rediscovery of the ordinary'. In its strange 'datedness', Life at Home involves the 
transportation of the reader and results in an 'alterity within' the reader. This alterity 
is also evident, if on a different level, in the depiction of the protagonist of the text. 
While the protagonist is lent a face where he - as black other on the farm - had none, 
this face is ironically disrupted in the refusal to close off the narrative. Life at home 
intimates an otherness at the heart of domesticity and exposes an otherness within the 
reader. 
The final chapter of this study considered J. M. Coetzee's Age of Iron, a text 
which is explicitly a prosopopoeia in that, in terms of the fictional contract, the 
narrator is dead. Here confession was postulated as the nexus of the relation between 
irony and otherness. The chapter attempted to indicate that any critical attempt to 
categorise Age of Iron as 'positive' or 'negative' is misplaced in that the novel's status 
is undecidable. The otherness of the text must be respected: its ending must be unread 
in being read. 
This study has attempted to indicate that there is, indeed, a clear link between 
irony and otherness. It has attempted to bracket the political in order to examine this 
relationship from the vantage point of Levinas's 'conception' of the other. If this 
study has considered irony in terms of Levi nasi an ethics, it is nonetheless not a study 
of the ethics of irony. The task remains to consider whether it is possible to approach 
irony ethically, or ethics ironically. And it would also be important to consider the 
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